THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER.

1877 1938

Founded by JAMES KNOWLES

1938 **JANUARY** No. 731. Vol. CXXIII.

LONDON: CONSTABLE & CO., LTD., ORANGE STREET, LEICESTER SQUARE, W.C. 2.

Registered for Canadian Magazine Post

Price Three Shillings, *Annual Subscription (Home and Abroad) 30/- post free*

U.S.A. and Canada, 75 cents. " " *U.S.A. and Canada $8.75*

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

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No. DCCXXXI—January 1938

THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath

'Collective security' is a typical example of the way in which actual tendencies and happenings in international relations crystallise as a slogan which, when faced with other conceptions, claims moral attributes, and exercises widespread influence as such. To people who endeavour to arrange international relations through large-scale combinations of States this technique appears to be a great advance over earlier methods. The origin of this slogan is, beyond all question, to be sought in the League of Nations, which was, of course, intended effectively to embody the principle of collectivity in international relations and cannot be considered apart therefrom. I am not, of course, concerned to explain why Germany left the League or to discuss its policy from the point of view of specific German interests. All that is now past history. I intend rather to invite attention once

more to certain basic points in the Statute of the League which are characteristic of the intention proclaimed at Geneva so to organise the nations that the all-important question of war and peace shall find its answer solely in the collective will of the nations.

It may be said that such a general discussion of the principles underlying the League of Nations is superfluous, as failure to realise these principles is nowadays a commonplace of international affairs, and few statesmen honestly believe that they will still succeed in bringing about a better realisation of the ideals which underlie the League. Indeed, in the course of a recent debate in the House of Commons a high authority frankly declared that the League was not in a position to carry out the function with which it was entrusted—namely, that of securing peace, that it afforded no guarantee against offensive wars and that it was therefore useless to continue to emphasise confidence in the methods of Geneva and in the will to make them effective. But the speaker qualified this gratifying admission by declaring that it was generally conceded that the principles underlying the League are in themselves right and that their failure in practice was primarily due to the fact that a number of powerful States do not belong to it. To attribute the failure of collective security to this circumstance seems to me to be a confusion between *post hoc* and *propter hoc*. That such arguments are still used, in spite of clear experience, shows that it is necessary to examine, once more, the fundamental aspects of this problem.

It is still easy to understand why, in 1919, mankind, shaken to its very depths by the war, welcomed the idea of a League of All States as a permanent guarantee for the peaceful settlement of all disputes and the suppression of all offensive wars, a confederation in which all were to stand for one, and one for all. What, however, is not so easy to understand is why the experts, and especially those representing neutral countries, did not immediately seize on and oppose with all their strength those points in the suggested constitution whose defects were even then clear. Even those who at that time were either unable or unwilling to give a full account of the plans of some of the victors must have seen, as lawyers, the limitations of the Statute of the League which so soon became apparent. In this connexion I only wish briefly to

refer—and it is a question here of things which everybody has known for a long time—to the following points which cannot be ignored in any estimate of the value, or lack of value, of the principle of collectivity.

The Covenant of the League prescribes a certain procedure for the peaceful settlement of all disputes, whether legal or political in origin, and whether of small importance or of vital interest to the nations concerned. It absolutely forbids States to have recourse to force in their own interests, however legitimate, before this procedure has been complied with. If people considered so radical a system possible, and honestly believed that it could be applied, was it not obvious that the procedure of the League should, from the outset, have been laid down along lines which, at least in theory, really guaranteed the parties concerned a binding and impartial settlement of their dispute, as well as a loyal execution of the decision? The Covenant affords no such guarantee; on the contrary, it does not exclude the possibility that one party to a dispute should refuse to carry out a settlement made in favour of the other, or even—especially in the most important cases—that a practical settlement should never be reached. In such a case the wronged party, after having sacrificed precious months upon the altar of organised peace, must, in order to preserve its rights, have recourse to its own resources without being able to call for the support of its fellow-members. The champions of the system have always declared that the delay involved by arbitration is in itself a powerful means of preventing war. The application of such an argument is, however, only justifiable when the plaintiff State obtains adequate and effective compensation for the often irreparable damage it has sustained, instead of the cold comfort that its behaviour has been in accordance with the Covenant of the League.

But that is not the most important point. What is the position as regards the body which, under the Covenant of the League, is called upon to settle international disputes? Could anyone really have believed that the Council of the League was suited for the *rôle* of impartial judge, seeing that the majority, both of permanent members, the representatives of the great Powers, as well as of non-permanent members, were bound, in most if not in all cases, to be interested

directly or indirectly in the matter under dispute and would therefore be acting as judge of their own cause? Moreover, what are the principles on which this body is to make its decisions? According to both letter and spirit of the Covenant it must always be guided by a scrupulous observance of the legal points in question, especially where treaties are concerned. The Covenant ignores the fact that every system of formal law must be subject to evolution, if it is not to stunt development of life. It disregards the truth that every organisation for peace which lays claim to completeness must always provide for an intelligent growth of law and, therefore, for a revision of treaties in keeping with the vital needs of the nations. Whatever is living is bound to grow: whatever has lost the power of growth has lost the power of adaptation and, in a changing world, must perish. The Covenant, indeed, contains in one carefully—almost furtively—phrased article a hint of such a need, but one destitute of any machinery which might make it effective.

I now come to the vital point in which the idea of collectivity was intended to find its clearest expression for, in spite of all the defects of the system of arbitration, its authors still thought that they could crown their peace system with a mutual guarantee of the territorial integrity of member States, backed by sanctions against so-called aggressors. Every signatory was pledged to the Covenant, whereunder every member State might be called upon to sacrifice vital interests and even to render military aid in order to prevent a dispute with which it had no concern, and which was perhaps not susceptible of friendly solution. That was to be the law; how and by whom the aggressor was to be named, and what would happen if opinion on the subject was not unanimous in the Council, was left out of account, nor was there any discussion, still less any decision, as to how the judgment of the League was to be carried into effect against a strong Power or group of Powers.

The Covenant indeed enshrines a promise of general disarmament, to achieve which should have been regarded as an indispensable preliminary in order to decide whether the rest of the Covenant was to be taken seriously or whether—as proved to be the case—it was destined to remain an empty promise.

If we consider the League of Nations to-day in the light of the succession of failures which have marked its development we find precisely what the circumstances surrounding the birth of this, the first and most comprehensive attempt to incorporate the conception of collectivity, had led us to expect. In the course of time it has become steadily clearer that the Powers which support and direct the Geneva institution have as their real aim, not the introduction of a rule of law corresponding to the true needs of justice and of international relations, but rather, under cover of such an ideal, the pursuit of particular interests. Because of these defects the Covenant promised to prove a convenient instrument for a policy which aimed at the preservation of the territorial *status quo* and the relative positions of victors and vanquished. But this combination of moral ideals, Utopian aims and Power politics has proved the undoing of the League in action, for reasons which we will now briefly touch upon so far as concerns the principle of collectivity and its various modifications.

The basic tendencies underlying the years of work by which men hoped to build up and secure the organisation of peace in the world soon became clear for all to see. Thus, though the famous Geneva Protocol of 1924 contained a complete draft for a treaty for the peaceful settlement of disputes between States, it laid down at the same time, as the leading principle, that *the treaties of 1919 must in all circumstances remain sacrosanct* and unaffected by the processes of evolution. At the same time every effort had been made to render possible the automatic functioning of sanctions in spite of the difficulties mentioned above. It foundered upon the rock of England's objections, but the trend of later endeavours of the leading statesmen in the League was in the same direction. Many Governments sought honourably and in good faith to achieve the effective organisation of international relations; they met with no success in the face of a group of Powers whose only concern was to use the machinery of Geneva in order to maintain the *status quo* and, in the event of hostilities, to ensure to their own forces the moral support and practical assistance of members of the League. It is instructive to follow the attempts made after the rejection of the Geneva Protocol to reintroduce the principle of collectivity under a

fresh guise. Since military sanctions, to the full extent visualised in the original plan—*i.e.*, with the co-operation of all powerful members of the League—were out of the question, 'regional pacts' became more and more popular in the councils of Geneva. The idea was that individual groups of States should, under the auspices of the Council of the League, conclude special treaties binding them to render immediate assistance to one another in the event of war. Such groups, however, were not to be formed on the purely geographical principles suggested by the expression 'regional pact.' Non-contiguous States could also adhere to such pacts if it served their political interests to do so.

The project of such regional pacts and the shape which they should take were long debated; draft treaties were prepared and there was no lack of pressing recommendations to adopt them. Such pacts, however, were never formed between the particular groups of States which the originators of the idea had in mind. While these deliberations were taking place at Geneva, in the world of actual international events the principle of collectivity progressed from failure to bankruptcy. In not one of the actual, concrete problems which presented themselves did it succeed in making any contribution towards a solution, in not one of the cases where hostilities had broken out was it able to do anything useful. The Disarmament Conference, where the idea of regional pacts received special prominence, was a miserable failure. Only in one case did the League make up its mind to apply the chief requisite of the principle of collectivity—namely, sanctions. It would have been much better, as has been justly said, if it had remained true to its traditions and stuck to speech-making. Nevertheless, even when the League's most faithful supporters could no longer speak of 'crisis,' but were compelled to utter the word 'failure,' the idea of regional pacts retained a certain vitality and, indeed, seems once more to be playing a considerable *rôle* in the course of current discussions at Geneva concerning League reform.

There is no reason why we in Germany should express any opinion on such plans. It is, however, of importance for us that the idea of regional pacts has, in recent years, also made its appearance outside the League. The slogan of collective

security has, indeed, been applied quite recently to regional pacts. The Government of Soviet Russia has for some time propagated these ideas, and has added to the vocabulary for Geneva, for its own private purposes, yet another slogan, ' the indivisibility of peace.'

It is easy to see the difficulties attendant upon an attempt to introduce a collective system of pacts embodying promises of assistance, even when such attempts were not universal but regional. Such a system of pacts, moreover, like the League's system of sanctions, is doomed to failure, when any strain is put upon it, unless supported by political combinations and interests which are alien from and external to its ostensible purpose. Even if the signatories, at a moment of crisis, should abide by the letter of the pact in spite of other combinations and interests, this could only be to the advantage of the more powerful partner, for one can hardly envisage a real protection for the weaker partner against the stronger.

Let us take as an illustration the plan for a so-called Eastern Pact with which Germany was confronted in the summer of 1934. Although the negotiations were at the time confidential, the draft and other important details have since then become generally known, and I need have no qualms in discussing it, especially as the project is no longer of importance. In so doing I shall pass over all points which were not typical of the idea of regional pacts, but which were merely connected with the peculiarities of this particular project.

The proposal was that Germany, Poland, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania should bind themselves to take counsel together in the case of a crisis and to render immediate military aid should one contracting party be attacked by another. Provision was also made that in the case of certain important disputes France should also take part both in the consultations and in rendering military aid. There is no difficulty in visualising the ambiguities and bickerings inherent in such an arrangement, especially in view of the nature of the relations which existed between the parties. If the Powers concerned were not unanimous as to which of the two parties to a dispute was the aggressor—a contingency for which no provision was made—either the smaller partners would have had to submit to the will of the

stronger or else form hostile groups among themselves, which would, of course, have meant a general war. Against any increase of security accruing to individual signatories must be set the resultant prejudice to the interests of States outside the pact. The result would not serve the interests of peace.

I am convinced that the same or similar objections would follow other attempts to apply so schematic a structure as a system of unconditional and mutual assistance to a comparatively big group of States. In favourable circumstances—that is, when they were really looked upon by all signatories as guarantees among equals—such projects would simply remain paper, *i.e.*, the increase in security would be in appearance only. In less favourable cases, however, they would in reality serve to camouflage and to strengthen alliances among certain partners to the disadvantage of others. I do not, of course, mean that the conclusion of various multilateral security pacts which also include military guarantees is politically impossible. Germany has, as is well known, willingly entered into negotiations for a new Western Pact to take the place of the Locarno Pact, though no public announcement can at the present moment be made concerning the stage reached in these negotiations, which are, for the time being, eclipsed by other and more pressing problems. Such a pact can only be contemplated when, as was the case with the kernel of the Locarno Pact, its scope is restricted to concrete and clearly defined possibilities, and when the extent of the obligations to be undertaken by the individual signatories is made quite clear from the very beginning. But it is quite a different case when the intention is, for instance, to apply to the Powers concerned an abstract scheme involving unlimited obligations to render assistance.

All experience shows that an effective organisation and combination of States is only possible in so far as it is directed solely towards the attainment of ends in which all the States concerned have the same interest. Abstract ideas of collectivity, the application of theoretical schemes to each and every problem and to each and every geographical area, are useless and hamper progress in international relations. For this reason the Government of the Reich have always maintained that each concrete international problem should be treated

ad hoc, that it is unnecessary to complicate things by combining it with other problems, and that a problem where two Powers only are concerned is best solved by direct negotiation between them. This method has served not only German interests but those of the nations as a whole; witness the German-Polish Agreement of January 1934 and the exchange of notes between Germany and Belgium last October. It is my considered opinion that such agreements have done more to ensure peace than all the projects built upon the principle of collectivity.

The Brussels Conference on developments in the Far East is a case in point. Germany was unable to accept the invitation to take part in this conference because it was intended to deal with the application of the provisions of what is known as the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, to which Germany was not a party. It followed, as a matter of logic, that she could not take part in any discussion concerning its application. In our reply to the invitation we made it quite clear, however, that Germany would always be prepared to co-operate in an attempt at mediation between Japan and China, provided that the indispensable pre-requisites for such an attempt were present and that it were made in a fitting manner. In this connexion I should like, without expressing any opinion as to the dispute itself, to suggest that it would be unfortunate if the attempts to end the dispute were inspired by the spirit of the resolution which the League recently passed on the subject. Incidentally, this resolution is but faintly tinged with the principle of collectivity. Whatever may be the rights and wrongs of the case, the Powers who wish to act as mediators between the two parties have no right to set themselves up as arbiters of morals.

One point I must emphasise in conclusion. We in Germany hear it said abroad that unconditional preference for the methods of collective security is synonymous with the will to peace and international co-operation, that to reject or even to criticise such methods is proof of the lack of desire for peace. We emphatically reject this false equation. If the adherents of the principle of collectivity will allow neither the experiences of the last twenty-odd years nor yet a sober consideration of actual possibilities to exercise any influence upon their opinion, they might at least cease to assert the

superiority of their morals and the greater rectitude of their intentions. They might even ask themselves, and explain to others, what actual results they have achieved with their plans. Personally, I can see none. The test of a policy which aims at peace is the degree of success achieved. Lofty ideals which are in practice unattainable are not merely valueless but dangerous.

KONSTANTIN VON NEURATH.

THE UNWANTED WORKER AND HIS TIME

By A. C. Richmond

For many years past a substantial proportion of the male population of this country have been unable to earn their living for shorter or longer periods. In those parts of the United Kingdom where industry has been most severely crippled large numbers of men have been reduced to living on unemployment money for three, five, and even more years.

In the year 1932 the average number of persons registered as being out of work was about 2,400,000, and it was this figure which was ordinarily mentioned in discussions about unemployment or references to it in public speeches and newspaper articles. But it is continually forgotten that this figure represents only the number of persons on the registers of the employment exchanges on any particular day. The individual men and women who are out of work change continually. Thus, the approximate number of separate individuals who suffered unemployment during the year 1932 was given in an article in the *Ministry of Labour Gazette* of January 1937 as no less than 5,900,000. But even this figure does not tell the whole story, for when a married man with a family is out of work his wife and his family suffer from the effects of a reduced income, and all that means, in a lower standard of living during the time that the head of the family is unemployed. Thus, it would hardly be excessive to add a further two or three millions in order to arrive at the total number of persons whose lives were seriously affected by unemployment during 1932. This brings us to a figure of somewhere about 8,000,000, or approximately one-fifth of the population of this country.

Since 1932 there has been a steady revival of industry and the figures for unemployment have improved, but even

last year the average number of persons claiming unemployment pay was 1,487,710, while the approximate number of separate individuals who experienced unemployment during the year amounted to over 4,000,000. Counting wives and children, the total number of people whose lives were affected by unemployment in 1936, when industry as a whole was comparatively prosperous, cannot have been less than 6,000,000, and was almost certainly more, and this figure will not be very much lower in 1937.

The average period during which people are unemployed varies from district to district and from trade to trade. In the coal industry as many as 25 per cent. of all the men employed are estimated to have been unemployed for a year or more.

Many workers experience separate spells of unemployment during a year varying from a day or two to several weeks, but the Ministry of Labour estimate that the average amount of unemployment experienced in the aggregate during a period of twelve months by persons who claimed benefit or assistance in 1936 was approximately one-third of a year Averages are, of course, apt to be misleading, and this particular average is weighted by the very long periods of unemployment—amounting to five or more years—suffered by large numbers of men formerly employed in the mining industry. Still, the fact remains that, in a year when there were more people employed than ever before and industry was prospering, over 4,000,000 insured workers experienced unemployment, and that for a considerable proportion of them the time during which they were out of work was more than three months.

When unemployed a man's income may be reduced to a sum which is not more than enough to keep him and his family alive. If he is lucky, some of his children earn, and the total income of the family is rather more than the amount received by him in benefit or assistance, but he has little to spend on things that might either kill time or help him usefully to spend it, and no comprehensive plan has yet been devised for enabling men to combat, through occupation, the demoralising effect of having nothing to do from morning till night for weeks, perhaps months or even years, together.

A year or two ago many people throughout the country

were coming to realise the magnitude of this evil. A number of voluntary organisations tried to do something about it. The Society of Friends started their scheme for providing allotments for unemployed men; the National Council of Social Service helped to create clubs all over the severely stricken areas where creative occupations of various kinds were available for the members; groups of public-spirited men and women came into being, and their members learnt something of, and became concerned with, this problem of what to do for men who were unoccupied and had no money. The difficulty of doing anything was great. Very many of the unemployed men, accustomed to a life of routine, made little response to efforts which demanded a corresponding effort on their part to be fruitful. Great demands were made on the patience and the generosity of these voluntary workers. It is no disparagement of them to say that many grew weary of the task and felt, when industrial conditions improved, that the need for them to sacrifice time and money was passing. While those important bodies that initiated the work still steadily pursue it and realise how great the need for it continues to be, the atmosphere of general relief that the acute crisis is over has made their task harder and is unfavourable to any constructive plan for dealing permanently with the problems created by unemployment. But these problems are too vitally important to be allowed just to slide easily out of the public consciousness. While unemployment lasts health of body and mind suffers, anxiety harasses the household, the children live in an atmosphere unfavourable to healthy development; the wife is strained and the man becomes every day less fit for work when the opportunity arrives. These conditions are worsened in proportion to the age of the worker, for in some occupations a man has little chance of regaining work after the age of forty-five, and a woman is already too old at thirty.

What, then, is the problem to be faced? In the first place, the fact has to be accepted that, as industrial life is at present organised, fluctuations in the demand for labour must occur. There can be no stability and no cessation of unemployment. The time cannot come when, as it were, unemployment is eradicated. It can diminish, as it has done this year, but it cannot disappear. The reasons are simple

Industry is never static. New inventions result in the failure of factories producing goods rendered out of date; mechanisation is constantly displacing hand labour which cannot be quickly reabsorbed; changes in public taste or fashion abolish the need for particular articles. Thus, when women decide to cut off their hair, factories making hair-pins go out of business unless they can quickly change over to making something else, or for no particular reason thousands of people give up using lace curtains in their windows, and the Nottingham lace industry gives notice to thousands of workers. These things must happen, and, however prosperous industry as a whole may be at any particular moment, they will continue to happen. In addition to this, while the average age of the population is rising the average age for certain important industries at which a man can hope to get work, if he has once fallen out of it, is falling. Thus the proportion of men over, say, forty-five who are still strong and capable of work, but are unlikely to get it, is increasing. Many in this class are, in fact, permanent State pensioners, on a low rate of pension although they are not yet recognised as such.

The first problem to be faced, then, is, since unemployment must be a constantly recurrent element in industrial life, what can be done to see that the substantial section of the nation concerned are not exposed to the serious physical and moral sufferings it involves? It cannot be in the national interest, apart from all humanitarian considerations, that a large part of the population should spend their lives harassed, as they undoubtedly now are, by the fear of unemployment, and periodically reduced to living on a level of bare physical necessity.

But there is another aspect of the question which sooner or later must be faced too. There seems to be little doubt that the more man makes the machine his slave the less willing he will be to perform the tasks which make little demand on his intelligence. It seems inevitable that just as in countries where the black man predominates white men refuse to do the grosser forms of work, so in countries where the machine is more and more developed men will want to take advantage of the freedom it can give to have fuller, more varied lives. It is possible that with better distributive methods the

increased output produced by mechanisation need not necessarily lead to a reduction of working hours, since the world is capable of vastly increased consumption. But in this matter it is not economic factors alone that will affect the issue. The standard of mental awareness of the population generally has been rising steadily and must continue to rise. As it does so the demand for 'more abundant life' will rise too. The bulk of men and women living on weekly wages will no longer accept conditions of work and living which they acquiesced in twenty-five years ago. They are reaching out for more experience and for contact with new aspects of life. This means that there must be an increasing reluctance to spend a large proportion of their days on tasks that bring no satisfaction to the worker, that possess no quality of interest. The demand for shorter hours will grow and economic methods will have to be altered to make it possible to satisfy them. For more than a century working hours have been gradually diminishing, from as much as fourteen hours to eight hours and even less a day, and this tendency continues. So long as science increases the productive capacity of the world and releases increased wealth, so long will man demand greater opportunity to share that wealth and use it for enriching his life. Nothing can stop that, and financial methods, which ultimately means distributive methods, will be compelled to adjust themselves so as to make it possible.

An analysis of the unemployment problem thus reveals a question much wider in its implications than that of what to do with men when they are unemployed. It shows that the unemployment problem has many different aspects, and that in essence it is not a negative problem of *un*employment at all, but a positive problem of the readjustment of our whole industrial and social life to new conditions. Industry provides the wealth by which the nation lives; the question is how to use that wealth for the maximum benefit of the nation as a whole—how to make it so flow as to give the whole of the people 'more abundant life.'

Owing to the fluctuations in supply and demand, to the changes and chances referred to above, industry contends that a pool of labour should always be available on which it can draw in times of pressure. No doubt also, under our

existing economic system, the existence of such a pool is regarded by employers generally as a necessary safeguard against the pressure which organised labour could exert in favour of a larger share in the profits and in the control of industry.

As things are, this point of view is not unreasonable, but it is another question whether it is in the interest of the nation that a large part of the population should be so dependent on the ebb and flow of industrial demand that almost at any moment they may have their standard of living reduced to bare subsistence level, the rhythm of their life disturbed, their health threatened, and their peace of mind destroyed.

In Germany the present régime have realised the political dangers inherent in this situation. During the period of severe unemployment—following one of great financial instability and of consequent misery and want—large numbers of the wage-earners became restless and bitter and began to advocate revolution as the only means of improving their lot. Political reasons, which do not apply in England, have thus influenced national policy in Germany.

At the same time the German Government does realise the weakness in the body politic which is involved by the precariousness of the lot of the wage-earner. In order to introduce greater stability one of the most important parts of their four-year plan is to transfer some 4,000,000 key industrial workers from their homes in the towns into new townships where each family will have not only a home of its own but a piece of land large enough to grow a substantial part of the food the family requires and to constitute a second line of defence against unemployment. Industries which earn more than a given percentage of profit are required to use the surplus in ways approved by the State, one of which is the provision of funds on loan for selected workers to enable them to acquire cottage holdings. Where new factories are being erected townships are being laid out on the principle of giving the workers not less than a quarter of an acre of land and are provided with all the amenities they consider necessary for a full social life—playing-fields, community halls, opportunities for adult education, etc. Germany is looking to the land as the principal means of providing a bye-occupation and of filling the leisure time of

industrial workers. The Germans are perhaps concentrating too exclusively on the land as the source from which the worker can draw a greater sense of security, for all wage-earners do not have a taste for gardening, nor can every wage-earner be provided with a garden even if he had a taste for cultivating it. But there are other motives behind the German policy than concern for the personal welfare of the worker which are not germane to the subject of this article. The important point is that the Germans are looking to the land as one means of defence against the evils produced by unemployment, but have not as yet gone further than this.

What should we, what can we do in this country? In the interest of the community at large and of those members of it who are living in constant danger of unemployment we should examine every possible device for enabling men and women who do lose their work to find occupation which will maintain their morale and their physical health; and we should ensure that the accident of unemployment should not rob them of their social relationships, their trade union membership, their various insurances. Unemployment insurance must be relied on to give them the means of living, but everyone who has had personal contact with unemployed people knows that it is their minds that need nourishing as well as their bodies, and that occupation of a kind that seems to them worth while is the best way of providing it. For this reason it is the land that provides the easiest and probably the most valuable solution, as the Society of Friends and the Land Settlement Association have shown, for it gives healthy occupation on the one hand and a tangible addition on the other to the unemployed man's larder.

An experiment is even now being made at the instigation of the Commissioner for the Special Areas which might show the way to an important development in this direction. A number of older unemployed men, with children of adolescent age, who cannot hope to find work again in the areas where they now live, are being transferred to settlements where each man will have a cottage and half an acre of land. These settlements are being placed in the neighbourhood of towns where industrial conditions are good and where the children can be absorbed at once into employment. Meanwhile, the father will have his piece of land on

which he can grow a substantial amount of food for his family, and, should he never regain normal employment, will have an occupation and will be contributing to the well-being of his family. This scheme might well be developed, not alone for people who are unemployed, but for industrial workers whose hours of work are neither so long nor so exacting as to preclude their being able to increase their economic security by cultivating a piece of land. There is no doubt that there are many men who would jump at the opportunity if it were offered. The resultant improvement in physical health of the men and their families and the very real spiritual effect of living in rural surroundings and in contact with the soil would more than compensate for the extra expense of this form of housing scheme.

But again the land should not be regarded as the sole means of providing against the worst evils of unemployment. The handicraft centres and unemployment clubs promoted by the National Council of Social Service have shown what a large—indeed, surprisingly large—number of men and women can develop new and unsuspected capacities, can discover resources in themselves of which they were unaware, once they are given the opportunity. It would seem to be asking almost too much to expect men who have never thought of doing anything beyond the daily work in the mine or the shipyard to respond when they are out of work to opportunities for forms of activity which bring no grist to the mill, but rather involve some slight inroad upon their meagre resources. The surprising thing is that so many men and women have responded and have engaged in various forms of creative work or of intellectual study which offered no financial inducement at all. That this is so merely shows the immense loss to the nation that is being incurred when this wealth of personality is left undeveloped, or allowed to wither from lack of nourishment. What has been done is nothing to what could be done if the Government and local authorities were to accept the view that permanent plans should be laid to develop systematically these various forms of bye-occupation. What has so far been attempted has been carried out mostly under conditions that made success infinitely difficult. Any kind of building has had to be utilised, often buildings that were so uninviting and depressing that

they offered little temptation to an unemployed man to enter them; whereas what is wanted is places that men who are naturally devitalised by the fact of unemployment can feel attracted to by their stimulating and cheerful atmosphere. Funds have been scarce; few local authorities have shown more than grudging interest or any imaginative understanding of what might be possible. The Government itself, while giving a measure of grant aid, has never regarded the work as of any permanent value or as anything but a temporary palliative of a temporary industrial crisis. And now that the crisis seems no longer severe interest has flagged and the question of how to help people not to go to pieces when they are thrown on to the industrial scrap-heap is being allowed to sink down from the national consciousness. But, in fact, the crisis can hardly be said to have passed, when over 4,000,000 workers experience unemployment in the course of a year.

Much more is involved in this question than just how to be, as it were, charitable to unemployed people. As has been suggested earlier in this article, forces are acting upon the industrial structure of industry which must produce changes that will affect our whole social life. These changes will be in the direction of more free time for those engaged in industry, and this not alone because of improved methods of production, but perhaps even more because a rising standard of living and education and general mental awareness must lead to greater insistence on opportunity for living more fully. Moreover, this demand will, incidentally, be reinforced by the diminution in the number of workers brought about by the falling birth rate. The increase of free time involves replanning the physical organisation of life. Our existing cities have grown up under a scheme of things in which, broadly speaking, the bulk of the population had no free time. Their life was one of work and sleep. Already with shorter working hours our cities are incapable of giving their inhabitants the means of life they need for the occupation of their free time. Cramped and congested as they are, there is insufficient room for playing-fields or for gardens, insufficient provision of places where people can cultivate interests which can be enjoyed only where they can meet their fellows or involve the use of more room than can be

found in the ordinary home. And new townships are being built with little thought of the needs of a proximate future. If the demands of the people of to-day, and still more of the next generation, are to be met, playing-fields and community centres ought to be regarded as the ordinary essential equipment of a township no less necessary than electric light, baths and drainage. As these are now looked upon as normal equipment and no more than is required in the interests of physical health, so those should be regarded as essential in the interests of mental and spiritual health. To neglect these things now is to be extravagant, for within a near future they will have to be provided, and the cost then will be greater. And in building towns on these lines we shall help to solve the recurrent problem of maintaining the health and self-respect of unemployed people; for where there is equipment for leisure, there enforced leisure can be used constructively and a period of unemployment can be made into a period of recreation and reinvigoration.

But the remodelling of our towns will take time, and meanwhile the strength of men and women is being allowed to be wasted when industry cannot use it. A policy is needed now of creating the means whereby those who are out of work should nowhere be left without a chance of keeping themselves in occupation, retaining their social contacts and affiliations and remaining normal members of society. Voluntary organisations have shown what can be done. It is for the public authorities now to see that an adequate structure is built upon the foundations that have been laid.

A. C. RICHMOND

FRENCH CANADA AND THE PROBLEM OF QUEBEC

By Wilfrid Bovey, O.B.E., D.Litt.

It is natural enough that in this period of feverish rearmament some consideration should be given to the possible actions of Canada. What would the Dominion do in case Britain were again involved in a European conflict? More than once Canadian Prime Ministers have declared that the question of co-operation would be referred to the Canadian people. Those pronouncements do not, at first hearing, carry us very far; most people will say at once that a nation may be led to vote any way at all, even in favour of the immolation of its youth. In Canada there are a number of special considerations which make it essential to revise such an off-hand opinion.

In the first place, Canada is inextricably linked economically as well as geographically to the United States, and President Roosevelt has expressed the intention of his countrymen to avoid any European conflict. The present American neutrality laws, taken in conjunction with the geographic and economic factors, make it virtually impossible for Canada to enter on overseas operations without the permission of the American Executive. The fact that Canada could not remain neutral if the United States were at war on the Atlantic or Pacific is interesting but not relevant.

In the second place, as far as can be gathered from the statements of citizen groups, the opinions of English Canadians differ violently. To those who say that danger to the Empire would compose these differences history gives an effective answer. The United Farmers of Ontario, for example, have recently passed a strong resolution in favour of non-intervention in any European war. In 1917 and 1918, during the conscription period, anti-conscription feeling was

widespread in the Ontario countryside, although popular attention was drawn away by the red herring of French Canadian resistance to the Government's methods. When the late Sir Arthur Currie, who had commanded the Canadian Corps in France, started a libel action in an Ontario rural district, it was openly stated that a fair-minded jury could not be obtained. The result proved otherwise, but the report had good grounds.

In the third place, any political leader or commentator must give far more consideration than has been given on other occasions to the position of the French Canadian. It is on this point that most Englishmen and a large number of English-speaking Canadians are obviously ill-informed, and in that there is nothing very surprising. English youngsters as we discover when the Victoria League or the National Council of Education send them to visit Canada, even members of university 'debating teams' which tour the Dominion, know next to nothing of Canada and its history. Most English Canadians do not read French Canadian papers, do not study French Canadian books, and do not listen to French Canadian broadcasts.

The 1936 provincial elections in Quebec were the subject of more comment in the English and English Canadian Press than any such events had received for a long time. They were interpreted by some to mean that a definite anti-English and separatist movement had been victorious; by others that Fascism had found its way into the Empire by way of its Latin quarter. It is not surprising that either view should have gained some credence—so many pre-election speeches and pamphlets seemed to point either in one direction or in the other—yet neither gives anything like an accurate picture of the situation.

The key to comprehension of the French Canadians is their geographical and historical setting. Their stronghold is the province of Quebec, its keep the old city on its grey rock. The Englishman expects the people of the Dominions to look to London as a Mecca; the Frenchman thinks that everyone who speaks French should turn to Paris: the French Canadian does neither; the St. Lawrence, not 'London River,' is the great artery of his national life. At the head of navigation on the St. Lawrence is the city of Montreal,

the second French-speaking city in the world, paradoxically dominated by English Canadian capital. Eighty miles or so lower down, at the mouth of the St. Maurice river, is Trois Rivières, filled with factories and huge pulp-mills; another eighty miles brings us to Quebec, with its citadel and Government buildings, its old streets and its new docks.

The more settled area around Quebec and Montreal is mostly farming country, dotted by villages and manufacturing towns, its southern and eastern borderlands wooded and mountainous, beautiful in their own wild fashion. The north-western limit of this section is the edge of the Laurentian plateau, a field of hills, a wilderness of mountains, lakes, forests and rivers, sought by skiers in winter, fishermen and hunters in summer, covering an area as great as that of the Rocky Mountains in the United States. Beyond the Laurentians is a huge, level, almost treeless waste, sparsely peopled by a few Indians, who sell their furs at the posts of the Hudson's Bay Company. Below Quebec the St. Lawrence widens rapidly. It is ten, then twenty, then thirty, then forty miles across. On the north shore broken, rocky hills rise from the water. At one spot the gorge of the Saguenay, a chasm two miles wide and almost a mile deep, half filled with icy water, leads westward to the fertile Lake St. John valley in the heart of the Laurentians. East of the Saguenay the north shore is barer and wilder yet, supporting a scanty population of fishermen, with one or two huge pulp and paper establishments.

The south shore below Quebec, *la côte su*, as its people call it, is the inmost heart of French Canada. For 200 miles a continuous row of houses stands along the highway which skirts the water. At the back of every house is a long ribbon of a farm, then come other parallel roads and other farms. Every six miles or so the houses cluster together about a church, its slender tin-covered spire rising above the peaked Norman roofs. Woods dot the farmland; a few miles back a range of tree-clad hills rises toward the American border. Eastward again, still on the south side of the St. Lawrence, is the Gaspé Peninsula, a mountain area jutting out into the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The highest summits rise almost 5000 feet above the level of the near-by shore; the highway

swings up and down, 800 feet to the mile, over folds that run seaward from the main range.

'French Canada' is, of course, not limited to Quebec. There are old French-speaking settlements in the neighbouring provinces of New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, more in Western Ontario, new settlements in Northern Ontario, and all across the prairies. French Canada and English Canada are fully intermingled; those who realise this least clearly, curiously enough, are to be found among French Canadians of Quebec. Their attitude is much that of the 'little Englander' of Chamberlain times.

The first to come under British rule were not the *Canadiens*, as the Quebecers call themselves, but the *Acadiens*, the original colonists in what is now western Nova Scotia. In 1713 their country was ceded to Britain, and from that time on the colonials of New England saw a terrible danger in the struggling little settlement. In the end Boston persuaded London and sent an expedition which deported most of the unhappy *Acadiens* at the point of the sword. Only a few escaped into the wilds of New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island. There, knocked from pillar to post, they clung desperately to their language and their religion; fortunately for them, the United Empire Loyalists, who came to New Brunswick after the Revolution, had more sympathy than Boston. Two generations later, when some of the *Acadiens* were farming in the then debatable land between New Brunswick and Maine, they still bore a grudge against the United States. They determined to remain British rather than become American, and the Maine boundary question was so settled that they did. To-day they form one-third of the population of New Brunswick, and there are 12,000 in Prince Edward Island.

In Quebec the *Canadiens* were more fortunate. The Treaty of Paris and the Quebec Act secured the preservation of French civil laws and the practice of the Catholic religion. The disabilities which still hampered Catholics in England did not affect them in the new colony; and although there was no provision for the use of the French language, it was tolerated. Judging by contemporary descriptions, the concessions were given rather for legal reasons than to conciliate the King's new subjects, but the result was astonishing.

When the Americans decided to forsake their British allegiance, and, later, invaded Quebec, the few English-speaking people who had come to Canada were inclined to follow their relations; in any case, they avoided fighting. Not so the French Canadians, who stoutly defended Quebec, and, materially helped out by smallpox, put an end to the invasion of 1775. In 1813 another invading American force of 5000 men was defeated by a few hundred French Canadian volunteer sharpshooters. It is no wonder that the French Canadians object when some political Boanerges Blitzen demands of them the humility of a 'conquered race.' 'We were never conquered, we were only deserted,' is their way of putting it, and they proceed to observe with some justice that 'the reason why Canada remained British is because it was French.'

In the early years of the last century British rule in Canada was misrule of the worst kind: the appointed Executive Council, a continuing and unscrupulous clique, held all the power and abused it; the Assembly was a mere sham. Both French- and English-speaking Liberals demanded the rights of British subjects; the more advanced came finally to the point of rebellion. Britain's political sense was stirred, after a long enough delay, and the now famous report of Lord Durham put the Liberals in the right by pointing the way to our modern system of responsible government. The change did not actually come about for several years; in the meantime, due in part to another recommendation of Lord Durham, there was a strong effort to anglicise French Canada; for some time the French language was not permissible in official assemblies or official documents. That effort failed of its object. Their language acquired for the French Canadians an almost religious value, a value which it has ever since retained, and in 1867, when the Dominion was formed, French was declared to be, as it is to-day, an official language for the Federal and the Quebec Parliaments.

Since Confederation two influences have tended to keep French Canadians homogeneous—their religion and their attachment to the soil. Practically all French Canadians are practising Catholics. The parish priests have not only been the religious guides of the people, but their secular advisers; for years after the cession they took the place of

judges; even to-day the Catholic Union of Farmers depen to an extraordinary degree on the priests, who are its pari chaplains, and, on the whole, their task has been well pe formed. The parish church was always the centre of t countryman's existence; it was the most beautiful thin apart from Nature, that he ever saw. This religious strai in the cord of French Canadian life is interwoven with tl system of education. To the French Canadian Catholi education and religion are not only linked, they form single whole; education includes, and is included in, rel gion; and religion means the Roman Catholic faith. Th Protestant may not, and probably will not, agree: the fac remains that the Catholic cannot change his philosophy; h can only change the way he puts his theory into practice The educational system of Quebec has always been, and i to-day, dual. The province has no Minister of Education the universities and colleges are independent; a Protestan and a Catholic committee advise the Government as to th conduct of schools supported by the tax contributions o Protestants and Catholics respectively.

The freedom of the Protestant minority in Catholi Quebec has not been paralleled in the English provinces There is no doubt that in 1867 the French Canadians though that both their language and their religion would have equal rights, not only in the Federal Parliament and the province of Quebec, but throughout the new Dominion Sir John Macdonald, the first Canadian Prime Minister thought so too. Both have been proved wrong. The French Canadians, with other Catholics, have been obliged to share in the support of State-aided schools controlled by a Protestant majority, and, if they wanted their own schools, to provide them for themselves. These schools have been subject to State control, and the language, which the French Canadians thought was theirs by right, survives, so the law tells them, by tolerance alone. Liberal Governments in Ontario and New Brunswick are making changes, but in the face of considerable opposition; even to-day the most lively political argument in any province of Canada centres around the new Ontario legislation which provides for Government aid to Catholic schools.

The second important characteristic of French Canadian

life is the bond between the people and the soil. The *Canadien* is, primarily, a farmer. He loves his countryside as did the Roman who wrote '*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.*' He has taken his full share in the opening up of Canada. The first explorers of the prairies, the young men who carved farms out of the forests of Quebec and northern Ontario, were largely French Canadian. Their elder brothers, who remained on the home farms of the St. Lawrence valley, were and are an independent and self-sufficient class, as well off, on the whole, as any farmers in Canada, proud of their way of life and, even among farmers, violent individualists.

Still more light is cast on the general situation by the late happenings in Quebec. It is necessary to recall that Quebec had been ruled for nearly forty years by a single party, and that since 1905 the governing group within that party, long led by the Hon. L. A. Taschereau, had remained substantially unchanged. Policies and practice had been continuous; the Civil Service had come to be of one political colour; Government business went to supporters of the Government and advertising to newspapers which supported the Government. The very considerable number of people indirectly in the employ of the Government, such as those working on the roads programme, were mostly on one side, and many lucrative duties were found for professional men whose friendship was desirable. It is not suggested that there was anything out of the way in the practice, for the same conditions have existed elsewhere without open acknowledgment, but the result over such a long period of time had been to divide the province into the 'ins' and the 'outs.'

One curious situation was brought about by the fact that the party in power called itself 'Liberal' and always retained the title, although, as the result of its long tenure of power, it found itself farthest to the right of any Canadian political group. It followed that the same local organisations handled not only provincial elections and 'patronage' but those of the Liberal Party in the Dominion House, the views and practices of which had developed along very different lines. The final result of their defeat has not yet been apparent, nor will it be so until the next Federal elections. It may be that by that time there will be no issue

between the National Union members of Quebec and the Federal Liberals at Ottawa.

Mr. Taschereau himself was a picturesque figure. Slim, grey, keen, descended from one of the aristocrats who did not desert Canada at the cession, a Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour, he was always 'the chief.' As time went on, and his rule continued, he became even more dominant among his own followers—perhaps circumstances forced him into doing so—but in its public affairs the Government of Quebec followed the strict traditions of British democracy. It even went a step farther than other Governments, for members of the public could speak on a public Bill as well as on a private Bill at the hearings in committee.

Three separate French Canadian movements, two of which involved more than one group, began to take shape about two years ago. The first was within the Libera Party. A number of men who had always been considered and considered themselves to be Liberals were alienated by what they thought an arbitrary use of power within the governmental circle. The French Canadian is very much of an individualist, so it was a long time before these various opponents of the controlling group drew together, but gradually they found common ground. The clique never had a name, but those who inspired its first actions were Dr. Philippe Hamel and Mayor Grégoire of Quebec.

While this was going on among the older politicians a second movement—a remarkable social effort led by the clergy and originally based on the various encyclicals of the Catholic Church—had been taking effect among French Canadian youth. For 150 years—ever since the cession of Canada to Britain—there had been little change in their education or their outlook. Of those who had passed through the primary schools some had gone on to the classical colleges; of those who had completed their *baccalauréat* in the colleges some had entered professional life. In more recent years a certain number had been trained for business, and, for the most part, had become accountants; a certain number of others had passed through technical schools, and had been turned out as mechanics. It had never occurred to more than a very few to study the general social situation of the French Canadian people, but those who had

studied it had been extremely pessimistic. They could not help feeling the unquestionable preponderance of English Canadian financial power. They realised that the French Canadians, more agricultural than urban in their outlook, had been left far behind in the race for wealth, that the great organisations of the country were almost all English. They talked of 'hewers of wood and drawers of water'—extraordinarily apt words in a country of enormous wood-pulp and hydro-electric power developments, where most of the labour was French Canadian and most of the profit was English Canadian or American. They had agreed that the French Canadian ought to improve his position, but had not proposed any very definite plan which would enable him to do so. The studies now undertaken were much more realistic. Large groups of young and middle-aged men began to consider how French Canadians, numbering one-third of Canada's population and controlling politically the largest and perhaps the richest province, might by united effort increase their wealth and influence and release themselves from what they felt to be economic subjugation.

The first association concerned was the A.C.J.C. (*Association Catholique des Jeunes Canadiens*), a society with branches in almost every parish, more or less corresponding to the Y.M.C.A. This society was not sufficiently 'politically minded' to please some organisers; it was still too objective, and so there appeared a 'ginger group' which called itself *Jeune Canada* (Young Canada), and aimed openly at political power and freedom from 'domination.' Its campaign was opened by active attacks on Mr. Taschereau and the 'English,' with whom he was (it thought) too friendly. *Jeune Canada* was succeeded by a still more 'nationalist' league, *Les Jeunes Patriotes*. Next came two other associations, the J.A.C. (*Jeunesse Agricole Catholique*) and the J.O.C. (*Jeunesse Ouvrière Catholique*), which naturally called themselves Jacistes and Jocistes. These were less political than social, although, in the final reckoning, the result was almost the same. Finally came two very small groups, one of which imitates the methods of Mussolini and calls itself Fascist; the other, which hides its light very carefully under a bushel, is Communist. Neither of the two last has had any effect outside a very restricted circle.

The third movement took place among the farmers, and it, too, had a religious tinge. The *Union Catholique des Cultivateurs* (U.C.C.) was a voluntary association which aimed at the establishment of rural credits and co-operation on the Belgian model. The society was organised by parishes, each local parish priest acting as chaplain and organiser, and at its local and general conventions the whole social and economic position of the Quebec farmer was thoroughly studied. The association at first made rather slow progress, but gradually gathered force, began to develop its plans, and made its voice heard. It was regarded as hostile to the Government, and this was probably correct—first, because most of its members were by family tradition *bleu* (Conservative); secondly, because it was aiming at legislation which the Government was not prepared to consider. At this point one might properly observe that among the main reasons for the subsequent turn of country people as a whole against the Government was the view generally held that its members did not understand, and were not much interested in, the farmer, a view which was by no means limited to members of the Union.

In 1935 the first results of all this ferment were apparent. Mr. Paul Gouin, son of a former Prime Minister of the province, entered the field with a programme which he called '*Action Libérale Nationale*.' The three words were borrowed from different sources: '*Action Catholique*,' which can best be translated as 'Active Catholicism'; '*Libérale*,' the name of the old 'left' party—now passed, as we have noted, to the right; '*Nationale*'—a vague adjective expressive of French Canadian unity. Mr. Gouin, like the leader whom he opposed, had an unusual personality. A lawyer and a poet, with youth and good looks on his side, he attracted the educated professional group: a charming speaker who understood the new French Canadian spirit, he was able to sway the young enthusiast; between the two he gathered a following.

Prior to the 1935 provincial elections Mr. Gouin and the 'A.L.N.' succeeded in attracting a very considerable number of 'young Liberals' drawn from the various new groups. Some of them were opposed to everything English, some of them were only opposed to Mr. Taschereau, some

of them were only politically ambitious, but all took themselves seriously. They found themselves in unexpected company. Mr. Maurice Duplessis, leader of the Provincial Conservative Party, a forceful young lawyer of Trois Rivières, had first fought for his place as leader, then fought the Government. Mr. Gouin had had little political experience and was apparently pleased enough to join his former opponents in the hope of attaining his ultimate objective. Mr. Duplessis, a thorough realist with a great deal of political experience, was quite ready to take advantage of the opportunity, and quite able to do so. Mr. Duplessis was not so much interested in the distant political future of the people as a whole as in the very practical and immediate matter of defeating Mr. Taschereau, and the advent of his astonishing allies under Mr. Gouin gave him strong hopes of success.

Mr. Duplessis began his campaign in the Public Accounts Committee of the Legislature, and insisted on searching nquiries into every payment made to Government supporters. and every action of Government employees. It was inevitable that after so many years of unchanging control there should turn out to be some abuses, and Mr. Duplessis had an uncanny knack of discovering them. The outcry grew louder. Mr. Taschereau failed to pass his estimates, accepted responsibility, and resigned; a temporary Government headed by the former Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Adélard Godbout, was set up. A campaign of unprecedental violence, so far as speeches were concerned, began. Mr. Duplessis and his 'Conservatives' and Mr. Gouin and his 'A.L.N.' maintained their coalition. It was at this point that the cry of 'separatism,' which has echoed so far, began to be heard. An odd light is thrown on the scene when the origin of the separatist trend is found to be traceable less to a forward than to a backward outlook.

The teaching of history in Canadian schools had suffered from the defects attributed by Professor Hearnshaw to English history teaching at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and it had not formed a good background for racial understanding in a country where racial understanding was imperative. Books had been compiled and taught from an English or a French point of view. History had been, to use Professor Hearnshaw's words, 'too local, too sectional,

too personal and too superficial.' In 1935 some historians became politically active, and, as has been the case elsewhere and at other times, the result was soon evident. A number of young French Canadians, justly proud of the early performances of their race, sensitive to their modern position, envisaged a new republic—a 'Laurentia' split off from Canada and ruled by its French Canadian majority. Perhaps it is unfair to say that they doubted their own ability to compete with their English-speaking fellow-countrymen, but the surmise is an obvious one. They were very vocal, and before long the whole of the *Action Libérale Nationale* was tinged with their notions; those who did not favour were afraid to oppose. One curious element in the situation is well worth noting. These young Quebecers forgot that Quebec is not French Canada. They forgot the French Canadians of the West and of Ontario, the *Acadiens* of the Maritimes, all of whom looked to Quebec for encouragement and support. This strange failure in an obvious national duty was one great weakness in their cause, another was its evident economic impossibility.

As the campaign developed it became evident that the separatist idea was accompanied in the minds of its sponsors by projects for public acquisition of private enterprise which were in effect Socialist. The title was never accepted, since to the French Canadian there is little difference between the 'Socialist' and the 'Communist'—both are enemies of order and religion; but the plans spoke for themselves. One day, out of a clear sky, the more advanced members of the separatist group produced an unofficial pamphlet, openly declaring their political and social ambitions. The arguments were so worded as to make it clear that at least a few clerical dialecticians were aiding the editors. St. Thomas Aquinas and the leaders of the American Revolution were both cited to prove that the British connexion was illogical and unnecessary. The danger of 'British wars' was a reason why Quebec should leave the Dominion.

The effect was exactly the opposite to that which the editors intended. The average French Canadian is quite willing, even though handicapped, to compete with the English Canadian. He has often done it with conspicuous success. He had no intention whatever of being pushed

into economic isolation, and he knew better ways of gaining his ends. He saw very clearly that Quebec, even if the province is less developed than Ontario, is still the keystone of the Canadian arch. The average French Canadian, moreover, is not opposed to the 'British connexion'—quite the contrary. He is afraid, more than is the English Canadian, of being Americanised; he sees very clearly how hard his lot would be in an American Canada. He is not willing to be tied up in a European knot which may lead him into war; but the English Canadian feels very much the same way.

Mr. Duplessis has a very clear comprehension of the ideas of the average man, and he saw immediately that the coalition was now imperilling him. He produced, like a conjurer, a new entity, the '*Union Nationale*.' This was not to be a party; it was to be what it was called—a union. There was to be room for Liberals and Conservatives and anyone else who would join. The aims were to defeat the Government, to maintain the place of Quebec in the Confederation, to uphold the ordinary methods of democracy, to ensure, without any too violent dislocation, the improvement of the French Canadian economic position. Mr. Duplessis' move squeezed out Mr. Gouin and most of his supporters. It would have failed had it not been for the force of Mr. Duplessis' own personality and for his realism. Instead of preaching a visionary future he sought an immediate battle and used every ounce of ammunition. Every weak point, every action of the Government that could be construed into a fault or failure, was attacked, every breach was widened. The somewhat academic left-wing A.L.N. was lost in the conflict; the Quebec countryman wanted to see a real fight. Numbers of Liberals as well as traditional '*bleus*' joined the Union, numbers of English- as well as French-speaking people supported it, and before the election it was evident that a large number of Liberals would be among its candidates.

The Liberals in the Federal Government found themselves in a strange dilemma. They were not, for the most part, friendly to the Quebec Government; they did not really know Mr. Godbout, but they were all, in theory, part of one organisation with one set of agents. At first their notion had, for the most part, been to do nothing, but

finally it was decided that any individual who felt in honour bound might help the official Liberals in Quebec. It was obviously dangerous; but some were swayed by opportunism, more by loyalty, and most of them faced the issue. They did not affect the result; the August election put the *Union Nationale* into office with a huge majority, and Mr. Duplessis, after years in opposition, found the reins of power in his hands.

The announcement by various Press correspondents of a 'Fascist victory' was, quite naturally, a good news story for England; the notion of a successful separatist movement was just as sensational for the English-speaking provinces of Canada. Mr. Duplessis and his associates countered the accusation of separatism by increasing English-speaking representation in the Provincial Cabinet. Their intention, as Mr. Bélanger, a Montreal member, declared in December 1936, was to give back to Quebec her proper place among the provinces, but they did not want to leave the Dominion. Mr. Jean St. Germain, a prominent lawyer, voiced the same sentiment in August 1937.

There had been, it must be admitted, some indications of an attitude which might be called Fascist. These were to be seen for a long time after the elections, but it may be said at once that all were deceptive. The small group of young men inspired by Mussolini continued to demonstrate, but remained small and not particularly important. There were still, among the academic group, a certain number of teachers with considerable influence who admitted that they would like to put an end to our form of parliamentary government. They had, however, no constructive suggestion as to what other form of government we might adopt and did not appear to have given much thought to the subject. Finally, there were sound enough economists in the Government circle who aimed, and still aim, at the formation of occupational corporations, especially among farmers and fishermen. This seems, at first blush, like the Italian system, but we find that these corporations would not be part of the State or even State-controlled, that there would in practice be little difference between such organisations and the familiar co-operatives. That is not Fascism.

In spite of all this, there was enough talk of 'the corporate

State' and a French Canadian polity to disturb English-speaking Canadians a great deal, and their fears were echoed in the Press and private memoranda. But in the summer of 1937 various authoritative statements put an end to doubt as to the general French Canadian attitude. Most important of all was a speech by Cardinal Villeneuve, of Quebec. 'As to political separation from the Empire or from Canada,' he stated, 'it is none of the Church's business and we feel no inclination for it.' 'Patriotism,' he added, 'must extend to the whole country and should be accompanied by a feeling of loyalty for our sovereign King George VI.' 'Never did I wish this province,' the Cardinal said, 'to be transformed into either a Clerical or a Fascist community'; and he proceeded to explain that, for his part, he did not think, and never had thought, of professional corporations as part of a State organisation. It was not long before other leaders followed Cardinal Villeneuve's lead and directly repudiated both separatism and Fascism.

The main trend of economic thought among the French Canadians is now gradually making itself evident; it does not depend on but controls Government policy. They intend that the economic balance shall be redressed, that the people of Quebec shall benefit more from the natural wealth of Quebec and so acquire increased importance in the Cofederation.

As a result of these varying factors and events the attitude of French Canadians towards the rest of the world, English-speaking Canada included, is difficult to describe. There are so many differences of opinion that they could not agree upon it themselves. With it all, however, the average French Canadian has a perfectly honest intention to get on well with his fellow-countrymen, to do what is best for Canada and to be loyal to a King whom he never sees. If his interest in the British Empire depends on the value of the Empire to the country which was his before the British came, can anyone blame him?

WILFRID BOVEY.

DIPLOMACY, SECRET AND OPEN

By L. B. NAMIER

THERE would be little to say about 'Diplomacy, Secret and Open,' were it not for the nonsense which is talked about it. Diplomacy is nothing but 'the organised system of negotiation between sovereign States,' and in its nature and methods differs little from other kinds of negotiations. As Lord Hervey wrote, two centuries ago, the transactions between men, great and small, are

> still the same game, and played with the same cards, the disparity in the skill of gamesters in each equally great, . the only difference is their playing more or less deep, whilst the cutting and shuffling, the dealing and the playing, is still the same whether the stakes be halfpence or millions

But games are not played with open cards, and negotiations, whether between States, business firms or individuals, can seldom, if ever, be conducted in public

At the root of most of the nonsense talked about secret diplomacy lies confusion between aims and methods, between 'policy' and 'negotiations' The vital distinction between the two is stressed by Mr Harold Nicolson, one of the most articulate experts and best-informed writers on diplomacy. 'Policy should be subjected to democratic control: the execution of that policy should be left to trained experts.' 'Policy should never be, and need never be, secret'; but the conduct of negotiations must be confidential. In other words, what the public have a right to know is the general trend of national policy and any binding commitments incurred in their name, while the decision as to the amount of information to be given out about negotiations, and the choice of time for doing so, must be left to those entrusted with their conduct.

Publicity destroys the freedom of negotiations. Every

word said in public is apt to commit the negotiator. This makes him over-cautious and leaves little scope for tentative proposals. Could even a non-political treaty—*e.g.*, a commercial agreement—be discussed in public? At every turn 'vested interests' would be created which would hamper the further course of the negotiations. Still worse where frontiers are concerned: that between the Irish Free State and Ulster admits of obvious improvements; but all thought of such amendments, which could have been made on a basis of give and take, had to be dropped because of the vested interests created by the Treaty once it was published. Those included in the State in which they wish to be, even if less numerous, have a moral superiority in supporting the *status quo* over those who would profit by a change.

In fact, premature publication, or 'exposure,' is a well-known method of interfering with negotiations. When in the spring of 1919 an inter-Allied Committee suggested a frontier which would have satisfied very nearly the maximum of Polish territorial claims against Germany, their secret report speedily found its way into the French Press, it being hoped by those who committed the indiscretion that the intense anti-German feeling in Allied countries would henceforth preclude any material change in the proposed frontier. There was a great deal to be said for that frontier which gave Danzig to the Poles, but not for the attempt to put pressure on what ought to have been a quasi-judicial body, considering territorial claims in the light of certain acknowledged principles; and the attempts of decent negotiators to find just solutions are seldom helped by public discussion and agitation. Fruit goes to waste if prematurely plucked by the incompetent hands of irresponsible people, and orchards require a reasonable measure of protection and seclusion.

There is a further, very important, reason why diplomatic negotiations must be conducted in secret. Most nations are extremely touchy. 'National honour' and 'national prestige' were a fetish in this country in the eighteenth century, and are still on the European continent, and the less nations observe honour in practice, the more sensitive are they to anything which might seem to question what amount of it they possess. The British and French Governments must have repeatedly charged the Italians with breach of faith in

the matter of non-intervention in Spain, even before Mussolini proudly proclaimed it to the world, and must have hinted at what everyone knew about the nationality of the pirate submarines in the Mediterranean. But any such public pronouncement originating from our side would have rendered further negotiations impossible.

Altogether, the veil thrown over diplomatic transactions, at least in so far as this country is concerned, often serves the purpose of hiding from the British public the bad manners and unreasonable nature of foreign Governments; in other words, it serves the interest of peace. Otherwise, damage is apt to occur. The Kruger telegram, which was a public act, is a case in point. It did serious and lasting harm to Anglo-German relations and weighed heavily with public opinion in this country. But in diplomatic intercourse with the Germans such incidents are by no means rare. What reception would the Kaiser have been given by the British public in 1899 had they known that he had refused to accept the invitation of his grandmother unless the British Government first acceded to his petulant and unreasonable demands arising out of some obscure squabbles in Samoa? Again, had every step in the negotiations for a limitation of naval armaments been disclosed to the British public, Sir Edward Grey's policy would have been fully justified in their eyes, but further talks would have become impossible.

Generally speaking, the public and the Press are much more inflammable than professional diplomats, or even Cabinet Ministers, who have to consider the consequences of 'blowing off steam.' Mr J. A. Spender, an unimpeachable witness, thus describes the diplomatic game before 1914:

> So long as the game went on, its dangers were limited by excluding an audience which must have taken sides. What a Foreign Secretary feared in nine cases out of ten was not the craft of his opponent but the too zealous backing of his own side, which would have cut off his retreat. Keep the public out of it, and it was a relatively safe game; let the public in, and it instantly became full of deadly peril. As a rule the public were only let in when the Foreign Secretary or his Government had decided not to retreat.

Still, those who are keenest on 'open diplomacy' also favour 'diplomacy by conference.' If only statesmen met and had heart-to-heart talks! Then they would see that there

was something to be said on the other side, and each would find that the other is not such a bad chap after all. And if they meet, and appear in the illustrated Press so nicely together, their faces wreathed in smiles, the public feel that here is 'open diplomacy'—not that sinister exchange of secret notes between Foreign Offices. The hearts of the public soften, and so apparently do their brains. For nothing can beat, or equal, the secrecy of such meetings: what these statesmen say often remains hidden from their own competent official advisers, from their colleagues in the Cabinet, and sometimes even from the two men themselves; after such a talk, each knows best what he himself has said, or what he had meant to say, or what he wishes he had said, but has only a dim and blurred recollection of what the other man said, or tried to say. Seldom has there been such a talk which, if put to the test, did not produce a crop of fatal disagreements as to what had been agreed upon; witness, *e.g.*, the interview between Aehrenthal and Isvolsky at Buchlau, which led to the Bosnian crisis, the forerunner of the Great War. Even where such interviews do not result in misunderstandings, they very seldom produce positive results. It is in the interest of decent diplomacy and of international comity that every step should be carefully examined and considered, that neither side should feel it had been 'had,' or had unduly yielded to charm and persuasion. Surprising results or gains obtained in personal interviews can seldom be maintained afterwards: in July 1905, at Bjorko, the Kaiser obtained what he desired from the Tsar, but the Russian Foreign Office soon managed to extricate itself from the absurd agreement. Even mutually advantageous treaties, if the product of a cordiality between statesmen which is not shared by their nations, are likely to do more harm than good. The Thoiry agreement between Briand and Stresemann is an outstanding example; they reached a complete understanding, and were both disavowed by their countries.

As Mr. Nicolson says, diplomacy, to be effective, 'should be a disagreeable business.' Diplomatic negotiations should be conducted with calm clearness and with hard-headed perseverance—best of all on paper; even then there is room for differences in interpretation, but infinitely less than in the case of verbal agreements. Nor is there in written negotia-

tions the same inducement to make undue concessions. To quote Mr. Nicolson again: 'There is nothing more damaging to precision in international relations than friendliness between the Contracting Parties'; the difficulties of precise negotiations in conference arise 'from the more amiable qualities of the human heart,' from 'consideration, affability, or ordinary good manners,' and the 'human difficulty of remaining disagreeable, to the same set of people, for many days at a stretch.'

None the less, personal contacts and conversations are at times essential, just because they offer that measure of freedom and elasticity which secrecy alone can secure; diplomatic notes have their own publicity, with posterity and history. But then personal negotiations had better not be conducted by the principals, but much rather by officials or juniors. What these suggest or listen to commits nobody; they can examine every approach and discuss all kinds of schemes. In the fifteenth century Phillippe de Commynes wrote in his *Memoirs*, while commenting on a meeting between Louis XI. and Charles the Bold:

> Et deux grans princes qui se vouldroient bien entreaymer ne se devroyent jamais veoir, mais envoyer bonnes gens et sages les ungs vers les autres, et ceulx-la les entretiendroient ou amanderoient les faultes.

Meetings between juniors or officials cannot produce the dilemma of their Governments having either to accept an unsatisfactory arrangement or to disavow a man who is supposed to have the power to enter binding agreements. The fatal mess of the Hoare-Laval agreement could never have arisen had the matter been transacted through ambassadors, or even through the Permanent Under-Secretary without the Minister. As Mr. Nicolson says, 'The execution of policy should be left to trained experts.'

Even so, the Foreign Secretary needs to be to some extent an expert, perhaps more so than any other Cabinet Minister. The best British Foreign Secretaries by preference limited themselves to that one sphere: Castlereagh, Canning, Palmerston, Salisbury, Sir Edward Grey. It is dangerous for ordinary politicians to handle international negotiations. In the first place, their attention is too much divided between the public at home, which they are accustomed to watch, and

the interests which ought to be the paramount consideration of foreign policy. Further, there is the vanity of politicians, connected with their habit of playing to the gallery. Lastly, there is the danger of their failing to make the necessary readjustments. Some succumb to the delightful atmosphere of diplomatic courtesy; accustomed for years to the rough and tumble of the House of Commons, they are apt to accept the courtesies of diplomatic life at their face value, and to mistake the form for the substance. Mr. Snowden, on the other hand, very nearly produced a serious breach with the French at the Hague by treating them as he was wont to treat the 'right hon. gentlemen opposite'; after the scene caused by his use of the word 'grotesque,' he remarked, slightly perturbed, to one of his assistants: 'But surely I have not said anything unparliamentary?'

Still, while the Foreign Secretary should understand the methods and traditions of diplomacy, he ought to be thoroughly free of foreign fancies. There is, in the first place, the question of foreign languages. No man is lightly to be chosen for the post of British Foreign Secretary who speaks any language but English; or at least, a man burdened with such accomplishments should be made to take a vow never to speak any other language He is certain not to know every foreign language which matters, and if he is familiar only with one, he tends to develop an undue bias in favour of that particular nation. But if, worst of all, he prides himself on such knowledge, and finds pleasure in jabbering that foreign lingo, then he is lost and essential British interests are in jeopardy. Lord Salisbury knew French, but avoided talking anything but English to foreign statesmen or diplomats.

Lastly, a statesman dealing with international affairs should know nothing about 'Teschen.' He cannot know every Teschen on the map, and if he knows one Teschen only, it will hide whole worlds from his sight; and even about the Teschen with which he happens to be acquainted he will probably know less than his experts, and his information about it will, in most cases, be out of date. A Foreign Secretary had much better possess a knowledge of continents pleasantly blended with an ignorance of particular foreign countries, and allow himself to be informed by his experts when occasion arises These he m[illegible] how to choose.

Judgment of men, of their character, minds, and knowledge, is an essential attribute in statesmen.

The same is true of democracies; here everything depends on the choice they make of statesmen. The essence of 'democracy' is that the nation should have the power to choose and change its rulers, and that it should, at all times, enjoy full freedom of political discussion. But when Mr. Harold Nicolson says that foreign policy 'should be subjected to democratic control,' he uses language which lends itself to misunderstanding and misinterpretation. It is difficult to see how policy can be democratically controlled, except through Parliament, and through the influence which the prevailing atmosphere exercises on Parliament and on the Cabinet. For what is public opinion, and how can it be ascertained? Or even could it be ascertained, its commands would mostly be vague and contradictory, and therefore impracticable. It would, *e.g.*, direct the Government to defend the cause of righteousness and to preserve peace; to make an omelette without breaking eggs. And even the intervention of the House of Commons (apart from the influence and pressure which it potentially exercises all the time) is dangerous. For it is in its very nature fitful, and therefore irresponsible. Once more: what the public is called upon to do is to choose its rulers, and what it is entitled to know is the general trend of national policy and any binding commitments incurred in its name.

As a rule, no commitments should be incurred which are not dictated by the national interest, and seldom, if ever, should the nation be made to promise things which it would not do without the promise. In 1919 Great Britain and America offered France a joint guarantee of her eastern frontier in lieu of a virtual French annexation of the left bank of the Rhine. When America refused to honour President Wilson's promise, Mr. Lloyd George took advantage of the clause which made the British guarantee conditional on America's participation. This was wrong, even politically, for we could never afford to see France broken and the Germans in control of the Channel ports. Our frontier is the Rhine. We concede nothing in guaranteeing the security of France beforehand, and a good deal could have been done at that early stage to calm French apprehensions by giving them such a guarantee.

In 1914 a certain school of pacifists professed to detect the origin of the war in our *entente* with France and in alleged secret military and naval commitments entered into by Great Britain. In reality the war broke out over the Yugoslav fears and the Balkan policy of the Habsburg Monarchy; and if there was a contributory cause in Western Europe, this was to be found in the German hope that we would remain neutral—in other words, not in the existence, but in the uncertainty of our commitments to France.

Even whilst the foreign policy of a nation is uncertain and badly defined, contingent military and naval arrangements must be precise. Therefore, when public opinion coloured by sentimental pacifism, as ours was before 1914 and before 1936, is timid and unwilling to face realities, military and naval agreements must necessarily exceed the diplomatic commitments. A modern war cannot be undertaken like a picnic; you do not drive out in your car till you find a nice spot where you stop and have lunch. Unless precise arrangements for common action are made beforehand, chaos ensues followed by defeat, for which the service men are made to bear the blame. In 1914 our Fleet was concentrated in the North Sea, and the French in the Mediterranean; and this arrangement, which was a matter of common notoriety, amounted to a quasi-alliance, even closer than was thought by responsible statesmen at that time. Sir Edward Grey made it known on August 1, 1914, that, even if we remained neutral, our Fleet would oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover by a German fleet, or any demonstration on the French coast. This might have sufficed in a short war, such as that of 1866, or even of 1870; but how would it have worked with regard to a blockade attempted by either side in a long war of attrition? Still, without this concentration of fleets and division of responsibilities, our naval armaments would have had to be much greater, which would again have displeased and distressed the pacifists. There is no escape from this dilemma: so long as there are bullies in the world, even the most pacific nation has to seek security in armaments and alliances; and if unwilling to assume the commitments inherent in alliances, it has vastly to increase its own armaments.

Pacifists reply to this by pæans on the beauty of multilateral treaties against the aggressor, whoever he may be, and

of 'collective security.' There was, indeed, much delight and self-congratulation in this country over the noble impartiality of the Locarno Treaty. This was a splendid instrument, so long as there was no occasion for it. We could simultaneously guarantee Germany against French aggression when it was clear that the French would not attempt another Ruhr, and France against German aggression when the Germans had no army. But would such double engagements be possible once things have become serious?

Those who inveigh most violently against 'secret diplomacy' favour 'diplomacy by conference,' the worst of all secret diplomacies; and, while similarly inveighing against 'secret commitments,' favour commitments so vague and wide as, in fact, to render their precise meaning (if they have any) secret. Never was a worse secret commitment entered into by those responsible for British foreign policy than the Covenant of the League of Nations; which, moreover, was passed by Parliament practically without discussion, as a mere appendix to the Treaty of Versailles, and under its cover. It is true the terms of the Covenant were public, and, indeed, every pacifist jazz-band blared them to the world. But how many people really understood the meaning of those commitments, and the burden which they entailed if honestly carried out, or their futility and dishonesty if that burden was shirked? Under the Covenant we were no longer entitled to restrict ourselves to the defence of our own vital interests. And those who insisted on our assuming such extensive commitments, at the same time achieved a one-sided disarmament of this country. For my part, I never believed either in the League of Nations or in 'collective security'; and immediately after the experience offered by Vilna in 1920 I thus formulated my objections and doubts: 'Those who are interested cannot be impartial, while those who are not interested cannot be effective. How, then, can you have international action?' Were we prepared to go to war over Vilna, Corfu, Manchukuo, or Abyssinia? Are we prepared to go to war over Spain or China, or shall we always find shelter behind the adverse vote of some Albania or Portugal? If unanimity and true collective action is required at every step, the League will remain what it is—a sham, a miserable farce; but if majority rule were adopted, it would become

a deadly danger. And even within the sphere of 'economic sanctions,' League action has proved more difficult and cumbrous than had been expected, and ineffective because it was timid.

The so-called 'old diplomacy' was accused of dividing the world into two camps, which was said inevitably to lead to war. And where are we now?—with Germany, Italy, and Japan outside the League, allied and more aggressive than any nation dared to be before the war, but leaving their satellites in the League, presumably in order to complete its farcical discomfiture. The only effective measure of an international character recently carried through, was the Nyon Agreement, which was concluded by one group of Powers, outside the framework of the League. If there is any salvation for decency and liberty in the world, it is not in the Covenant of the League, dishonoured and disgraced, nor in the 'splitting of articles' at Geneva, but in co-operation between Great Britain, the United States, and France, a group to which other Powers could adhere.

The greatest danger in foreign politics lies in what Mr. Nicolson once described as 'complacent, unctuous, and empty rectitude'; in high-sounding shams which deprive people of a sense of responsibility, in a pacifism which will not face facts, and thereby hands over all power to those who count only with facts and with a capacity to create them. The last line of defence for the League of Nations is to claim that the idea is fine, only people will not carry it out honestly. Clearly the difficulty is in men and their nature. But what is the value of a 'practical' political programme if it is not adjusted to the real conditions of life? Those who could work the League require no Covenant, and those for whom the Covenant is required will not work it.

There is the old, well-known story about the man who during the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, went about hawking anti-earthquake pills; but one incident is forgotten—when someone pointed out that the pills could not possibly be of use, the hawker replied: 'But what will you put in their place?'

L. B. NAMIER.

THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM IN INDIA

By K. S. Shelvankar

The new Constitution in India will come into force under the viceroyalty of a statesman acknowledged to be an expert in agricultural matters. It is natural, in the circumstances, that the question should be asked whether the coincidence has any significance for the peasant. Are we to see in the near future a striking improvement in agrarian conditions? Much as we may wish to take a hopeful view, the magnitude of the problem and the terms of its solution do not encourage optimism. In a predominantly agricultural country like India there is no general social problem which is not ultimately an agrarian problem—which does not, that is to say, touch the lives and occupations of the peasantry. Poverty, ill-health, illiteracy, inadequate communications—all these evils have their gravest incidence in the village. Of more immediate concern, however, to the cultivator—because more directly affecting his fortunes from year to year—are the problems, some scientific and others economic, which range from research into soils and seed varieties to the provision of suitable credit and marketing facilities.

Something is being done on these lines, but well-intentioned as the efforts are, their efficacy is governed and limited by a defect in the very foundations of the productive system, which, one may feel, nothing short of a blasting operation can remove. The bare physical fact is that the greater proportion of the peasantry have holdings too small to permit of any but the most primitive methods of cultivation. Not only are the holdings diminutive, but their total acreage is broken up into strips and patches and parcels of land scattered about the village. Hence the present limited resources of the peasant—his labour, supplemented by that of his family, a bullock or two, and his crude ineffectual antiquated implements—are

not utilised to the full. Although this situation had existed *in posse* for a long time, its dangers only became apparent when, during the last century, a phenomenal rise in population took place and obliged vastly increased numbers to seek a livelihood in agriculture. Other occupations there were none, or they were rapidly diminishing: village industries, badly hit by competition from abroad, where machinery had already established itself, offered no openings; on the contrary, they disgorged multitudes of workless craftsmen and drove them on to the land for employment. Fresh tracts were no doubt brought under cultivation wherever possible; but there necessarily comes a point beyond which the only way to give a man a separate property is to break up an existing one, however small it may be.

Besides population, two new factors came into play which, through interaction with the ancient land system, have set in motion the main currents in the present situation. The first is the principle of private property. It is not altogether unknown, in certain restricted areas, in the Mogul Empire; and there are those who doubt whether it may be said to obtain in its entirety even under British rule. But these uncertainties are academic; for, whatever may be the position *vis-à-vis* the State, the practical result of the Revenue Settlements was to abolish the joint control of the village over adjacent lands and fields and to create in its place individual and separate responsibility. The principal systems of land tenure (*zamindari* and *ryotwari*), although they denote different relations with the Government, and suggest a difference also in the size of the property held, have this in common—that they invest the holder with virtually full rights of ownership.

At the same time, the village lost its isolation. It became an organic part of a complex legal and economic system; money and monetary values gained unprecedented importance, owing mainly to the necessity of paying taxes and other dues in cash; and trade, formerly confined to luxuries and superfluities, swept the peasant under the sway of world prices and world requirements as conveyed to him by the local middleman. The self-sufficiency of the village, the stability of the relations of its members one with the other, were gone for ever: they were dissolved by the steady, the insidious and irresistible power of money. Law and con-

tractual obligations and rights replaced custom. The fields themselves acquired 'negotiability.' Within the village, among the peasants themselves, ownership had no precise legal significance in pre-British India: it was simply a matter of customary *de facto* possession by each family of its ancestral holding (though, it must be added, there was usually a non-cultivating owner exercising a claim, real or fictitious, to a share of the produce). Grazing rights, and access to water, woodlands, etc., were shared by all alike; and the village collectively exercised the measure of control and supervision required by the exigencies of the open-field method of cultivation. The moneylender, in an economy which almost completely dispensed with money, was a very minor figure; in any case, his power was kept in check by the fact that the leasing, sale or mortgage of land were not admitted to be within the sole competence of the individual but had to be approved by the community as a whole.

Now the forces released during the last century, working upon the old system, have tended not so much to transform it as to relax its safeguards and strengthen its evils. The *zamindars* were given proprietary rights over large estates, partly in the hope that they would devote themselves to land development, introduce new methods, and improve conditions all round. They certainly make full use of their right to receive rents (in many cases they exact rack-rents) and they levy diverse tributes, legally and illegally, on their tenantry (the position in some districts can only be described as mediæval in the worst sense); but there is nothing in their tradition or background to incline them towards agricultural pursuits, and in return for all their privileges and perquisites they render no service of the slightest value to agriculture.

Again, the free market in land is only leading to the deterioration of the cultivator's lot. His financial difficulties constantly put him in the power of the moneylender or trader, or some member of the urban professional classes; and since his chief assets are his legal rights, it is not long before he is compelled to part with them. He continues to remain, however, on his land, as a sub-tenant or tenant-at-will now, subsisting at his master's mercy. Even in the provinces commonly supposed to be strongholds of peasant proprietorship, a large and increasing proportion of agriculturists are

being reduced to this state of semi-slavery. Meanwhile, the fragmentation of the holdings goes steadily forward. It is promoted not only by the break-up of the joint-family, but by the fact that, in a country where land is at a premium, it is often highly profitable to divide a holding, irrespective of its size, and lease it to a number of tenants or under-tenants.

The British Raj, in short, has effected nothing less than an agrarian revolution. It has subjected a mediæval system to the influences of money, trade and individualism. In other parts of the world, too, a similar change has occurred; but because, as in Western Europe, it was accompanied by a deliberate effort to reorganise the land, and industrial expansion simultaneously absorbed the growing population, its result was greater productive efficiency. In India, during the corresponding phase, industrial activity languished, and the economic foundations of agriculture were left unaltered, or altered for the worse. This is largely why the peasant to-day 'finds himself a kind of serf tied to plots of land which are gradually crumbling away.'

If we exclude a minority of solvent and relatively prosperous peasants whose legal position is sound and whose 'farms' are of a reasonable acreage, we may sum up the situation to-day by saying that we have, on one side, the actual tillers of the soil, who put their scanty resources, their knowledge and experience into the land in the struggle to make it yield a sufficient harvest, and, on the other, a less numerous group which contributes little of positive benefit to agriculture, yet has acquired the right, either by original grant or subsequent encroachment, to squeeze the peasant within the limits of expediency. And underlying the relations between the two is the smallness of the average holding and its excessive fragmentation. A vicious circle is thus at work: uneconomic holding, poverty, indebtedness, expropriation, poverty at a lower level, and again the uneconomic holding. The question of population is, of course, intimately bound up with these issues. It would nevertheless be futile to rest in the hope that improvement would come about through a fall in the birth rate, desirable as it may be in itself. Even then it would at the most ensure that the position did not continue to deteriorate, in no way would it alter the fact that the position has already deteriorated to an alarming extent.

Industrial development on an extensive scale might afford some relief and help to lighten the pressure on the land, but it is beset with difficulties of another sort, and the prospects are uncertain.

The authorities have not, indeed, been inactive in face of this situation. A number of laws have been passed to control evils such as indebtedness and arbitrary eviction, but their total effect is negligible: there are too many gaps in them, and suitable machinery for their prompt and meticulous enforcement is not provided for. Their failure must, however, be traced, in the last analysis, to a deeper cause. They do not seek anything more than to stabilise the *status quo*, and arm the peasant with special rights against landlord and money-lender, on the assumption, evidently, that tenancy and its corollaries are not incompatible with efficient agriculture. The assumption may be valid in some countries; but in India, where intense competition prevails not so much to earn higher profits from the land as to satisfy the desperate need for subsistence and employment, by acquiring or retaining a field, or a fragment of a field, the only circumstance that can make tenancy tolerable—equality of bargaining power between the parties—does not exist. And in its absence every measure designed for the peasant's protection is frustrated by his overriding land-hunger, and usury and absenteeism thrive in despite of the law, and at times with the passive and helpless connivance of the peasant. This was the Irish experience in the last century, and it is India's in the present.

There are experts who declare that the vicious circle can only be broken by a more resolute promotion of competitive capitalist farming. Private enterprise and the ambition for personal advancement should be fostered, they say, by every available means, so that the peasant would be induced to enlarge his holdings by purchase or lease, and learn to exploit them by modern scientific methods. These precepts are in harmony with the growing commercial spirit of the country, and they have an instant appeal to those who find themselves comparatively well off even under the existing organisation. In Russia, it will be recalled, a similar policy of 'betting on the strong' was initiated by Stolypin. To pursue it to any length in India would be to pave the way for a serious

upheaveal. Multitudes, driven off the land by the superior economic power of the enterprising peasant, and unable to find other work, would be thrown into stark destitution; and the agrarian disorders that are bound to follow would be neither mild nor fruitful. Statesmanship must strive to avert, not hasten, that crisis.

And it can, perhaps, be averted, but certainly not by any feeble or half-hearted measures. The problem is too grave for tinkering. Rooted at its centre, and affecting every ramification of the system, are, as we have seen: (1) the rift between ownership and the financial interests associated with it, on one hand, and the real agriculturist, who is the peasant, on the other; and (2) the unchecked liberty to sell, divide, tease or mortgage the land. These factors must tend, in theory, to maximise productive efficiency; in actual experience, and over the country at large, they make for precisely the opposite results: they steadily undermine efficiency and lower the peasant's status. It is essential, therefore, to remove these twin sources of corruption, and establish an agrarian system where ownership is identified with cultivation and 'free trade in land' is subjected to severe restrictions. Alternative proposals and policies lead nowhere, or lead, all too clearly, to disaster.

If such a reform were carried out, our troubles would still not be over, but we should at least have—what we lack to-day—a sound basis for constructive effort. The indifference of the peasant, for instance, his inertia, of which we often hear, is due not only to innate conservatism but to the intense feeling of hopelessness engendered in him by present conditions and his knowledge that whatever profit is to be had by discarding traditional methods and adopting the new ways would infallibly go into other pockets than his own. If the peasant is really to be educated, psychological obstacles of this kind must be broken down and his independence and sense of responsibility restored to him. Similarly with the question of fragmentation. Some of its worst features are amenable to correction within a relatively short time, but the peasant must first be relieved of the fear that he would in any way be victimised in the process. It is true that, even so, the farms would be small—too small; but the attempt to consolidate them into larger units of cultivation, as technical

considerations may dictate, could then be pushed forward with some chance of success, by demonstrating to the peasant the practical benefits of the scheme and appealing to his self-interest. An approach toward co-operative production would thus be rendered possible. And co-operation for other purposes as well, for credit, marketing, etc.—upon which great hopes are fixed—is known to have a much better prospect of development among peasants who enjoy the security and freedom of ownership than among a harassed tenantry clinging to the soil on harsh and precarious terms.

A solution on these lines is imperative if agriculture in India is to be rescued from the forces which are sapping its vitality. Legislative action is needed, of course, to give concrete shape to it, and for that we must wait upon the general movement of events in India. Already there are signs that peasant organisations here and there have discovered that the key to the problem lies in the political sphere. It is, however, improbable that the machinery to be set up under the new Constitution will facilitate the necessary changes. Opposition to them would in any case be strong; but, as even friendly critics have pointed out, the Government of India Act lavishly loads the scales in favour of the moneyed and landed interests on the plea that public order cannot otherwise be preserved. It is a dubious plea; for no constitutional forms can safeguard peace and order in India so surely, and lastingly, as a well-conceived programme of land reform and the thorough eradication of the causes of agrarian distress. The Royal Commission over which Lord Linlithgow presided some years ago made the most exhaustive study of these problems that has yet been carried out, and there is nothing in the present article which is not consistent with the bulk of the evidence there tendered, or indeed with the conclusions of the Commission itself. We may assume, therefore, that Lord Linlithgow is fully aware of the urgency of agrarian reform in India; and it cannot be doubted that his assumption of office as Viceroy will do much to push things forward in that direction; but even a Viceroy is not omnipotent, and his success must depend to a large extent upon the co-operation extended to him by the landed interests in India.

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THE REFORM OF THE LAW

X. Legal Education

By R. A. Eastwood, LL.D

There are too many people in the world to-day who want to reform what they do not understand, and too many also who oppose reform because they believe, often with reason, that they do understand the working of the institutions to which the reformer's zeal is directed. To the former it is necessary to point out that true reform, reform which reconstructs instead of destroying the objects of its attention, must start from an accurate understanding of things as they are; and persons of the latter class should be brought to realise that an institution is not socially desirable merely because its working is understandable and fascinating to trained minds. Reform must commence with accurate knowledge, and it must be influenced by vision; and, if that be true, it would seem to follow that the most effective starting-point for law reform is a proper system of legal education, a system which gives an accurate knowledge of things as they are and yet leaves the student with a critical attitude which causes him to ask whether things, as they are, are the best that might be. Judged by that standard, it would seem, the legal education supplied by the universities of this country is lamentably lacking.

It must be admitted, of course, that the universities are not the only bodies responsible for legal education to-day. There are also the systems of legal education administered by the professional bodies, by the Council of Legal Education for those who wish to become barristers and by the Law Society for aspirants to admission to the so-called lower branch of the legal profession, a branch, by the way, which in fact appears to be 'lower' neither in ability nor in earnings than the other. These two professional systems are of com-

paratively recent date. It was not until 1843 that a candidate had to pass an examination in law in order to be admitted as a solicitor, and it was not until 1877 that the Law Society obtained complete control over that examination. It was not until 1872 that the passing of an examination in law became a pre-requisite for call to the Bar. It was only to be expected, therefore, that these two professional systems should overlap to some extent with the university system of education in English Law, the beginning of which dates from the appointment, in 1758, of Blackstone as Vinerian Professor at Oxford.

The overlapping continues, fortunately. The Council of Legal Education, for instance, will grant exemption from parts of its examinations to candidates who have passed approved university examinations in certain subjects. Theoretically, it would seem, exemption is a matter of special application in each case; but, in practice, a suitably prepared candidate appears to run little risk of his application being rejected. The Law Society grants exemptions according to more definite rules. A pupil who, before entering into articles of clerkship, has passed the Intermediate Examination for the degree of LL.B., or its equivalent, at any university in England or Wales may have the normal five years' period of pupilage reduced by six or twelve months, according to the preliminary examination on the basis of which he has entered upon his university course; and a graduate in Law need serve under articles for only three years, though this is a privilege which he shares with graduates in Arts and in Science as well. Moreover, the Law Society has made a definite concession to formal legal education in that it has caused to be made statutory the rule that no articled clerk shall be allowed to sit for his Final Examination for admission as a solicitor unless he shall present a certificate of having attended satisfactorily for a prescribed period a course of study at an 'approved law school,' which means, in practice, either a university law school or a law school of substantially equivalent status.

Welcome as they are, however, these are but minor concessions. The Council of Legal Education and the Law Society control between them the entrances to both branches of the legal profession, and they are prepared to admit, on the passing of prescribed examinations, persons who have

had little or no formal education in law or jurisprudence. Both bodies provide classes for those who wish to attend them, and those classes, within the scope of the subjects with which they deal, are as efficient as one could desire. But the fact remains that attendance during a full course is not compulsory. So it comes about that a candidate may be called to the Bar without ever having attended a single lecture in law and without having seen even one set of papers in a barrister's chambers. A distinguished member of the Bar once confessed to me that the first lecture in law which he ever attended was the first which he delivered himself. The position of the young solicitor is different from that of the young barrister. He has learned, at least, how a lawyer's office is run; but of formal legal education he need have no more than a minimum The Law Society's regulations on the subject of compulsory attendance at an approved law school say that the period of attendance shall amount to 'at least seventy-two hours'; and seventy-two hours is a very minute fraction of a period of pupilage which extends, normally, over a period of five years.

It is this lack of insistence, on the part of the professional bodies, on formal instruction which provides the university law schools with both their opportunity and their responsibility. The average boy who leaves a public school or a secondary school, with a professional career in prospect, desires a university degree; and the result is that the majority of would-be lawyers, and a growing number of others as well, receive a formal legal education in the shape of a university course. Yet it would seem that the majority of university courses in law are far from consonant with the needs of today. To me, at all events, they appear to be, at the same time, too narrow and too lacking in detail.

In the opening chapter of Blackstone's *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, a work which was founded on the lectures which that author delivered at Oxford, there are several pages devoted to a smoothly-phrased discussion of the 'utility of a knowledge of law.' One passage therefrom runs as follows:

> Let us . . begin with our gentlemen of independent estates and fortune, the most useful, as well as considerable, body of men in the nation. . . . It is their landed property, with its long and

> voluminous train of descents and conveyances, settlements, entails, and incumbrances, that forms the most intricate and most extensive object of legal knowledge. The thorough comprehension of these, in all their minute distinctions, is, perhaps, too laborious a task for any but a lawyer by profession; but still the understanding of a few leading principles, relating to estates and conveyancing, may form some check and guard upon a gentleman's inferior agents, and preserve him at least from very gross and notorious impositions.

Then the learned author proceeds to discuss the value of the study of law to other persons, to testators, to jurors, to justices of the peace, to members of Parliament, to the nobility, and so on. Always the underlying meaning of his words is clear. His audience should acquire an acquaintance with a 'few leading principles.' To acquire a knowledge of the law in detail would be 'too laborious a task'; for he is talking, not to men who have a career to make, but to those who have no need to make one; and he concludes:

> Few gentlemen now resort to the Inns of Court, but such as are intended for the profession; the rest of our gentry (not to say our nobility also) have usually retired to their estates, or visited foreign kingdoms, or entered upon public life, without any instruction in the laws of the land, and indeed with hardly any opportunity of gaining instruction, unless it has been afforded them at the universities.
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> That the universities are the proper places for affording assistance of this kind to gentlemen of all stations and degrees, cannot (I think) with any colour of reason be denied

These and other passages from Blackstone have been quoted so often by our academic lawyers that they have become almost sacrosanct; and I suspect that they have had a greater influence on our traditional methods of teaching law than has ever openly been avowed At all events, the insistence of our academicians is always on 'principles'; and it seems to me that some of the 'principles' which many of them teach are in danger of losing contact with the realities on which they ought to be founded. Quite recently I turned the pages of a book written by one who is regarded, deservedly, as a leader among our academic lawyers; because I was curious to know what a learned man had said about some recent decisions on the subject of restraint of trade. I found, and approved, his analysis of the recent cases. He

had read the reports of them, and he had brought a cultivated mind to a consideration of the arguments which had been used on behalf of the parties to them and to the doctrines on which the judges had based their decisions. But what struck me most forcibly was the fact that a very learned author stated the 'principle' governing contracts in restraint in a way which I hardly can regard as being consistent with the economic facts of to-day. He pointed out, as nearly every writer before him has pointed out, that our early common law judges set their faces sternly against contracts in restraint of trade and tended to hold that any contract which might interfere with the freedom of a man to dispose of his goods or his services as he wished was contrary to public policy and, therefore, void. Then he continued, following the tradition of writers on this subject, and said that as time went on the attitude of the courts towards restraint of trade changed and that some restraints were admitted as valid; and, finally, he pointed out that in the nineteenth century the whole of the law relating to contracts in restraint of trade was reviewed in a famous judgment in the House of Lords, wherein it was laid down that the test of the validity of a contract in restraint of trade is whether or not the restriction which it imposes is 'reasonable'—reasonable, that is to say, in the interests of the parties concerned and not injurious to the public It was on the basis of that decision that he, in common with most academic writers, sought to explain the recent cases; and, if one does not examine too closely the economic background of things, it is possible to explain them on that basis At all events, the judges who decided them used the word 'reasonable' quite a lot; but a realist cannot shut his eyes to the fact that some restraints have been held to be 'reasonable' which would have appalled men of a generation not very remote from our own.

It has been laid down, for instance, that if manufacturers combine to maintain prices and to protect their trade the court will not inquire, as a rule, into whether their agreement is 'reasonable' as between themselves; it will regard them as the best judges of that. In other words, they may agree to regulate their industry pretty much as they like, and the court will place on their activities the label 'reasonable' almost as a matter of course. That statement is subject to one qualifica-

tion only, and it is a theoretical qualification. It has been laid down that a trade protection agreement might be held to be invalid if it could be proved to constitute a 'pernicious monopoly'; but the judge who formulated that rule said that the onus of proving a 'pernicious monopoly' would be on the person alleging it, and, he added significantly, 'it would be no light one.' Most people would imagine that it would be an impossible one; for its discharge would depend on the possession of facts, relating to prices of raw materials, costing and the like, to which the objector would not be given access. Everybody engaged in the practice of law or of commerce knows as a fact that it is possible for a powerful trading combination to exclude altogether from the conduct of his chosen trade a trader who will not conform to its dictates, and the methods of the combination may be legally unassailable. Economically, that may or may not be desirable; my present point is that it is unfair to a student to label things for him with the nineteenth-century ticket 'reasonable,' and then turn him out into the world where he will find that we were talking about a monopoly.

Moreover, this same subject of restraint of trade has acquired an aspect of which I have not seen even a mention in a students' text-book. Since the war we have seen a remarkable series of statutes designed to assist industry to 'reorganise' itself Those statutes generally provide that a Minister may sanction and give statutory force to schemes produced by a majority, not necessarily anything like the whole, of those engaged in a certain trade; and schemes of that kind now are many. They represent the ultimate development of the doctrine of restraint of trade. With them there can be no question of 'reasonableness' or otherwise; they are statutory A substantial part of the economic life of the country is conducted under them; yet they are not mentioned in a single students' text-book, and I do not believe that the average lecturer ever mentions them in a classroom. I was startled recently by a question put to me by a club acquaintance, a young practising barrister and a recent graduate of one of the older universities. 'What,' he asked, 'is the Milk Marketing Board, and where can I find anything about it? I have to represent a farmer at an arbitration.'

His difficulty is that of the average university-trained

lawyer. In the natural sciences the academic investigator generally leads the way. In legal science he often lags behind and contents himself with recording the achievements of the practising branch of his profession; and that is why his students often are bewildered by the contents of modern law when they emerge into the world in which it is applied. The fact is that whilst teaching methods and the contents of courses at most universities still show the influence of Blackstone, the contents of our law itself have changed substantially since Blackstone's day. Nowadays, the law touches aspects of life which prevailing opinion a few generations ago would have regarded as being altogether outside the scope of State concern. Moreover, since legislation is the only machinery of law reform left to us, we live in an age in which statute law, and in consequence technical interpretation, bulks larger and larger. In view of that, it seems impossible to claim that we do our duty to our students if we equip them merely with a few broad 'principles' of common law and of equity; for, as soon as they get into the world of practical affairs, they find that the cases in which the 'principles' are applied are the exception and those from which the 'principles' are excluded are the rule.

There has just been published in London a comparative study between the English and the Continental attitudes towards a certain aspect of commercial law. Its author is a young German lawyer who, after some years of mature experience in his own country, came to this country and read for an English degree in law; and I cull the following passage from his work:

> When the student of the law of contract has succeeded in mastering the rules of the common law he is confronted with a chaos of individual sets of provisions for various sorts of contracts altering, and, as often as not, setting at nought, the efforts of the common law to balance the conflicting interests of citizens and State in a just and equitable way. Only in a superficial sense is it true to say that there exists one law relating to the sale of goods. In fact, several laws obtain for the sale of corn, of silk, of cotton, of machines, etc., and these examples could be multiplied by describing the situation in other trades.

That passage seems to me to be significant of the problem which is encountered by every student of law when he enters

the world from a university. To most young men the situation is bewildering; and, if education is (as I believe it to be) a training for life in the world, the teacher should attempt at least to lessen the bewilderment.

But what, I shall be asked, do I propose? English law is too vast a subject for a student to acquire any but a part of it; and you cannot find time to teach the law relating to the sale of corn and of silk and of all the other things. I do not propose that we should. What I do propose is that we should recast our courses in English law in such a way as to make them touch at least those aspects of it which are most important in modern life, and, above all, what we do teach should be carried to a stage at which it touches reality. A course in the law of real property, for instance, should not be concluded without some elementary instruction in the art of conveyancing. A student being instructed in the law relating to restraint of trade should be told of the existence and general characteristics of statutory schemes and of where to find the details of them A course in the law of contract should introduce the student to the special peculiarities of such matters as insurance and bills of exchange; and I doubt whether anyone should be allowed to emerge from a law course without a passing acquaintance with the limited liability company, which can be, according to the use which is made of it, either the greatest menace to, or the greatest convenience of, modern commerce.

Such a course, I claim, would be in the true Blackstonian tradition; for did not Blackstone say, in the course of the pages from which I have already quoted, that 'as every subject is interested in the preservation of the laws, it is incumbent upon every man to be acquainted with those, at least, with which he is immediately concerned'? The only difference between his time and ours is that nowadays the scope of law is so very wide that an individual is 'immediately concerned' with more law than was a man in Blackstone's day, and, therefore, there is more to be learned. Moreover, experience in the application of my own methods has shown me that students assimilate much more readily a course of the kind which I have indicated than the traditional and more abstract courses. The mind of the average young Englishman works from the concrete to the abstract more

frequently than in the reverse direction; and if you once put him in touch with reality you arouse an interest which will enable you to lead him to deeper thinking than ever you would be able to do if you approached him, in the first instance, with an abstraction.

The chief burden of my scheme is likely to fall on the teacher; for it must be admitted that there are many teachers of law to-day who have had a minimum of practical experience. I know of one case in which a man was appointed to a university post before he had seen even a single set of papers relating to an actual case. That, it is true, is an exceptional instance; but many a man is appointed to a full-time teaching post when he has had no more practical experience than is afforded by a few months of pupilage in the chambers of a barrister. In my view, universities should insist on a more active experience in the persons whom they appoint; and those who are appointed should endeavour to maintain some kind of active contact with the practising side of the profession. The view that to be a scholar one must be a recluse is untenable in the modern world No one expects a teacher of engineering to do without a workshop, or a chemist to learn without a laboratory; and the laboratory of the social scientist, be he jurist or anything else, is the world itself The problem is, I confess, a difficult one It is neither possible nor desirable for the average teacher of law to be a general practitioner; but there are growing opportunities to-day for teachers of law to engage in work, usually public work, of a legal or quasi-legal nature, and, fortunately, some are taking advantage of those opportunities. Such work has at least one advantage to those who participate in it. It enables them to see law in action, and it shows them that a rule which theoretically may seem desirable in a text-book may sometimes work real hardship in its application. In other words, it causes them to consider law in relation to human values and activities; and that is the first step in the making of good law. Nor need such activities detract from academic achievement. In a generation which can see several of its leading teachers of law distinguishing themselves, at the same time, in the world of affairs, it would be invidious to select individual examples. An example from a past generation must suffice; and I will content myself with suggesting

that the academic value of that classic work, Kenny's *Outlines of Criminal Law*, was enhanced and not hindered by the fact that its author was able to find time to sit as a chairman of quarter sessions.

I am aware that some of my readers will be accusing me by now of having forgotten an important fact: namely, that some of those who read law at a university—and they are a growing number—do not intend to enter the legal profession. I have not forgotten it; but I would point out that the majority of them are not Blackstone's gentlemen who intend to retire to their estates. Statistics recently issued show that during the year 1936–37 more than one-half of the undergraduates at Oxford were receiving financial assistance from other sources than their families, relations and friends. They, at all events, will need a post-university career; and it is a safe assumption that most of the remainder will have similar ambitions. What is true of Oxford is probably true of other universities. In other words, it is a safe assumption that the average undergraduate to-day contemplates a career; and, be that career in law or in anything else, it can scarcely be hindered by the accuracy and application needed for such a course as I have indicated. In any case, if a student chooses to read law, he should be given a realistic view of his subject.

A more formidable criticism of my methods may be that I am in danger of training a race of mere technicians. That is a point which must be considered with care. There is no greater enemy to progress than the man who, having mastered the technicalities of a subject, finds in the working of them complete intellectual satisfaction; and it must be admitted that the technicalities of law can afford a very fascinating exercise indeed. The danger, therefore, is real; but my reply is that I have never yet encountered anything worth doing which did not involve an element of danger. A shot-gun in the hands of a farmer is potentially dangerous; but it would be an ill-equipped farm that was not supplied with a shot-gun. As a rule, danger is inherent, not in a thing itself, but in the use that is made of it; and I would try to ensure that my student knew the correct use of the technicalities he had learned.

Much, in this direction, can be done by correct methods

of teaching. In these days of specialisation, when every specialist lays claims to the superior cultural value of his own chosen field of study, we are apt to forget that culture depends more on how we teach than on what we teach; and experience shows that some branches of law which people tend to reject as too technical for formal teaching can be taught in a way which will serve a real educational purpose. It is possible, for instance, for a competent lecturer to take a modern purchase deed, to analyse it into its component parts, and then, by reference to the history of real property and conveyancing, to show how each part is the result either of historical accident or deliberate design. In doing so he will not detract from, but rather enhance, the cultural value of legal history. In fact, it is doubtful if the history of nineteenth-century reform can be fully appreciated if any other method be adopted; and this method has the added advantage that it gives the student some training in that precise use of language which is of the essence of draftsmanship. Its only disadvantage is to the teacher who uses it conscientiously; for he must have a knowledge of legal history, which the average practitioner does not possess, and the trained ability to draw a deed, which the average legal historian does not possess. Both, however, can be acquired by those who will.

Again, I would seek to avoid the dangers that lie in technicality by the nature of the preliminary education which I would require of every law student. In my view, the average law student comes to his studies too immature to appreciate the facts with which his subject deals. For that reason, if I were granted the opportunity to realise my ideal, I would make every degree in law or jurisprudence a post-graduate degree, available only to those who had graduated already in some other subject. About what that subject should be I would not be dogmatic, provided only that the student's teachers had given him some maturity of outlook and, above all, had taught him always to seek for cause as well as effect. But the requirement of a preliminary degree, in these days of middle-class economic stringency, is an unattainable ideal; and so, for the non-graduate, I would substitute a year, at least, devoted mainly to the study of political philosophy and history—above all, economic and social history He would then come to his technical studies knowing that laws have

been made with an end in view, and his technical studies would enable him to decide to what extent that end had been attained and to what extent reform should be sought.

Thereafter he should learn the materials for reform. For that reason I would have him complete his course by a final year devoted to such subjects as Jurisprudence and Roman Law, which very often are taken too soon. As an undergraduate, I had to study both subjects before I knew anything of English Law at all. The result was that, not having the wherewithal to criticise the juristic theories of my teachers, I just memorised them and passed, I was told, quite competently. As for Roman Law, it was to my immaturity a thing dead and resurrected. I had never seen English Law in action; how, then, could I imagine Roman Law in action? Yet to a student who knows already the outlines of his own law, and, above all, has studied that law in relation to social and economic needs, Roman Law can serve a most useful purpose as an introduction to comparative study. Roman Law, even to-day, is the basis of living systems, as anyone who reads an opinion by a Scots lawyer will realise; and if Roman Law were but studied by a student who had come to regard his own law as a living reality, he would have commenced a process of value for purposes of future legislation, a process the value of which would be increased if there were added also a comparative study of a chosen subject in the English and some Continental system.

So I would divide a law course into three stages: first, a preliminary stage in which the student should be taught that law is a means to an end, an engine of social progress; second, a stage in which he should learn accurately and in some detail what the law of his own country has become; and third, a stage in which he might acquire ideas for its improvement.

R. A. EASTWOOD.

SIR EVELYN RUGGLES-BRISE AND PRISON REFORM

By Shane Leslie

Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise died in 1935. He was the founder of the Borstal System of Prison Reform, which should, in the proper fitness of things, have been called by his name. It was called after the minor prison near Chatham which was the scene of his first experiment with juvenile crime. That experiment, as carried out by himself during a long tenure of office at the head of the Prison Commission, has revolutionised the treatment of crime in this country. It has interested and affected the penal workers of all civilised countries. There is a strong reason, then, for placing the name of Ruggles-Brise with the honoured names of Romilly and Howard. It is remarkable that different Societies to-day are associated with their two names. There is a Howard Society. There is a Romilly Society There is not a Ruggles-Brise Society ; but anybody working to-day for the improvement of system or prisoner may consider themselves as honorary members of such a body, whether it exists or not.

At the moment of writing prison reform is in the air. The world in every department of civilisation is certainly changing. It has been said that in England the science of penology has always been in arrears. It is forgotten that while Ruggles-Brise was chairman of the Prison Commission the progress of reform was not only steady, but that at several periods England led the penal world towards happier conditions for both warders and warded.

Who was Evelyn Ruggles-Brise ? He is remembered in Whitehall as a strong-minded humanitarian, who had his own way, although with tremendous difficulties, during his twenty-five years' tenure of the prison chairmanship. He came of the old landed gentry, one of those once many County families

who are now, as in the days of Augustus, so John Buchan has reminded us, being pushed aside by carpet-baggers and *nouveaux-riches* and too often despoiled of their inheritances by death duties. The family of Ruggles-Brise fortunately still hold their own in Essex at Finchingfield. Sir Evelyn's father, Sir Samuel, was member of Parliament in the palmiest days of Queen Victoria. His nephew is a member for an Essex Division to-day. Sir Evelyn and his brothers were brought up at the historical home of the family, Spains Hall. He became a first-rate shot, especially at partridge, and a devotee of country life

The history of British expansion is largely made up of the struggles and adventures of the cadets, and Evelyn Ruggles-Brise had the moral advantage of being a younger son. He was one of five sons—and there were seven daughters—whose parents lived to celebrate their golden wedding. It was all in perfect accordance with the spacious years of Victoria.

As a second son he was set in the way of working hard. Private schools were very tough, but the tutoring was good. Ruggles-Brise took a scholarship at Eton. He made his way through a College career, but, by the time he was in the Eton Eleven and playing 'wall' for College, his father had been so bitterly criticised for allowing his son to take a scholarship worth £100 a year that he ordered his boy to become an Oppidan. Only an Etonian knows what that means. Obediently, Ruggles-Brise cut himself off from his friends in college and assumed the captainship of Tarver's House. His physical strength and athletic prowess enabled him to hold his own. He played for the Oppidans against his old friends at the wall, and won the unique distinction of wearing the colours of both. He played for Eton against Harrow in 1875 and 1876, and in the latter year he played in an eleven which defeated both Winchester and Harrow by an innings.

Hard athletic life had been his. He passed through the roughness of College as it was under Hornby, and he had reached the stage of power which only athletic distinction can confer at Eton. He would need all these assets in the future. He went up to Oxford, and devoted himself so hard to the study of Greek and Plato under Jowett that he took his First Class in 1880 in *Literæ Humaniores*. All was well. He had

only to look round to find a career where position and competence were assured to such a record as he carried with him. He had not yet cast his eye on matters humanitarian. The Victorians did not trouble much about their prisons, any more than about their sanitation. It was presumed that all was conducted for the best behind the scenes by the best of permanent officials.

Oxford had proved a more gruelling discipline than Eton, with the life of ease and pride permitted to the successful cricketer. To win his Class he had had to take up a simple life and work long hours covering the whole field of classical philosophy. In this he always agreed that Aristotle was the stiffest fence of all. But his brain was stretched and strengthened for the enormous wastes of office work over which it was to carry him. He began to drop his athletic friends save as an occasional relaxation. They included Forbes, who won the record for throwing the cricket ball while yet at Eton, and young Rhodes, who had been in the Eton Eleven. He used to gamble with the elder brother Cecil Rhodes, who was then only known to fame at Oxford as 'the brother of the Eton cricketer'!

With the choice of the Bar or Diplomacy before him, Ruggles-Brise preferred to compete for the home Civil Service. Accidentally, he had read a notice in *The Times* of examinations forthcoming in a service he was eventually to mark considerably; this required a knowledge of subjects of which Eton and Oxford had given him scant store—modern history and literature, and even the foreign languages which English diplomats then proudly left to foreigners to learn. But the great coach Baptist Scoones filled the deficiency. Ruggles-Brise found himself placed in the first dozen out of hundreds.

Six months later he was offered a position in the Home Office under Sir William Harcourt, who made him his assistant private secretary. For ten years he served a succession of Home Secretaries, under whom, of course, his future field in the prisons lay. They included Harcourt, Henry Matthews (later Lord Llandaff), Lord Cross, and Mr. Childers. The prisons were, of course, under the Home Office. The Prison Commission is under its own responsible head, and the Secretary of State was not inclined to interfere with such an

established martinet as the late Sir Edmund Du Cane. Sir Edmund held sway while Home Secretary succeeded Home Secretary. Ruggles-Brise seemed equally permanent in his position, but the underworld of crime did not reach him in the guise of reform or discipline, save in a series of cases which his chief had to deal with as one wielding the Royal prerogative.

Under Harcourt he enjoyed a spell of Fenians and dynamiters. He heard their famous explosion in Westminster Hall from the Home Office. It was on that occasion that he used a telephone for the first time between the Home Office and Scotland Yard. The first day of Mr. Childers' tenure of office was marked by the 'Mayfair Riots.' But it was under Henry Matthews that he drank deep of a series of *causes célèbres*. There were the exploits of 'Jack the Ripper,' whose real name, known or unknown, is set with Dick Turpin and Dr. Crippen in the unhallowed annals of English crime. Then there was the Cass case, when the Tory Government lost a division in the House on the irreproachability of an arrested but respectable female of that name.

And there was the case of Mrs Maybrick, an American lady alleged to have poisoned her husband, though the dose she administered was not sufficent to prove mortal. And, most nerve-racking of all, there was the Lipski case. The prisoner had been condemned to death by Judge Stephen, but his innocence was being loudly asserted by Mr Stead in the *Review of Reviews*. Public clamour had been raised against the Government, who were anxious that Matthews should be able to find an excuse for a reprieve at the last moment. In fact, with angry crowds outside Buckingham Palace and the Home Office, matters had become decidedly uncomfortable. Lipski was due for execution on a Monday. All Saturday the judge and the Home Secretary, attended by Ruggles-Brise, sat in vain consideration of the case. It was clear that Lipski had killed his paramour in squalid circumstances. They agreed to sit on Sunday again at the Home Office, and as the long day wore itself out, they avoided lights for fear of the attentions of the crowd without. A storm darkened London and the judge continued to darken counsel. Hours of agony passed by, and the judge still paced up and down. The great brain of Henry Matthews could no longer brace

itself on the facts. The Home Secretary leaned back exhausted in his chair and prayed for guidance. At that moment the door opened and a slip of paper was handed to Ruggles-Brise in an envelope. One glance told him that, for once, prayer had been signally and directly answered. It was Lipski's confession, which his Rabbi had persuaded him to sign. If Lipski had not signed, he would probably not have been executed the next day.

Ruggles-Brise had every reason to be knowledgeable about criminals, although the conditions and working of prisons had not yet entered into his perspective. His ambitions turned elsewhere, and at one time he was corresponding with Lord Lansdowne on the chance of becoming the Viceregal secretary in India. But Fate, in the person of Henry Matthews, turned him elsewhere. By 1892 Matthews was ascending to a higher place as Lord Llandaff, to a House where Mr. Stead would cease to trouble him and execution days would not spoil his Sabbaths. Fortunately, he bethought himself of a rise for his faithful secretary Ruggles-Brise as well, and asked Her Majesty to appoint him a Commissioner of Prisons in place of Admiral Hornby, who had recently retired.

The formidable old chief of the Commission, Sir Edmund Du Cane, had his own candidate, but wrote welcoming the new Commissioner, whom he expected to follow and carry out his views with almost the same obedience required from prison governors and warders. Since 1877 all the local prisons, as well as the convict prisons, had been administered by this one man. The penitential idea was in the foreground. Reform of character or restoration of responsibility scarcely crossed the minds of the old officials as a possible or even a desirable aim. But many behind the scenes were wondering how to initiate reform. The system was no doubt to blame, but Sir Edmund Du Cane was the obvious target. It is easy to blame him, but neither the public nor Parliament were interested.

To-day, when everyone has a soft heart for prisoners and prison reform is a recurring topic, it is not easy to imagine the mental and moral condition of the Victorian prisoners. Not that there was lunacy or immorality, but that they bred apathy and sheer misery. While the prisoners were inmates they

were forbidden to hope—except for a release into renewed hopelessness. A day was to dawn when Ruggles-Brise was to select the treadmill for his special aversion and final abolition. The traditional picture showed some twenty men treading in compartments the steps which drove round the immense wheel which at least ground the corn for the prison. No better illustration would be found for what Oscar Wilde ironically called 'humanity's machine.' At best the prisons were regarded as rather hopeless, and therefore to be served as a joke on the public under the facetious appellation of 'Her Majesty's Hotels.'

Very soon Sir Edmund Du Cane discovered that he had a Commissioner on the Prison Commission who preferred to think and speak for himself. There is no need to hash up memories of what English prisons were in the 'eighties and 'nineties. By 1896 *The Ballad of Reading Gaol* was on its way, and there can be no doubt that it carried the exact atmosphere. It is often said that Oscar Wilde's prison term was a turning-point in the history of prison reform; that his poignant pen started people sympathising with prisoners and execrating the system. There is something in that, for Ruggles-Brise was a reader. The truth of the matter was that a very powerful permanent official had arrived behind the scenes. There had been a fierce disputation on the Commission, ending in stand-up rivalry between Sir Edmund Du Cane and Ruggles-Brise. Du Cane's view was that of an old officer drawn from the Royal Engineers—that the other Commissioners owed him obedience. Ruggles-Brise, with the Eton cricketing tradition and a Balliol First Class behind him, demurred. The result was a first-class row, which need not be referred to except to show that the Civil Service can find its own reformers within, and not necessarily in the Home Secretary and Ministers in Parliament. Ruggles-Brise summed up his duel under the telling phrase of 'David and Goliath.' Sir Edmund was worthy, diligent, conscientious, and possessed many of the bull-dog qualities which have made the British race. But his Governors were chosen after his own utterly insensitive and unimaginative determination to make prisoners feel that they were being punished all the time whether for their own good or not. Sir Edmund's simple philosophy was to make prisons so strict and unpleasant that prisoners

would think many times before they took the risk of returning to prison.

There is no need to describe the whole of the encounter which led to the withdrawal of Sir Edmund Du Cane. Only a year before he died Ruggles-Brise said that it was all begun through Dr. Morrison (the present venerable Rector of Marylebone), who was chaplain at Wandsworth Prison and wrote an article presumably criticising prisons. Sir Edmund was very indignant, and sent Dr. Morrison word that what he had done was strictly against the laws regulating the prison service and that he was dismissed. Dr. Morrison had had prison reform at heart for a long time, and went to Massingham of the *Daily Chronicle*, which published several articles. In the end Sir Edmund resigned; he was the last of the Bastille-keepers, but, unfortunately, his views that prisoners should be made to eat the bread of affliction were shared by the Governors he had appointed.

By this time there was a demand for light and reform in certain circles. Fortunately, the Liberal Party was in office, and Mr. Asquith was Home Secretary. Mr. Asquith had never met Ruggles-Brise, but he was immensely struck by one of his reports. Asquith appointed a Committee which adopted a number of recommendations which had not appealed to the Chairman of the Commission. Of this Committee Asquith wrote on leaving office: 'I have appointed the best Committee ever seen, who will go on with my work. Ruggles-Brise, who is the head, is a splendid little fellow.' Mr. Asquith simply replaced Sir Edmund Du Cane by Ruggles-Brise. This was in June 1895.

Ruggles-Brise as a young man of thirty-eight found himself in sole and complete charge of all the prisons of the country. Lord Llandaff wrote delightedly: 'Nothing in Asquith's administration is better than this last act.' Asquith's note on appointing him was a simple request for the Committee's recommendations to be carried into effect, and he added: 'I believe that you have the disposition, as I know that you have the ability, to bring about this object.' But it took Ruggles-Brise twenty-five years of downright hard work to achieve what he had in mind. Fortunately, he came to the task in the prime of his life. He became his own master and the disposer of an entire branch of the Civil Service before he

was forty. Results are best obtained by benevolent dictatorship wielded by men who are not looking for promotion. As an old Etonian and one of Jowett's Balliol hopefuls, he felt himself at no disadvantage when dealing with men who were enjoying a public career as compared with the hidden life of the permanent servant in great offices.

Ruggles-Brise always kept a letter written to him, on becoming Chairman, by a convict who prayed: 'May the cause of humanity (always remember that a prisoner is still a human being) find in you a merciful and enlightened administrator. Now 'tis possible to do great things in the interests of your fallen brethren, neglected too long.'

There was another stimulant to his zeal which was always on his desk: the photograph of two children prisoners in regular prison garb with a warder between. It was the sending of young prisoners to herd with the old 'lags' which struck him as something which required eradication. It is well known how he gave the best years of his life to this. In the same way that Lord Lister had observed the gangrening of wounds in hospitals caused by contagion to the air and had successfully applied a treatment of asepsis, so Ruggles-Brise immediately formulated a system whereby the uncontaminated youth who chanced to find himself in a prison was not immediately infected by the criminal atmosphere.

He found his reforms were steadily blocked from high quarters; but he had several of the most enlightened judges in his confidence. Mr. Justice Alfred Wills communicated with him at length on his experiences in the criminal courts. They are interesting letters dating from the 'nineties and will find their place in the biography of Ruggles-Brise. Readers who peruse them in the future will rub their eyes when they find as the privately expressed opinion of an experienced judge that, in his opinion, English prisons were 'utterly unsuited for children'! Who ever supposed they were? It had been so all through the golden age of Queen Victoria, but after Ruggles-Brise became Chairman of her Prison Commission there were no more child prisoners.

Having settled a better way to deal with children, he turned to the problem of youth: young boys who were sent to prison as young adventurous fellows who had foolishly made a mistake or two, and who emerged sullen criminals.

The Borstal System was his answer.

It was interesting how the judges, who detested the sentences they often had to inflict on youths, looked towards the Prison Commission to ease their path. Here is Mr. Justice Wills writing to Ruggles-Brise in 1897 from the Judge's lodging at Edgbaston :

> Will you kindly spare me five minutes? I have to try here a youth of 15 for a manslaughter which looks very like a murder. A sentence of 12 months might—or anything like it—would be, if the case turns out what it appears upon paper to be, really inadequate. But public feeling revolts against penal servitude as it is generally understood for a long term, inflicted upon a mere lad. Have I not read or heard, I am not sure that I did not hear something of it from you, that improved modifications of penal servitude have been devised by which youths and other persons not known bad characters have the severity of ordinary penal servitude discipline relaxed ?

The tenor of Ruggles-Brise's reply can be judged from Mr. Justice Wills' next letter, which we quote as follows :

> I am very much obliged for your letter In one sense it increases my difficulty here, for the punishment I shall have to inflict is, in this case, quite inadequate, if the facts come out as they appear upon paper. But in face of what you tell me, I can hardly send this boy to penal servitude. I do hope your efforts will be successful and that we shall have some prison for juvenile offenders where the discipline is better adapted to their age I have always thought that the ordinary discipline applied to adults sentenced to penal servitude was singularly out of place in the case of youths and children, but it appears to me that there is just now a sort of outburst of juvenile violence The great facilities for acquiring firearms at anything between 1*s*. 6*d* and 4*s* 6*d* leads to a great deal of mischief, and helps to develop a very unpleasant phase of youthful ruffianism.
>
> As this is a very good typical instance, I think I shall write to the Home Secretary calling his attention to the great want of some such establishment as you speak of

From the treatment of this obscure case and the correspondence which it evoked between a criminal Judge, a Chairman of the Prison Commissioners, and the Home Secretary we may date the beginning of the Borstal System, which was to revolutionise the treatment of crime in England and, incidentally, to put England in the lead for penal reform.

But Ruggles-Brise had years of uphill building before him. He found in the late Lord Chancellor (Lord Halsbury) a most formidable opposition to any change of reform in the administration of criminal punishments. At times he was almost driven to despair. He could not believe that men of great education and power could remain so relentless towards their fellow-creatures. On the other hand, he was always able to remain friendly with the Home Secretaries in Office, such as Sir Matthew White Ridley, Lord Gladstone, and Mr. Winston Churchill.

The old view held by officials had been that as English institutions were generally superior to all foreign institutions, so the prison system in England was one which Europeans or Americans must equally envy. Mr Asquith had, however, appointed Ruggles-Brise to represent his country at the International Prison Congress which was held at the Sorbonne in 1895. It was then that he initiated an exchange of views on the treatment of juvenile offenders. He learnt that the French made sixteen the age at which the young could become criminal, whereas in 'Merry England' Ruggles-Brise noticed that 'our laws profess to deal with childhood from the age of seven years.' His contribution to the Paris Congress was a speech on 'aid to discharged prisoners.'

In 1897 Ruggles-Brise made a trip to the United States, and embodied his views and reactions in a pamphlet which he distributed on his return amongst friends and sympathisers. The extraordinary thing was that the long-delayed prison reform was largely the work and suggestion of amateurs.

The Borstal System for setting apart young prisoners, treating them by a mixture of confidence and discipline and returning them to society without the criminal taint, dates from 1900, when a dinner-party was held at Mr. Gilbert Johnstone's at which a bishop, an actor, a journalist, a solicitor, a soldier, a barrister, a stockbroker, and an ex-convict attended. Ruggles-Brise then outlined his schemes for helping juvenile adult prisoners. This was followed by a few experiments, and they were sufficiently successful to allow the first Borstal Association Committee to be formed. A great many men were interested at the time, especially members of Parliament like Alfred Lyttelton and Claude Hay, who wrote:

What a blackguard I should have been if I had been born under

the conditions which have moulded the lives of many prisoners. I am not certain how you would have turned out—either you would have been a street agitator or a Nonconformist preacher!

Especial zeal was brought by Captain Robert White, who, as a Jameson Raider, had seen the inside of Holloway Prison and was deeply moved towards reform.

With Lord Gladstone and Mr. Winston Churchill as Home Secretaries, Ruggles-Brise had much his own way, as they were willing to adopt his experience as their own ideas. Outside Parliament idealists like Wilfrid Scawen Blunt (who had been imprisoned in Galway Gaol) and John Galsworthy were bringing all the influence they could bear—the one privately by his friendship with Mr. Churchill and the other by his dramatic writings. Galsworthy set himself against the horrors of separate cellular confinement Ruggles-Brise found him a nuisance, as he was working out his reforms slowly from within. With the Home Office and the Treasury agreeable, Ruggles-Brise was able to bring about:

(1) New rules as to political prisoners,
(2) Restriction of separate confinement;
(3) Prisoners' aid on discharge;
(4) Merit marks for prisoners;
(5) Lectures and concerts

He made great advances in these directions whenever he found the least experiment had been tried previously.

Ruggles-Brise distinguished between a true humane sentiment and the feverish sentimentalism which followed in the trail of articles in the Press. The practical aim of the officials was to deal with the 125,000 perfectly purposeless short sentences which were imposed every year, and one-half of them upon first offenders. It will be realised what a colossal tangle they were unravelling.

Mr. Churchill's aims were:

(1) To abolish all imprisonment for periods of less than one month;
(2) To reduce by one-third the annual committals to prison;
(3) To reduce by 15 per cent. the average daily prison population.

All this was a quarter of a century ago, and now that the demand for prison reform has returned full circle it is encouraging to realise how much was done in the past by a few determined and well-informed men.

The greatest step forward was the Borstal system, with which is associated the names of Sir Haldane Porter and of his successor Sir Wemyss Grant Wilson. This was an attempt to attribute trust and honour where society declared it to have been forfeited or, more generally, never to have existed. In spite of many exceptions and some dire failures, Ruggles-Brise was proved to be right, and if the reform of young criminals so called is to proceed it can only be on the lines he initiated so boldly and trustfully. That he was right is now a commonplace. He tackled prisoners at both ends of their careers. He took the minors and youths and gave them what was practically a public-school career in the Borstal System. They learnt games, discipline, obedience, and the preparatives of trade and work. They learnt, if they had the vital sparks within, the meaning of honour and tradition. The old prisoners, who seemed hopeless at the close of their dreary careers of crime, he sent under the scientific term of 'recidivists' to Camp Hill, in the Isle of Wight. There was not much to be done with them, but their detention was made milder. It was as though he hinted that their failure should be recognised as a failure of society as well as of certain individuals.

The years have brought great advances. Ruggles-Brise used to deplore that the outbreak of the Great War put back his reforms for four years. But it was impossible for the Prison Commission not to proceed on his lines on his retirement in 1921 after his quarter of a century's work.

When he took service as chairman the British prisons held 1000 children under sixteen After seventeen years had passed it was impossible for anyone to go to prison under that age. Ruggles-Brise shed no tears with the sentimentalists, but he shed anachronisms. Treadmills passed to the museum. Floggings were restricted. He detested useless labour and worthless employments in prison. He recognised that the cure was often impossible. All the more, he believed that prevention was one of the first duties of the State.

The most permanent effect that Ruggles-Brise had on the

prisons of England was that he inspired their occupants with hope. The atmosphere changed amongst Governors, warders and prisoners. Instead of the useless fermentation of the criminal outlook, all were set to create a new condition aiming at a restoration of gain instead of permanent loss to the State. England was to be the better for the majority of the youths who passed through Borstal. Prisoners of maturer age and accomplishments were to be assisted to recover some kind of work or position in the world. The great mental cesspools of convict stations were to be drained in time.

As for Governors, they were to combine the instincts of officers, gentlemen, and humanitarians. The warders were to feel that theirs was, not a distasteful profession, but an honourable and interesting one. The relations between warders and prisoners were completely changed in a generation. Ruggles-Brise lifted the position of a warder from that of the old-fashioned 'turnkey' into an agency for social reform. No doubt it was the great confidence which the warders felt for their chief which prevented them sharing in the police strike of 1919.

He published two important books—*The English Prison System*, in 1921, and *Prison Reform at Home and Abroad*, in 1925.

He died in 1935, having, by his combination of talents, industry, character and love for his fellow-men, left his country high in the annals of prison reform. His name can be confidently placed with the names of Howard and Romilly as a beacon to those who are now proceeding to carry out the further reforms which he visualised but was not able to carry out, or for which he considered his own time not sufficiently ripe.

SHANE LESLIE.

PARLIAMENT AND THE INDEPENDENT BOARDS

By Hugh Molson

The success of democracy in Britain is largely due to the frank recognition by Parliament that good government is impossible if the Legislature interferes constantly with the administrative routine. While, therefore, Parliament never forgets its power to dismiss the Executive if its work is unsatisfactory, it does not as a rule seek to interfere with the administrative work of a Government in office. This common-sense principle of good administration obviously should be applied equally in those new spheres of activity in which the State is now engaging, and the idea of the public corporation was developed so that, while policy is determined by Parliament, administration is entrusted to specially qualified men, protected to a greater extent than Ministers could be from popular and political influence.

The public corporation in this way aims at obtaining the advantages of nationalisation without its dangers and abuses, and it seems probable that this form of public management will be greatly extended. It is therefore of interest to see where the line is drawn between the general and the particular, between policy and administration, between what is subject to parliamentary control and what is not. It will, in fact, be found that no recognised line of demarcation exists, or at any rate has been drawn; and there is, moreover, doubt as to what authority is empowered to draw the line.

A considerable list of public corporations could be given which fall within the category under discussion—only one, however, the Port of London Authority, dating back to pre-war days. Some, like the Traffic Commissioners, are, in effect, judicial authorities appointed to regulate private enterprises. Others are administrative bodies in a full sense. In

this category are the British Broadcasting Corporation, the Racecourse Betting Control Board, the Central Electricity Board, the Unemployment Assistance Board, and the various Agricultural Marketing Boards. To what extent they are subject to parliamentary control is in the first place a question of parliamentary procedure, and it is difficult to arrive at any certain conclusions. To trace every ruling which has been reported in *Hansard* would in itself be a search for a few needles in a haystack, while the fruits of such research would be inconclusive. Many of the decisions are of a negative kind and are not reported, as, for example, decisions by the Clerks at the Table, acting under the Speaker, that a question a member wishes to put down on the paper is out of order, and therefore cannot be accepted. Much of the information in this article has therefore been obtained by private inquiry.[1]

The effectiveness of parliamentary control does not depend solely upon the question of order; it is necessary, also, to consider what opportunities the House of Commons and individual members in fact have of criticising administration, for it does not follow that what may be, will be discussed. Almost any matter may be raised if the Opposition deems it of sufficient importance, as, for example, by a vote of censure, and any matter may be raised on a substantive motion or in the form of a Bill by a private member who has the exceptional good fortune to be successful in the ballot in years when private members' days are not taken over by the Government. These rights extend Parliament's theoretical control, but from a practical standpoint they are often nugatory. The fact that Parliament, if so minded, could discuss the actions of a certain statutory body is little comfort to a member whose constituency has been injuriously affected by the policy of that body, and who finds himself prevented from raising the matter by the rules of order or the time-table of business. The private member has to rely upon his ordinary opportunities of raising grievances—*i.e.*, Questions, Supply, Consolidated Fund Bills or Motions for the Adjournment, either nightly at 11.0 p.m. or before a recess; but it is just

[1] After writing most of this article, the author obtained additional information from a study of *British Public Utilities*, 1933, by M. E. Dimock; *Public Enterprise*, 1937, edited by W. A. Robson; *British Experiments in Public Ownership and Control*, 1937, by T. H. O'Brien.

in these cases that the rules of order are most effective, as will appear later, to bar discussion.

In order to scrutinise the expenditure of public funds and the administration of the departments, the House of Commons sets up annually a Public Accounts Committee. Standing Order 74 used to entrust to this committee only 'the examination of the Accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted by Parliament to meet the public expenditure,' but in 1933 the Order was amended to include 'such other Accounts laid before Parliament as the committee may think fit.'

The accounts and papers which are in fact examined by the committee fall into three categories:

(1) Accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted by Parliament to meet the public expenditure;
(2) Such other accounts laid before Parliament as the committee may think fit; and
(3) Other accounts and papers, outside the first two categories, which the committee consider necessary to complete the picture of a department's activities or to elucidate some doubtful point.

The committee interpret their terms of reference as obliging them to examine and pass all accounts in the first category, and they pass, also, the limited number of accounts which they include in the second category. They do not 'pass' the documents falling in the third category, but they merely examine them.

Strictly speaking, the third category does not fall within the terms of reference of the committee. It seems that the widening of the terms of reference in 1933 was intended to regularise the existing practice of the committee to consider such accounts as the Road Fund, Greenwich Hospital, and the National Health Insurance accounts. The B.B.C. and Agricultural Marketing Boards accounts, however, are not strictly included, because they are not required to be laid before Parliament, but only presented to a Minister. That this question of technical responsibility is not purely academic is shown by difficulties which arose with regard to the accounts of the Scottish Milk Marketing Board. When these were under examination, the representative of the Scottish Office

did not know the particulars of, and did not accept responsibility for, the accounts of the Board. The chairman pointed out that although these accounts did not require to be passed, they had been communicated to the committee, and therefore there ought to be someone—and there was, in fact, no one—in a position to answer questions and accept responsibility.[2] It is understood that subsequently the Agricultural Departments have in practice answered questions on the accounts of the Marketing Boards, but that is due to reasonableness and good will on all sides: legally, no Minister is responsible, and no Minister could compel a board to disclose to him information.

This situation as described illustrates the degree of independence enjoyed by boards, which is considerably greater in constitutional theory than it is prudent to insist upon in practice. A board's existence will depend upon not abusing its independence, and its freedom in action is most likely to be preserved if it is willing to give information quite freely about its policy and administration.

While interpellation of responsible Ministers is the normal method by which Parliament informs itself and supervises administration, it must be remembered that another method is available. Parliament has the power, which it delegates to some of its committees and always to the Public Accounts Committee, 'to send for persons, papers and records.' This power is wholly independent of the Government, and could be used to investigate any matter whatsoever, even the affairs of a private company. But this general and overriding power does not usually affect the subject of this study, which is the independence of public boards from interference by Parliament or Government.

Returning to the normal procedure, the first point to be realised is that Parliament's powers of interrogation and control, whether acting itself or through the Public Accounts Committee, are determined by the instrument—whether statute or charter—setting up each body. It is true that Parliament can at any time repeal or amend a statute, but the legislative omnipotence of Parliament enables it to restrict all its own powers except that of legislation. The control of

[2] First and Second Reports from the Committee of Public Accounts 1936, at p. 269.

Parliament does not depend upon any general principle of universal application. It would not, for example, be true to say that if a body depends upon public funds, Parliament can criticise that body; nor that because a body is self-supporting, it is exempt from criticism. The expedient of charging a service upon the Consolidated Fund instead of providing that it shall be met out of funds provided by Parliament does substantially diminish the opportunities of criticism, but it does not take away the right. The B.B.C. is financially self-supporting, but it is not exempt from parliamentary criticism; the Unemployment Assistance Board is dependent upon parliamentary vote for its funds, but it enjoys some measure of independence of the Minister. Again, the accounts of the Lighthouse Commissioners have been examined by the Public Accounts Committee, although their revenue is not derived from public funds. From the fact that we have no fixed law of the Constitution it follows that there is no general principle overriding the Act setting up each body.

The independence of each statutory body is, then, to be determined solely upon a true interpretation of the Act. Who is the interpreter? The Speaker may rule a question or speech out of order, but, even if he thinks it in order, he has no converse power to compel a Minister to give an answer.[3] If a Minister declares that he is not responsible for the acts of a statutory body, the Speaker cannot compel him to accept responsibility. On December 10, 1929, a member raised as a point of order the refusal of the Chair to allow a question with regard to the B.B.C. to be put on the paper The Speaker replied that he understood that there was no Minister responsible to Parliament for the administration of the B.B.C., and appealed to the Postmaster-General for guidance. Mr. Lees-Smith, the Postmaster-General, replied that he was 'responsible for questions of general policy, but . . . not . . . for questions of details and particulars as to service.'

It is therefore clear that it rests largely with the Minister himself to decide how far he will answer parliamentary criticism. This is not as unsatisfactory as it appears. A Minister whose interpretation of his responsibility differed from that of most members would quickly become aware of his isolation, and, if he persisted in his attitude, would find

[3] Erskine May, 12th ed., p. 222

himself removed from his office whenever an opportunity presented itself.

On June 17, 1937, the Prime Minister was asked to state how far, in the Government's view, the Secretary of State for India was answerable to Parliament for provincial administration in India after the coming into force of the provincial autonomy provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. Mr. Wedgwood Benn asked: 'Is it competent for the Prime Minister to decide on what matters he proposes to give information? . . . Is it not rather a matter for the Chair to rule? . . .' The Speaker replied: 'Undoubtedly that is so. I do not think the Prime Minister will rule anything. He will only say what are the responsibilities of Ministers.' But in a certain sense a Minister can give a ruling, for it must be repeated that the Speaker, if he differs from the Minister's view, has no power to compel him to reply.

When we come to examine the amount of supervision which Parliament exercises over different bodies, it is apparent that while the wording of the statute is the basic, precedent is the only effective, authority. The precedents in each case are largely the result of the personality of the Ministers concerned and of the amount of public interest taken in the work of the public body concerned. Practice is widely different from principle. Reference has already been made to Mr. Lees-Smith's interpretation on December 10, 1929, of his responsibility for the administration of the B.B C. It is clear that this statement was an authoritative precedent, because it was supported by his predecessor in office from the Opposition benches, not objected to by the Speaker, and subsequently explicitly endorsed by the House of Commons on February 22, 1933. Consistently with this view, the Prime Minister refused, on May 15, 1930, to revise the charter of the B.B C. when asked 'to make the Postmaster-General responsible for questions such as the treatment and remuneration of the officials of the Corporation, and also to enable the programmes to be subjected to effective criticism' The general principle was again clearly laid down by Sir Kingsley Wood, Postmaster-General, when he said on February 22, 1933,[4] that 'the whole design [of the charter] . . . was not to prohibit ultimate parliamentary control, but to limit parliamentary interference,

[4] *Hansard*, 238, at col. 1833.

and to accord to the Corporation reasonable liberty of action as trustees of the service in the national interest.'

It is noteworthy that this statement was made in an important and full-dress debate on the B.B.C. On the Post Office Estimates, on motions for the adjournment and on the Expiring Laws Continuance Bill, it was only in order for members to raise broad matters of policy, but on a substantive motion the whole matter could be discussed in detail. Accordingly Mr. Charles Emmott, who had been fortunate in the ballot, introduced and carried a resolution approving the work of the B.B.C. and declaring that it would be contrary to the public interest for the Government or Parliament to exercise any closer control than was already the practice.

It is apparent, therefore, that the B.B.C. does, in fact, enjoy a considerable degree of independence of the Government and consequently of Parliament. A reference, however, to the wording of the charter and licence illustrates the difficulty, already mentioned, of deducing in each case the extent of a Minister's control, and the need to interpret written words in the light of precedents. The charter requires the B.B.C. to observe 'the provisions prescribed by our Postmaster-General in any licence he may from time to time grant to the Corporation' (clause 18). The licences granted have, however, taken the form, both in 1927 and in 1937, of bilateral agreements valid for ten years under which the Postmaster-General defines and limits his own power of control. Under clause 4 (2) the Corporation must broadcast any matter when required to do so by a Government department; and under clause 4 (3) it may not broadcast any matter specified by the Postmaster-General in writing. These powers might well have been regarded as sufficient to make the Postmaster-General responsible to Parliament for the B.B.C. if it had not been generally agreed otherwise. This point was made by Mr. Lees-Smith on July 6, 1936, when he said: 'The Government really have almost full control over the Corporation if they wish to exercise their powers. So also has this House. . . . I was Postmaster-General for the time, and I used to give advice to the chairman. . . In fact, both the Government and the House impose upon themselves a self-denying ordinance.' It is difficult, however, to avoid the conclusion that this convention has been seriously undermined both by

the Chair and by the Postmaster-General in the years 1936 and 1937. The Ullswater Committee correctly stated the constitutional position and declared their wish to maintain it. Their recommendation that the Corporation's vote should be presented separately from the other Post Office accounts so as to afford fuller opportunity for discussion hardly seems consistent with this, but they certainly cannot have intended that their Report should be the excuse for the very interference by Parliament which they deprecated.

On April 29, 1936, the Ullswater Report was made the excuse for a full-dress debate on the administration, as well as the policy, of the Corporation On July 6 the same questions were raised again when the Opposition put down the Post Office vote in Supply for the express purpose of discussing the B B.C. On both these occasions the debates were no doubt in order, but the Postmaster-General would have been justified by precedent in refusing to discuss the Corporation's administration. That the debates took place illustrates, in fact, the statement that almost any matter can be discussed if the official Opposition is prepared to devote to it a Supply day. It is much more doubtful whether it was in accordance with precedent for the matter to be raised yet a third time on December 17, 1936, on the adjournment If this debate was in order, it can only have been because the new charter was about to come into force, and the Postmaster-General was held responsible to Parliament both for the charter and the licence issued thereunder. On March 8, 1937, a more serious departure from precedent was made when the Postmaster-General undertook that the Corporation would 'furnish any hon. member, on request by him in writing, with a copy of any individual broadcast in which he is specially interested.' Not only is this a departure from the principle that the Corporation is to be independent of Government control in matters of detail, but it encourages the House of Commons, and even individual members, to act as unofficial censors. On June 21, 1937, so domestic a matter as the right of the Corporation's employees to belong to trade associations was raised on the adjournment, and the Postmaster-General replied. These recent cases can scarcely be reconciled with those cited earlier, and they show that the independence of public corporations from political interference cannot be

ensured by any rules of order unless Ministers are prepared to resist attempts by the House of Commons to exercise influence.

Another striking example of a quasi-independent statutory body is the Racecourse Betting Control Board. This corporation was given by an Act of 1928 the monopoly of operating totalisators on horse racecourses, and it was required to apply its net profit 'in accordance with a scheme . . . approved by the Secretary of State for purposes conducive to the improvement of breeds of horses or the sport of horse racing' The Board was to consist of fourteen members, of whom four, in addition to the chairman, were to be appointed by Ministers of the Crown. It was reasonably clear that the Home Secretary was responsible to Parliament for the way the Board's net profits were applied; but what right had members to criticise the Board's administration so long as there was no profit but only an accumulating loss, which was the case for years? Since the Government did not appoint a majority of the members of the Board, it disclaimed responsibility, and this view was upheld by the authorities on rules of order.

It is significant that the youngest of the departments, the Ministry of Transport, supervises a whole family of quasi-independent authorities. The one feature they have in common is that they all represent Government supervision or administration in spheres where it did not until recently penetrate. The development of motor transport in the country has resulted in private enterprise being subjected to a two-fold system of public licensing, while the intense and localised passenger traffic of the London area seemed to demand nationalisation rather than mere regulation. The new and technical problem of electricity demanded both an expert public supervising body and also a public administrative board.

Under the Road Traffic Act, 1930, the business of transporting passengers in public motor conveyances was brought under a public licensing system. The power to grant licences was entrusted in each traffic area to a commission of three persons appointed by the Minister of Transport. Aggrieved persons were given a right to appeal 'in the prescribed form' to the Minister. When it is remembered that it had previously been the almost unrestricted right of any subject to engage in his vocation, it might have been expected that many appeals

would have been made and that political pressure would have been applied to the Minister to grant more licences. The only safeguard was the requirement that the application had to be made 'in the prescribed form'—that is, to the Minister sitting in a quasi-judicial capacity. It is therefore significant that the subsequent Act of 1933, dealing with goods traffic, provided that an appeal against the decision of the licensing authority should lie to a specially constituted Appeal Tribunal, and the explanation of this provision was given by the Minister of Transport when he said on May 3, 1933: 'Hon. members . . . are not always able to foresee the exact moment when a Minister exchanges the motley of the politician for the ermine of the judge, and . . . they sometimes address to him requests and put forward considerations which they would never do if they were addressing someone whom they recognised to be in a judicial capacity.' On March 10, 1937, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport refused to press on the Traffic Commissioners complaints that had been made in the debate: 'I say categorically that in my opinion it would be most improper for my department to interfere with the Commissioners, seeing that this House laid it down that they were to be an independent semi-judicial authority.'

With the nationalisation of London transport we pass from the sphere of independent judicial bodies to that of independent administration. The London Passenger Transport Board enjoys freedom in administering its services, subject to a right of appeal if its fares are thought to be excessive or its service inadequate. In the original Bill a complaint by a local authority with regard to services and facilities was to have been heard by the Minister of Transport, but in the statute that power, like the power to hear appeals against fares, has been entrusted to the Railway Rates Tribunal. The Minister's control is virtually limited to financial matters and eliciting information about the Board's administration. The accounts have to be presented to him, but not to Parliament; and if the Minister and Board do not agree as to the form, a decision is to be given by arbitrators. Probably, therefore, most questions relating to the Board could not be raised on the Minister of Transport's Estimates.

As early as 1919 the Minister of Transport was provided

with expert advisers and assistants in the highly technical subject of electricity. The Electricity Commissioners are advisers in so far as the Minister is required to consult them on all matters entrusted to him under section 39 of the Act (except where he is acting in an appellate capacity), and are assistants in so far as he may transfer (and, in fact, has transferred) to them many of his statutory powers, but the Commissioners are responsible to him and are to perform their duties under his direction. The Central Electricity Board is entirely different because it is an executive body formed to create 'the grid.' It was set up by statute seven years later as an 'authorised undertaker,' and enjoys special advantages as, for example, the right, not exercised, to have its loans guaranteed by the Treasury, while enjoying some protection from political interference in its administration. That Parliament intended to set up an administration on business lines is shown by the requirement that the Minister, in making appointments, shall consult representatives of such interests as local government, commerce, industry, labour, etc. The Minister has no powers of general supervision, but in many important matters the Board has to secure the concurrence of the Electricity Commissioners, who are definitely under the Minister. An annual report has to be presented to Parliament, and accounts in a form prescribed by the Minister have to be published, though not technically presented to Parliament. It would appear that the Board has, in fact, been allowed to do its work without many attempts at political interference

Supervision and criticism of the Agricultural Marketing Boards by Parliament is authorised by practice and precedent, but not by principle, for it does not seem to be warranted by any control which the Minister of Agriculture has over the boards once they have been set up When the Minister has made certain that the procedure has been duly carried out and has appointed a Consumers' Committee, a Marketing Board is not subject to his control. He can, it is true, by a certain procedure obtain control; he can appoint a Committee of Investigation if he thinks the scheme is injurious to consumers and the public interest, and if the committee condemns the scheme the Minister may amend or revoke the scheme or direct the Marketing Board to amend the scheme.[5] Similarly,

[5] Agricultural Marketing Act, 1931, s 9 (3) and (5).

he has what was obviously intended to be an emergency power to revoke a scheme without waiting for the report of a Committee of Investigation.[6] In both procedures the Minister's order has to be laid before Parliament. The board must, as has already been stated, present accounts to the Minister, and he does, in fact, append them to his annual report to Parliament, but this falls far short of giving the Minister any power of continuous supervision or control of the operations of the boards, and he has no right either to prescribe the form of their accounts or to demand information as to their operations. It is only if he suspects abuses that he can intervene. In spite of this, it has been the invariable practice of Ministers of Agriculture to answer all reasonable questions addressed to them as to the working of the schemes, and in a considerable measure to defend the operations of the boards. That the Minister has no control is usually indicated by the introductory sentence: 'By courtesy of the Marketing Board, I am able to give the hon. member the information he desires.'

A remarkable example of Parliament providing funds and allowing them to be expended by persons over whom it exercised practically no control is afforded by the system of transitional payments from 1931 to 1934. By an Order in Council issued under the National Economy Act, 1931, the Public Assistance Committees of the local authorities were entrusted with the responsibility of applying the means test to persons who would, but for the Order, have been entitled to receive transitional benefit. By this Order the Minister of Labour and, therefore, Parliament expressly deprived themselves of power to supervise the determinations made by the local authorities, and only retained the power to supersede the authority by a commissioner. This system could be and was defended only as a temporary and emergency measure.

The Unemployment Act, 1934, set up a partly independent body called the Unemployment Assistance Board to deal with the problem of almost all the able-bodied unemployed between the ages of sixteen and sixty-five. The intention of the Bill was described by Sir Henry Betterton in the following words: 'The Minister of Labour will be responsible to Parliament for general policy and for obtaining the necessary money, but the

[6] Agricultural Marketing Act, 1931, Part II, Sched. I, par. 5.

application to individual cases of the policy approved by the Minister and by Parliament will be the business of an independent Board.' [7]

It is necessary to see what meaning really attaches to that sentence, and in particular what is meant by the Minister's responsibility. The principles on which allowances are to be made are laid down in Regulations which the Board draws up, which the Minister can only approve or disapprove, and which he must then submit to the House of Commons for acceptance or rejection without amendment. It is manifest that the Regulations are in fact drafted by the Board in close consultation with the Minister. Although in form the Minister hardly does more than submit to the House of Commons the draft prepared by the independent Board, there could scarcely be a clearer case of a Minister being held responsible than the protest made in the House and the country against the working of the first Regulations (approved November 1934) and the introduction by the Minister of the Unemployment Assistance (Temporary Provisions) Act, commonly called the Standstill Act. While it is arguable that under Sir Henry Betterton's definition the revision of the Regulations is a question of 'general policy,' it is none the less true that Parliament broke through the safeguards for independence that it had created and insisted upon a revision of the Regulations in matters of detail because of their effect on individual cases. And there emerges the difficulty: the effect of general policy can only be illustrated, justified, or criticised by the citation of individual cases.

Parliament attempted to make the Board independent by providing (Sixth Schedule) that the salaries of its members should be borne on the Consolidated Fund, but the funds required for paying the Board's staff and for paying allowances to the unemployed are both laid before Parliament in the form of Votes of Supply asked for by the Minister of Labour. It is therefore possible for a member to move a reduction in either vote in order to criticise the administration generally, but his criticism must be confined strictly to what is general in scope and administrative in character. If he sought, for example, to raise a series of individual determinations in criticism of an official of the Board, he would be ruled out of

[7] *Hansard*, 283, at col 1094

order on the ground that the Minister had no control over the officials of the Board. It is difficult to say where the line is drawn between citing individual cases as illustrations of a criticism of principle and criticising individual cases, but the Chair is, in fact, drawing that line constantly. The Minister of Labour has no responsibility for individual determinations. In the somewhat similar case of the Insurance Acts, the right to unemployment benefit has long been decided in the last resort by two judicial bodies, the Courts of Referees and the Umpire, and therefore the Minister of Labour has always been able to refuse to accept any administrative responsibility for disallowance of benefit He can now take a similar line with regard to unemployment allowances, because any person dissatisfied with the determination made by an officer of the Board can have recourse to the independent and judicial Appeal Tribunal.

If a member sought to carry his criticism in the Committee of Supply in any way beyond pure administration, he would again be stopped by the Chair: if, on the one hand, he began to press for revised Regulations, he would be out of order because the Regulations are made by the Board and not by the Minister; if, on the other hand, his criticism was directed against the Unemployment Act itself, he would be out of order because advocating legislation.

The conclusions to which this study leads us are therefore now clear. There is no machinery, either of parliamentary procedure or of legislation, which can define once and for all the meaning of Ministerial responsibility, which can draw a clear line between policy and administrative detail, or which can provide an impartial and authoritative arbiter. The powers of a corporation and the degree of its independence are contained in the words of the instrument, but the meaning to be put upon them will be determined by parliamentary custom, and that custom will represent not so much a logical construction of the words of the instrument as the general wish of Parliament as expressed through the conflict of private members, Ministers, and the Speaker. The reality of parliamentary control is not merely a matter of right as defined by the rules of order, but is affected also by the opportunities afforded by the time-table of the House of Commons and the use made of them by the Opposition and

private members. Public opinion inside the House and outside will insist on discussing the administration of any matters about which it is deeply moved, and so the independence of quasi-public bodies is preserved in the last resort only with the concurrence of public opinion. When, however, wide public interest has not been aroused, rules of procedure and the time-table of business in the House of Commons are extremely effective barriers against attempts by individual back benchers to interfere with the administrative routine of these independent bodies to which has been delegated by Parliament the responsibility of working out the details of policies it has itself laid down in broad outline.

HUGH MOLSON.

THE MANUSCRIPT OF CARLYLE'S 'FRENCH REVOLUTION'

By W. A. Hirst

Carlyle's *French Revolution* was published in the latter half of 1837. The first volume was the subject of a tragi-comedy. There are four actors and actresses in this little drama—Carlyle himself, John Stuart Mill, Mrs. Taylor, and (in a minor part) Mrs. Carlyle

Soon after Carlyle and his wife settled in London, he decided (June 1834) to write of the French Revolution. 'Whole boxes of books about me,' he says, referring to his authorities. Many of these books, along with other material, had been sent him by his sympathetic friend Mill, who had himself intended to write upon the subject, but when he heard of Carlyle's purpose he generously relinquished his plan and did all he could to help the hard-pressed author Carlyle, indeed, shortly before the disastrous event which we are now considering, had sorrowfully recorded that it is now 'some twenty-three months since I have earned one penny by the craft of literature' Mrs. Taylor resented Mill's good nature, thinking that her friend, already well known to the world, ought not to have made way for the obscure Scot.

Mill is the leading actor. He is too well known to the world to need minute description. At that time he was a pillar of the *Westminster Review* and was far the ablest of the younger Philosophical Radicals—persons of great importance in their day. When Carlyle visited London in 1831, he met Mill and was strongly attracted by him and thought him 'a new Mystic.' Such a view seems strange in view of *Political Economy* and *Logic*, but Mill's posthumous writings—very repugnant to the straitest sect of rationalists—show a strain of mysticism. Mill continued to encourage Carlyle and was delighted with the first fruits of his labours. He took away the manuscript of the first volume to read at his leisure.

We may now introduce the leading lady. As soon as *Carlyle came to London for good,* he heard that 'a young *Mrs. Taylor,* tho' encumbered with husband and children, had ogled John Mill successfully, so that he was "desperately *in love*".' She came from a Unitarian family; at the age of eighteen she had married Taylor, 'a wholesale druggist and drysalter,' as we are told, and had children. The lady believed herself to be intellectual and found her husband dull. Mill came and discoursed with her on high subjects; he was astounded by her breadth of intellect. The only astonishing circumstance in the matter is the infatuation of Mill for a very ordinary woman. After her husband's death he married her, and when she died in her turn, he expressed the wish in the preface to *Liberty* that he were 'capable of interpreting to the world one half of the great thoughts and noble feelings which are buried in her grave' In fact, Mrs. Taylor's limited mental outfit was entirely provided by Mill himself. It was said (and most truly) by some of his friends that her excellence consisted in echoing his own views. However, the two found one another indispensable, and the accommodating Taylor—to whom all the present writer's sympathies go—consented to a separation She took a little house at Kingston-on-Thames, where Mill henceforth spent a great deal of his time.

It was hither that he brought the manuscript for Mrs. Taylor's perusal, and it was here, on March 6, 1835, that the catastrophe occurred Froude gives a perfectly colourless account of the transaction and does not refer to Mrs. Taylor except as the shadowy 'occupant' of a cab. Mill did two very extraordinary things, one of which was this bringing of Mrs. Taylor along with him. Froude relates that Mill came to Chelsea in a state of despair and stammered out that the manuscript 'left out in too careless a manner after it had been read' had been accidentally destroyed The labour of five months was dust and ashes Thus far Froude. It is said that when Mrs. Carlyle saw Mill's agitation, she exclaimed: 'Gracious Providence, he has gone off with Mrs. Taylor!' He, however, asked Mrs Carlyle to go down and speak to Mrs. Taylor, who doubtless dispelled the suspicion of an elopement. Mill continued his blunders, nervously talking for the space of two hours—some say three. When at last he went, Carlyle said to his wife: 'Mill, poor fellow, is

terribly cut up. We must endeavour to hide from him how very serious this business is to us.' Next day he wrote: 'Your sorrow must be far sharper than mine.' Mill sent Carlyle a cheque for £200, of which the author accepted £100, *modestly assessing 'five months' work' at that small figure. As is well known, Carlyle heroically recommenced his task* and finally triumphed.

Mill, it may be observed, did not say that it was *he* who destroyed the manuscript; he employed the passive voice. Mrs. Taylor, guilty either of negligence or wickedness, was the culprit. The current version of the story was given by Carlyle long afterwards. Mill, he says, confided the manuscript to 'a friend of his own,' and 'this person sat up . . . perusing it far into the wee hours of the morning, and at length recollecting himself, surprised at the flight of time, laid the manuscript carelessly upon the library table and hied to bed. There it lay, a loose heap of rubbish, fit only for the waste-paper basket or the grate. So Betty, the housemaid, thought, when she came to light the fire in the morning—etc.'

Now it is next to impossible for a bulky manuscript, containing at least 100,000 words, to be destroyed accidentally. It was *vol. i.*, not *book i.*—*i.e.*, one-third of the whole work. It is possible that a careless slut might have torn off half a dozen of the top pages to kindle the fire therewith, but this is most unlikely. In a literary household the value of 'waste-paper' would have been impressed upon her. Mr. Birrell once described how difficult he found the task of burning a book, and much the same applies to a manuscript. Mill was obviously in a most difficult situation. He had, as far as possible, to divert suspicion from Mrs. Taylor to himself; and it is probable that the Carlyles knew the truth from the first moment. He would also wish to conceal the fact that he was at the little house at Kingston at the time when Mrs. Taylor was avidly devouring Carlyle's work. He made a blundering job of it.

There is an extremely strong probability that Mrs. Taylor did the deed herself. It may be asked why should she be guilty of an act which would bring discredit and misery upon her lover. The answer is that, like Fleur Forsyte, she had a possessive rather than a devoted love. Her man had, she

thought, been balked by an intrusive Scot and deserved to be punished for his easy good-nature. Experience shows *furens quid femina possit.*

The second extraordinary proceeding of Mill may now be recorded. Carlyle very soon completed book i. of vol. ii., and offered to lend it to Mill. Mill replied: 'Another bit of manuscript I will not take. I would bear the badge of my unworthiness. If however you would give me the pleasure of reading it, give it to Mrs. Taylor.' Once bit twice shy, Carlyle declined the proposal; but one is amazed with Mill. He can hardly have been Machiavellian enough to have made the proposal with a view to diverting suspicion from his beloved one In the opinion of the present writer, Mrs. Taylor was an arrant humbug.

Mrs. Carlyle may have suspected Mrs. Taylor's guilt, and apologists have urged that, had this been so, that vocal lady would certainly have communicated her suspicions to the world. But she was a generous woman and Mill survived her by many years. She never would have given pain to him by aspersing his beloved wife. The shrewd Carlyle must have suspected the truth. Now he has to his discredit many, very many, ungenerous and uncharitable comments upon his contemporaries But his injuries were verbal; it is difficult to saddle him with any mean or uncharitable act. And evidently he was determined not to bear too hardly upon Mrs. Taylor—in the account quoted above he even changes her sex. But he had probably made a very good guess at the truth of the whole matter. Certainly he remarked to Norton that 'I never heard that it very much diminished her content in life'

I had some correspondence with the late D. A. Wilson on the subject. His five volumes tell us almost all that can be known about Carlyle, and they are most entertaining, although the biographer does not keep 'on this side idolatry.' Wilson said that he was reluctant to believe that Mrs. Taylor could have been so wicked as deliberately to destroy the manuscript, but he thought that she came under grave suspicion. He mentions the jealousy which she felt about Mill's help to Carlyle.

As was his wont, Carlyle cried aloud to high heaven of his torments. 'There is but a third volume now,'

he wrote; but he continued: 'It seems to me, I will fly into some obscurant cranny of the world and be silent there for a twelvemonth. The mind is weary, the body is very sick; a little black speck dances to and fro in the left eye like a signal of distress.' But—*Dabit Deus his quoque finem*; and the end came at last within two years of the 'accidental destruction,' and in due course *The French Revolution* appeared.

At once Carlyle became famous. He was no longer known as a writer of crabbed articles ('clotted nonsense') in *Fraser's Magazine*, but as a man of genius. Not more surely did *Pickwick Papers* (in a lighter sphere) give universal fame to Dickens, or *Vanity Fair* to Thackeray, than this white-hot history did to Carlyle He had attained It is a commonplace that reviewers are blind to the things before their eyes. *The Athenæum* solemnly remarked: 'Originality, without justice of thought, is but novelty of error; and originality of style, without sound taste and discretion, is sheer affectation.' The reviewer speaks of the University of Bedlam, crudities and extravagances, a strait-waistcoat, absurdity of mannerism, and concludes a very long review by complacently asking: 'Readers, have we made out our case?' The answer is in the negative.

Mill wrote a most discerning criticism in the *Westminster Review*. Pointing out that every book which is 'eminently original, either in matter or style, has a hard battle to fight,' and that Wordsworth and Coleridge thirty years ago were 'ignominiously hooted out of court,' he adds: 'If we read it captiously, we shall never have done finding fault.' His conclusion is:

> No true poet, writing sincerely and following the promptings of his own genius, can fail to be contemptible to anyone who desires to find him so, and if even Milton's *Areopagitica*, of which now, it would seem, no one dares to speak with only moderate praise, were now first to issue from the press, it would be turned from with contempt by everyone who will speak discouragingly of this work of Carlyle.

Mill had more discernment than the *Athenæum*. Carlyle thanked him for 'a courageous article.'

The book is not by any means as trustworthy as was believed in the nineteenth century; it gives, indeed, that view

of the French Revolution which the general reader has held for a century, and he will continue to cherish it in spite of evidence. This *bourgeois* revolution, promulgated by a few lawyers, backed by a gang of desperadoes, was rightly estimated by Burke, whom Carlyle ignores. But, dubious as were many of Carlyle's facts, he made them all tell; he martialled them in such a way that he swept all his readers along with him. And his book gives promise of much better work—the magnificent, crowded panorama of *Frederick*.

To return to our main subject. The verdict must appropriately be the Scottish verdict of 'Not Proven.' Whether the efficient cause of the tragedy were the poor, ignorant housemaid or that woman of 'great thoughts and noble feelings,' Mrs. Taylor, will never be known. The strong point in Mrs. Taylor's favour is that neither Carlyle nor his wife said a word to support the darker suspicion, and they, as Sir Edmund Gosse once said, were a pair of irrepressible chatterboxes. But it has been already pointed out that they were very generous, and, even after Mill's death, when Carlyle thought of his former friend as 'poor Mill' and opined that he was 'a logic-chopping engine,' we may suppose that he still kept silent for the sake of Miss Taylor, Mill's stepdaughter, and on other grounds. And there was a further good reason for silence, that he did not know for certain exactly what had happened, however strong his suspicions may have been.

The present writer gives judgment against Mrs. Taylor.

W. A. Hirst.

A POLICY FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH FOR BRITAIN

By J. D. Bernal

[This article is based on the Memorandum on the Development and Finance of Scientific and Industrial Research drawn up for the Parliamentary Science Committee by a joint Committee of the British Science Guild and the Association of Scientific Workers. It incorporates suggestions made by Sir Albert Howard, Sir Richard Gregory, Professor Holman, Mr Stone, Mr. Bernal and others, and has been amended, after consideration, by the scientific associations forming part of the Parliamentary Science Committee, the Institute of Chemistry, the Institute of Physics, and other cognate bodies.]

The full development and utilisation of scientific research is of crucial importance for any modern industrial nation. Both the maintenance of the standard of agricultural and industrial production and the development of new methods depend on scientific research more than on any other single factor. But it still remains a fact that the full importance of scientific research has yet to be recognised. The public, and even many industrialists, are still thinking in terms of the advances of production in the nineteenth century, in which science had not yet acquired its present position and where much more depended on common-sense and the experience of the trade. Certainly it can be said that the scale of the benefits which science is capable of giving to industry, agriculture and health are not yet adequately realised. Compared with any other form of expenditure, science is capable of yielding a return incomparably greater.

Precise figures on this score are notoriously difficult to obtain, but such figures as have been provided by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research tell their own story.[1] It will be seen that research carried out by the department costing a few thousand pounds has in many cases saved the industries concerned hundreds of thousands of pounds per annum. Thus the British Refractories Research Association, by the improvement in the designs of saggars costing

[1] For footnote see p. 100.

£8500 in all, effected an annual saving to the pottery industry of £200,000; while a number of small improvements introduced by the Cotton Research Association, which has a total income of some £80,000 a year, amount annually to over £300,000. From six research associations, for an expenditure of less than £400,000 in all, have come researches which have made possible in practice a saving of well over £3,000,000 a year. In agriculture and medicine it is, naturally, practically impossible to express the value of applied research in actual money, but the saving in resources, time, and, far more importantly, in human suffering, due to scientific research, is

[1] Some economies effected as a result of researches carried out by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research

Research carried out by	Nature of Research	Total Government Grant to R. A.	Number of Years paid	Estimated Annual Saving to Industry
Group I Iron and Steel Industrial Research Council	Blast furnace coke and coal utilisation	£ 23,000	4	£ 1,700,000
Cast Iron R. A.	Moulding sands			100,000
	Balanced blast cupola furnace	42,000	12	200,000
				Total £300,000
Non-ferrous Metals R. A.	Fire-box stays and bolts	72,000	13	800,000
Group II Electrical Industries R. A.	Cable loading			100,000
	Overhead transmission			300,000
	Insulator oils			100,000
	Turbine steam nozzles			140,000
	Other investigations	106,000	12	360,000
				Total £1,000,000
Group III Refractories R. A.	Saggar replacement	25,000	13	150,000
Group IV. Food Investigations Board	Apple disease			250,000
	Bloom on meat	44,000		100,000
				Total £350,000
Group V. Cotton R. A.	Miscellaneous investigations	171,000	16	500,000
	Total	£440,000		£3,850,000

already great and could be, but for the starving of such research, immeasurably greater.[2]

When we consider the advantages which science can bring, and is bringing, it seems somewhat surprising that its use is continually hampered by lack of funds and adequate organisation. For in Britain, at any rate, the actual use of scientific research represents only a fraction of the use to which it could be put at a relatively trifling cost to the community. The present budget of science in England is impossible to estimate precisely. This, in itself, is a severe criticism of the existing organisation. Estimates vary from £3,000,000 to £6,000,000 per annum, depending largely as to what is or is not counted as scientific research. Of this sum the Government contributes approximately £1,000,000 for civil research, £2,000,000 for military research (not all of which, however, can be counted as scientific), and the remainder is made up by the universities and industry. If we take a mean figure of £4,500,000, this represents only one-tenth of 1 per cent. of the national income, which seems, indeed, an extremely small sum to spend on such a vital service as science, and contrasts very unfavourably with the millions spent on advertising. This sum, trifling as it is compared with other forms of national expenditure, is also small compared with what is spent on science by other nations which are our rivals in the industrial and cultural field. Thus, in the United States the annual expenditure on scientific research is approximately £40,000,000—nearly ten times what is spent in this country, representing three-tenths per cent. of the national income, or relatively three times as much as the British expenditure. In the Soviet Union the expenditure is only

[2] The relative figures are of necessity approximations. It is impossible with present systems of accounting to discover the precise amount expended on a particular research, or even the approximate savings effected in industry. In any case the precise economic value of scientific research is essentially unmeasurable. The figures must be taken only as representing an order of magnitude. They are obtained by multiplying the net saving per unit in cost of production by the number of units produced. How much of this saving goes to the producer and how much to the consumer as reduced price is not stated. It must also be realised that they represent merely an arbitrary selection of researches. Only six research associations are referred to, and each of these has carried on many other researches besides those given. On a conservative estimate not more than half the money spent on the associations has been used for these researches, and, allowing for the direct contribution of industry, we may say that a *total expenditure of not more than* £400,000 on industrial research has yielded economies of *not less than* £3,200,000 per annum—a return on money invested of 800 per cent per annum.

just under 1 per cent., while in Germany and Japan, where comparable figures are not easily obtainable, it is probable that the proportional sum spent is between three and five times that of this country.

However strong the position of any country may be in world economy at any time, it cannot afford to lose the possibility of improving it by starving its scientific research. Sooner or later the country that uses its resources best in that respect will lead the world in other respects as well. It is only in the amount spent on British science that the position is unsatisfactory. The present method of finance of science is extremely complicated and irregular in its action, while the organisation of scientific research, although in many respects excellent in detail, lacks any effective central direction. It can safely be said that science in Britain is not being carried out on an adequate scale, is not growing rapidly enough, and does not cover adequately the needs of producers or consumers.

Research into the applications of science is carried on partly in the laboratories of individual firms, partly in those directly or indirectly controlled by the Government. Only in the latter does any degree of co-ordination exist. The three departments primarily concerned are the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, the Medical Research Council, and the Agricultural Research Council. These three bodies are very different in the extent of their powers and the sums which they administer. The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research has an annual budget of £510,000 (1935–6); it is directly responsible for the conduct of the National Physical Laboratory, the Fuel, Food and Building Research Institutions, the Geological Survey and a number of minor institutes, and partially controls nineteen industrial research associations to which the Government, in all, gives a grant of £109,000. The Medical Research Council operates on a much smaller scale, with an annual revenue of £170,000. It has one chief research institute, and for the rest distributes its funds to assist research in various independent or medical laboratories. The Agricultural Research Council is essentially an advisory rather than an administrative body. It is responsible for directing the allocation of Government funds to the amount of some £200,000 a year to about twenty-seven

small independent or semi-independent institutes scattered throughout the country.

While there can be no doubt that the actual conduct of research under these bodies is of an excellent standard and that, considering their limited resources, they make a very good showing, yet it is amply clear from their own reports that they are unable to make a comprehensive attack on the problems of industry, agriculture or health. Thus, while the industries covered by the Department of Industrial Research have a net annual production of approximately £600,000,000 and those partially covered by it of £700,000,000, making £1,300,000,000 in all, those not connected with it at all have almost as large a total net product, £1,000,000,000: that is to say, at least half the industries of the country are not taking any advantage of Government-aided research, and for the most part it is probable that very little research of any kind is being undertaken by them. This is not due to any lack of enterprise on the part of the department. Actually sums of Government money are available for research which have not been taken up by industry. In the last Report of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (1935–6) we find:

> We regard this development as encouraging; but that is not to say that the position of the Research Associations as a whole is yet satisfactory or that adequate advantage has been taken of the grants now offered to them. The offers of grants made to the various Associations take two forms. The Department has agreed to make a block grant to a Research Association provided a specified income, the amount of which varies from Association to Association, is obtained from industry. To encourage further expansion, the Department has also offered additional grants to match additional income up to a maximum prescribed in each case. For the financial year 1936–7 it is estimated that additional grants of this kind will cost the Department £15,000. But the total additional grants which have been offered by the Department amount, not to £15,000, but to £81,000 per annum. In other words, for the present, the Department is prepared to find for this purpose another £66,000 each year, and would have been prepared to find that sum in each of the past two years had industry been ready to provide equivalent contributions.

For medical research it may be said that, considering the importance of the health of the people, the sums spent are ludicrously small and, in particular, that the amount of fundamental physiological and biochemical work needed for

understanding the bases of medicine is virtually being starved of support.

Agricultural research, although it might appear better supported, is actually in a bad way. The present situation satisfies neither the research workers themselves, who complain very reasonably of their low salaries and their lack of prospects, nor the farmers, who have not yet been persuaded of the full value which agricultural research carried out on an adequate scale might bring to the industry.

The present lop-sided development of science, which concentrates on physical and chemical research—there are more chemists than all other scientists put together—to the detriment of biological and still more of sociological research, is at last being recognised. It is due largely to the more immediately profitable character of industrial as against medical or agricultural research. It is clear that here only intelligent and effective centralisation and distribution of research funds can redress the balance.

The problems to be faced are those of finance and organisation, and these are necessarily closely linked. It will be impossible to secure an adequate finance for science unless there is some guarantee that the organisation, particularly in relation to the contact between science and industry, is sufficiently efficient and comprehensive to see that the money spent is not wasted.

The requirements of finance for scientific research are in many ways different from those either of industry or administration. The character of scientific work is such that returns in the shape of successful applications cannot be expected except after a number of years—rarely less than ten—of continuous study. For this purpose the first requirement is, therefore, a steady source of income. Rapid fluctuations, such as have occurred only too often in applied research, break up the work and may cause the effective loss of all the results gained.[3] On the other hand, scientific research is a growing occupation: new things are always being dis-

[3] Thus, work of the Rubber and Silk Research Associations ceased altogether during the crisis, to be revived later on. Even during the three years 1933–5, years of generally growing prosperity, we note that while the grants to certain associations, such as the Iron and Steel Industrial Research Council, doubled in the period, those of the electrical and allied industries sank by one-third, while other similar associations showed even more violent fluctuations.

covered, and the scope of the work is continuously widening; therefore the need is also for a fairly steadily increasing amount of money which should be limited only by the availability of good workers. A reasonable minimum figure would be an increase of 10 per cent. per annum, and greater increases could be profitably made. Thus the Cotton Research Association increased its scale of operations by 40 per cent. in three years.

The need for a steadily increasing budget is particularly important in relation to the position of the scientific workers themselves. Unless there is some assurance of fairly continuous employment and some prospect of improvement in status and salary, good workers will be, and are, driven out of research into the safer fields of teaching and administration. Thus, Sir William Bragg, in his presidential address to the Royal Society for 1936, said:

> The position of the men, and especially of the younger men, who are encouraged by these financial aids to devote the most ingenious years of their life to scientific research must be considered by those to whom the ordering of their lives is due. Some of the most brilliant young men in the Empire are selected for a specific purpose, which purpose they undoubtedly fulfil. Good work is done, and when it is finished a fine and most useful type of man is available for further service. In a great number of cases the satisfactory opportunity of further service presents itself. But it is not always so. It is possible to find a man living on income derived from one research trust after another until he ceases from age or other limitations to be eligible for further aid. His work may have been excellent, and his competence as great as ever, but he finds that he must look in some new direction for his living. Academic activities may be no use to him, nor he to them. His occupation has led him up a blind alley. I am told that there is a certain tendency for men who have been employed in industry as research workers to change over, when possible, to purely administrative work which is expected to be more lasting and in the end more remunerative. There is here a hint as to the true cause of the trouble. The blind alley should be a thoroughfare leading to occupations more suitable to the men and better fitted to get the best out of them. It is obvious what these occupations are. They are places of responsibility to which specialists in science are as yet but rarely admitted. There is an encouraging beginning; but it takes time to realise that the man who is in touch on one side with the growth of natural knowledge should be in close touch on the other side with the opportunities of its application. He should be an equal in the council chamber rather than a subordinate in the waiting-room. On the other hand, the scientific expert must himself help to take down the barricade

that makes the alley blind This requires that his education should be much more than sufficient to make him only a laboratory man.

The requirements of a steady increase of funds for research are not met, and cannot be met, by the present system of finance which depends on annual grants, or, more rarely, five-yearly block grants, by the Government and voluntary contributions from industry. These sums necessarily depend on the exigences of the trade cycle, as the figures quoted from the reports of the department quite clearly show. In slumps both sources of income are cut; in good times the institutes are not in a position to make use of money which might be available. It might seem that this difficulty could be met by subsidising scientific research entirely from Government sources, but this solution presents definite disadvantages. In the first place, it is not at all certain that fluctuations would be avoided in this way. In difficult times Governments will always be tempted to economise on scientific research. A more serious objection is, however, that an effective application of scientific research can only be carried out if there is close contact between scientific institutes and the industries they serve, and that this cannot be achieved unless there is, at any rate, a minimum of financial contribution from these industries. This necessity is well expressed in the annual Report of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research:

> From the point of view of industry, research is only a means to an end. The end is the application of scientific knowledge to all the stages of production and the development of new processes. The application and development of scientific ideas in industry depend upon a complete understanding of the way in which industry can make use of science and scientific method This application and development can be fully attained only if the problem of this co-operation is studied by the man of science as well as by the industrialist Between men of scientific education and most of those engaged in productive industry there are differences of training, experience and outlook which are not always present to the mind of those who are anxious to secure the potential benefits which science, wisely used, can bring to the community The scientist has to meet the industrialist half way For that reason one of our most important tasks is so to organise the conduct of research as to promote contact with industry.

It is, in any case, equitable that individual firms which profit from the result of scientific research should bear a portion of its cost Some would go further and suggest that they should bear all the cost, but this would be both inequit-

ible and impracticable. Scientific research in any particular ield is likely to yield results which can be usefully applied in very different fields. Even in applied research any particular piece of work may prove to be as advantageous to other ndustries as to the industry which undertook it. It is here hat the Government should come in as representing the ieeds of productive industry and of the community as a whole. It should also be remembered that, whether equitable or not, in many cases scientific research will not be undertaken by industries at their own expense exclusively, and that, unless the Government is prepared to step in, no research will be done, particularly in the older established and traditional industries. Consequently all schemes for finance of research should provide for contributions both from Government and industry; the difficulty is to combine this necessity with the one above mentioned of providing a reliable and steadily growing income to science.

How can this difficulty be met? The present system has now been tried for twenty years, and, although it has great things to its credit, it is plainly not meeting the requirements of the situation. Some bolder and more comprehensive scheme is needed to put the finance and organisation of British science on a footing compatible with its great tradition and with the needs of the industries and of the people of the country. Such a scheme has been outlined in the Report of the Parliamentary Science Committee. It is, in brief, a proposal to form a permanent endowment fund for science so as to ensure at the same time (1) adequate finance provided regularly; (2) a suitable rate of increase of income; (3) a comprehensive scheme of research covering all, and not only part, of the industries of the country; and (4) an organisation co-ordinating the work of the different scientific departments and institutes.

The recommendations[4] include the setting up of a National Scientific Research Fund to be controlled by a Scientific Research Endowment Board—an autonomous authority of the same type as the Electricity Board or the B.B.C. The fund would be provided jointly by the Government and industry through block grants from the Treasury over a number of years until a sufficient reserve had been

[4] See p 111, 'Recommendations.'

built up, and by contributions on a voluntary basis from industrial firms, possibly taking the shape of some form of voluntary levy.

The rate at which contributions flowed into the fund would not affect its ability to finance science on a steadily increasing scale (suggested figures are shown in the schedule below [5]) as long as they remained well above the annual expenditure. The larger they were, the sooner the period would be reached in which scientific research would be entirely self-supporting. Thus a contribution from the Government of £3,000,000 a year for twenty years or of £2,000,000 for thirty years, with approximately half as great average contributions from industry, would be sufficient. If, however, it was considered desirable only to make the endowment partially self-supporting, smaller sums would be needed at first, but they would have to continue indefinitely.

The advantage of this arrangement would be that, while the expenditure on science could be maintained at a constantly increasing level, the payments to the fund might be, after the first few years, quite irregular—large in good times, small, or even nothing, in times of national emergency. Thus the fundamental difficulty of the incompatibility of an irregular income and a regular expenditure would be met. Various additional methods are suggested by which money could be raised for the endowment fund: contributions from industry

[5] SCHEDULE

Rough estimate of annual needs of industrial, medical and agricultural research Government contribution only (amounts in thousands)

Year	Industrial	Medical	Agricultural	Total
	£	£	£	£
1937	590	160	200	950
1940	1,100	600	300	2,000
1945	2,000	1,200	600	3,800
1950	3,000	2,000	800	5,800

The estimates given in the total are based on a rate of increase of existing undertakings equal to that which has occurred in the past two years namely, about 10 per cent per annum. At the same time the introduction of new institutes and research associations is planned in a graduated way, the greatest increase taking place between the third and fourth year of the inception of the scheme. By 1941 it is expected that the complete scheme should be in working order, and after that time the increase here also becomes normal, as does the relative distribution of industry to governmental expenditure, which is kept low for the first five years. If such a rate be considered too slow or too fast, the table would still give an indication of the relative development suggested for different parts of the industrial research scheme; at half the rate the developments scheduled for [illegible] would be reached in 1940, etc.

might be freed from tax and legacies to it from death duties. Sums might be allocated from marketing boards or from tariff receipts to ensure that the industries receiving benefits should contribute to the scientific research needed to improve the quality of their product. All these, however, are details the discussion on which should not be allowed to interfere with the general conception.

The Scientific Research Board would not, of course, be an entirely new creation. As in the case of the formation of similar bodies, full use would be made of the existing organisation, which would be merged in it. The interests represented on it would be the Government, industry, agriculture, medicine, science, the universities, and, perhaps most important of all, the consuming public. The three Government scientific departments, while preserving their identity, might now function as executive organs of the Board. The scientific societies would be represented on the Board, and might find in its operation a solution to their present financial difficulties. The Board would not be concerned so much with the detailed running of scientific research as with laying down the main direction of work at any given time and as serving as a meeting-place between science, administration and industry.

Some have objected to such a comprehensive scheme on the ground that it will be impossible to find a personnel sufficiently gifted to run it. This, if true, would be a sad reflection on the present educational system. Happily, there is no reason to believe that it is. Among scientists, at any rate, it is opportunity, and not ability, that is most in demand. It is true that the present conditions of employment in Government and industrial service are not such as to attract the best men, but this the new Board would easily remedy.

A further objection has been raised to this scheme on the ground that it would interfere with the liberty of scientific research. This is a confusion between liberty and inefficiency. Actually, scientific research is effectively controlled already by the bodies which supply it with finance. All that the proposed scheme would do would be to co-ordinate and regularise their activities. The movement for such co-ordination in science is essentially similar to the present steps which are being taken in this and in other countries for the co-ordination of Defence Services, and the need for it is hardly less urgent.

Once the Board was set up, a move could be made for the adequate planning of scientific research on a comprehensive scale. Research associations could be increased to cover all industries instead of only half of them as at present. These could be grouped under research boards on the model of the present Iron and Steel Research Board, and, in addition, a number of institutes for studying the fundamental aspects of applied research could be set up. (Some of the new bodies that might be created are shown in Appendix II.) In this respect England lags behind other countries. Institutes for research into the more fundamental properties of metals, textiles, ceramics, etc., have existed for a number of years in the United States, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union. The formation of such institutes would supply an extremely important link between pure and applied science, to the lack of which we owe the fact that while the standard British science itself is now the best in the world, its application falls far below the standard of many other countries. A further advantage of these connecting links between science and industry would appear in the solution of many of the problems of technical obsolescence. With a comprehensive system of research institutes sufficiently well financed to be able to undertake experimental production on a semi-factory scale, it would be possible to develop new methods to a stage when they were unlikely to undergo any drastic alteration, and thus short-circuit the extremely expensive process of setting up full-scale factories at a time when technical improvements are still going on rapidly.

It may be asked whether this is the time for embarking on such extensive schemes. The needs of rearmament now bulk so large that other more peaceful developments might seem to be doomed to remain unrealised. But it should be remembered, first, that the amount involved of some £2,000,000 or £3,000,000 a year is trivial compared with the £1,400,000,000 of armament expenditure, and, secondly, that when a country is rearming it can least afford to neglect scientific research—a lesson which it might be thought had been learned by this country in the late war. It should be remembered, also, that the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research was set up during the war and largely on account of the deficiencies which the war revealed.

The proposed scheme for the endowment of science is obviously a first draft. It is framed to meet certain palpable defects of the present system, principally the lack of adequate and regular finance, the extremely partial character of present schemes for applied research, and the lack of direction and co-ordination which they exhibit. It may be that other means than those proposed can be found to remedy these evils and to lead British science to take the place it deserves in the world. Such proposals, however, have not yet been made publicly, and the purpose of the present scheme would be satisfied if, from the discussion to which it gives rise, alternative, better-balanced and more comprehensive schemes should emerge. But some solution must be found to put an end to a very serious wastage of the potential wealth of the country, both material and mental. For in the present state of world affairs such waste may be of critical importance to its prosperity or even its survival.

J. D. BERNAL.

APPENDIX I.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A.

1. That the contributions from Government sources to the Research Institutions (National Physical Laboratory, etc) and to Research Associations take the form of block grants for a period of five to ten years in advance.

2. That the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research together with the Medical and Agricultural Research Councils endeavour to obtain, by negotiation with industrial firms, associations of such firms, or other bodies, an agreement guaranteeing contributions to Research Associations, Research Stations, etc, for a corresponding period.

3. That the Department should open negotiations with all industries for which research facilities are at present inadequate, with a view to providing a comprehensive system of Government-aided industrial research.

4. That the aggregate sum made available for existing and new scientific research, laboratories and investigations be graduated to increase annually according to a prepared scheme, with allowances for extraordinary expenses

B.

5. That in order to secure continuity and adequate expansion of scientific research (according to recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4) in periods of variable industrial prosperity, a *National Scientific and Industrial Research Fund* be established.

6. That the Fund receive from the Exchequer an annual sum of £3,000,000 (or £2,000,000 to £4,000,000), or 10 per cent. of the value of Customs receipts.

7. That part of the annual receipts be used to defray the governmental contribution to scientific research.

8. That the accumulated reserve of the Fund be invested in trust securities (except as under 10) and the income thereof be used to defray part, and ultimately all, of the expenditure on scientific research

9. That the Department endeavour to secure contributions from industry to the Fund, which need not be regular in amount, but should provide over a number of years an aggregate equivalent to that provided from Government funds.

10 That similar schemes be inaugurated for medical and agricultural research, or that these be provided for by one general Scientific Research Endowment Fund

11. That legislation be amended to permit contributions or egacies from individuals or corporations to the Fund to be free rom income tax, super-tax or death duties, and that the Fund be permitted to accept stocks or shares in industrial concerns

12. That the control of the Fund and the payments from it to cientific research be invested in a *Scientific Research Endowment Board*, an autonomous authority with representation from Government departments, industries, agriculture, scientific and medical odies, universities and the public.

Recommendations A (1, 2, 3, 4) are independent of the adoption f the scheme contained in recommendations B (5 to 12). If the tter scheme were adopted, recommendations A. would refer erely to the control of expenditure for the maintenance and velopment of scientific research, and not for the provision of nance.

APPENDIX II.

Suggested New Research Boards

Mining and Quarrying.
Engineering
Plastics, Rubber and Leather

Textiles.
Transport.
Consumers' Research Council.

Suggested New Research Institutes

Geophysics.
Optics.
Metals.
Silicates.
Plastics
Fibres
Cookery
Domestic Engineering
Expansions of National Chemical Laboratory with subsidiary institutes

Suggested New Research Associations

Metalliferous Mining.
Quarry Products
Mechanical Engineering
Machine Construction.
Civil Engineering
Shipbuilding
Bricks and Cement.
Glass
Chemical Manufacture
Fine Chemical and Pharmaceutical
Brewing and Distilling.
Tobacco
Clothing Industries
Woodworking and Furniture
Paper and Allied Industries
Light Industries
Cinematograph and Photographic Industries.
Distributing Industry.
Business Welfare and Efficiency

BOOKS RECEIVED

The British Empire before the American Revolution: provincial characteristics and sectional tendencies in the era preceding the American crisis (vol. i., Great Britain and Ireland; vol. ii., the Southern Plantations; vol. iii., the Northern Plantations), by Lawrence Henry Gipson, B A (Oxon.), Ph D., F.R.Hist.Soc. Professor of History, Lehigh University (Caxton Printers, Caldwell, Idaho, U.S A, 1936, $15).

One of the greatest objectives of the Crown in the eighteenth century was to make the Empire economically self-contained: by 1750 this ideal had in great measure been realised, for Parliament had effectively supplemented, by bounties or tariffs, the administrative efforts of the Board of Trade. From the point of view of the development of self-governing institutions, and the successful establishment of varied forms of individual enterprise, in an attempt to realise favourable conditions of life for a widespread population combined with Imperial self-sufficiency, the old British Empire in 1750 was the most imposing politico-economic structure the world had ever known (vol. iii., pp 298–9).

It was no easy task to shape by legislation, even with the best of motives, the complex economic forces within the Empire on the lines of a planned economy. Economic sectionalism at home and in the colonies defeated every effort put forth (vol. iii, p. 232). Yet it is to the credit of Great Britain that she sought so to plan. Professor Gipson's narrative gives chapter and verse for negotiations during this chosen period which differ little in spirit from those of Ottawa in 1932.

The *damnosa hereditas* of British rule in the New World was the policy of immigration—of slaves from Africa and from the United Kingdom and Europe, for the convicts, and even the 'willing' indentured labourers, were little better than slaves. They were sold into bondage to pay their passage money: few children under seven survived the journey; few women in confinement survived the journey; some (German) were thrown overboard before death, to save trouble (vol. iii., p. 168), by the Dutch 'man-stealers.'

The immigrants, British or German or African, were for the most part ill-suited to their new home: the waste of life was appalling. Troubles grew apace: the laws became increasingly severe: men feared a slave rebellion: for striking a white man a

second time a slave might not only be burnt alive, but in such a way as to prolong his tortures, or might, if preferred, be starved to death in the presence of food (vol. ii., p. 250).

Yet from such dissident and unassimilable elements within four generations an organised society emerged which was able to hold its own and to acquire a stability which the more highly urbanised communities of the north lacked. How it grew up, what were the effects in America of English failures and Irish weaknesses in Ireland, and of local relations with the West Indies and with Spanish and French possessions is here told with copious references to original authorities in a spirited narrative which should make the volumes no less welcome in a public-school library than on the shelves of our great university and reference libraries. The volumes are provided with a number of early maps, are well printed and separately indexed.

Once Your Enemy, by Heinrich Hauser, translated by Norman Gullick (Methuen, 10*s*. 6*d*. net).

This is a good translation of a notable book which should not only encourage and inspire many young men who are 'up against it,' but will help us all to understand why modern Germany is what it is. It will explain why most young Germans feel that there are worse things than war, and why and how they have acquired their fears as well as their hatreds of Communism. In the penultimate chapter, the writer—a young married man—reveals his deepest feelings in a few sentences.

We are all trying to escape from 'I' to 'we.' The economic collapse of 1931 was a sobering and icy-cold bath, which cleansed us of luxury and swindling. How wonderfully our youth maintained itself through this distress! Youth burst in thousands through the walls that hemmed it in: officials sacrificed safe, soft jobs, clergymen went voluntarily to poverty-stricken parishes, young schoolmasters fought with enthusiasm against pedantry in high quarters. 'Everything must be changed.' How much ground had to be cleared before we could begin to build again. We did not lack money or technical equipment; what we needed was men of the pioneer breed. Our hope lay with the children. Already something which had been lost for a hundred years was beginning to stir in them: the ideal of physical fitness, a feeling for bodily beauty and soundness, which is the beginning of response to all beauty. Only future generations would succeed in recapturing those racial characteristics which had died out, but already

the well-developed and disciplined bodies of the younger generation refused to submit to fossilisation. The youth of Germany, whether it had yet openly joined the crusade or not, was wholly committed to it.

Out of the shapeless masses of our people, who have lost their racial homogeneity, we must again evolve a definite type of human being, of thoroughbred quality. How are we to recover it? Think how we have sacrificed it to comfort, indulgence, and evil living. Think how many of us have been in danger of losing our fighting instinct for the sake of urban ease, settled habits, and a plump wife who cooks our favourite dishes, or for the sake of goldfish and postage stamps. The whole of German history during the last fifty years can be likened to the career of a post-office clerk. Fighters must be lean and always hungry. In schooling ourselves to face hardship, danger and death we must begin all over again. The new race will have shorter nerve-tracks, quicker reactions, and the instincts of the hunter. Our people must be regenerated, must recapture that light-hearted daring which laughs at danger and fears only to die in bed instead of on the battlefield. Our hardest fight will be the fight against inertia. For the last twenty years there has been no peace for the *bourgeoisie*. All its fortified positions have been smashed or rolled up, but in its longing for security it still endeavours to dig itself in and consolidate. That must not happen: the fight must go on. We must overcome once and for all the fatal tendency of our people to make itself secure, to put on fat and become static.

Many readers will close the book with the feeling that those words apply not only to Germany, but to all Europe, and, not least, to Great Britain.

Actes du Consistoire de l'Eglise Française de Threadneedle Street, Londres. Vol. i., 1560–5 (publications of the Huguenot Society of London); vol. xxxviii., 1937 (edited for the Society by Elsie Johnston, M.A., Docteur de l'Université, Paris)

This volume of some 130 quarto pages is much more than the raw material of ecclesiastical history. The introduction by the editor, covering 37 pages, is much more than a mere summary of its contents, for, read in conjunction with the valuable 'notes,' it throws fresh light upon an important aspect of English social and economic history. Here we see laid bare, for the first time, the inner workings of a society of foreign exiles, centred in the Church, but with far wider ramifications, seeking to adapt itself to a new environment, maintaining discipline in matters of conduct, looking, not in vain, to Edmund Grindal, Bishop of London, for

guidance, and seeking, not always successfully, to relieve individual members of their flock from the persecution of common informers, an evil not yet entirely eradicated from the Laws of England.

Many Huguenots were skilled men and were regarded with jealousy by the trade unions of the day; the Port of London was being 'marvellously abused by strangers,' as it is to-day, and the position of aliens was in consequence precarious, though Huguenots were less under a cloud in Elizabeth's reign than in that of her predecessor.

The Huguenot community were accorded, in matters of personal law, extra-territorial rights. Calvin recognised divorce on grounds of infidelity or desertion, if proved before ecclesiastical authority, and we see here with what care the Consistory Court dealt with such a case. The censure of the Church was a valuable weapon, and it seems to have been wisely used. Calvin, relying on Pauline injunctions, inculcated submission to the civil authority, however hostile, as an obligation on Christians: the questions that arose in this regard were (p. 38) no less difficult then than now

Continuity, Christian charity, common-sense, and caution are the outstanding characters of the documents here reproduced: all are thoroughly English characteristics, few if any foreign communities have made more valuable or harmonious contributions to the main stream of English life

Religion and Reality: An essay in the Christian co-ordination of contraries, by Melville Chaning-Pearce (Macmillan, 1937, 7*s*. 6*d*.).

This book is the outcome of prolonged thought and of wide and discriminating study. The writer is a layman, and it is no disrespect to the clergy to say that he is better equipped than many of them for the task which he has essayed. It is in all respects a remarkable book both in clarity of expression and in the width of the mirror which the author uses to gather the light which he seeks to bring to a focus.

His thesis is that religion and reality are problems of life rather than of learning and can be usefully studied by one who has had a large experience of life and has some little learning. He has written, as he says, not easily, but from the depths: he has lived, not in a cloister, but among men, and has checked his bookish knowledge by his practical experience, which, in turn, has led him to present an 'existential' case for Christianity—namely, for Christian doctrine judged by its correspondence with life as seen by the ordinary man The arguments for such a case are carefully

marshalled; by them the author's conclusion, and his book, stand or fall.

If they be accepted, it matters little, or not at all, whether historians can prove to the satisfaction of other historians that certain episodes of our Lord's life and teaching are, or are not, historical. The proof of truth is its perception by human experience.

Mr. Chaning-Pearce has not reached his conclusions easily: the conflict between the sceptic and the Christian in him is as apparent as in the old Egyptian dialogues of B.C. 2000. But he ends by identifying the Christ of Faith with the Jesus of History: he accepts the dualism of matter and spirit, body and soul, as an existential dichotomy—from which, and from which alone, the 'new life' of a Christian can be born.

The most striking chapter is perhaps that dealing with 'Christianity and Life,' in which the Empedoclean view that the world is governed both by Love and Strife is developed and carried a step further by the writer, who deals with the problem of the relation of the Christian life to carnal passion with an imaginative fervour and a recognition of the tremendous difficulty involved in any attempt to equate the two. Yet both are a part, and a necessary part, of the full life.

This section in particular of the book deserves close study, which if given will repay those, including the younger members of the Oxford Group, who realise, not in retrospect, or at second-hand, but in daily life, that passion is fire, but that it is not therefore to be shunned, and that, in Coventry Patmore's words, 'All men are led to Heaven by their loves, but these must first be sacrificed.'

ARNOLD WILSON.

Unknown Karakoram, by Colonel R. C. F. Schomberg (Hopkinson, 15*s*.).

The distinguished traveller-explorer, Colonel Schomberg, has further added to the world's knowledge of the northern face of the Karakoram range by his two latest journeys in the summer of 1934. Winter travel in these regions is rendered practically impossible by raging winds and temperatures of 20 degrees below zero Fahrenheit, and would in any case be valueless, for snow and mist unite to obscure all features of the landscape. Effective travel is limited to three and a half months of summer, at a time when torrential floods from the melting glaciers render ravines and river valleys impassable. The traveller is therefore continually forced to scale precipitous cliffs in his detours, and his speed may be reduced to two miles in five hours of strenuous exertion. The formations of the Karakoram

—being very 'recent' in geological time—are treacherously friable, which makes rock-climbing among them a tenfold hazard.

Pack transport is out of the question, and such local nomads or peasants as may be pressed into coolie service display a most natural aversion from following the incomprehensible manœuvres of a European with a passion for penetrating the Unknown and making maps of uninhabitable country. Payment offers little lure. If left alone they have enough to eat and wear, and cash in the Karakoram has about the same value as pearls in the Sahara. The traveller has therefore to contend not only against the inhospitalities of Nature but against a very high degree of passive human resistance.

Striking east from the main Hunza valley, Colonel Schomberg crossed the Karun Pir into the valley of the Shingshal and explored the hitherto unknown head of its tributary, the Pamir i Tang. Then crossing the Shingshal pass (15,900 feet), the watershed between India and Central Asia, down into the Braldu valley, he examined the lower portions of the unexplored Braldu glacier, whose advance has completely closed a road which a hundred years ago was a great caravan route between Hunza and Baltistan. Pursuing the Braldu down to its junction with the Mustagh he turned north down the left bank of the latter river and north-west up its unmapped tributary, the Oprang, crossing the Oprang (17,200 feet) and Khunjerab (15,400 feet) passes into the Khunjerab valley, which led him back to Misgar, in Hunza proper. After a few weeks' pause Colonel Schomberg again set out eastwards for the Mustagh, crossing this time two hitherto untrodden passes of 18,900 and 19,600 feet into the valley of the Ghujerab (a tributary of the Khunjerab), roughly parallel to but north of the Shingshal. He again descended the Braldu and succeeded in ascending the right bank of the Mustagh to its junction with the Raskam, where they combine to form the Yarkand river, that flows north to lose itself in Central Asian sand. He proceeded up the left bank of the Raskam, unweariedly mapping, until the lateness of the season compelled him to retrace his steps. The delightful map accompanying the book embodies the results of this notable feat of single-handed exploration, and its value is enhanced by some beautiful photographs.

The author candidly calls attention on almost every page to persistent moods of peevishness, irritability, exasperation, etc., so that the reader will duly discount his acid judgments on the men he dealt with. Recurring attacks on the Mir of Hunza suggest merely that that much-tried potentate could find much to say in refutation of the various charges brought against him if he, too, had access through the Press to the public in this country.

E. O. LORIMER.

WALKS AND TALKS

By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P.

The most popular historian is and, as Juvenal reminds us, always has been the journalist, who records, in a form suited to his readers, what he thinks has happened during the past few days or hours. I used to meet their prototypes—professional gossip-mongers, story-tellers and wandering minstrels—in Syria, Arabia and Persia. They have been superseded almost everywhere by the daily papers and the radio. Intellectual malnutrition is becoming endemic, for a diet of newspapers and radio-talks satiates without satisfying. It encourages short views, for long views are not 'news.' It breeds easy optimism, alternating with unreasoning pessimism.

History, as taught in our schools and universities, starts a very long time ago, and generally ends at some date before most of us were born. I have never heard recent issues of *The Annual Register* recommended to students by those specialists in a dead and jejune past who mainly control our public examinations and, therefore, the compulsory intellectual exercises of our youth. These volumes, dating from 1758, deserve far wider recognition than they have attained.

It was said of Whewell that 'knowledge was his forte and omniscience his foible' but, wiser than some of his successors, he prided himself on bringing his pupils into touch with the world in which they would have to live, and I have heard it said of J. R. Green that he tried to focus all history on a point, which lay always a little ahead of his own day; if his mind, like a prism, displayed the white light of current history as consisting of strange colours, it revealed beauty and meaning to many simple souls.

A growing public look to historians, as the late Dr. M. R. James wrote of my father twenty years ago,

> Temporis annales prisci tu promis, et idem
> Horae gesta sequi praetereuntis amas,

to 'set forth the annals of old times, whilst following the events of the passing hour.' To this end I have for many years past preserved successive issues of '*The Times*' *Review of the Year* (issued as a free supplement on January 1) as the handiest compendium of strictly contemporary history—a cheap substitute for *The Annual Register*, and a luxury which every school and every home can afford. I wish *The Times* would reprint them at intervals in a handy volume, to help us to follow the advice of M. de Thiers to 'take everything seriously, nothing tragically'; I know of no better antidote against depression of spirits or undue elation than to read, in restrospect, these sober, comprehensive annals of the times in which we live, which gain in interest and value from the fact that they are written whilst the events and tendencies which they record are fresh in the memory of the contributors, as is shown by the following excerpts.

The year 1930 was described as one on which it was 'possible for few to look back with satisfaction—a period of depression from which the immediate future promises no relief.' The year 1931 was '*annus mirabilis* in the wrong sense, to be noted perhaps in the future as a Black Year in the history of the world.' It was conceded twelve months later that 'to a depressed and frustrated world it cannot be said that 1932 brought no prospect of relief; . . . to review the complicated struggles of the last twelve months without reference to the future would certainly be to paint a blacker picture than is justified.'

The year 1933 brought 'perceptible relief to a world worn by the economic and political shocks of the last few years.' The fundamental causes of the economic storm . . . have not been removed: there is not even general agreement in the diagnosis of these causes, . . . but there are at least some encouraging signs of economic improvement . . . the beginnings of recovery have become apparent.' The year 1934 was 'a year of many discomforts and afflictions. On more than one occasion it seemed that peace was preserved only by the League of Nations and mutual dread, . . . but, as they surveyed the plight of others, the inhabitants of Great Britain might congratulate themselves that, for all its faults, theirs was still the best country to live in.' The year 1935 ended 'under a sky not clear of ill-omened signs—the danger

if not the certainty of war; of war between two members of the League of Nations, not in Europe itself but on a field closely affecting European relations . . .' destined to 'test the strength, the utility and, perhaps, the further durability of the already impaired League of Nations.' As for 1936, it was said of that year, still fresh in our memories, that it could 'be dismissed with the feeling that it might have been worse.' In fact, in the words of Spenser's *Shepherd*:

> Thus must the world wend his allotted course
> From good to bad, from bad to worse.

What, I wonder, will be the verdict of 1942 upon 1937? It has been a year so memorable that many will reckon events in their lives from it, as Greeks from the Olympiads.

* * * * *

'He has not learned the lesson of life,' wrote Emerson, 'who does not every day surmount a fear.' That lesson was well learned in the dark days of twenty years ago. It can best be studied by daily contact with the humbler walks of life. Nowhere is 'kindness in another's troubles, courage in their own' so widespread as among our wage-earners; to hear of it and to experience it is an inspiration and a tonic. It was brought home to me one bitter evening in December when, in response to an invitation, a farm-worker and his young wife came to see me. He was a cowman: his wages averaged 46*s*. a week for a seven-day sixty-hour week. He could just 'thole out' on that, and the three children were, they assured me, strong and well-fed. But incessant labour had proved too much for him and he had fallen ill. He did not blame his employer, who was working just as hard and could not afford to employ more men, and he had been just as hard pressed by a rich man's bailiff last year. After two months in bed, drawing sickness benefit at 28*s*. a week, he had struggled back to work in spite of the doctor, for he could not afford to convalesce. His garden was full of weeds: he was in arrears with rent, and owed tradesmen money, for his wife could not manage on 28*s*., which left only 20*s*. for food, fuel and light, without counting a few shillings now and then for clothes and boots for the children. He had lost a stone in the last few months and had a hacking cough: his wife

feared it might end in consumption, but he dared not be overhauled by a doctor lest he should lose his job.

I should not have heard of this had I not written to him just before Christmas asking him how he was faring: he had not, he explained, cared to worry me with his troubles; I must have plenty to think of already. His wife spoke of rising prices: the distributors were making money, but not farmers, nor those whom they employed. That evening the tape machine at the House of Commons recorded that the profits of 357 representative companies had risen by 25 per cent. in twelve months. I was glad that she had not seen that, nor the advice of financial experts to exchange from production to distribution, as in the event of a slump the latter would be the last to suffer. But women have votes.

What hurt him, and her, was that many of his bachelor school friends were drawing from £3 to £5 a week as munition workers, as painters and bricklayers, spending most of it on pleasures and going on the dole cheerfully when work was slack.

A man with children not only got no more pay but was frowned on by bailiffs: he had three times been refused a good job because of his three children, though his credentials were excellent, on the estates of men whose names are to be seen daily in the papers. They, of course, did not know what was done in their name. National Health Insurance did not cover children, nor wives: a hospital bill for his wife, after a third child, came to £10, apart from the doctor; he had been dunned by the hospital far more insistently than by the friendly tradesmen to whom he owed money. He wanted to stick to the land, none the less, for it was the ambition of them both to have a small-holding.

* * * * *

Monsignor Hinsley, the Archbishop of Westminster, whom an English Protestant may be permitted here to congratulate on his elevation to the Cardinalate during December, was voicing the thoughts of many not of his flock in his pastoral letter for Advent, which included the following passage, itself an echo of Pope Leo XIII.'s Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, 1891:

No State can claim to be constructed rationally or morally when one section of the community has to be heavily taxed to provide another, at the cost of its natural dignity and independence, with a sort of parasitic existence and a measure of bodily and mental welfare.

The cost of the social services for 1900 was £36 millions; for the year 1935 it was £503¾ millions, made up as follows (Command Paper 5609):

	£
Unemployment Benefit, etc.	52,111,000
Unemployment Allowances and Transitional Payments	46,855,000
National Health Insurance	38,344,000
Widows', Orphans and Old Age Contributory Pensions	44,628,000
Old Age Pensions	43,774,000
War Pensions, etc	40,450,000
Education	111,748,000
Approved Schools	679,000
Hospitals and Treatment of Disease	14,629,000
Maternity and Child Welfare	3,590,000
Housing	48,157,000
Relief of the Poor	51,819,000
Lunacy and Mental Treatment	6,999,000

The figures take no account of the quasi-commercial social services—industrial assurance policies to meet funeral expenses—and workmen's compensation, nor the contributions of commercial firms to their own pension schemes, which would bring the total to £600 millions or more. The question we shall one day have to face is whether we are getting the best value for this vast expenditure. Theodore Roosevelt once warned his country, and his countrymen, against 'our two besetting sins—hardness of heart and softness of head.' There was never greater need to eschew both.

* * * * *

On November 18 it was announced that

the informal and explanatory discussions with a view to reaching an agreed basis for the negotiation of an Anglo-United States Trade Agreement had reached a point at which the respective Governments were able to announce that negotiations for such an agreement were contemplated.

The news was received with little enthusiasm on either side of the Atlantic and with anxiety in some quarters. The plain fact is that the Hawley-Smoot Tariff was a major cause of the Great Depression; the Ottawa Agreements did far more to stimulate than to reduce overseas trade. No political party in Great Britain is willing to contemplate any substantial reduction in existing tariff levels which would, by unsettling now well-established industries, cause far more unemployment in busy industries than fresh employment in those which are still insufficiently supplied with orders for the export market.

America is now the greatest of creditor nations: she has not yet recognised that this fact necessitates a radical change of policy on her part. She must be more willing to receive goods, and in much larger volume, before she can hope to sell more. Some of the export markets that her farmers desire to recapture were lost to her before an Ottawa Agreement was even talked of. Her products have been ousted from our markets in fair competition by those of Argentina and Denmark.

It has been suggested that the motive underlying the desire for a Trade Agreement is political: there is talk of 'the great democracies' getting closer together by this means. A Trade Agreement should not require to be bolstered up by such arguments, but should justify itself on commercial grounds. Meanwhile, there is some danger that the discussions should be regarded abroad as portending a fresh alignment of forces—those who have gold *versus* those who have none, in which case the latter will be tempted to take as their text, as did Samuel Wesley one Sunday in May 1688,[1] the noble answer of the three Jews to the Chaldean tyrant:

> We will not serve thy god, nor worship the golden image which thou hast set up.

The possession of gold, whatever its merits as currency, is to-day a dividing factor, the importance of which it is folly to minimise.

Special importance attaches in this connexion to a public address by Sir Robert Kindersley on October 22 last. He

[1] Southey's *Life of Wesley*.

reminded his hearers that whereas up to the end of 1934 we had always lent more than we received back by way of sinking funds and repayment of capital we have, during the past three years, received from foreign investments net repayments of capital totalling £76 millions. This fortuitous windfall helped to fill the gap in our adverse trade balance, enabling us to dispense with additional export to that extent. Our aim and duty, he concluded, was to reduce our adverse balance of payments and trade, in order that our special imports for rearmaments may be paid for without undue strain on our resources. In other words, we must do like other countries, increase our home production, and rely less upon imports.

* * * * *

Mr. Namier's contribution in this issue made me turn to Monsieur Jules Cambon's little book *The Diplomatist*, which earned very high praise when it appeared in 1931. It can be studied with advantage to-day.

'The Chancelleries of the world are unduly inclined [he writes] to cherish the illusion that nations enjoy no rights beyond those which are conferred on them by treaty. Nations have a personality and a life of their own which are independent of diplomatic conventions. . . .

'The mind of the negotiator and that of the lawyer are worlds apart. The application and the interpretation of the law require in theory a certain mental rigidity which is quite out of place in the empirical world of politics. The capacity to look facts in the face, . . . and even to submit to injustice in order to obviate a greater evil, are foreign to a disposition to stand upon the letter of the law; . . . much remains to be done before international law can be interpreted with the same accuracy as our Statutes; still in its infancy, it has hardly as yet acquired more than the force of custom.'

Those words may well serve as a commentary upon the observations of Baron von Neurath with which this number begins.

* * * * *

Time will show whether the policy adopted by Japan will bring prosperity and strength both to herself and to China. It is possible to win a war, and lose a peace. Of those now executing Japanese policy in China the verdict of history may

well be that of Milton, writing in 1670 of the Danish invasions of England in the seventh and eighth centuries :

> Valiant, indeed, and prosperous to win a field ; but, to know the end and reason of winning, injudicious and unwise : in good or bad success alike unteachable. . . . Hence did their victories prove as fruitless as their losses dangerous ; and left them still languishing under the same grievance that men suffer conquered. . . . What could be expected, but confusion in the end ?

But those who demand the condign punishment of offenders would do well to remember that, as we found three years ago in Iraq, such a demand by foreigners, however justified, may well make them popular heroes and thus exacerbate public feelings on either side.

* * * * *

The first anniversary of the King's Accession passed almost unnoticed in London : few commercial offices displayed bunting ; one great club had not hoisted its flag to mark the occasion, perhaps because it does not appear upon current calendars. The churches with very few exceptions seem to have ignored it. Yet, as Canon Swanzy reminded us in these columns last month, it is one of the oldest of our voluntary ecclesiastical observances ; and not for one hundred years have we had such good reason to give thanks to Almighty God 'upon the day on which His Majesty began his happy reign,'—to use a phrase which modernising clerics, careless of tradition, have removed from the Accession Service, with the assent, alas ! of the Home Office, which did not trouble even to print in *The London Gazette*, as of old, the Royal Warrant prescribing December 11 as Accession Day. Is it vain to hope that our episcopate, as in 1377,[2] will next year enjoin upon the clergy the importance of the Accession Service ; and could not members of the House of Commons procure the revival of an old custom and attend such a service, in their corporate capacity, at St. Margaret's ?

* * * * *

Christmas is of all our festivals the most English. Scots set comparatively little store by it, and across the Channel St. Nicholas comes to children on December 6. It is the

[2] See 'Parliament at Prayer,' *Nineteenth Century and After*, April 1937.

Festival of Birth, one of those observances which, becau they were good, were early adopted by Christians and, becau they are true, have survived with undiminished force. T early Christians did not know when Christ was born, but th felt, as we feel, that every child born into the world is a si that God does not despair of man. Christmas is to us—as them—a pledge of hope.

Every scientist knows that the facts of science are b approximations to truth, so far as it can be comprehended l the limited understanding of successive ages. The Christm legend is as true as anything that science can teach, for ever thing in our nature tells us that what it teaches is true, and has been so enshrined by art that it is immortal.

'*Adeste fideles, laeti triumphantes*' ('O Come all ye fait ful, joyful and triumphant') was sung when the Christi Church was young. It was a cry from the living to those wl had passed before and it proclaimed the Communion Saints. Those who have outgrown the simple materialism a mechanistic age, and can contemplate without bewilde ment the wonders of Nature in a clear sky, find, at Chri mas, fresh hope for the future, dark as it is to us, as it w to our forefathers. With the light of all recorded histo behind us, let us emulate their courage and step forward wi confidence into the New Year.

ARNOLD WILSON.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of t NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 *&* 12 *Orange Stre* *Leicester Square, W.C.2.*

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER

1877 1938

Founded by JAMES KNOWLES

1938 **FEBRUARY** No. 732. Vol. CXXIII.

LONDON: CONSTABLE & CO., LTD., ORANGE STREET, LEICESTER SQUARE, W.C.2

Registered for Canadian Magazine Post

Price Three Shillings. *Annual Subscription (Home and Abroad) 36/- post free*

U.S.A. and Canada, 75 cents. " " *U.S.A. and Canada $8.75*

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCCXXXII—February 1938

RENEW OR DIE!

I.

By Sir Leo Chiozza Money

> The invincible power had been tamed by a slow disease. Rome had stopped. . . . Men were wanting; the Empire perished for lack of men.
>
> J. R. Seeley.

Progress continues to be made in disposing of the fallacies on the population question, so rife until a few years ago. It is difficult now to believe that as recently as March 13, 1932, Professor A. M. Carr-Saunders wrote in the columns of the *Observer* that 'it is very desirable that the practice of family limitation should spread through all sections of the country,' when that practice had then become so common that it had already reduced the birth rate to 15·3 per 1000, or far below replacement rate. I pointed out to the Professor, in

the *Observer* of March 20, 1932, that he was altogether wrong in supposing there was then no cause for alarm, or that the great fall in the birth rate was due to the infertility of the upper classes, or that the decline in the British population would be slow, or that it was for good that the population was virtually decreasing. Now, it is good to add, Professor Carr-Saunders is manfully aiding the good cause of resistance to depopulation.

I do not know if we have converted Dean Inge, who as recently as 1930 wrote that 'unless a new sense of responsibility is awakened, either compulsion of some kind must be resorted to, or the population will probably increase beyond the optimum number and its quality will be C3 or worse. No kind of rational regulation can be thought of without conception control.' I observe with interest that his trenchant pen has been recently silent on the subject.

As for the Government, it is with great enterprise making inquiry. The registrars are to obtain in confidence further particulars from married folk to enable us to secure more statistics. I repeat my observation that when a quart shrinks to a pint, no very precise measurement is required to detect the change. What we want are, not more figures, but more children. Inquiry is all very well, but the case for immediate action is sufficiently established and very urgent. If anyone still really doubts what is the matter, let him examine the unblushing contents of the chemists' shop windows. The money spent on contraceptives is now big enough to support quite a number of children! As for the expenditure on motoring, which now reaches at least £350,000,000 a year, it proves how unwarranted is the supposition that the nation cannot *afford* children. Even the tiniest villa now boasts a garage of sorts inhabited by a hungry baby usually named, I understand, Austin or Morris.

If authority is not moved to drastic action by facts already available, it is difficult to conceive what more can avail. Let us for a moment put birth rates aside and look at the elementary school record. Here is no account of woebegone income-tax payers bled white of the means to educate children and therefore deciding to be childless, but of the children of the masses, who most certainly are better off than when the birth rate was high :

ENGLAND AND WALES: CHILDREN ON THE REGISTERS OF PUBLIC ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS MAINTAINED BY LOCAL EDUCATION AUTHORITIES

1913	6,016,000
1920	5,918,000
1933	5,639,000
1936	5,251,000
1937	5,123,000
Fall in the twenty-four years 1913–37	893,000
Fall in the twelve months March 1936–March 1937	128,000

This is a picture not of decline but of fall. The Board of Education published in 1933 an estimate by my gifted friend, the late Sir Alexander Watson, which showed that it was probable that in the next fifteen years the elementary school population might fall by about a million upon certain not improbable assumptions. Since 1933 the birth rate has slightly recovered, from 14·4 to 14·8, but there is grave fear that the country as a whole, with rural depopulation still continuing, may soon have as low a birth rate as that of L.C.C. London, which is 13·6.

The Population Investigation Committee have published a memorandum which, *on the assumption that nothing is done to change recent trends* of fertility and mortality, offers the following estimates of the future population of England and Wales:

1940	40,700,000
1950	39,800,000
1970	33,800,000
2000	17,700,000
2035	4,400,000

These figures have been widely and carelessly used by people whose voices carry authority, but they should be regarded with extreme caution. I do not believe in scare methods to aid a good cause, and it should be pointed out to the uninformed who are tempted to quote such estimates that they *assume a continuance of trend.* Thus, the birth rate of 1935–39 is *assumed in the calculation to fall to* 12·41, and in 1940–44 to 10·72, whereas, in fact, the rate has slightly risen in 1934–37 upon the 14·4 of 1933. Nevertheless, we must

remember how the London rate has fallen, and that even lower rates have been already reached in some urban districts. Moreover, if British emigration were seriously revived, and young people again poured out of the country as in quite recent years, the rot at the centre would assume even graver proportions, a fact almost entirely ignored at the 1937 British Migration Conference at the Guildhall. In that case the threatening table I have quoted would become much less than the truth.

We cannot with certainty forecast what the population will be at a remote date, but it is also true that what will happen to the future of vital statistics is settled in advance. It is not what will happen in 1958, but the number of children born in 1937, that will decide (apart from the mortality factor, which can vary but little) how many men and women of twenty-one years of age will be living in 1958.

Let me now pass to the white population of the Empire, the British part of which, as I pointed out in December 1936, is smaller than the population of the German Reich. The birth rates of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India have moved thus in recent years:

BIRTH RATES: UNITED KINGDOM, BRITISH DOMINIONS AND INDIA, WITH ESTIMATED POPULATIONS IN 1936

Year.	United Kingdom	England and Wales	Irish Free State	Canada.	Australia	New Zealand	Union of S. Africa (whites only)	India
Mean of—								
1921–5	20·4	19·9	20·3	27·4	23·9	22·2	27·1	32·7
1929	16·7	16·3	19·8	23·5	20·2	19·0	26·2	32·8
1930	16·8	16·3	19·8	23·9	19·9	18·8	26·4	32·9
1931	16·3	15·8	19·3	23·2	18·2	18·4	25·4	34·3
1932	15·8	15·3	18·9	22·4	16·9	17·1	24·3	35·0
1933	14·9	14·4	19·3	20·9	16·8	16·6	23·3	35·7
1934	15·2	14·8	19·5	20·5	16·4	16·5	23·2	33·7
1935	15·2	14·7	19·6	20·2	16·5	16·2	24·2	34·9
1936	15·3	14·8	19·6	20·0	17·1	16·6	24·4	—
Estimated Population in 1936 (in millions)	47·0	40·5	3·0	11·0	6·8	1·6	2·0	375·0

While the birth rates of Britain and her Dominions have fallen all round in the half-generation reviewed, it is notable

that South Africa and Canada are more fertile than the almost purely British Dominions of Australia and New Zealand. It is the French Canadians and the Boers who prevent a greater fall in the rates of Canada and South Africa. Thus, while the birth rate of Ontario (1936) is as low as 16·9, that of Quebec is 24·3. Soon the British population of Canada will fall below the non-British population. Ireland has maintained her fertility during the period. As for the total population, we find the United Kingdom, Irish Free State, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa to have an aggregate in 1936 of 71,400,000. Adding all the whites of the rest of the Empire, we reach a total of about 72,400,000, of whom about 7,900,000 are of other than British descent, giving a total British population (English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish) of, roundly, 64,500,000.

This extraordinary fact cannot be too greatly stressed. The British people emigrated in great numbers in the past, but their main stock overseas is not to be found in the British Empire; it is in the United States. We have only to examine the birth rates of Australia and New Zealand to realise that the small peoples of both these Dominions are dying out, their reproduction rates being far below replacement rate. They must either attract white immigrants or perish as white nations. But if they draw from the Mother Country they will quicken her decline. In Canada and South Africa the failure of British fertility will soon have serious results from a British point of view. The British stock, moreover, has been deserting South Africa and leaving the field to the Jews and other races. In 1926 the Boers numbered 964,500, the British only 564,600; to-day the disparity is even greater. In the Union a handful of whites is associated with nearly 6,600,000 natives and 1,000,000 other coloured people and Asiatics. The Boers (many of whom have German blood) are maintaining their fertility, while the British, as elsewhere, are in virtual decline. According to information that reaches me, the British in South Africa are made to feel that they are a minority. This is supported by examination of the membership of the Union Government and of its representatives abroad; the entire list contains few British names, a thing we little dreamed of when Campbell-Bannerman's Government set up the new Boer–British State. In effect, the Boers were conquered to

make Boer dominion larger still. The fact that they out-breed the English should not escape the attention of those who would understand the world. Conquest by fertility is the greatest conquest of all.

The Empire as a whole in 1936 had a population of over 480,000,000, so that the whites of the Empire, of all races, counted for only about *one in seven* of its people. That is very far from a position of security, but it cannot be improved while vital facts remain as they are. The Empire is a realised league of nations within which war is unthinkable—a significant thought, and one that redeems what is so often lightly condemned as 'Imperialism.' It is no small thing that war within the boundaries of a fourth of the world's area is impossible; can those charged with its welfare be indifferent to the fact that the only true and lasting possession of territory is to people it?

Before considering the rest of the world, let us look at the fertility of India. In 1921–25 the birth rate in British India —without the Indian States, that is—was 32·7, and it is higher now. By 1941, according to India's Public Health Commissioner, the population is likely to reach 400,000,000; it was about 375,000,000 in 1936. Birth registration is defective, and the actual birth rate, therefore, may be higher than the official figure. India is outstripping her food resources, and needs commensurate measures of land reclamation and irrigation if she is to ward off pestilence and famine.

Our survey of populations now passes to the world at large. Beginning with Europe, I give the birth rates of its ten most populous nations in the period of 1921–36, with a note of their populations in 1936. (For some of the facts I am indebted to the *League of Nations Year-book*.) Europe has 533,200,000 people and many nations, but the ten most populous nations in my list account for 447,400,000 of them. It is rather amusing to reflect that the remaining small nations of the Continent, representing about a fifth of the Continent's population, can exercise at the League of Nations eighteen votes on world affairs. This fact, combined with satellite voting, makes Geneva 'decisions' not a little ridiculous.

Of these ten populous European nations, six have birth rates above replacement rate; Germany has made a fine

EUROPE: THE TEN MOST POPULOUS NATIONS. BIRTH RATES, 1921–36, AND ESTIMATED POPULATIONS, 1936

Year	Russia	Germany	United Kingdom	England and Wales	Italy	France	Poland	Spain	Rumania	Czecho-slovakia	Yugoslavia
Mean of—											
1921–5	44.1	22.1	20.4	19.9	29.7	19.3	35.1	29.8	37.9	27.1	35.0
1929	—	17.9	16.7	16.3	25.6	17.7	32.0	28.1	34.1	22.4	33.3
1930	—	17.5	16.8	16.3	26.7	18.0	32.3	28.2	35.0	22.7	35.5
1931	—	16.0	16.3	15.8	24.9	17.4	30.2	27.4	33.3	21.5	33.6
1932	—	15.1	15.8	15.3	23.8	17.3	28.8	28.1	35.9	21.0	32.0
1933	—	14.7	14.9	14.4	23.7	16.2	26.5	27.6	32.0	19.2	31.4
1934	—	18.0	15.2	14.8	23.4	16.1	26.5	26.2	32.4	18.7	31.4
1935	—	18.9	15.2	14.7	23.3	15.2	26.1	25.2	30.7	17.9	—
1936	—	19.0	15.3	14.8	22.2	15.0	26.2	—	31.5	17.4	—
Estimated population in 1936 (in millions)	139.0[1]	67.5	47.1	40.8	42.8	42.0	34.2	25.0	19.4	15.2	15.2

[1] In Europe only, the total population of the U.S.S.R. in Europe and Asia was about 175,000,000

recovery, and three nations—Britain, France and Czechoslovakia—are in serious decline.

The first column is headed 'Russia,' but the Soviet Constitution knows only of a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). The Constitution thoughtfully embraces and invites the entire world. There is nothing to prevent Great Britain or the British Dominions from graciously accepting the Moscow ticket to-morrow. Few people, I think, realise that there is no Federal Russian State, and that the U.S.S.R. is *the theoretical expression of Communist world dominion.* The Communist conception of a League of Nations is tersely expressed in the motto: '*Proletarians of All Lands, Unite!*' It is true, however, that the largest constituent of the universal and world-embracing U.S.S.R. is the R.S.F.S.R., or Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. As this contains about half of the entire Soviet population, which was about 175,000,000 in 1936, the high birth rate of the R.S.F.S.R. is sufficient proof of Soviet fertility. The preliminary report on the new Soviet census, taken in January 1937, gives a provisional estimate of 180,000,000. This gigantic figure will not surprise those who realise that the U.S.S.R is growing every year by a number of people nearly as great as the population

of Scotland. Before the Great War, Russia in Europe and Asia had 180,000,000 people, but the Tsarist empire included Russian Poland, Bessarabia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The loss of these territories reduced the Bolshevist Empire to 120,000,000, so that 60,000,000 have been added in a few short years. The 180,000,000 include many very different peoples, speaking about a hundred different tongues.

A marvel to ponder, this federation in a Communist State of a twelfth of all the world's people, ruling 8,000,000 square miles of territory within a single political boundary, spanning the globe from west to east. In less than twenty years its population will reach 250,000,000. It already wields enormous forces, and has the greatest army in the world. It can train 30,000,000 men in arms, and is also arming its women. It claims to have the greatest and most efficient air force, and its aviators have won high distinction; it declares its determination also to possess the greatest navy. It seems that there are good grounds for regarding the U.S.S.R. as a formidable fighting unit, and it is for those who contemplate joining her in warlike operations to consider whether it would be more serious to be defeated or to be victorious in her company.

Worse than useless either to deplore or to ignore inevitable Soviet economic developments. We must needs hope that good will come to so many labouring millions, and that it will become possible to forget dark yesterdays, as they have been forgotten in other lands. Yet it was as recently as the meeting of the Communist International (Comintern) at Moscow in March 1924—a function attended by delegates from thirty-two countries—that Stalin publicly rejoiced in the antagonism between Japan and America, and in the agitations in Egypt, North Africa, India and China, while Zinovieff, not foreseeing his fate, thanked his gods for every sign that European nations were in difficulty, whether in India or Persia, Turkey or Japan. The Bolsheviks, it was declared, must utilise every such difficulty to weaken and destroy the *bourgeois* forces in Europe. Important 'victories' in the Orient were expected by the Soviet, *particularly in China and Japan.*

That, of course, was before the Trojan Horse was joyfully admitted to the League of Nations. It was before the able and ingenious M. Litvinoff amused himself by knocking heads together at Geneva. It was before the eloquent Zinovieff,

with many another Soviet dignitary, was taken out and shot to prove his blood not Red. It was before Moscow, with the aid of the British Fleet, was pouring arms into Spain in an attempt to add another province to the Red empire.

But it is impossible for an informed man not to admire the great economic development of the Soviet territories, from the Arctic—from the Pole itself!—to the warm regions of the south where cotton grows. I prefer to think of the U.S.S.R. husbanding mighty estates which the Tsars so gravely neglected, and to hope that she may soon be found neither shooting up her Old Guard nor seeking to impose her political doctrines upon the world. And it should be patent that success and peace at home would be the best advertisement for the U.S.S.R. Aren't we all 'planners' nowadays?—as Harcourt very nearly said.

Turning to Germany, her birth figures are a sufficient answer to those who tell us so frequently that Hitler's attack on infertility has failed. On the contrary, it has succeeded, and we ought to be glad to have such a demonstration. The 14·7 of 1933 became 19·0 in 1936, which means that Germany has nearly restored replacement rate. Certain rejoicings over a fall in the Italian rate in 1936 are also short of the mark. That fall was, of course, due to the Abyssinian war, and recovery is in rapid progress. In the first nine months of 1937 there were 12,933 more births than in the corresponding period of 1936. On the 1937 anniversary of the March on Rome 46,155 marriages were solemnised; thus that single day's marriages will add substantially to the birth rate! No doubt the special prizes awarded to those who marry on the Fascist festival accounted for this record. Yet we are told that all the efforts of Germany and Italy have failed. We seem to be suffering from serious inability to look facts in the face.

Whether we look at them or not, the facts remain. It appears that, in the ten most populous European nations, having an aggregate population of 423,000,000, fertility is still sufficient to increase the population in the U.S.S.R., Poland, Italy, Spain, Rumania and Jugoslavia, which countries have an aggregate population of 276,000,000. If we extend our survey to the entire Continent, it is true to say that it is Western Europe, together with Scandinavia and Central

Europe, that are in virtual decline, and especially the United Kingdom, France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria and Czechoslovakia, while Germany has not yet fully recovered her fertility. This generalisation remains true, whether we base our observations upon crude birth rates, upon crude fertility rates based upon the number of children born in relation to the number of women of child-bearing age, or upon a reproduction rate which forecasts the number of future potential mothers.

France, with an empire of about 5,100,000 square miles, has at home a population of 42,000,000 and in her great over-sea possessions perhaps 1,250,000 French and other Europeans, while the native population approaches 60,000,000. The world needs many more Frenchmen, and it is deplorable to record that at the census of 1936 the population was 41,906,000 as compared with the 41,835,000 of 1931. And these figures include, of course, the restored Alsace-Lorraine.

Before leaving Europe, let us glance at the worst cases of race-suicide—Austria and Sweden. In 1936 Austria had a birth rate of 13·1, the lowest in Europe, while the Swedish rate was 14·2. (For comparison, we may again note that the London rate is 13·6.) May we not say of these lands, as of France, that it is pity for white civilisation that peoples of such great gifts should destroy their posterity? There are now less than 7,000,000 in Austria and less than 9,000,000 in Norway and Sweden. All three nations are in rapid decline. Sweden, stirred by the revelation of her danger, has made a slight recovery, from a rate of 13·7 in 1933–34 to 14·2 in 1936. Austria, too, has been recently moved to action. Norway exhibits a continuous fall.

The decline of Scandinavia was the subject of a deeply interesting essay in the *Evening News* of February 7, 1928, by Professor K. A. Wieth-Knudsen, of Trondhjem University, and since he wrote it the birth rates of both Norway and Sweden have fallen heavily. He attributes the unfortunate leadership of Scandinavia in race-suicide to legislation which, by conferring 'women's rights,' has destroyed the husband's captaincy of the home. He urges that family authority should be re-established in the hands of the husband in return for the husband's indissoluble obligations to his family; otherwise he sees nothing for it but the complete dissolution

of the family and consequently of white social order and civilisation. There is an assumption here that men are more anxious than women to maintain the family; is it true? Is the modern woman of North Europe becoming denatured to a greater extent than the man, or are both alike degenerate? Curiously, the marriage rates of Norway, Sweden and Denmark have not fallen, but increased, even while the birth rates have fallen. In England the marriage rate has been steady since 1921, although births have fallen off. This seems to point to an increase of what may be called nominal marriages, with agreement that there shall be no children—an agreement, that is, for the mutual frustration of life. That does not entirely cancel out Professor Wieth-Knudsen's view, for men give consent when women in pursuit of 'freedom' deny them children. I fear that we must leave the Professor, as he despairingly quotes the words that Milton put into the mouth of Eve addressing her Adam:

> My author and disposer, what thou bid'st
> Unargued I obey; so God ordains,
> God is thy law, thou mine, to know no more
> Is woman's happiest knowledge and her praise

To which so obsolete matter I will add, entirely without prejudice as the lawyers say, the following pregnant line from G. K. Chesterton: '*Birth control . . . is mixed up with a muddled idea that women are free when they serve their employers but slaves when they help their husbands.*'

Turkey now hardly figures as a European Power. She is firmly seated in Asia Minor, and most of her population is extra-European. Her wonderful recovery under Kemal Ataturk, which enabled her to defy the attempt to dictate to her the grossly unfair 'Treaty' of Sèvres, has been followed by a very remarkable social and economic development. It is impossible for me here to do more than point out that between 1927 and 1936 her population, including the small part in Europe, rose from 13,700,000 to 16,200,000.

The European stocks out of Europe are mainly in the continent of America, the number in Asia and Africa being negligible in a computation of the world's population. Asia, the most populous continent, had in 1921, according to a close estimate I published in 1925 in my book *The Peril of*

the White, 786,000 Europeans, including the British garrison of India. In Africa there were about 3,100,000 Europeans. These figures have made small growth. The Union of South Africa, the chief white constituent of both Asia and Africa, in sixteen years has gained only 500,000 of white stock, including many Jews. It is a fact which nearly concerns the European leadership of the world.

The whites of America are mainly British in the North, mainly Spanish or Portuguese in the South; this is one of the main curiosities of human development. It is very difficult to analyse the Latin American populations, but after much detailed inquiry for *The Peril of the White* I estimated that it was probable that America, south of the Rio Grande, had a white population in 1921 of about 35,000,000. In 1936 this figure may have risen to 40,000,000. This not unreasonable estimate may be compared with the 117,000,000 whites of the United States and the 11,000,000 of Canada.

The birth rates of Latin America, so far as they are available, point to a generally high degree of fertility, but it is notable that Uruguay and Argentina, the two nations with almost purely white populations, have rates that have fallen after the fashion of Europe; Uruguay in 1935 was down to 20·4 and Argentina to 25·5. In 1921–25 these two nations stood respectively at 25·8 and 32·8.

The United States is in serious virtual decline, although she has so much territory that her existing population amounts to no more than about forty to the square mile. In 1921–25 her birth rate averaged 22·5; in 1935 it had fallen to 16·9, far below replacement. It is of interest to compare the cases of the United States, Japan and China. (See table on next page.)

The American fall is indeed remarkable, and no doubt has been precipitated by the economic *débâcle* of 1929–31, which brought the entire world of work to ruin and must have actually slain hundreds of thousands of people, in addition to preventing the birth of millions more. The world has need of special measures of protection against American methods which, operating upon the greatest stores of natural wealth in the world, have power to spread death and destruction throughout civilisation. President Roosevelt can hardly have forgotten that his first inauguration was saluted by every

BIRTH RATES AND POPULATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND CHINA

Year.	USA	Japan	China.
1921–5	22·5	34·6	Not known.
1929	18·9	32·7	
1930	18·9	32·4	
1931	17·8	32·2	
1932	17·4	32·9	
1933	16·6	31·6	
1934	17·1	29·9	
1935	16·9	31·6	
1936	—	30·0	
Estimated population in 1936	128·5	70·0	450·0

bank in America closing its doors; but how, remembering it, can he address admonitions to European nations and tell them that they are marching to bankruptcy? America, as I write, is again causing British securities to slump; yet on November 3, 1937, Mr. Norman Davis, opening the abortive Brussels Conference on China, and having nothing whatever to propose on the real question before it, actually took opportunity to address irrelevant economic homilies to the world, as though unaware of renewed American distress and the fall in the value of Wall Street securities of £5,000,000,000 in a few months. America owes it to herself to put her own house in order before again lecturing the world at large.

One in three of American married couples are childless: the proportion in the towns is even higher; in 1935 it was 34·8 per cent. The virtual decline of the American population is still masked, as in England, by the survival of members of older generations. In the cities, according to Dr. T. F. Murphy, of the Federal Vital Statistics Division, many men and women continue to earn separate incomes after marriage and have no true family life. When I was in America in 1926 this fact was commented upon to me with great bitterness by a married employee, the father of several children. That

was at a factory where girls earned high wages and left work in the evening in fashionable fur coats. American schools, like our own, are declining institutions. Even the American negroes (at least a third of whom have definite traces of white blood) are recording an increasing number of childless families. This is a result of the flocking of negroes to the industrial centres to earn more money than they can make in the deplorable conditions of the South.

The American population—in 1937 nearly 130,000,000—includes members of almost every race under the sun. The British stock is, roundly, 50 per cent. of the entire population, which may be taken in 1937 as :

	Numbers.	Per cent
British stock . . .	65,000,000	50
Other European stock .	52,000,000	40
Coloured stock . .	13,000,000	10
Total . .	130,000,000	100

A very large part of the British-American stock is Irish—Southern Irish. Excluding the Ulstermen, the Irish number about 13,000,000. The other chief constituents are Germans (including German Jews), 20,000,000 ; Italians, 5,000,000. A strange reflection, that the Irish are a nation as scattered as the Jews, and that the bulk of the race is to be found, not in the Emerald Isle, but outside its borders and mainly across the Atlantic :

> They say there's bread and work for all
> And the sun shines always there :
> But I'll not forget Old Ireland,
> Were it fifty times as fair !

For me, the dispersion of the Irish is one of the most saddening features of the world's population. As recently as 1841 the Irish in Ireland numbered 8,200,000 against the 15,900,000 of England and Wales. Since then the Irish in Ireland have been halved, but the Irish of the world have grown to probably 25,000,000—a great nation.

The picture of the American 'Anglo-Saxons' works out something like this:

AMERICAN COMPOSITION IN 1937: AN APPROXIMATION
(To nearest million)

United Kingdom stock (English, Welsh, Scottish, North Irish)	52,000,000
Southern Irish	13,000,000
Germans and German Jews	20,000,000
Italians	5,000,000
Swedes	2,000,000
French	2,000,000
Other European stock	23,000,000
Negroes, Mulattos and other coloured folk	13,000,000
Total	130,000,000

The negro population, descendants of the survivors of an enormous importation of slaves, lives for the most part in conditions of degradation. Professor R. Kuczynski has put the importations at 900,000 in the sixteenth century; 2,750,000 in the seventeenth; 7,000,000 in the eighteenth; 4,000,000 in the nineteenth—nearly 15,000,000 in all. That under 13,000,000 descendants should survive after so many years is a sufficient indictment. That the survivors should still be living in degradation is not creditable to America. Within the last few months we have read not only of lynching and lynching joy-parties, and the continued existence of the Ku Klux Klan, but of a negro member of Congress, graduate of a university, thrown out of a Pullman for daring to ride with white men, and of farmers out with guns to stop the migration of negroes from their plantations. According to that competent authority Mr. Archibald Rutledge, 'the plantation negroes to-day sorely need food, clothes and shelter, . . . they need to be healed in body before we can do much with their minds and souls.' I never read one of the frequent blasts of American eloquence upon freedom and the imperfections of Europe without thinking of the American negroes—and of many other things that cry to Heaven for redress.

Although in virtual decline, America has cut down

immigration to small quotas, the quota admitted from each European nation being in proportion to the number of the people of that nation already in America. America has the unchallengable right to decide her immigration policy, but we are entitled to relate it to the danger to civilisation which results from a combination of white race-suicide with denial of opportunity to races still fertile.

When we turn to the Japanese records, we find a condition of abounding fertility. With half the population of the United States, Japan adds as great an annual increase. Moreover, the Japanese increase is not illusory—not a masking of real decline, as in America. Her birth rate is 10 per 1000 higher than is needed to maintain her existing population. She is still adding 800,000 a year to her people, who as I write number nearly 71,000,000. The population of Japan is predominantly young. How different from our own case !—in England and Wales the proportion of persons under twenty-five years of age has fallen by about 25 per cent. since 1900. So rapid has the ageing of England become that whereas in 1901 520 out of every 1000 persons were under twenty-five, the corresponding figure in 1935 was 388.

Let us make a few comparisons of moment. Japan built her first railway in 1872 ; since then her population has grown from 33,000,000 to 70,000,000, while that of England and Wales has grown from 23,000,000 to 41,000,000. More significant still for the British Empire is this statement :

AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND JAPAN IN 1936

	Area (sq miles)	Population
Australia	2,975,000	6,800,000
New Zealand . . .	103,284	1,600,000
Japan (Japan proper without her possessions) . .	147,785	70,000,000

In the next ten years Japan will add to her people a number as great as the combined populations of Australia and New Zealand.

Turning to China, we have to confess that we have no

reliable data. Vital statistics do not exist, and the estimate of population is largely guess-work. When we put it at 450,000,000 for all China, including Manchukuo, Mongolia and Tibet, we name a figure that may be plus or minus 50,000,000 or more. We can, however, say that it is credible in relation to the census figures of India. China proper has an area of 1,532,000 square miles, so that a density figure based on the traditional estimate is not very high—278 to the square mile for the 427,000,000 included in the total estimate of 450,000,000 for all China. Female infanticide continues, but the Chinese long for heirs and reckon a childless man poor, however wealthy he may be. A considerable Chinese emigration has already taken place, and millions of Chinese are to be found prospering in French Indo-China, in Siam and Burma, in the Philippines, and throughout the Malay Archipelago. The Dutch East Indies have about a million Chinese, who are active wholesale and retail traders. We do not know to what extent Chinese food production could be increased by science, but we do know with what intensive care the Chinese already cultivate their soil.

I now gather together the main facts we have reviewed, with a host of smaller details too numerous and too complicated to mention here, and present the world in perspective, at a near estimate for 1936, with apologies to the 2,108,000,000 (or more or less) people thus reduced to ciphers :

THE WORLD'S PEOPLE, 1936
(In millions, to nearest million)

Continent.	Europeans or European Stock	Others.	Total
Europe . .	533	—	533
Asia . .	1	1146	1147
Africa . .	4	146	150
America . .	167	100	267
Oceania . .	9	1	10
The world .	714	1393	2107
Per cent. . .	33·9	66·2	100·0

The world is composed of a few that lead and many that follow. To every race its leaders; to all the world races that lead. There need be no false shame in accepting leadership, whether of man or of race, and those who must follow are not to be regarded as unworthy or negligible. Even the Australian blackfellow, they say, is a white fellow on close acquaintance. I have seen a little of only nine countries, but wherever I have been I have found it true that men own one heart. A man who has travelled much has written, 'At bottom, men are alike.'

There is much to be said about leadership and its quality; in its domestic aspect the issue is being unconsciously discussed in the controversy about 'democracy,' which is not my business here. In its world aspect I believe that white leadership, with all its imperfections, is a thing to be cherished for the good of all humanity, not in arrogance, but in the conscious and educated exercise of great gifts.

And as I see it, white leadership is in grave danger. The broad analysis I have given here should arrest alike those who condone or even applaud race-suicide; those who exacerbate ill feeling between the nations; and those who would deny a share in the development of the world to nations which, for whatever reason, have had no opportunity to gain the control of extra-European territory.

Of the world's 2,100,000,000 people, we see, *only one in three is a European or of European stock.* The white is master of Europe and of America. In Asia he has a precarious footing, and his prestige has never recovered from that amazing year, now thirty-two years ago, in which Admiral Togo surprised Port Arthur and in four days put the Russian fleet out of action. In Africa the white man is *one in forty* or so of the population, and many white agencies have been and are still teaching the Africans that the whites who once ruled all North Africa ought to be massacred at the earliest opportunity, and rejoice in big headlines if they hear, or fancy they hear, that a few of the whites have been surprised and slain. Many of them even went the length of suggesting—nay, urging—that the fleets of Europe should cut off a body of hundreds of thousands of Europeans in Africa so that they could not escape massacre. If we turn to Oceania, we find the whites in possession, truly, but so oblivious to consequences that

they deny access to Europeans even of their own stock—to the only available means of maintaining white civilisation in regions the most remote from Europe and European aid. They so greatly neglect the obvious that, after a hundred years of white settlement, Australia cannot defend herself for lack of manhood, and can only hope that, if dire occasion arises, her battle may be won for her either by naval action in the Pacific or by victory in Europe.

The failure of British fertility is a misfortune for the British Isles; it is a greater misfortune for the British Empire and the world. Civilisation is not yet strong enough to withstand the sapping of the roots of Europe. Many of us are inclined to gird at Mussolini and his endeavours to increase Italian fertility; it should not be forgotten that, as a good European, he has pointed out, not to his own people alone, but to all Europe, that the white man must renew or die. I venture here to repeat the warning. The drying up of the fountain of British lives, if it is not stayed, must mean the disintegration of the British Commonwealth. What could the bitterest enemy of England desire more than that she should teach her young women not to become mothers? It takes a great deal of warfare to destroy as many people as private and open counsels now conspire to kill. Birth control, in every year since 1918, has suppressed more British lives than were killed by the Germans in the bloodiest year of the Great War. If the object of war is to kill, to subdue, to devastate, to destroy, then the war on births is the most successful warfare of all time. The bombing aeroplane, dangerous weapon as it is, is a toy compared with the contraceptive.

The larger issue is that any European nation which, consciously or unconsciously, still further reduces the small proportion of whites in the world is an enemy not only of his own kind but of all the world of men. I hope that I hardly need to add that no suggestion is made here of a 'Yellow Peril,' a term which is as absurd as it is insulting. The peril of the white is that both in the Old World and the New he is in danger of committing race-suicide. If the whites go under, it will be because they will have proved themselves unworthy to survive.

* * * * *

I repeat very briefly the programme of positive action which I proposed in these pages in December 1936. Many echoes of it have reached me, and I again submit it for consideration. It is :

(1) A Ministry of Maternity and Childhood should be established.

(2) A modification of taxation should encourage family life.

(3) Basic wages should be accompanied by family allowances.

(4) Generous Marriage Dowries should be paid, supplemented by Child Bonuses.

(5) A vigorous land programme should bring the soil into full cultivation and restore the balance of urban and rural life.

These things—with inspiration, with Leadership !

LEO CHIOZZA MONEY.

RENEW OR DIE!

II.

The Cultivators Speak

By G. T. Wrench

You who live in lands which no longer produce all that you need take from our soils that which your own fail to supply. You take our grains, fruits, vegetables, sheep, cattle, hides, fibres, vegetable oils, gums, trees—all transformations of the fertility of our soils.

Now a natural law of the fertility of the soil, which can be seen in your untouched forests, is this: that which is produced by the soil is in a changed form eventually returned to the soil. The food of the soil is transformed into leaf, fruit and wood, and, at a later time, leaf, fruit and wood become mould. Animal matter also returns finally to the soil. Hence, in taking these raw products from our lands, you take the transformed natural foods of our soils. Herein lies no fault. But what do you give us back? Do you return to the soil all that which has taken life from the soil that it may become life again?

It is these soil foods, we repeat, which turn into the wheat, rice, fruits, flesh, wool, hides, cotton, jute, oil, rubber, timber and so on, which you need for your food, and for your bags, ropes, buildings, paper, leather goods and the countless other articles which you manufacture with such astonishing skill and speed. It is these soil foods which are the very substance of our agricultural stability. The strength of our soil is the strength of our people; its weakness, their weakness. What do you return to us that is comparable in value to what you take?

'We sell you artificial and synthetic manures carefully designed by science to replace lost soil foods.' This is your

answer to our question. While answering, you carry in your minds the many indirect benefits you have bestowed on us, such as your wonderful irrigation works, the order you maintain, the protection you give us from outer enemies; but these you do not proffer in your answer, for they are not relevant to our specific question. Artificial manures are no sound answer, even were they distributed with such wide liberality that every peasant got his full supply. They lack the lowly organisms which, it seems, play such an important part in the formation of humus and its peculiar character. They stimulate the soil, but they do not maintain the continuity of its fertility. They are no answer to our question.

Then there are the bone and fish manures, the natural phosphates and nitrates, which you sell. These, again, are only fragmentary answers to our specific question, which at greater length runs in these words: Do you return to the soil after its use all that which once took its life from the soil? Do you allow the wheel of life its equable revolution from soil to plant, plant to animal, and from plant and animal again to the soil, by restoring to it such vehicles of life as you have borrowed for your service? Our reply is that in this you fail.

We must at once acknowledge that in this you do not stand alone. What you fail to do many, many generations of cultivators have failed to do also. But compared to them you are such giants of achievement that your failure is far more threatening than theirs. Theirs has led to a low level or slow deterioration of life in many eras and many countries. But the speed of your era is so terrific that the decline of life can become almost catastrophic in a far shorter space of time.

You have opened up huge new territories of the earth's surface, you have seized upon older lands to work them for the profit of your peoples, and also, so you hope, for the profit of their inhabitants. Many of these older lands have been worked by native cultivators, who have given little heed to the dictum we have enunciated, that of giving back to the soil after use that which has been taken from the soil. These ill-worked lands have, therefore, offered opportunities under your highly skilled but incautious use of them. So, for the time being, they have lent themselves to your speed.

We have said that there have been many generations of

primitive cultivators who have failed to preserve the fertility of their soils. Such, for example, are those who have and still practise ‘ shifting cultivation ’—that is to say, clearing a piece of land by axe and fire, cultivating it, and abandoning it when either its fertility is exhausted or the weeds outgrow the crop. A fresh piece of land is cleared, and so the shifting cultivation proceeds. The abandoned land, denuded of its protective forest or grass, tends, usually after several cultivations and abandonments, to deteriorate. In wet climates it may become swampy, in arid climates waste or desert.

It is shifting cultivation in the arid parts of Africa that has caused the desert to advance and overcome once fertile lands. The tribes, dependent upon the soil for their own and their beasts' food, have been forced to move away from the encroaching desert to more fertile parts. Naturally, their migrations have been resisted. So neglect of the preservation of the soil's fertility has led to inter-tribal wars.

In many lands of settled cultivation, other than your own, there has been a slow continuous deterioration of soil fertility. In India, for example, your Royal Commissioners came to the opinion that the overwhelming proportion of the agricultural lands of India long ago reached their maximum impoverishment. Some of your experts term this, ominously enough, the dead level of fertility. We have not here space to go into the causes of this loss, nor the effect it has had upon the history of India. We must limit ourselves to the statement that the rule of return has not been followed in India. It has not formed a traditional principle of Indian agriculture.

In contrast to these many countries of neglect, we turn with relief to the countries of its observance. For many centuries the crowded millions of the great agricultural civilisation of China and its pupil lands have observed the rule. It was the late Professor F. H. King, of the Department of Agriculture of the United States, who exposed the contrast between the Western neglect and the Chinese observance in a book to which he was able to give the spacious title of *Farmers of Forty Centuries*.

The Chinese use everything that has taken life from the soil to make further life. They collect used material with meticulous care. Even the mud of their canals, with the

food substances which have been washed from the fields and hills, is studiously used. They collect the waste of their towns and they use legumes with their enriching nitrogen. Of all these materials they make a compost or manure and spread it evenly over their fields, which with infinite labour they have graded to produce level surfaces. They conserve and control the waters of their rivers for the service of the soil by simple yet successful mechanical means. They are only defeated by severe drought or the occasional overwhelming power of a great river in spate.

By these practices they have preserved the fertility of their soil through many centuries. Its productivity is so excellent to-day that upon seven holdings, King estimated, it supported a rural population at a rate per square mile thirty times that of the rural population of the United States upon improved farm lands.

The contrast between this conservation for the soil of that which the soil needs and the waste of it in your Western civilisation aroused the Professor to forcible utterance. These are his words:

> Man is the most extravagant accelerator of waste. His withering blight has fallen upon everything within his reach, himself not excepted; and his besom of destruction in the uncontrolled hands of a generation has swept into the sea soil fertility which only centuries of life could accumulate—fertility which is the substratum of all that is living. It must be recognised that the phosphate deposits which we are beginning to return to our fields are but the measure of fertility lost from older soils, and indices of processes still in progress. The rivers of North America are estimated to carry into the sea more than 500 tons of phosphorus with each cubic mile of water. To such loss modern civilisation is adding that of hydraulic sewage disposal, through which the waste of 500 millions of people might be more than 194,300 tons of phosphorus annually, a waste which could not be replaced by 1,295,000 tons of rock phosphate, 75 per cent. pure.

Such is a difference between your civilisation and the agricultural one of China. In theirs, there is no hesitation to regard human excreta as material to be added to others which, after fermentation together, form the compost for the soil. In yours, under the sardonic term of hygiene, you waste components of the wheel of life.

Now, the stability of the soil, we maintain, has been a chief cause of the stability of the Chinese Empire. Chinese stability maintained itself, chiefly by methods of peace, up to the last century. It is a record in human history almost unparalleled in its significance. In comparison we wish to bring your attention to that great but dead dominion which was in its material magnificence a forerunner of your own gigantic civilisation.

The rise and fall of the Roman dominion have been attributed to a number of causes, but we, as cultivators, will confine ourselves to their relation to the soil and its fertility, with which aspect, we feel, you are not sufficiently familiar. The rise of the Roman power, like that of China, began with its agriculture, which provided food and the raw materials of manufacture. It was upon men of our profession that the historic strength of these two famous empires was founded. The Latin peasants cultivated a fertile soil, enriched by volcanic ash. They had knowledge and the agricultural engineering skill which distinguished the Chinese. We cannot go into the evidence of their skill in any detail, but we will select one example, which would appear exceptional even at the present day. We refer to the numerous relics of underground tunnels, drains and dams which have been found by excavation and by which the Latin farmers both saved the soil from erosion due to seasonal freshets from the Apennines and conserved water for distribution upon the land.

This is an example of the skill and labour by which the early cultivators supported themselves in their fifty or more thriving villages. In the Latin plain they erected an agriculture comparable in its heroic quality, if not in its area, to that erected by the pre-Inca Peruvians in the inhospitable valleys of the Andes.

The great works of the Peruvians, those of the Latin farmers, and those of the Chinese needed peace and protection for their proper functioning. Their very success exposed them to the aggressive cupidity of less skilful peoples. The healthy vigour of their closely-set populations, the powerful organisation which these very works imply, presented, to the aggressors, a formidable barrier and the possibility of heavy punishment. Moreover, all these people had an especial art of federative polity and bound other peoples to themselves

by associating them in their own agricultural and civil superiority. How, then, is it that China has been able to preserve her great civilisation whereas that of Rome fell? Our answer is that China preserved, while Rome failed to preserve, the health of the soil.

In your knowledge of China you have included little of her agricultural history. That is because it has been so different to your own, and so lacking in danger to yourselves, that you have been able to disregard it. But, we believe, you can do so no longer with safety to yourselves. If you read such Chinese history as your scholars have translated into your own languages you will learn that the axis upon which Chinese history revolves has always been the preservation of peasant agriculture. Their earliest sages established the system of the Tsing Tien, or the nine fields. The Tsing Tien was a device for the preservation of social wisdom. Eight square fields surrounded the ninth. The eight were worked by eight familes for their own use, the ninth was worked by the same families in co-operation for the State. The link between the families and the State was one of agricultural service; it was not, it is to be noted, one of money.

The history of China is largely one of the protection of the Tsing Tien against the encroachment of large estates which rich men were able to form at periods of agricultural distress. Such periods were caused not only by a succession of droughts and floods but particularly by wars and imperial extravagance, leading to a demand for larger immediate revenues, which were extracted either by the taxation or the enforced sale of land. An historic example was that due to the building of the Great Wall. To meet its cost the Emperor Kwan Chung officially abolished the Tsing Tien system and decreed the destruction of the literature of the sages. Both system and literature, nevertheless, survived and their propagation was again promoted. The traditional principles of the Tsing Tien have, indeed, never been obliterated, though time changed their practical application. Continuous intensive cultivation by peasant families is still the characteristic agriculture of the Chinese Empire. The partnership of the peasant and the soil has endured. Through it the soil has preserved its remarkable fertility.

We believe that without this close, continuous partner-

ship of peasant families and their particular soils the stability of a people cannot be preserved. Without it, soil fertility is not a matter of comprehended routine but sways within a great range of variability, so that men who are its creatures as well as its artists are tossed upon the waves of change and chance.

Such became the story of the Roman world. The peasants were called upon to leave their farms in order to fight the successive wars of the State. They were, indeed, the strength of the State. As the Tsing Tien was the principle of strength which permeated Chinese history, so was the peasant owner the principle of strength which permeated the history of Rome. But in China the principle was more profoundly thought out and more stoutly defended. It was peaceable and real. In Rome it was the military, not the agricultural, quality of the peasant owner which was so highly esteemed, and it was through his very military quality that the peasant owner suffered agriculturally and eventually succumbed. He became an ideal, and it was as a traditional ideal, and not as an actuality, that he permeated Roman history in the constant laments of Roman statesmen and thinkers over his decline and their constant endeavours to recreate him.

His land suffered through his absence at the wars. To restore it he had sometimes to borrow, and so he became a debtor. The early farmers kept strict control over money-lending. They so ordained their laws that, while the thief should be cast in double damages, the money-lender should make fourfold restitution. But Hannibal's invasion of Italy did to the peasant owners what the Great Wall did to the Tsing Tien. Only it did it far more permanently, for all the attempts to restore the older system failed. From that time capital, and not family partnership, began to dominate agriculture.

This seizure of the land to form large estates is commonly attributed to the acquisitive greed of the Roman capitalists. War, it is held, is upon the side of the capitalist. We cannot deny either of these factors, but we do assert that neither of them is primary. The primary cause is loss of soil fertility. Had the Roman polity comprehended the intimacy between peasant owner and soil fertility, as did the Chinese, the ascendancy of the capitalist in agriculture would have been

greatly curtailed and eventually disestablished. It is the intensive cultivation of peasant owners that permits of a family living on a small area of land. The farm of seven *jugera* was famous in the Roman tradition as sufficient for a family, but it would have proved quite inadequate after the warrior had long outweighed the farmer and the farms had been devastated by the Carthaginian and his allies, so great was the loss of soil fertility.

The change in methods of farming which accompany loss of soil fertility may be named in the following order: peasant ownership, large farms with peasants as labourers, large estates or latifundia belonging to capitalists and worked by some particularly cheap form of labour. On the Roman latifundia the slaves fulfilled the part of labour which is now taken by your machines. The three types merge into each other and may even be combined. Where seven *jugera* fail to support a family, a farm of seventy *jugera* of poorer land may support a farmer owner and his poor-living peasants. Yet poorer land, worked on a huge scale by slaves or machines, may yield a profit which enables the owner to enjoy the pleasures of life in the city, whereas divided up into several large farms and worked by agricultural labourers it fails to be profitable.

Many improvements now occurred in the Roman agriculture which was suitable to the large estates. Land that was no longer fitted for intensive farming and arable cultivation was improved as pasture land by the use of artificial grasses. Cattle, previously reared in small numbers for milk, cheese and labour, now roamed over large ranches. The vine and the olive were cultivated on latifundia with commercial success. New fruits and fibres were introduced from foreign lands. Nevertheless, the soil of Italy continued slowly to decline, and with it declined the Italian people themselves. Foreign slaves took their place, and through constant importation maintained the numbers which disease and poor circumstances depleted.

Italy was largely deprived of the excellent fresh foods of small intensive farming. She could no longer feed her urban populations. The wealthy classes were able to procure the fruits and foods of Italy and the fish of its seas, and to add to them delicacies procured from the dominions, so that their

food in its variety was scarcely surpassed by that in which the wealthy classes of your more powerful civilisation can indulge. The food of the lower classes declined in quality; that of the poorer citizens was imported from the provinces and was daily at the mercy of the waves and tempests. As to the health of the lower classes and the agricultural labourers, there are no records by which we can compare it with that of the Latin farmers. We have only the bare statement from the imperial time that for many centuries its ancestry had no need of physicians.

The loss of soil fertility first began in the land of the early Latin farmers. Latium, once renowned for its productivity, now became notorious for its sterility. The degradation spread centrifugally to other parts of Italy. Arable land became pasture, and later even waste land or swamps. Farmers were compelled first to contract unpayable debt and then to sell their farms. Farms became derelict in spite of the efforts of statesmen to force or even subsidise men to cultivate them.

Nor did the degradation remain in its Italian motherland. It passed into the countries which fed the Italian cities at such profit to the capitalistic merchants. Province after province was conquered to feed the growing proletariat with corn, and province after province, at first made more profitable by the Roman agricultural science and engineering, slowly yielded to the same decline, with recoveries at times of peace and good government and relapses at times of war and disorder.

The fertile soil of Latium and other parts of Italy was converted into swamp, that of lands subject to aridity into waste or actual desert. Only the annual overflow of the Nile saved Egypt from the fate of Libya—begun by the Romans, completed by the Arabs. The almost frantic efforts of statesmen to recreate a farmer class and repopulate the countryside scarcely interrupted the slow decay. Binding the cultivators to the soil as serfs was the last effort of despair to get from the soil sufficient food for the people. Finally the wealthy classes, with their prodigious riches, having exemplified on a scale never before witnessed the power of money to delay the effects of the centrifugal decay of the soil which its own ascendancy decreed, abandoned the depopulated remnants of

the world-famed peninsula and built themselves a new and distant capital.

A migration to fresh lands was at that time possible as salvation for the civilisation of Rome. It is, we assert, no possible for yours.

In their new capital the Romans still relied on the fertility of Egypt as well as that of Asia Minor and the Balkan and Danubian provinces. Nevertheless, by their transfer, the Romans moved nearer to a distant loss of soil fertility occurring on so gigantic a scale that its effects largely determined their history—and not only theirs. This was the loss that afflicted the great belt of country lying to the north of the deserts of Gobi, Lopnor, Tahlamaken and Kisyl-Kum, and including the lands affected by the Great Salt Desert of Persia and the deserts of Arabia.

We are aware that the authorities are not agreed as to whether this huge belt of land stretching across Asia and Africa has become drier during historical periods owing to an increasing aridity of climate, but none deny that man himself has been here pre-eminently the extravagant accelerator of waste. Half a century ago a distinguished French traveller wrote:

> The nakedness of Arabia and the vast tracts of Asia to the north and west, the sterility which extends like an oil-spot over Persia, cannot be traced to any other cause than the pastoral life of the inhabitants. The people adopting it are locusts, they destroy all woodland and vegetation, modifying even the climate—whence the necessity of emigration. Had the invasions of the barbarians any other cause? A study of the question in this sense would perhaps give us the key to the great migrations of mankind These lazy nomads destroy the forests by axe and fire, their goats achieve the rest down to the very roots, the goat is a scorching iron which one must destroy—they lay bare the very rocks.

The tragedy of a period of drought to the pastoral peoples of this belt may be vividly realised through a recent calculation made in New South Wales. A rainfall of 20 inches will keep 600 sheep upon a square mile of land. One of 13 inches reduces the number to 100, and 1 inch often to but 10 sheep

It is not our purpose to attempt to estimate whether the locust habits of pastoral peoples or a growing climatic aridity against which they were powerless has been the chief impulse

of their migrations. All we are concerned with is to emphasise the bearing that a loss of soil fertility has had upon the fate of man. The histories of China, of India, of Europe, have all largely depended upon the force that drove the pastoral peoples to seek food during a period of aridity or owing to the slower decay of their accustomed pastures.

As far back as the twenty-sixth century B.C. Chinese history records the invasion of their territories by Northern Mongols under the name of Hun-yu. The struggle against the northern nomads continued right through Chinese history. The Chinese, harassed, disorganised and occasionally conquered, were never for long continuous periods under the rule of nomads as were the peoples of Upper India, nor were they supplanted by them as were the early inhabitants of much of Europe. Their superior agricultural civilisation always enabled them to recover their ascendancy.

Nevertheless, the destiny of China was largely dependent upon the distant aridity of Northern Mongolia, Eastern Turkestan, and to a lesser degree Tibet. At times of its mitigation the agricultural civilisation of the sages flourished; when it became continued and severe, this civilisation waned. The invasions, the devastation caused by them, and the cost of defensive wars undermined the independent peasantry. Even the most successful wars were a heavy charge upon the revenue—those recoil wars in which the Chinese chased these invaders into and through Mongolia and Turkestan and forced them upon peoples to the west, until, by a shunting-train action, yet more-western peoples were driven into India, Persia, Asia Minor and Europe.

The history of India, and especially the India nearest to the arid area, also began with an invasion from the north. In times of more accurate history many conquerors from the north set up dynasties in India, whose period of power commonly endured for about a century and a half, a term which may be noted elsewhere in countries of settled agricultural civilisation overcome by nomad peoples. The Sesunaga, the Yueh-chi, the White Huns, the Ghor, the Khilji-Tuglak, the Moghul and others, testify to the daring by which the huge Himalayan barrier was overcome and the influence that the distant aridity had upon the destiny of India.

In Europe the Celts, Goths, Visigoths, Franks, Burgun-

dians, Lombards, Teutons, Slavs, Avars, Finns, Bulgars, Magyars, Turks and Arabs, meeting only one power, that of the Romans, made history depend, in an even greater degree than that of India or China, upon the great belt of aridity.

We wish to recall this history of aridity, though it is lodged in the past. We do so because we conceive that though in the matter of hunger you, like your Roman predecessors, through improved organisation and traffic, have modified and mostly mastered the disasters which scarcity used to cause, nevertheless you yourselves have put such heavy demands upon the soil that you have introduced a new hunger far in excess of the primary one for food. The new hunger is for raw materials for manufacture. This new hunger directs your destinies and policies as surely as hunger for food directed those of the nomads. The results of their migrations are simple to follow. Through them the nomads came into hostile contact with other peoples because of their hunger. Under the spell of hunger they were fierce and ferocious conquerors. Without it they were mild and humane.

It is the new hunger which has forced you into the lands of others by armed trade, for unless your machines are fed millions of your people will not be fed. The new hunger, compared to the old, is on the same vast scale as is the might of your machines compared to the unaided toil of men. To both hungers soil fertility has to respond. Its failure to serve all your people according to their needs is the centre of your disorders, which are so varied, so widespread, so accrescent, so beyond control, that some of you have come to regard the present world as having gone mad, a term you are wont to apply to folly which, in its extremity, surpasses your comprehension.

Others of you blame the greed of the wealthy classes ; but this greed is the outcome, not the cause, of your condition. The wealth that accrues to that condition has its facsimile in the past, when the wealthy Romans ransacked the most remote parts of the ancient world for their luxuries. But these luxuries themselves were so built into the Roman fabric that they, too, became necessities of the distribution of services and their payment. So, also, is it with you.

You are therefore as primarily dependent on soil fertility and its preservation as were the peoples of the past. You only

rom them in the speed with which you add tension to
it links that bind you to it. You are consequently
ent, above all, upon us cultivators, and it is the culti-
whom you have most ignored.

: Romans destroyed their landowning peasantries. It
:ir first step in the degradation of the soil. You have
nd are doing the same. You do not elevate these
ries. You degrade and eliminate them. You subject
id to the methods and values of the cities. Your
is United States laments the rapid decay of families
oth own and cultivate. Your independent British
ry belongs only to the past. In Russia your suppres-
the independent peasants has been like a fire in the
pursuit of the van of your civilisation. In the East
isants of India are arousing themselves to a struggle
the growing danger, and those of China are threatened
have never been threatened in their long pro-peasant
. This partial or complete destruction of the indepen-
:asantry has, it seems, been an inevitable accompani-
f the demands without return which you have made
he soil. It is the same irrelative demands which have
you to waste the stored fertility of virgin soils. You
:prived the soil of its dumb partners, in whom also was
a local intimacy and traditional knowledge so necessary
soil's service.

do not maintain that all the work upon the soil must
ied out by the peasantries, but we do maintain that
eedless disregard of them has subjected you to a peril
s struck at the very roots of healthy life. For upon a
soil depends the health of your food, and upon your
food depends your own health. Your food and your
are inextricably interwoven. Healthy food stands in
ry forefront of men's, animals' and plants' freedom
isease. It stands in the very forefront of the means for
iinment of sound physical health, and the sound temper
derstanding which accompany it. Of what avail, then,
ir efforts to raise the health standard of your peoples if
soil fertility is not put in the forefront of your measures?
ld, indeed, that much of the grave instability of these
vould find its remedy in a stable, well-fed soil.

: have now come to our last words. We of the soil

have no skill in the oratory of the cities. We lack the art of appeal. Our voices have little influence in the national councils. We can only trust that what we have said will be weighed by those of you who are puzzled by the stupendous new burdens that are laid upon the shoulders of the modern generations. You feel youselves to be enmeshed in a confusion which you cannot master. You can procure no enlightenment in your histories, which are rich in records but poor in essential causes. The promises of your leaders to free you from your embarrassments result in repeated disillusion. You have your several individual faiths, but they, too, fail you under the stress of your experiences. You find yourselves continually confounded by secondary things which once you believed to be primary. Nowhere can you find the *terra firma* you so desire.

We suggest to you that it may be that not only is individual life healthy when the soil and its products are healthy and sick when they are sick, but so also is it with the body politic. We feel that the primary sickness of the present sick world is a sickness of the soil. We have brought before you some of the great effects in the past of the degradation of soil fertility. We have reason to believe that a like degradation is very widespread through your Western civilisation and its dependencies. We ask you: May not degradation at the source lead to widespread and varied degradation in effects?

You have been dowered with the wonderful recreative power of the soil. Be its vigilant custodians.

G. T. Wrench.

CENTRAL EUROPE IN JANUARY

By C. F. Melville

The New Year will witness renewed efforts to answer the main question of contemporary European politics: Is a durable settlement possible between Germany and the 'Western Powers,' Britain and France, or is the gulf between them fixed and eternal? The two notable attempts with which the Old Year closed—the Hitler–Halifax talks at Berchtesgaden and the Anglo-French conversations in London—failed to find the answer, but succeeded in clarifying the question. They showed that the basic problem to be resolved is that of reconciling divergent interests in Central Europe. Berchtesgaden made it clear that in Germany's view Central Europe is a specifically German interest, a 'family affair' between the Reich and its Danubian neighbours, and one which Germany could not agree to bargain as part of a general settlement either in Western Europe or in the colonial field. With equal clarity the British and French Governments declared in London that some form of guarantee for Central Europe must form part of any settlement involving colonial concessions to Germany.

This is how the situation stands. It indicates that future developments in Central Europe will be primarily influenced by the actions and reactions of the Great Powers. In the event of a sudden strengthening of the Rome–Berlin Axis, and a corresponding weakening of London–Paris collaboration, Central Europe would certainly fall under effective German domination, for, as far as the Danube is concerned, Germany is potentially stronger than her Italian partner. On the other hand, a strengthening of the London–Paris line and a weakening of the Rome–Berlin Axis would make it possible to form some kind of Danubian co-operation which would erect a barrier to German expansionism. A continuance of the

present uneasy balance between Britain and France on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other would mean the continuance of the actual situation on the Danube for an indefinite period.

Broadly speaking, the interests in Central Europe on the part of the Great Powers is in the following order of magnitude: Germany, Italy, France, Russia, Britain. The first named is not only more interested than the other Great Powers in the Danubian regions, but has been so for the longest period of time. She cherished dreams of a German controlled *Mitteleuropa* long before the advent of National-Socialism, which has but intensified the campaign, and, by reason of its racial doctrines, provided it with a new and formidable technique. The eventual aim is the union of all the German-speaking peoples of Europe in the Third Reich. This Greater Germany, while avoiding the absorption of non-German peoples, would reduce the Czechs to political impotence, and bring Hungary and the Balkans into the German sphere of influence. The first step is to bring the Germans of Austria and the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia into the closest communion with the Germans of the Reich by means of *gleichschaltung* (uniformity of régime). A vivid light is thrown on the actual methods envisaged by the famous memorandum—which caused so much controversy in Parliament and Press in London at the time of the Halifax mission to Germany—purporting to give the background of the Hitler–Halifax talks. On the eve of the Berchtesgaden talks certain unofficial but influential British personalities, desirous of an Anglo-German agreement, had obtained from responsible National-Socialist circles in Berlin a list of Germany's principal requirements for a settlement. The document in question underlined German claims in Central Europe, suggesting the setting up of an autonomous Sudetenland within a federated Czechoslovakia, and the holding of a 'free vote' in Austria, which, it was claimed, would result in the inception of a National-Socialist régime in that country.

Until recently Germany's influence in the Danubian Basin was equalled by Italy's prestige in that area. But the Abyssinian war and the intervention in Spain necessitated Italy's seeking German support for her Mediterranean aspirations. The price of this support was Italy's recognition of Germany's

special interests in Central Europe. Signor Mussolini realises that in the course of time this must mean a diminution of Italy's *rôle* on the Danube. To guard against this taking place too rapidly, he has made it a condition of his recognition of Germany's special interests that Italy must be a partner in any modifications of the Danubian situation which may be brought about by Germany. Fundamentally, the Central European ambitions of Germany and Italy are opposed. Italy knows that, should Germany arrive on the Brenner by way of Austria, the question of the sovereignty of the Southern Tyrol will be raised. But for the present the Rome–Berlin Axis is a very real thing, particularly as regards its effect upon Central Europe, for it consists of a mutual accommodation by means of which German and Italian interests are carefully adjusted on the Danube in order that the two Powers may collaborate in the wider sphere of European politics.

France's interest in Central Europe, although less direct than that of Italy, is nevertheless considerable. She has treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia, in virtue of the system of the Franco-Czech, Franco-Soviet and Czech-Soviet Pacts. She has no such obligations in regard to Austria, but she could not look with indifference upon the addition of 6,000,000 Austrians to the 66,000,000 Reich Germans. The union of Austria with the Reich would give Germany the hegemony of Europe—directly in Austria and Czechoslovakia, indirectly through the attraction of a Greater Germany for the Balkan States and Poland. Such a situation would mean the entire loss of French influence in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Hence, for France, the maintenance of Austrian independence is an interest hardly less vital than the defence of Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity. Another cardinal point in French policy is, of course, the maintenance of the solidarity of the Little Entente as a whole, and the prevention of any German attempt to disrupt it by detaching any individual member from the friendship with France.

Soviet Russia is much less concerned than is France. Her only direct interest is in regard to Czechoslovakia, with which country she has a defensive pact. M. Stalin, at the moment, has too many other preoccupations to be able to spare much time or energy for the Danube. He has Japan on his eastern frontier; in the west Germany, linked with Japan through

the anti-Commintern pact; in the Mediterranean his forces are facing those of Franco's Spain—Italy and Germany. Lastly, he has his hands full at home. Indeed, the success with which he has 'liquidated' the best military brains on the Russian General Staff has reduced, for the time being, the value of the Soviet as a military ally, for France or Czechoslovakia.

Britain is probably the only Great Power in Europe without direct Central European interests. But she has important indirect ones. Thus, in the view of official London, while Britain cannot undertake definite commitments in Central Europe, she is equally unable to disinterest herself in that region. She could not remain indifferent to a conflict which, starting in Central Europe, might spread westwards, and is, therefore, opposed to the expansion on the Danube of Germany or any other Great Power, on the ground that it would be certain to result in war. On the other hand, there is another school of thought here, unofficial but influential, which takes the opposite point of view, and believes that by allowing Germany room for expansion on the Danube war may be averted. According to this view, Britain should come to terms with Germany, and grant her a free hand in Central Europe in return for an Anglo-German agreement which would release Britain from European anxieties, and leave her freedom of action overseas and in the Far East.

Between the time of the Hitler-Halifax talks and the coming to London of MM. Chautemps and Delbos there was a sharp conflict behind the scenes between these two schools of thought. The Prime Minister listened to both points of view. Anxious to obtain a European settlement, and believing that efforts which had failed in Rome might perhaps succeed in Berlin, he had agreed to the Halifax mission to Germany. He believed that an Anglo-German *détente* should prepare the way for a wider settlement. In the long run, however, he inclined to the view of his official advisers that to allow Germany a free hand in Central Europe would not only mean the end of the Anglo-French collaboration, but also the complete hegemony of Germany in Europe.

The opposite school of thought will undoubtedly press their case again as the occasion presents itself. But for the present the official view prevails. If there is any modification, it is in the fact that the earlier Anglo-French formula regarding

the maintenance of the *status quo* in Central Europe has given place to a new one which registers the interests of the two Governments in the maintenance of peace in the Danubian Basin. This means that both Germany and her Danubian neighbours are to be asked to make contributions—Germany by giving pledges of peaceful intentions, and Czechoslovakia by removing German minority grievances within her borders; while as regards Austria, the suggested basis is the carrying out by both sides of the provisions of the Austro-German Agreement of July 11, 1936 This modification does not alter any principle. It denotes a new method. British policy in Central Europe has not undergone any radical change.

This brings me to a consideration of the conditions obtaining in the various countries of Central Europe.

In Austria, provided there is no change in the larger European balance, the present internal situation may continue for some time The recent growth of National-Socialism is mainly due to the peaceful penetration of Germany under the cover of the Austro-German July agreement. Captain Leopold, the local leader of the illegal National-Socialist Party, maintains his headquarters in a main street in Vienna, and has political tea-parties with General Glaise Horstenau, the 'pronounced' National member of the Cabinet, and with Dr. Sys Imquart, the 'referee' between Government supporters and the 'pronounced' Nationals in the official *Vaterlandische Front*. Nevertheless, the balance of forces between National-Socialists, Social-Democrats and the supporters of the Government is still such that the National-Socialists could not overthrow the régime from within. They have some sympathisers in the bureaucracy, a few in the army, and more in the police. But all these arms of the public authority keep together and support the Government. The army and the police are disciplined, and the bureaucracy wants to remain in office. Those who hold important posts in Vienna do not wish to become minor officials of the Third Reich. And many National-Socialists (other than the Radical elements) would prefer to become Ministers in a coalition Austrian Cabinet than be merely district leaders in an Austria embodied in the Third Reich.

The so-called 'National Opposition' includes the National-Socialists (subdivided into about half a dozen

varying shades, ranging from radical Nazism to moderate 'pronounced' Nationalism) and also many whose nationalism is more a matter of dislike of the present régime than of any deep political conviction. On the other hand, there are the Social-Democrats and Communists, who maintain an underground opposition. The attitude of the Chancellor is that both the Social-Democrats and the members of the National Opposition may collaborate as individuals with the Government within the *Vaterlandishe Front* provided they accept the Austrian idea. What he will not permit is their existence, either within or without the Government organisation, as distinct political entities, or as bodies which reject the Austrian idea.

Dr. von Schuschnigg himself has a positive ideal of 'Austrianism'; and the Catholic Church gives him powerful support. For the rest, there seems to be little positive belief in the 'Austrian idea' amongst the opponents of National-Socialism. Their support of Austrian independence appears to be due mainly to the negative motives I have described. Nevertheless, under the leadership of the Chancellor, a patriot and an able politician, there is little danger of a sudden political landslide. He has the internal situation well under control. The danger is from without. Any sudden shifting of the larger European balance in favour of Berlin might result in a National-Socialist victory in Austria.

In regard to Austria's place in the international picture, it may be said that she sits astride and across the Rome–Berlin Axis. She is balanced on the axis inasmuch as the Hitler–Mussolini agreement to accommodate their opposing interests in Central Europe necessarily circumscribes her freedom of action in foreign policy. In these circumstances Austria could hardly go very far in a direction contrary to the interests of Berlin and Rome, even if she wanted to do so. Dr. Schuschnigg and his advisers at the Ballhausplatz are, therefore, careful to avoid friction with either of Austria's two most powerful neighbours. On the other hand, Austria cuts across the axis, because she feels that her special relationship with Berlin and Rome does not go so far as to make it necessary for her to join in any *bloc*, such as, for instance, the Rome–Berlin Tokio anti-Commintern pact. Within the

somewhat narrow limits of her 'independence' Austria endeavours, not without success, to maintain an 'Austrian' policy: that is to say, a policy based on the Austrian conception of the German mission on the Danube, as apart from the National-Socialist ideological conception of Germanism.

In Czechoslovakia M. Hodja, the Prime Minister, also a patriot and one of the last of the good Europeans, is striving equally for appeasement at home and consolidation in the Danubian region. He told M. Delbos, when they met in Prague, that his Government is willing to do everything in its power to make the agreement with the German activists work, but there could be no case of accepting the proposal put forward by the Sudetendeutsch Party, with the approval of Berlin, for granting the German minority autonomous status within a federated Czechoslovakia. The reason he gave was the practical impossibility of making such a plan work without disintegrating the State.

The agreement between the Prague Government and the activist German parties (Christian-Socials, Agrarians and Social-Democrats) covers the removal of German minority grievances in regard to such matters as employment in the State services and in industry, and cultural questions. The plan put forward by Herr Henlein's Sudetendeutsch Party—in the form of a series of bills laid before Parliament—goes much further than the adjustment of minority grievances as such, and calls for the creation of a special status for the Sudeten Germans, and a special relation between them and the Germans of the Reich, based on the principle of *Volksgemeinschaft*. The principal idea put forward by Herr Henlein is that all the nationalities in the republic should be formed into autonomous administrative bodies. Citizens registered on the roll of a given nationality would belong to the individual corporations. Once inscribed, their nationality would be irrevocably fixed. The organisation of these nationality corporations would be as follows:

The governing *presidium*, composed of senators and deputies of the given nationality, would elect a 'Speaker' (or leader). This would in fact establish the *Führer prinzip* much on the lines of German National-Socialism. A simple majority of votes in the *presidium* would be sufficient to decide upon the responsibility of the Speaker.

The effect of these proposals, in practice, would be—(1) to invest the Sudetendeutsch Party, as the most powerful numerically amongst the German minority parties, with the governance of the German National Corporation and exclude the Activist parties, and (2) to give to the National Corporation functions in the cultural and economic life of the country which ordinarily would belong to the existing State organs.

The Czechoslovak Government feels that such a new organisation would be irreconcilable with the principles of the republic's democratic Constitution, and, moreover, disruptive of national unity.

With regard to the implications of the Sudetendeutsch Party's demands in the field of foreign policy, a clear light is thrown upon the matter in a pamphlet recently issued by Dr. Arthur Herr, the librarian of Warnsdorf, who is close to Herr Henlein. Rejecting the declaration of Dr. Krofta, the Foreign Minister, who recently stated that the Germans of Czechoslovakia could achieve the position of the 'second State nation,' provided their efforts at cultural unity with the wider German-speaking world were in harmony with the fact of their citizenship of Czechoslovakia, he puts forward the following remarkable thesis:

After the dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy, Dr. Herr writes, the relations between the Czech nation and the whole Germanic race (*Gesamtdeutschtum*) 'returns to its original condition,' by which he means the sort of relationship which existed between the Bohemian State and the mediæval Holy Roman German Empire before the rise of the Hapsburg Monarchy. Czechoslovakia and Germany, according to this interpretation, should act in permanent friendship and unity of aim, '*zu gleicher Hand im Donauraume.*' An exact rendering into English of this phrase is hardly possible. Broadly speaking, it means a community of interests and an approximation of German and Czech policies in the Danubian regions. Theoretically it could mean an equal partnership. But as between a State of 66,000,000 and a State of 15,000,000 such an equality could not exist. It would inevitably mean that Czechoslovakia would have to serve the interests of Germanism in the conduct of her foreign policy. This would create a state of affairs in which the entire present European equilibrium would be radically changed, and in consequence

Czechoslovak independence reduced from substance to shadow.

These various projects of the Sudetendeutsch Party, Herr Henlein's rejection of the agreement with the Activists, and the German National-Socialist Press attack on the action of the Prague Government in setting up at Melivik a broadcasting station in the German tongue (which station all the German parties in Czechoslovakia, including the Henlein Party, had for long been demanding)—all these things lead the impartial observer to wonder whether, after all, even the most complete adjustment of the German minority grievances in Czechoslovakia would fail to bring about real harmony between Berlin and Prague. Indeed, there are reasons for believing that National-Socialist Germany is less concerned with the removal of the grievances of Germans in Czechoslovakia than with the reduction of Czechoslovakia to the status of a vassal State. If Czechoslovakia would agree to '*die Politik zu gleicher Hand*,' and accept the *rôle* of the handmaiden of German expansionist policy, it is not unlikely that we should hear far less of the German minority grievances in that country. But it is not, unnaturally, precisely this solution which Czechoslovakia feels herself unable to accept.

Yugoslavia is in a different position from either her Czechoslovak or Rumanian partners in the Little Entente, for she is at once a Central European, a Balkan, and a Mediterranean State. This being the case, her friendship has become sought after by various powerful neighbours. M. Milan Stoyadinovitch, the Premier and Foreign Minister, has utilised this favourable diplomatic position to obtain political and economic advantages for his country.

Thus, in the case of Italy, when Signor Mussolini recently substituted the olive branch for the revolver, M. Stoyadinovitch was ready to do a deal. The pact with Italy secures for Yugoslavia tranquillity on her Adriatic border and various economic concessions, the latter being increased on the occasion of M. Stoyadinovitch's recent visit to Rome. Signor Mussolini was only too willing to be accommodating, as he was in urgent need, above all, of tranquillity on his Adriatic border. The pact with Italy has not brought about any fundamental changes in Yugoslav policy.

With regard to Yugoslavia's policy towards Germany, the

two countries have important economic ties and no major political differences. It is worth their while, on both sides, to cultivate good mutual relations. But neither the friendships with Germany nor the pact with Italy means that Yugoslavia has exchanged old friends for new. Belgrade, it is true, does not regard it as compatible with her interests to get tied up with the elaborate network of mutual assistance pacts so often proposed by Paris. Yugoslavia is more interested in her regional security. But the alliance with France stands, nevertheless. And with Britain—both on account of a community of interests in the Mediterranean and of the sincerely Anglophil sentiments of Prince Regent Paul—the very closest ties of friendship exist.

M. Stoyadinovitch, as he declared to British Ministers on the occasion of his recent visit to London, has no intention of joining any *bloc*, either anti-Fascist or anti-Communist. His Government is opposed to Bolshevism and has no sympathy with the Soviet régime. But between this attitude and joining the anti-Commintern pact there is a wide gulf which M. Stoyadinovitch has no intention of crossing. Similarly Yugoslavia is too essentially democratic in spirit to have any leanings towards Fascism. But this does not mean that she would align herself against the totalitarian States. This policy has been criticised in some quarters as sitting on the fence. The reply to this is, obviously, that the fence is the most diplomatic place to sit on. Actually, I would rather call it a policy of neutrality as between rival and opposing ideologies.

Rumania has undergone a dramatic development. There is now installed a quasi-authoritative Government, with anti-Semitic leanings, under the leadership of M. Goga. Actually the arrival in power of M. Goga's numerically weak party is the outcome of a manœuvre on the part of King Carol, who, dissatisfied with the ordinary party system as worked by the Liberals, and unwilling to give power to the National Peasants because of his quarrel with their leader, M. Maniu, but fearing, above all, the 'all for Fatherland Party' (Iron Guard), put in M. Goga. M. Goga's 'Rumanianism' and anti-Semitism, applied in small doses, will, in the King's calculation, serve to keep out of power the violently Fascist and anti-Semitic Iron Guards. An Iron Guard Government would mean the breaking of Rumania's ties with Britain and France and a complete

swing over to Germany and Italy. M. Goga, on the other hand, means to try and be all things to all men as far as Rumania's relations with the totalitarian and the democratic Great Powers are concerned. It is as yet too early to say whether the experiment will be successful, or whether M. Goga is destined to play the *rôle* of a Rumanian von Papen and pave the way for National-Socialism in Rumania.

And now a word as to the relations between Hungary and the Little Entente. These of late have been improving. Hungary, disappointed with the negative results of Italian championship of her revisionist claims, and not a little alarmed at the prospects of German penetration, has recently not only drawn closer to Austria, but also shown a more friendly attitude towards the States of the Little Entente. A project is in being whereby the Little Entente will recognise Hungarian equality of rights (meaning mainly military equality). This military equality already exists *de facto*. It is now only a matter of *de jure* recognition. The idea is that in return for this recognition Hungary should sign non-aggression pacts with the three States of the Little Entente. Hungary is willing to do this provided she can obtain an agreement with these States regarding the Hungarian minorities. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are known already to be willing. But Rumania hangs back

The realisation of such a *rapprochement* between Hungary and the Little Entente would of course be a considerable step forward in the consolidation of Central Europe. Together with the already markedly improved relations between Austria and the Little Entente, it would go some way towards the organisation of Central Europe, and the resistance of the Danubian States to German penetration.

This brings me back to the cardinal point: Is Central Europe to become a specifically German sphere of interest, or is it to consolidate itelf on a corporative basis within the framework of a general European settlement? This is the basic problem which must be resolved as part of the solution of the wider question of the future relations between Germany and the Western Powers. Indeed, it would not be too much to say that upon this may ultimately depend the issues of peace and war in Europe.

C. F. MELVILLE.

THE MILK PROBLEM IN GREAT BRITAIN

By Lieut.-Colonel C. Waley Cohen, C.M.G.

During the last twenty years there have been no less than five Royal Commissions or Committees dealing with the milk supply of England and Wales—the Commissions presided over by Lord Astor, which reported from 1917–19; the Linlithgow Commission, which reported in 1923; the Grigg Commission, which reported in 1933; the Cattle Diseases Committee of 1934; and the recent Milk Reorganisation Commission, which reported in November 1936, covering also Scotland Professor A. W. Ashby was some connecting link between these investigations, for he was a member of the Linlithgow, the Grigg, and the 1936 Commissions.

There has been during the period a similar cornucopia of legislation and orders. Starting with the sale of milk regulations of 1901, which are mainly concerned with minimum fat content and non-fatty solids, there is the Tuberculosis Order of 1925, dealing, amongst other things, with the slaughter of cows with tuberculous udders or yielding tuberculous milk; the Milk and Dairies Order of 1926, providing for registration by sanitary authorities of producers and distributors and certain sanitary standards for buildings, etc.; the Milk Special Designations Order of 1923, which introduced the grades of certified, Grade A, T.T. or Grade A milk from tuberculin-tested cows, and Grade A milk or milk of special cleanliness from cows inspected by veterinarians quarterly, and also pasteurised milk. This last order has been superseded by that of 1936, and we now have added the grade of Accredited milk, a standard practically identical with Grade A milk. The Ministry of Agriculture has also started under the Milk Act of 1934 a scheme of attested herds with conditions applying to the test of cows, and not directly to the quality of the milk.

There has also been much legislation, but it is sufficient to refer to the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1931, which made it possible for the Milk Marketing Board to come into being, and the Milk Act of 1934, which made it possible for the Board to work. Finally, there is the Government White Paper on milk policy issued in July 1937, which, if carried out, will involve special legislation, particularly in the matter of compulsory pasteurisation of all milk in certain areas, rural and urban, under conditions which will ensure that pasteurisation is effective

With an industry subject to such vicissitudes, it is hardly to be wondered at that the farmers (registered producers of milk numbered, in March 1937, 146,438) are nervous and inclined to be suspicious, or that the public are bewildered. Nor is it surprising that the price of a pint of liquid milk is high in England compared with some other countries, or the consumption low compared with what is desirable or what is consumed in some countries abroad The estimates for consumption of liquid milk vary from ·28 of a pint per head per day to ·44; but consumption, whether of liquid milk or whole-milk powder, is undoubtedly lowest in the largest families, where it is most needed by the children, and in the lower income levels of the population.

Is this strange process of 'muddling through' to be attributed to the inherent difficulties of the problem, to the power of vested interests, to administrative ineptitude, or to some evil fate that since 1918 has hovered over the milk industry? All these elements have contributed their share to the chequered history. The inherent difficulties of the problem were clearly set out in the Linlithgow Report. Prior to 1900 the main part of the supply of liquid milk to the consumer was direct, though in some cases a retailer was interposed. By 1923 the producer-retailers supplied only about 40 per cent., and to-day they supply only 20 per cent., of the total requirements. The remainder is bulked, in containers holding sometimes as much as 1000 gallons or more, often carried long distances, and then distributed perhaps twenty-four hours or more after it is first received.

This problem of bulking of liquid milk is the key to many of the difficulties, and reference to it will be made again. It gives rise to the major problems of milk-borne

disease, and it was the proximate cause of the creation and necessity of the Milk Marketing Board. It is probably part of the price we have to pay for the congestion of our population in large towns and in urban areas. While bulking of milk would have come gradually in the normal course, a great impetus was given to bulking by the necessities of the war. The growth of the United Dairies, which came into being in 1915, is described in the Linlithgow Report; but what has happened in the case of this organisation can be paralleled in the case of other distributing organisations, and notably the Co-operative Societies, which between 1919 and 1931 increased their share of the total liquid milk distribution from 2½ to 14 per cent. Before the war the producing side of the industry was the stronger, and the distributing side, on the whole, weaker and less remunerative; since the war the reverse has been the case. In fact, in 1931 many producers were threatened with complete bankruptcy.

In addition to all this a vast impetus was given by the war to the importation of cream, butter, cheese and other milk products from the Dominions and foreign countries. The average import of cream in the years 1909–13 was just over 8700 cwt., by 1922 it had increased to 11,100 cwt., and by 1931 had leapt to 99,700 cwt. In 1935 it was 75,000 cwt., of which 45 per cent. came from the Empire, including Ireland. The figures for butter are equally striking. The average for 1909–13 was just over 4,100,000 cwt., by 1922 it had increased to over 4,200,000 cwt., and by 1931 to just over 8,000,000 cwt. The figure for 1935 was 9,481,000 cwt., of which 56·6 per cent. came from the Empire. In the case of cheese the figure for 1909–13 is 2,360,000 cwt., that for 1931 2,856,000 cwt., and that for 1935 2,684,000 cwt., of which 88·3 per cent. came from the Dominions. A considerable quantity of condensed whole milk (379,000 cwt.) was imported in 1935, though this was about 23 per cent. less than the figure for 1909–13. But condensed skim milk import increased from 602,000 cwt. in 1909–13 to 1,405,000 cwt. in 1935, of which only 4·7 per cent. came from the Empire, and skimmed-milk powder imports increased from 28,000 cwt. in 1909–13 to 215,000 cwt. in 1935, of which 78·8 per cent. came from the Empire.

In order to maintain the liquid milk supply it is necessary

under present conditions of distribution that there should be a reserve of 20 to 25 per cent. of liquid milk which, when not required for the liquid market, is manufactured into butter, cream, cheese, etc. The immense increase in the import of these commodities materially lowered the price for milk sold in Great Britain for manufacture. Between 1925 and 1935 about a third of the total milk produced in Great Britain was manufactured or sold to manufacturers, and the price realised, based on the prices of imported butter and cheese, has been less than 50 per cent. of the price realised for milk sold for the liquid market.

Some idea of the unfortunate position of the milk producer since the war may be gathered from a comparison with the brewery trade. In the milk trade, before the Milk Marketing Board was formed, production was in the hands of nearly 150,000 producers loosely held together by the National Farmers' Union, which represented them on a Permanent Joint Negotiating Committee for fixing the wholesale price. The distributive trade and the manufacturing trade were controlled by large organisations such as the United Dairies and the Co-operative Societies. In the brewery trade, on the other hand, production is in the hands of large breweries, ever amalgamating and getting more powerful, and distribution scattered amongst small units such as licensed premises and grocers. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Grigg Commission found in 1933 that while the price for wholesale milk received by the producer between 1923 and 1931 fell by 15½ per cent., the retail price paid by the consumer for liquid milk fell only by 5½ per cent. in the country as a whole and 6 per cent. in London, the distributor retaining the balance.

Bulking of milk and the increased time which elapses between the milk leaving the producer and reaching the consumer made some kind of heat treatment necessary. For the cleanest fresh raw milk does not keep indefinitely. Thus we find that in May 1937, of Glasgow's 71,500 gallons of liquid milk per diem, 84 per cent. was heat-treated, and in Liverpool, of 46,300 gallons, 53 per cent. was heat-treated. In London about 90 per cent. is heat-treated.

But bulking also largely increases the danger of infection. The Bournemouth outbreak of typhoid in 1936 was due to the milk of thirty-seven producers, bulked together, being

contaminated by the inclusion of 20 gallons from a single producer. The producer's wife was suffering from an attack of typhoid which had been wrongly diagnosed as influenza.

All pasteurisation, whether inefficient or efficient, involves bulking of milk. Inefficient pasteurisation plus bulking is in itself a danger, as the container in which the treatment is carried out may become infected and carry the infection to fresh consignments of milk. If bulking and heat treatment are not to bring this unfortunate procession of disasters in their wake, then it is necessary for a highly scientific system of efficient pasteurisation to be enforced where bulking takes place. In 1935 the Hannah Institute found that of nineteen pasteurising plants in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee and Aberdeen, milk from five of the nineteen plants contained pathogenic bacteria to the extent of 3 per cent. of the total milk examined. At the meeting of the Royal Sanitary Institute, reported in the October 1937 number of the Journal, figures for the West Riding of Yorkshire for 1936 were given, showing that unsupervised pasteurised milk was more infected by pathogenic germs than fresh raw milk.

Much emphasis has been laid by the Ministry of Health and some medical officers and bacteriologists on the danger of bovine tuberculosis being conveyed to man by fresh raw milk. This emphasis is both misleading and dangerous, and it is feared that much confusion has been caused in the past owing to policy being dominated by the laboratory hermit instead of worked out by the administrator on a complete view of all the data. Some trace of the same lopsidedness is shown in the recent paper issued by the *Bulletin* of the Health Organisation of the League of Nations. Bacteriologists from Pasteur onwards have contributed to miracles for public health. But the results have been reaped by the administrator who can co-ordinate their discoveries with those of the practitioner and the statistician. In fact, infection of bovine tuberculosis to man, as is shown by Report No. 63 issued in 1931 by the Ministry of Health, is a fast-diminishing disease. Further, there is abundant evidence that some of the infection is due to dust, and not to milk. Where milk is bulked, other diseases equally dangerous and insidious may be carried by raw and still more by imperfectly pasteurised bulked milk. The Hove outbreak of sore throat in 1929, where 1000

families were infected and sixty-five deaths occurred, was due to milk from a tuberculosis-free herd, though this fact was curiously and rather unfortunately concealed in the Report of the Animal Diseases Committee of 1934.

Accredited milk, where this is not bulked, has been shown to be generally free from risk of conveying infection. The quarterly inspection of herds by a veterinary officer has proved an effective safeguard.

We therefore find ourselves brought to the conclusion expressed in the proposal of the Government's White Paper of July 1937 that in the case of bulked milks some kind of efficient pasteurisation is desirable. Three modifications in the proposals are, however, suggested by clear reasoning and common-sense. The first concerns unpasteurised milk sold in urban areas where a compulsory order for pasteurisation is in force. We suggest that in these areas the unpasteurised milk, which is not bulked and therefore allowed to be sold in spite of the order, should be of the accredited standard within three years of the passing of the order. This milk is safe—far safer, indeed, than pasteurised milk that has been bulked and not efficiently pasteurised. We also suggest that the exemption from pasteurisation in these areas should extend to milk drawn from not more than three herds, instead of one herd, as suggested in the Government White Paper. All outbreaks of disease through bulked milk have occurred in urban areas where milk from thirty or forty herds is bulked together before distribution. The most economical and efficient method of creating a herd free from tubercle is that recommended by Professor Bang, of Denmark, and involves keeping two herds. One herd is a tuberculin-tested free herd, and reactors are put into the second herd and gradually eliminated even from this. A cow which reacts to the tuberculin test never produces tuberculous milk unless the udder is affected. If the udder is affected or the animal shows one of the well-recognised clinical signs which can be ascertained by the quarterly veterinary inspection involved in accredited milk production, this inspection adequately protects the consumer. A producer-retailer has sometimes to borrow milk from a neighbour to maintain the supply for his round. The amendment proposed will therefore conduce to convenience and honesty and involve no risk. A third amendment to the

Government proposal is suggested—namely, that the power to make compulsory efficient pasteurisation orders should be confined to urban areas and never be given to rural authorities, and should at first be confined to county boroughs or larger urban authorities and to urban district authorities in Greater London. The risk of milk-borne disease in rural areas and in the less congested urban areas is low, as bulking is rare and the importance of cheap milk is from every point of view considerable. Efficient pasteurisation in small urban areas—*e.g.*, those with a population less than 10,000—and still more in rural areas, will prove very expensive and deprive these areas of the reduction of *4d.* to *6d.* per gallon in retail milk price which they now enjoy.

Let it be noted, finally, that on mere grounds of self-interest (except in the case of producer-retailers) efficient pasteurisation should be welcomed by wholesale producers. It shifts the burden of the avoidance of any danger of contamination from the producer to the distributor. That there is any opposition on the part of farmers is due to causes some of which are disappearing. Developments in the milk trade in the last twenty years have all tended to increase the stranglehold of the distributor on the producer. It is the bulking methods of the distributing trade in urban areas which have made efficient pasteurisation necessary. The existence of the Milk Marketing Board has since October 1933 somewhat redressed the balance of power, and to this extent mitigated the position. It may be that for children under one year old in congested urban areas it is wise, as suggested by the League of Nations Committee in April 1937, that milk should be first pasteurised by the retailer and then boiled in the home. The losses in food values by these processes can be made up by the inclusion of other ingredients. Powdered whole milk would perhaps seem to be a simpler and cheaper expedient. Farmers, however, whose children have been brought up on unpasteurised milk have found that it is much more palatable, if not more nutritive, than pasteurised. Pasteur himself had a profound belief that popular beliefs always concealed some basis of scientific truth, and many of the discoveries of his disciples were due to popular peasant ideas of which they found the scientific basis by subsequent patient research. The special value of milk to growing children is recognised, but

has as yet found no scientific explanation. Many, though by no means all, of the bacteriologists and specialist doctors forget the advice which William Harvey borrowed from Sallust and gave to his fellow-doctors : ‘ Concordia parvae res crescunt, discordia maximae dilabuntur.’ The work of other doctors, such as Sprawson and Goodfellow, on the value of raw milk are disparaged and dismissed by the extremists in favour of the pet theory. Perhaps the most striking and humiliating exhibition of this unfortunate attitude of mind was seen in the attack of the doctors on the veterinarians at the great Conference on Accredited Milk which is fully reported in the April 1937 number of the Journal of the Royal Sanitary Institute.

Again the Ministries of Health and Agriculture have sometimes failed to observe the recommendation of the Linlithgow Commission that they should examine the probable effects both on distribution and prices of orders and regulations regarding the sales and production of milk before they become operative. The 1923 Grading Order admittedly contained provisions for Grade A milk which made it impossible for a Grade A milk producer to have his herd tested for tubercle, since the order forbade his retaining in his herd a cow which reacted even though there was no danger of it producing tuberculous milk. This point was raised at innumerable conferences ; amendment was promised, but for thirteen years nothing was done owing to squabbles between the two Ministries. Even now, the 1936 Order has a similar kind of defect which prevents accredited producers from clearing their herds of tuberculous cattle by the most approved Bang method (noted above), which involves keeping two herds. Finally, the accredited scheme, admittedly the measure which has done most in recent years to promote clean milk production, was devised by a few private individuals with the valuable support of *The Times*, in the teeth of the opposition of the officials of the Ministries of Agriculture and Health. That the farmers are only too anxious to improve methods of production is shown by the increase which took place in Grade A and accredited producers as soon as the obnoxious 1923 Order was withdrawn and extra payment of slightly less than 1*d.* per gallon given for the superior Grade A or accredited milk. From 1923–34 the number of Grade A producers never exceeded 800. To-

day there are over 21,000 accredited producers, and it is estimated that they are responsible for, roughly, a third of the total milk production. In contrast to this, the Ministry of Agriculture's scheme of attested cows, in spite of the extra 1*d.* a gallon which it carries, has been as yet a comparative failure, the number of such herds being only 567 in October 1937.

The establishment of some better 'concordia' on the medical side between experts, general practitioners, medical officers of health, bacteriologists and veterinarians, on the commercial side between producers, distributors and manufacturers, and generally between all these and administrative officials, has been shown to be badly needed. This is one of the tasks which it is hoped that the permanent Milk Commission proposed in the Government White Paper will tackle. If it does this successfully it should receive a warm welcome, particularly from producers. But for the Commission to succeed it will need to have a broad-minded administrative outlook. Above all, it will have to have the cordial support of the Ministers concerned, so that it may have the necessary prestige to control the wilder men on all sides, or, as it has been put, to pasteurise policy and orders so that they are reasonably safe for general application. It is undesirable that the staff of the Permanent Commission should be large. It should use the accumulation of accurate information available at the Milk Marketing Board, and such institutions as the Agricultural Economics Research Institute at Oxford, which has just published an excellent interim report on the cost of milk production in England and Wales for the year 1934–35.

It is contemplated that the Commission, amongst other things, should apply its attention to the reduction of the cost of production and distribution of milk and the increased consumption of liquid milk by the public. The recent investigation by the Agricultural Economics Research Institute at Oxford suggests that the figure hitherto put forward for loss in herds from disease of 2*d.* a gallon is as a general figure unduly high; and that the correct figure is nearer 1*d.* or 1½*d.* for tuberculin-tested herds. But something may be done in standardising requirements as regards buildings and limiting these to necessary requirements. It is significant that in Denmark outside the show institutions

there is hardly a building which does not contravene the regulations enforced in England and Wales, and there is hardly a gallon of milk which is not produced under conditions which contravene the requirements enforced by local authorities in this country under the 1926 Milk and Dairies Order.

As regards distribution, the opportunity for reorganisation and economy appears much greater. Possibly, as Mr. St. John Gates suggested on December 23, 1937, reorganisation in the distributive trade would be much assisted by the creation of a Milk Distributors Board on lines similar to the Milk Marketing Board. This was one of the suggestions of the Grigg Commission which was not carried out. A comparison has already been made with the beer trade.

It might be possible for a Milk Distributors Board to reduce the excessive number of distributors by some kind of levy and compensation similar to that under which, during the last thirty years, excessive retail licences for beer have been reduced with such success in the brewery trade. The permanent Commission will, it is hoped, succeed in clearing away the dead wood which has accumulated in orders, and particularly in the arrangements for supply of milk for schools. At present the latter are hampered by the absurd provision which leaves it to medical officers in each area, as little dictators, to decide what milk standard should be required. County councils who are the statutory education authorities are thus faced, where the medical officer is narrow-minded, with the alternative of dismissing him or being themselves superseded in this matter. Much confusion has inevitably followed. In three counties Grade A tuberculin-tested milk direct from a neighbouring farm has been refused in favour of bulk milk imperfectly pasteurised, or boiled milk, which the children will not drink. No wonder, therefore, that the consumption of milk in schools, which when, with Government assistance, the price was reduced from 1*d.* to ½*d.* a third of a pint jumped to 2·3 million gallons per month in October 1935, remained in October 1936 practically stationary at this figure. The annual figures for the last three years tell the same story—1934–35, 22,853,000 gallons; 1935–36, 21,900,000 gallons; 1936–37, 22,877,000 gallons. Accredited milk for children in schools, particularly

where this has not been bulked, has been adopted by many counties as the standard and has proved satisfactory. Where this cannot be obtained unbulked milk of high standard has proved satisfactory. It is a curious fact that it was not until the farmer, and in particular the enterprising representatives of Australia, drew attention to the importance of adequate milk that neither the doctors nor the public recognised the importance of milk as a nutrition element for children, and even for adults. A wide field for increased consumption of liquid milk still lies open all over the world for development, particularly in the case of expectant and nursing mothers.

The Milk Reorganisation Commission of 1936 recommended that the difference between the price of liquid milk and milk for manufacture in this country should be met by a levy on imported butter and cheese, or by a subvention from the Government. The maximum required is estimated not to exceed £4,000,000 per annum. The figures quoted earlier in this paper in regard to the importation of milk products indicate that this levy or subvention should be regarded, as in fact it is, not as a subvention to milk production, but as an insurance or subvention for cheap imported butter and cheese, the bulk of which comes from the Empire. Above all, it is desirable, as the Milk Reorganisation Commission recognised, that nothing should be done to restrict or discourage the production of milk in Great Britain. Milk production is carried on in every county in England and Wales. The income from milk and dairy produce forms no less than 28 per cent. of the nation's agricultural income, and the industry is outstanding in the agricultural economy of the country. From the point of view of regional planning and green belts round urban areas, it is undesirable that the difference in regional price levels for producers, which amounts at present to slightly over 1*d*., and which before the advent of the Milk Marketing Board was considerably larger, should be further reduced. The cost of production in the areas receiving the higher prices is greater. This is not because of differences in rent, as the recent Oxford inquiry shows. It is unfortunate that the Milk Reorganisation Commission of 1936 should have fallen into error on this point. The difference is due to costs of labour and other

matters, and it is noteworthy that nearly all the milk produced in these areas is required for the liquid market.

In spite of all the vicissitudes and difficulties of the last twenty years, it is satisfactory to note that the cow population of England and Wales has increased by 1 to 2 per cent. since the Milk Marketing Board came into existence. The same may be said of Scotland. Between the first year of the operation of the Board and the second year, liquid milk consumption increased by about 4·6 per cent., and in subsequent years this increase has been more than maintained, 1935–36 being about 6·4 per cent. and 1936–37 about 10·8 per cent. above 1933–34. The standard of milk production, particularly since the introduction of the accredited scheme, has improved enormously. The manufacture of cheese on farms, which decreased from 60,000,000 gallons of milk in 1931 to 14,000,000 gallons for 1934–35, rose to nearly 18,000,000 gallons in 1935–36, and has increased rather than decreased since then. The production of butter on farms has decreased ; but, unlike cheese, butter is probably as good, if not better, when produced in centralised factories. The amount of milk which went to factories increased by about 70 per cent. in the first year of the Milk Marketing scheme, and now represents slightly less than a third of the total production. It does not appear likely that there will be any further large increase in milk for manufacture, and some part of the milk which goes to factories, possibly over 40 per cent., must be regarded as a necessary reserve, if the supply of good liquid milk at all times of the year for public consumption is to be ensured. On price to the consumer only and the general level of consumption throughout the country has progress been less successful. Conflict of aim and administrative 'discordia' have contributed something to this. There is much scope for a permanent Milk Commission, and there is much hope that, with a real administrative competence, such a Commission, using all the available expert aid and the vast accumulation of information now available at the Milk Marketing Board, not only can help advance where advance has already begun, but also initiate improvement where there is now stagnation or regression.

C. Waley Cohen.

DICTATORSHIP IN THE HOLY LAND

By E. T. Richmond

When, for reasons not unlike those that prompted our conquest of the Sudan, the Italians invaded Abyssinia, a great volume of indignation was released in England. Much of it was of course real, honest, sincere indignation. But some of it, perhaps a good deal of it, was no more than a form of camouflage for those who dislike the Italian régime because it stands in the way of World Revolution, and who hoped they had found a good occasion for weakening it.

It is noteworthy that no group is more vehement in condemning Italy's aggression than the small but noisy group that so fanatically supports another contemporary act of aggression for which, though it has no real national backing, our own country must bear the grave responsibility. This is the aggression which for twenty years we have been committing against the Arab people, who, by reason of disunion, enforced and encouraged by ourselves, are, for the time being, deprived of the one condition needed before they can provide themselves with the material force necessary for their defence. Our aggression, different from that of the Italians, is against a people wholly unorganised for defence; against a people, moreover, who trusted us, and had been our allies during the war. Our aggression, different from that of the Italians, did not take the form of military attack—such was not needed—but of a slow penetration of influences fatal to Arab independence.

The Italian enterprise was carried through by the energies of a people, unified and made effective by the devotion of the vast majority to a great leader whom the revolutionary elements seek to discredit by the device of dubbing him dictator, thereby seeking to establish in men's minds the false conception that he stands, not for the representation of his people, but for their coercion.

Our aggression against the Arabs has no wide national pport. What interest, indeed, can we English have in aking enemies of the Arabs? The aggression was planned, itiated and is being carried out under the direction and ntrol, not of British democracy, but of a special, *ad hoc*, njunction of interests and influences. From this conjunc-ɪn proceeds a Voice. That voice dictates action. It is the ice of a hidden dictatorship: dictatorship, because it :tates; hidden, because it cannot be related to any definite dy. Two things at least are clear: first, the fruits produced it are not of a character that is English; second, it stands : the coercion of the Arabs.

Whenever reference is made in the Press, in books, or in nversation to 'our rule' in Palestine, what is referred to is : rule of this hidden dictatorship (much could be written the use and meaning of the words 'our' and 'we,' when :d in the Palestine connexion). The wholly un-English iracter of that rule, alike in its aims and in its methods, is w patent to all. It is also patent to all that it is a resounding lure. Its aim is the substitution of a non-Arab, non-ɔslem domination in a land that has been under Moslem e for thirteen centuries. The new régime is to be neither ristian nor English; we English are, in accordance with lers received, to be responsible only for setting up this ;ime; it is to be set up in favour of immigrants and against · wishes of the inhabitants. There is nothing characteris-illy English in so fantastic a project. To call it 'noble alism' does not turn it into good sense.

As to methods: these fall into two phases. The first is iracterised by the employment of a method whereby, under · back-stair devices of a mandate and the protection of ronets provided by us, our dictatorship seeks, gradually l surreptitiously, to build up a non-Arab and non-Moslem ɪnomic and social structure of sufficient importance to iin in the course of a few years the effective political nination of the land by non-Arab and non-Moslem nents. This first phase has been a failure. Success was ɪendent upon too many false assumptions. The Arab racter and the Arab intelligence were too lightly regarded. ything could, it was thought, be done with the Arabs. n, especially Arab man, lived by bread alone. Any little

ifficulty due to 'fanaticism' would give way before the oothing influence of appropriate economic measures. The eys of material progress and prosperity would be enough to pen the door of success. These were the real and ultimate ıctors in human affairs. There was nothing else to bother bout.

The second phase is the one we are now entering. What rill be the methods no one yet knows. The fantastic aim, omewhat reduced in scope, is, it seems, to remain unchanged, regnant though it is with disaster. But we shall see. At the ıoment, except for the plentiful exercise of brutality—a rocess called restoring law and order—all is vague and esitating.

No one could expect a régime, having the aims, employing ıe means and inspired by the crude materialistic outlook just ımmarised, to show any high degree of sympathy with, or f understanding of, a people with the proud past, high tradiıons and keen intelligence of the Arabs, at a moment of their istory, moreover, when, relieved at last of the Turkish ıcubus, their hopes were high for the renewal of the life ıat is in them. So little sympathy and so little understandg has in fact been shown during the last twenty years that ıe Arabs have, throughout that period, been in a state of rer-increasing ferment against us, with the result that, under e compulsion of our dictatorship—a compulsion the more adily submitted to by us because our pride had been enlisted beit on the wrong side—we have been forced to the rpocrisy of causing violence to masquerade as strength, and ranny to call itself law and order.

In our methods, then, no less than in our aims, we seek in un for anything characteristically English.

It is commonly believed in most parts of the world that e English people are represented by their Government; a ıe distinction is not everywhere drawn between the British overnment, the dictatorship in force for Palestine, and the ıglish people. The result is unfortunate for the good name the English people, not only among the Arabs, but also sewhere in the world. In view of what is happening in lestine, the English people are supposed, not so much in eir individual capacity, but collectively and when in action a people, to have changed their character, to have lost their

sense of justice and fair-play, to have become morally and intellectually degenerate and to be well on the downward road. Certain it is that the English people may, like other peoples, be misled; but not permanently. The impression of our national degeneracy is unfortunate: it adversely affects peace prospects. To remedy that impression, and thereby to improve those prospects, it is not enough to rearm materially. Our moral, spiritual and intellectual equipment and direction as a people calls loudly for attention—some sorting among our directives, some reinforcing of purpose by soundness of intention, and, not least, some scrapping of our hallucinations. Our *ad hoc* dictatorship for Palestine would not welcome so wholesome a change. Like any dictatorship that lives, not for the people but its own purposes, it thrives on muddle-headedness, sentimentalities, ignorance and superstitions.

What is our dictatorship's prevailing spirit? It is the spirit of a strange new religion which may conveniently be described as the Religion of Materialism. This religion is substantially the same as that of which we see the riper fruits in Russia and in Spain. It is this religion of materialism that we are, in obedience to orders, importing into the Holy Land; and we have been bemused into believing that we are thereby preparing for a great Rosy Dawn in the Near East, and for the fulfilment of something that is 'written in the stars.' All this when, by a little trouble, by a little looking about us, we might discover an ominous discordance between the nature of this religion and the character of the people among whom we are introducing its missionaries. We know well enough that this religion is a godless politico-economic doctrine. Nevertheless, under a smoke-screen of pietistic mystification and a monstrous propaganda, we have dumped its missionaries in thousands into Arab land. If peace be the main interest of Great Britain, why introduce a new religion, brought from Eastern Europe and Russia, into territories already amply supplied with religious diversity and already inhabited by a vigorous and courageous people of strong religious convictions?

The Arabs have no use for suggestions that their attachment to their religion, whether it be the religion of Christ or of Islam, is a sign of backwardness. They are not impressed by the wisdom of those who say in their hearts (and also

openly) there is no God. They do not take it as a proof of culture to bring morals into line with 'modern thought' or to adapt them to the exigencies and opportunities of modern trade and commerce. They are not eager to disintegrate the social and economic framework of their lives on the plea that it is out of date because only held together by 'outworn creeds' and ancient tradition. They still believe in the institutions of the family and of property. They see no advantage in substituting proletarianism for economic liberty. They do not like the looks, nor the behaviour, nor the clothes—or rather the absence of them—of emancipated woman. Not many of them are prepared to align themselves in the service of an atheistic barbarism and to become true neophytes of materialism. For them contact with such influences is not education but a process of spreading disease by contagion, a path of subversion leading nowhere but to chaos and to war.

The main difference—and it is a big one—between the religion of materialism and the others on Arab shores is that it is essentially atheistic. To add to the dangers due to so sharp a difference, it has a missionary zeal of formidable intensity. If it were to prevail, the whole fabric of life, as hitherto led by the Arabs, would collapse in moral squalor. Hence it follows that the other religions, worshipping the Creator and not things created, are bound to unite against a peril as pressing as it is obvious to all. Thus it is that Moslem, Christian, Druze and the rest are stirring, preparing to assemble under the common banner of nationalism and the common war-cry, '*For God and Country*.' Should the day come, they may not find themselves without allies. They are not the only people in the world who believe in the same fundamentals and are prepared to fight for them.

The present conflict is a religious conflict, in the Near East no less than it is in Spain. In the Near East we have offended, in a fit of absentmindedness, that which those who seek peace would do well not to offend. We are continuing to offend. We are showing open hostility to the very guardians, in the Islamic world, of faith and morals. Is the Christian world also to expect, sooner or later, similar treatment from England? We are encouraging subversion in the Near East. Unless we pull up, the Eastern Mediterranean will see war, with perhaps ourselves engaged, not

only on the wrong side, but on the side which, if present omens are to be trusted, may prove the losing side.

What does our dictatorship for Palestinian affairs compel us to do in the face of the opposition we have raised and the contempt we have earned? Having for twenty years exasperated the Arabs beyond endurance, ignoring their protests, violently suppressing their demonstrations, crowding the prisons with 'criminals'—that is to say, with those who resent and violently express their resentment in the face of a state of affairs that any normal men *must* resent—we, instead of redressing obvious and crying wrongs (that is not allowed; it would be against established policy!), violently suppress all and sundry as disturbers of law and order! That, to the Arab, shows an almost perfect combination of savagery and hypocrisy. First goad your Arab into violence, then shoot or hang him as a rebel. That has been our line and is still our line. There is nothing particularly English about that, but it accurately reflects the character of our Palestinian dictatorship. The Arab will not give in. He can't afford to. His existence as a people is at stake. The more brutally we repress, the less repressible will he prove to be.

Not content with these exhibitions of the strong hand and weak head, our dictatorship provides further evidence of its affinity to things Russian, by causing us to 'liquidate' Moslem ecclesiastics, Moslem and Christian notables and landowners, by deprivation, exile, execution or imprisonment. This because of their 'disloyalty' in not being so accommodating as subserviently to welcome the handing over of their country to aliens and the subversion of their co-religionists in accordance with the requirements of atheistic materialism: because, too, we are called upon to believe that which elementary knowledge and common sense demonstrate to be untrue, that, if the leaders are liquidated, the bulk of the Arab population will quietly subside and accept the situation; the facts being, of course, that every man, woman and child in every class is violently opposed to us, and that the liquidation of their spokesmen and representatives merely increases and confirms that opposition.

When the Press of other nations draw attention to our follies and brutalities—to phenomena, that is to say, which have an objective reality—our own Press, with some excep-

tions, and particularly those organs of the Press which profess to speak for the Protestant Churches, have no better reply than the entirely childish retort that it is to the malicious propaganda of foreigners that our troubles with the Arabs are due. In short, our troubles are everyone's fault—Arabs, Italians, Germans, Belgians and what not—but never our own!

Cases of possession that have lasted for many years are in danger of becoming chronic. Are we to be one more example of the old saying: '*Quos Deus* . . .,' etc.? Let us hope not, but time is getting short. We cannot expect an indefinite extension. Moreover, the Arab world now understands. Mystification no longer avails. An appeal to trust to British justice, unaccompanied by any just action, now merely raises a laugh. Propaganda among the Arabs is useless: they see, and feel, our deeds; their shattered homes and villages are before their eyes; their leaders are in exile: fresh in the memories of their women and of their children is the fate to which we have doomed their husbands and their fathers for the 'crime' of standing up for their religion and their country.

And we, with our mess and muddle, our executions and liquidations, our bombs and our bayonets, might well excuse an onlooker for mistaking us for Russians.

Such is the bankruptcy to which our dictatorship for the Holy Land has reduced proud England. It is time for a change—a change away from dictatorship and back to things English. Let us hope that such a suggestion, reminiscent though it may be of the bad old days of narrow nationalism, would not be considered too painful for the delicate international susceptibilities of the Geneva Sanhedrin.

E. T. Richmond.

January 1938.

SOME NAVAL PROBLEMS

'BRITAIN IN DANGER'[1] AND CAPTAIN BERNARD ACWORTH

By ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND, K.C.B.

THE question of whether the hundred-odd millions now being spent upon the Navy is spent to the best purpose is one of such supreme importance to the nation that those who believe policy or practice to be at fault are warranted in offering their criticisms. No one is infallible, not even the most august departments of State. The bubble of official infallibility has been pricked many a time since Dr. Menzies' solemn official condemnation, in the Crimean War, of the 'unwise indulgence' of employing women to nurse the sick. At the same time the critic of authority is not infallible, however powerfully he may present his case.

Captain Acworth has strong views, and has given much thought to the problems on which he writes. He has chapter and verse for his reasons, and his industry in procuring information is equalled by his vigour in setting out his conclusions.

He begins by putting a question which goes to the bottom of things—'What is the British naval policy?' In plain terms, on what principles is the strength of the Navy determined to-day? Up to the period when the German menace arose, the statesmen of this country had acted upon a well-understood principle for over two centuries; which was that the 'battle strength' of our Navy should be sufficient to meet the combined strength of any two Powers, with the exception of the United States. This policy, expressed either in terms of shipbuilding or in the more precise form of a declaration supplemented by the resultant construction programmes, had the treble merit of simplicity, of plainness, and of making no

[1] *Britain in Danger*, by Bernard Acworth (Eyre & Spottiswoode, 8s 6d)

discrimination between foreign Powers. It did not point the finger at any nation as a probable enemy. It did not fluctuate with changes in the international situation. There was, therefore, no trimming or alteration when 'potential enemy A' of one decade became 'potential ally A' of another. Such changes are in the natural order of things, as we are only too well aware to-day. Thus, in 1854–55, Britain and France were fighting as allies, yet a bare four years later this country was taking steps to guard itself against a French invasion. Then, though there was no reason to suppose that a collison would occur with any other country than France, we see the Queen writing to Lord Derby saying that our superiority at sea must be such that 'it would not be lost at any moment that France might be joined by any other country possessing a navy.' In other words, a Two-Power Standard, irrespective of transient friendships or antagonisms, was the solid rock upon which it was considered that British security should stand. In 1889 public declaration was made that this was the naval policy of Great Britain.

Captain Acworth asks whether there is such a policy to-day—not necessarily the same policy, but any policy whatever. Certainly there seems to be none, or if there is one, it has not been made public. In a statement made by the late First Lord we were told, in terms that cannot be described otherwise than nebulous, that 'it is the duty of the Navy to keep open the trade routes and the communications of the Empire.' Undoubtedly that is one of the duties of the Navy, but as an expression of policy it leads nowhere. It is a generalisation indicating some of the functions of the Navy—by no means all—but it affords no quantitative basis. We were told, further, that we have to provide for the communications in both the Eastern and Western hemispheres. That, too, is nothing new; but what we are not told is whether it is our policy to provide for that security if it is threatened by maritime Powers in both hemispheres simultaneously. The old Two-Power Standard was plain and precise. This pronouncement is neither. It has indeed the appearance of being no more than a defence of the policy of building a base at Singapore for the reason that a great naval Power has arisen in the Far East.

Captain Acworth infers from this statement that 'we are

returning at last to a Two-Power Standard.' But, inasmuch as there is nothing in the words to indicate whether simultaneity of antagonism in the East and in Europe is contemplated, this deduction does not seem to be warranted. In so fundamental an element in our national defence there should be no room for doubt in this matter. It is not one affecting the security of this country alone. It affects the policies of defence of the outlying Dominions. No one, for instance, who has watched the progress of Dominion thought, is unaware of the existence of an assumption that if Great Britain were involved in a war in Europe the Dominions in the Pacific could expect no help from the British Navy. From that assumption the conclusion has followed that the defence policies of those Dominions must be based upon the expectation of being forced to rely upon themselves, and that their defence must take the form of local forces on land, at sea, and in the air. So, instead of a co-ordinated policy of security based upon the elementary principle of concentration of the greatest possible common effort upon a single object, we get dissipation of effort, with the usual result of being strong nowhere.

Whether, however, the policy of the Two-Power Standard is in the minds of Ministers—and it is Ministers, and not the Board of Admiralty, who determine policy—it stands clear to the eyes that it is not being implemented in construction. The figures for the indispensable auxiliaries of a fighting fleet, its cruiser and flotilla forces, demonstrate this beyond a shadow of doubt. Hence Captain Acworth draws the conclusion that, if trouble should arise, the assistance of France is regarded as axiomatic. If the experience of the past affords one plain lesson, it is the uncertainty of help from a third Power unless the interests of that Power dictate the necessity, or advantage, of involving itself in a war arising out of a quarrel in which it has no direct concern. The question, therefore, 'What is our naval policy?' is extremely pertinent.

Passing from the general question of the principles governing naval strength to that of the principles governing construction, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that attention has been focussed to an inordinate degree upon the air. No sensible man shuts his eyes to the possibilities of the new weapon-carrier in the air, but it is necessary to keep in mind

the fact that the appearance of a new instrument is not a substitution for, but an addition to, those existing. It is necessary to meet that new weapon and to make use of it appropriate to its nature and potentialities ; but that must not be done at the cost of other no less necessary weapons. Captain Acworth's analysis of the tendencies underlying recent construction suggests that the eyes of those responsible have been cast into the sky and under the water to an extent which has diverted them from the surface of the water itself. We seem to have been thinking more of making a certain limited number of our fighting ships, the so-called 'battleships,' immune from injury from the air or from the submarine than of producing a Navy which can fulfil the functions which a Navy exists to fulfil. The specialist in weapons is a useful servant. But he is a very bad master. 'To satisfy everybody,' wrote von Tirpitz of his specialists, 'one would soon have 100,000-ton ships without having gained anything at all.' Construction seems to have been guided by a series of assumptions : first, that of need for immunity from injury for one particular class of ship ; secondly, that the only way to render her immune is by increasing her powers of resistance, and, therefore, her size ; while finally, notwithstanding the defensive strength thus attained at a vast cost, the ship must not be exposed to injury, but must be kept out of the range of aircraft.

These are novel ideas. Much comment could be made upon them, but it is enough here to say that they convey the impression that more thought is given to the material aspects of the weapon than to its use. Thus the late First Lord is quoted by Captain Acworth as having reminded his listeners that if the precautions taken to defend the great ships in their harbours should prove insufficient, the Fleet could be moved out of the range of aircraft. Such a statement produces an uneasy feeling. The object of a fleet is to frustrate the intentions of an opposing fleet. It can do so only if it can take up a position from which it can, with a reasonable degree of probability, intercept its opponent if he puts to sea for any purpose whatever. This is possible only if the fleet occupies a position on interior lines, and the whole history of our policy regarding the possession and position of our bases has been to acquire and hold harbours so situated. To with-

draw beyond the reach of aircraft will, in certain obvious situations, have the effect of leaving the way open for an opponent to act with freedom : in other words, the fleet so withdrawn will be unable to perform the specific duty for which it exists. It is disturbing to see statements so lightly made that they convey the impression that problems of strategy are given less attention than problems of the safety of certain ships.

In the matter of trade defence there is hardly less reason for anxiety. We are assured that, while we have to be ready for any eventuality, the convoy system will not be introduced until sinkings have become so great that what is called ' the country ' no longer feels justified in allowing ships to sail by themselves. If there is one outstanding lesson of all war at sea, confirmed to the hilt by the last war, it is that convoy is the surest method of defending shipping. Yet, in defiance of this experience, in defiance of the plainest proof to the contrary during 1917 and 1918, we are told that it will be safer for ships to sail by themselves because they present a smaller target. The facts are precisely the reverse. It was one of the arguments used by the Admiralty in its opposition to convoy and disproved almost immediately. It is impossible not to feel anxious when such statements as this are officially made.

It is undoubtedly possible that situations may arise in which the danger to ocean-going shipping from sporadic attack may be so slight that it is less harmful to the national interests to sustain some blows than to slow up the flow of trade. But even if such should be the case on the ocean, shipping no sooner enters the focal areas—the narrow straits through which it must pass, the landfalls it cannot avoid or must make, the coastal routes where diversion is impossible—than it becomes exposed to intensive attack. Squadrons or single cruisers, flotillas of those smaller cruisers which are miscalled ' destroyers,' submarines—all of these are to be met with in such places. We must not base our expectations on the future as the limited scope of the operations of 1914-18, when, owing to geographical conditions, surface attacks in force were necessarily rare. It is, indeed, most strange to see such an opinion as the following expressed by responsible authority : ' As convoys will not be needed on the outbreak

of war it will give us time to improvise protection by destroyers and trawlers while orders are given to build the ships which we shall eventually require.'

One rubs one's eyes and wonders whether we are living in a world of realities. On what possible reasoning, on what experience, is the assumption made that there will be no need for convoys on the outbreak of war? What is to delay the opening of such attacks as were invariably made in the very earliest stages of the wars in the past? Foreign nations to-day are building numbers of submarines, numbers of small cruisers; and the submarines are armed with guns and can operate like surface craft against unarmed vessels. There is nothing whatever to support the opinion that a maritime nation possessing these craft will be either unwilling, or unable, to conduct attacks from the very striking of zero hour.

There were reasons for the delay in the beginning of the submarine war. Germany had but few submarines, and of those not many were gun-armed. The objective of the submarine was the man-of-war: the *Pathfinder*, *Hawke*, *Cressy*, *Aboukir*, *Hogue* and *Formidable* were her targets. Further, the Central Powers could still enjoy the prospect of winning the war on land, while torpedo attack upon merchantmen might bring powerful neutrals into the war. To-day those reasons for abstaining from the use of the modern gun-armed submarine do not exist, while as to the use of the torpedo, though agreements have been made to apply limits to its use in the submarine, such regard as we have seen paid to international agreements in recent years gives little reason for confidence that, if advantages appeared possible, those limits would be observed. Taking these several matters into consideration, the forecast that no immediate need for convoy would arise is, at the least, extremely optimistic. Optimism is a dangerous state of mind in which to build a policy.

Optimism is strongly marked in the next part of this declaration of policy, wherein we are told that we shall improvise protection by destroyers and trawlers. Where, one wonders, are these destroyers and trawlers to be found? In the late war we had over 400 of these vessels, nor was it until we were approaching those numbers that the convoy system was deemed practicable: the lack of sufficient small craft was one of the reasons given for convoy being impossible.

In another war, the opening of which might, as it did in some of the old French wars, take the form of an intensive attack upon our shipping, we are apparently counting upon 'improvising' protection. Have we still not learnt what improvisation means in war? Will the main fleet, or fleets, be denuded of their flotillas—the vessels which protect the battle fleet when it goes to sea? Assuredly there was no inclination to deprive the Grand Fleet of its flotillas in 1917–18, even when its superiority over the High Sea Fleet was as two to one. Yet, when our destroyer flotilla is a bare third of what it then was, we are asked to believe that vessels will be available to protect trade.

Trawlers are to be improvised also. But this takes time. Before these slow small craft can act they must be provided with guns and depth-charges; and when this has been done, does any practical man imagine that these vessels are fit to take the sea against the vessels manned by trained gunners? Has the fate of the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* been so soon forgotten? It was not merely the material inferiority of those ships to von Spee's that caused their rapid destruction: it was also that untrained crews were opposed to highly trained crews.

While this improvisation is being put in progress the seas will be a fruitful hunting-ground for the submarine, and, in some parts, for the surface flotillas also. The construction of a number of sloops, we are told, will be put in hand. How many months is it supposed will elapse before there are enough of those vessels for the service of convoy?

As to defence on the high seas, one hesitates to believe what Captain Acworth asserts to be the policy of defence, for its absurdity is such as to place it beyond the region of reasonable probability. His assertion is that it is proposed to patrol the trade routes with aircraft-carriers, operating under the protection of battle-cruisers.

Apart from the fact that the battle-cruiser is a capital ship, that there are few of them, and that what there are will be needed with the main fleet or fleets unless every elementary canon of strategy is to be thrown overboard, a more hopeless conception of trade defence can hardly be imagined. Even if there should be enough of those costly and very weak vessels, aircraft-carriers, to supply the patrols of many thousands of

miles of trade route, the idea that commerce destroyers could be dealt with—that is, discovered and destroyed—by aircraft lies outside the range of practical possibility. The proposal recalls Einstein's saying that bombarding atoms with sub-atomic particles was like shooting birds in the dark in a country where there are very few birds. One can indeed only imagine that Captain Acworth is mistaken in supposing that such an idea of defence can ever have entered the minds of responsible persons.

This, however, by no means exhausts the reasons for discomfort concerning trade defence. Captain Acworth quotes a statement, made by a responsible Minister, that if convoys are attacked by land aircraft we have to remember that the nearer the convoy gets to our own shores the nearer they come to the protection of our own Royal Air Force. Is it, then, only in our own home waters that shipping is open to attack from shore-based aircraft? Are there not routes through the Mediterranean and the Red Sea flanked by the coasts and other countries from which land aircraft can sally? Moreover, even in our own waters, is it really imagined that if a convoy should be attacked by aircraft there would be time for the planes of the Air Force to reach the spot to afford protection? Is it believed that a portion of the Royal Air Force would be hypothecated to the duty of 'standing-by' awaiting reports of attacks?—for no one in his senses imagines that aircraft can act as escorts to an eight- or twelve-knot convoy. The remark appears further to imply that the defence of trade is to be a divided responsibility between two separate administrations—the Admiralty and the Air Force. Such an idea can be dismissed as impracticable.

From questions such as these Captain Acworth passes to another of momentous importance—that of relying upon foreign sources of supply for the motive power of the Navy, its fuel. There the great doctrine of official 'infallibility' seems to reign triumphant, judging by the correspondence which passed between Lord Baldwin and a body of naval officers and others who desired to present him with their views. Repeated requests to be heard were summarily rejected. The word 'vital' is often loosely applied, but there is no looseness in applying it to the supply of the Navy's fuel. Not all the land forces, air forces, forts, courage, or

speeches will save the country and the Empire from defeat if the Navy, for want of fuel, is tied to its ports. Those who are uneasy about the supply are neither ignorant men nor men moved by personal considerations: yet their demand for an impartial and reasoned inquiry was refused.

The problem is in three parts—technical, tactical and strategical, and political. On the technical question whether oil or coal is the more efficient, in all the purely technical aspects of engineering and construction, the information at the disposal of the Admiralty must be greater than that available elsewhere. But even if this be so, the views of the outside technical opinion deserve examination. There is always a certain risk when a policy has not only been adopted, but questioned, of a tendency rather to defend the policy by every possible argument than to reapproach the question with the object of discovering the exact measure of the disadvantages or advantages which are claimed for or against its adoption.

The same may be said of the tactical and strategical issues. Granting again that the department is or should be the repository of the best tactical and strategical thought, it is not to be forgotten that, even in matters of this nature, errors have been made in the past. Has, for example, the policy of this country in initiating the growth in the size of the fighting ship proved advantageous? Was the view that light cruisers were useless a correct one? Was a system of trade defence which, rejecting convoy, replaced it by sending vessels out to search the ocean for enemy commerce destroyers a sound one? Was the tactical doctrine of making the defence of the battle fleet, the primary function of the fleet flotillas, correct? And if it was, why was it changed in 1917? Did convoy prove, as it was said that it would, that shipping in convoy was exposed to greater dangers than ships sailing singly? Every one of these and of other opinions were contested in their days, but upheld and insisted upon. These matters are recalled to remind ourselves that authority may err. Though there is what is called a Science of War, it is not one of the exact sciences. War is largely an art, art is a matter of judgment and opinion, and judgment and opinion can be developed only by free and unfettered discussion. To re-examine the tactical and strategical features, to weigh the

advantages and disadvantages of the two fuels, is no more than an act of reassurance.

If we should find, as we must be prepared to find in any impartial inquiry, that the technical, tactical and strategical advantages favour the use of liquid fuel, there still remains the question of whether the supply can be assured, beyond any shadow of doubt, in war. Oil is almost entirely a foreign product. Those who have studied our past history are aware of the anxiety which beset our statesmen in the past when the source of supply of the motive power of our sailing Navy—its masts, yards, canvas, rope and pitch—was the Baltic. It was pointed out in many a discussion that while we paid excessively to the foreign monopolist in times of peace we were liable in war to be denied or prevented from obtaining these vital materials. Our Baltic policy, in Sir John Seeley's words, 'rested almost exclusively upon the principle that no Power should acquire the power of closing that sea.' What negotiations, diplomatic manœuvres and expeditions into the Baltic that principle forced the country to undertake are worth remembering, no less than the steps taken to set the country free from this dependence upon the whims or policies of foreign rulers.

To-day there is anxiety of the same nature. What is asked is no more than an unbiassed examination of the question of whether we run a risk of not being able to obtain what we need. We saw, during the last war, the pressure which a powerful military State could bring to bear upon its weaker neighbours in the case of the mining of the Sound by a neutral Power under a threat. We see Neutrality Acts passed whose application no one can predict. We see countries which are sources of oil becoming increasingly hostile to Great Britain in consequence of British policy, and hostile feelings stimulated by a persistent propaganda. Those who, like Captain Acworth, ask for an examination of this political side of the problem, and who desire that we should not indulge in that form of optimism which refuses to look facts in the face, are not panic-mongers. They are asking for the exercise of elementary precautions, precautions which were not neglected by statesmen in the past.

Powerful, therefore, though the arguments of technique may be, the arguments of policy are more powerful. In the

long run errors of policy have far more far-reaching effects than errors of strategy, errors of strategy than errors of tactics, and errors of tactics than errors of technique. True as it is that technical equipment is needed for tactical victory, tactical victory for strategical success, and strategical success for achievement of the political aim, the fact remains that even if certain technical disadvantages result from the use of a particular material, an inferiority in the unit is redeemable by numbers. Numbers admittedly cost money, but defeat costs more; and there is no use whatever in superior material if, in war, it is unobtainable. This is no small matter to a maritime empire dependent entirely upon the preservation of its lines of communication in war.

Whether Captain Acworth's own proposals for a reconstructed Navy are technically, tactically and strategically sound is another matter.

H. W. RICHMOND.

PRESENT-DAY ARCHITECTURE IN INDIA

By A. G. SHOOSMITH, O.B.E., A.R.I.B.A.

THE architecture of a country is the direct outcome of its ast and present conditions of life, and in considering the rend of architecture in India at the present day it will be een at the outset that the primary causes to which the re- rientation of thought in Europe is due do not operate in ne Asiatic country. The nineteenth century in Europe wit- essed a gradual social revolution in which the displacement f a privileged aristocracy as dictators of architectural fashion vas followed by the ostentatious efforts of the commercial pirit to express itself. The confusion was heightened, as it vas ultimately resolved, by the development of steel as a uilding material. Although a few signs of the struggle of eason to assert itself became apparent before the Great Var, it was that calamity which gave it a definite aim. The eneration which had passed through it not only lacked ioney to pay for inessentials, but gradually freed itself of ie desire for them. It found itself in a world from which iuch that had seemed permanent had passed away, and nong the new values life assumed a simpler form. This mplification was most clearly expressed in the buildings iat arose. They had to be provided at a maximum speed id a minimum cost, and in time it was found that brickwork iadorned and the stark and vital forms of reinforced con- ete were capable of a new conception of beauty. Un- ippily, the newly found forms, like those of previous styles, on became the prey of uninstructed eclecticism, and many iildings which could with more propriety have been signed on traditional lines have been deformed to suit hat has been mistaken for a new vogue. It is to this cause at such appearances as the modern European manner has ade in India are mainly due.

India is a deeply conservative country, and has experienced as yet no social revolution. Caste is the cement of the Hindu community, which forms the most numerous as well as the wealthiest section of the population; and under the dominance of caste equality among men is unthinkable. In the States the power of the Princes is absolute. The political agitation that has occurred in India is due to a natural desire among the educated classes for self-government, and to no general liberation of thought. The war, though it caused some financial embarrassment to the Government, neither impoverished the country nor created any counterpart to the necessity in Europe of quickly making good an enormous deficit in building. The life of the people has not appreciably changed in centuries except in so far as stable government, irrigation, communications and medical science have given them security and checked the ravages of famine and disease. The nationalist ideal aims at self-sufficiency and freedom from alien interference, and is therefore in direct opposition to the foreign commercial interests which share with novelty-seeking potentates responsibility for the importation of modern European architecture into India. Whether it is a commercial necessity may be doubted; the point will be referred to later.

India has a long history of honourable achievement in the field of architecture. From the earliest times of which we have any knowledge until the end of the seventeenth century there was a continuous building tradition, preserved by the caste system under which the son followed his father's trade. These Hindu craftsmen the Mohammedan conquerors from the thirteenth century onwards wisely employed, satisfied for long with buildings planned to their requirements but remaining Hindu in detail. The influence of Persian artists, imported more plentifully as the Mohammedan rule strengthened, gradually brought about an Indian Mohammedan style which culminated during the reign of Shah Jahan in a number of buildings of outstanding beauty in Agra, Delhi, and elsewhere; but there seems reason to accept the opinion of those authorities who aver that these works are an integral part of a continuous India tradition of which the hereditary Hindu craftsmen were the mainstay. Be that as it may, certain it is that in the following reign, that

of the fanatic Aurungzeb (1658–1707), the dismissal of the Hindus, on religious grounds, from their employment by the court synchronised with a decay too rapid and too extreme to be accounted for by the normal process of decline. Aurungzeb was the last of the 'Great Moghuls,' for his bigotry dealt a death-blow, not only to Indian architecture but also to his empire; and though in the period of chaos and misery which ensued the scattered craftsmen maintained the tradition for varying whiles in remote states, it lacked direction, and in the few places where it is still found at the present day it is lifeless and corrupt.

It so happened that during this period the European influence was gaining strength, and some very interesting and charming architecture was developed in the Portuguese, French, and Dutch settlements. But the downfall of the Indian tradition opened the way for the frequent employment by Indians of ill-trained Europeans, who were guilty of buildings of incredible debasement and vulgarity in their attempts to design in a style of which they knew nothing and with a flamboyance to suit their Indian masters' love of display. The growing power of the British East India Company as the eighteenth century progressed had the effect of checking these evil influences; at that time every educated Englishman had some knowledge of classic architecture, and many dignified buildings displaying porticoes and colonnades designed with a large measure of correctness appeared at Calcutta, Madras, and elsewhere. After the Mutiny the designing of Government buildings became a duty of officers of the Royal Engineers and later, on the formation of that body, of engineers of the Public Works Department; and a desolation of inartistic building resulted [1] which was only occasionally relieved by the work of architects eminent enough in England to be commissioned to design buildings of importance in India, where, however, these protagonists of the styles then at war in England added to the confusion by their diverse products. They had, moreover, little or no understanding of the requirements of the Indian climate, with the result that many of their works had to be mutilated

[1] No disparagement of the engineers, either civil or military, is meant. Their work in India is a monument to itself (and to them) which will stand for all time. But it does not stand in the field of æsthetics.

beyond recognition to render them habitable, or pulled down entirely. It is small wonder, therefore, that the British official, in those days of rare furlough cut off for long periods from cultural influences, expected little of a building beyond that it should protect him adequately from the elements, and became indifferent to the manner of its doing so. From this indifference he is only slowly emerging.

The work of Cunnyngham, Fergusson and Daniels and other archæologists and artists did much to revive an interest in ancient Indian art, and it only required a Viceroy of Lord Curzon's culture and initiative to pave the way for the restoration of architecture to its rightful place. Not only did he promote the rescue of many historic monuments from the decay into which apathy, both British and Indian, had been allowing them to fall, but during his term the office of Consulting Architect to the Government came into being. The lead of the Central Government in appointing an official architect was followed by the principal provinces. The men appointed with a common earnestness but in varying manners addressed themselves to the task of designing buildings which should fulfil the purposes for which they were built, meet the conditions of the climate, and be capable of execution with the labour and materials at hand. Their influence might have been stronger but for the diversity of their efforts, deriving partly from the conflict in architectural thought and education in Britain, and partly from local prejudices in India. Calcutta, with its East India Company heritage, clung to the classic manner; in Bombay a Gothic vogue had sprung up; while most of India was bespattered with fantastic buildings in what has been called the Indo-Saracenic style, some of which reach a level of monstrous absurdity. That the features of historical Indian architecture were capable of intelligent application to modern needs when raised above mere senseless copyism is shown by Ransome's Secretariat at Dacca; and in the Lady Hardinge College and Hospital at Delhi John Begg produced an interesting harmony of Indian forms blended with modern ideas in design which it would be difficult to praise too highly. Meanwhile two buildings erected in Calcutta shortly before the war by architects practising in London—Howrah Station, by Halsey Ricardo, and Giliander House, by H. S. Goodhart-Rendel—

directly reflect the trend of thought in England and the revolt against traditional forms that was taking place.

It was at this stage that an event occurred which, but for the incidence of the European War, would have had a much further-reaching effect than it has had, and which for purposes of official buildings might have been epoch-making. The capital of India having been transferred from Calcutta to Delhi by Royal Proclamation at the Durbar of 1911, Mr. E. L. (now Sir Edwin) Lutyens was chosen as architect to plan the new city and design the principal buildings. An early desire to complete the huge project in four years led to the addition to him of Mr. (now Sir) Herbert Baker, architect some years previously of the South African Union buildings at Pretoria. It was not to be expected that these two architects, strong supporters of the English classic tradition, would lean towards the Indo-Saracenic style, but in his quick and sensitive appreciation of the essential qualities of Indian architecture and their expression in pure English idiom in the great viceregal palace which he designed, the towering genius of Lutyens is clearly shown.

The appointment of these architects was greeted with considerable outcry from many who thought that a unique opportunity of reviving Indian architecture by employing Indian master builders to design and build the new capital was being neglected. It is certain that to do so would have been to put back the clock, and it is improbable that the work could ever have been completed by such methods. Quite apart from the difficulties presented by the immense organisation required, the master builder had practically died out in the two centuries since Aurungzeb's persecutions. In Rajputana and elsewhere where he had survived he had sunk to the level of a *mistri*, or craftsman. His designs for small houses are still good in places where they are not disfigured with balconies supported on the projecting ends of steel girders and sheltered with corrugated iron; but any important building requiring more pretentious treatment reveals at once the decadence of taste.

Had the times been favourable, it is probable that the seed planted by Lutyens would have flowered widely in India, though some care and skill would have had to be devoted to its acclimatisation. The Viceroy's house was planned

essentially as a cold-season building; its rooms have neither the protective verandahs nor the upper ventilation necessary for hot-weather habitation, though its thick walls and wide-spreading *chajja* suffice to keep the interior tolerably cool. But it affords a magnificent example of how Eastern and Western ideas may be combined to produce great architecture, which would have had wide repercussions had they not been overwhelmed by the greater ones of the war.

The war's first effect was a move towards curtailment of expenditure, and this in the sphere of building operated not only against New Delhi but against the scope of projected works in other parts of India. The old official suspicion that architecture was no more than a stamp of respectability whose function was to dignify buildings which could be designed with equal efficiency by engineers was far from dead, and by degrees several of the provinces dispensed with their official architects, in some cases finding themselves as a consequence under the necessity of employing architects in independent practice, who were multiplying in India, to design their more important buildings. Those deemed less important were once more entrusted to the hands of engineers, and so a retrograde step was taken.

Another effect of the war was felt in India at second hand. It was the quickening of the change in direction of architectural aim in Europe, already noticed. This undermined New Delhi as a future influence. Bereft now of the support of imported architectural thought for the classical spirit which informed it, and stigmatised, however unreasonably, as expensive, it is in danger of appearing as a splendid culmination to the old epoch instead of inaugurating a new. What architecture in India has thereby lost it is useless to speculate; that it is robbed of much of the effect for good of by far the most important and probably the only first-class work in the European contribution up to date it is hardly possible to doubt. The lesson it offers is missed, and the aimless uncertainty continues.

What, then, is left? A morass in which a degenerate native architecture lies suffocated under a heaped chaos of foreign importations—some good, some bad; few offering any intellectual stimulus. Can it be resuscitated? A movement is afoot to revive Indian painting, but it is anti-Western in its mainspring and suffers from a resultant maudlin

romanticism which extends even to the reproduction of such mannerisms as should be regarded as shortcomings of draughtsmanship in old work, whose vigour and breadth of decorative effect it misses. Indian architecture so revived could never enjoy a robust renascence. It would succeed only in making village buildings pretentious. Steel and concrete have come to stay, and no architecture which cannot wield them can hope to serve present-day life. If Indian architecture is to recover strength and continue its individual existence, it must accept a transfusion of Western blood. While this is taking effect a period of further confusion appears inevitable. Official architecture in the Delhi orbit is classical; elsewhere it varies. The European architects, both British and Continental, employed by Princes and commercial firms speak with many tongues, and side by side with a revival of mediæval Persian in one State we see modern German designs for palaces in others. In the large cities are a few houses and commercial buildings reminiscent of the latest creations of Paris or Czecho-Slovakia, though whether the impulse towards their design was anything more than a desire to be in the fashion is to be doubted. The essence of reinforced concrete construction as developed in Europe is the concentration of loads on as few supports as possible, the whole being enclosed by thin screen walls, often largely of glass. Such enclosure would afford totally inadequate protection against the great heat and blinding light of India. In the big commercial cities, where space is precious and high buildings are necessary, modern methods of construction, backed up by modern methods of thermal insulation, may be of real value. But elsewhere space is almost boundless, and the fatigue of vertical movement in a hot climate is a thing to be avoided; so that the natural plane for Indian building would seem to be the horizontal. This conclusion is in accord with tradition, for few or no ancient buildings outside the crowded towns are high, except for purposes of fortification. One or two storeys, and a flat roof to sleep on, are what the Indian requires. Against heat his traditional defences are massive masonry and shady verandahs, whose supports should be sufficiently wide to exclude an excess of reflected light. So long as his rooms are

But European engineers have taught him that with steel beams he can increase his spans, and it is in those that the element of discomfort stands revealed. He has never digested steel. For that he can hardly be blamed, having had to swallow it raw just as it was given to him long ago by the European, who has himself only lately solved the problem of its absorption into everyday building by its use with concrete and other coverings. The novelty and audacity of the forms to which ferro-concrete lends itself have excited the æsthetic sense of Europe, and, since the needs of the different countries in that continent have much in common, they have found something approximating to a universal expression. This internationalism has brought about a lack of change in the architectural scene in which the traveller (other than the devotee) misses much that gave interest to his wanderings. Varying national taste will restore that in time.

Indian architects must use ferro-concrete, and certain classes of buildings can perhaps be built entirely of it with advantage. The commercial building has already been considered. There is also the building designed for special resistance to earthquake; but since severe shocks are practically confined to certain Himalayan regions, it may be that the rebuilding of Quetta will remain the only important instance. (The Bihar catastrophe of 1934 was an isolated phenomenon.) For general purposes the wall will continue to be an essential element of Indian building, and the framed structure will always be something of an intruder. On the other hand, the potential usefulness of ferro-concrete in slab construction for floors and roofs, and for external overhanging features like balconies and wide-spreading cornices, is almost unlimited. Its employment will result in some measure of invasion of such European commercial centres as Calcutta and Bombay by many characteristics of the international style, but that they will find a welcome in India proper is not to be expected. A straight line is an affair of the drawing-board requiring an exactitude in execution to which the Indian is by nature indifferent. It is not the distorted line, but the hard line, which offends him. To him architecture means vivid light and shade, with abundance of enrichment, and a style whose appeal lies in fine line and an alien science will have scant virtue in his eyes. Such a style may establish

itself in the cosmopolitan seaports, and make random appearances elsewhere, but it cannot subjugate India. In the absence of a living architecture with which to oppose it, a style so repugnant to her character will meet with passive resistance and probably travesty, and finally find its modified forms absorbed, as all things are absorbed that India needs.

The unchanging East is changing at last. Japan, by combining Western scientific methods with low Oriental costs, has become a powerful force. Its resources are organised, and European architecture has found acceptance by a practical and artistic people living in an earthquake-ridden land. Their commerce has penetrated a convulsed China, and to a disquieting extent into India. Bound to Europe by political and cultural ties, India may become a battleground of influences, and the peril from the East to a divided country is a patent reason for the retention, and strengthening by mutual good will, of the British connexion, in which protection lies her best hope fo attaining once more to the full stature of a great people. Indians are assuming every year more and more of the responsibility of administration in all fields, and when they can compose their internal differences and free themselves of the shackles of caste which hamper their progress in a swiftly moving world, they will enjoy a future as splendid as their past, which has left them a rich inheritance of building. The Indian architect will have great opportunities. He must not neglect his natural ally, the craftsman. The Hindus have always been masons and sculptors, the Moslems cunning with bricks and ornamental patterns. At New Delhi they have shown what they can do when the best is demanded of them, and under expert guidance—superlatively good stone and marble work and plastering worthy of a Moghul palace. The Sikh proved a better joiner than the renowned Chinese; as an electrician he is employed all over India. But ever since the disappearance of imperial patrons India has been satisfied with the second-rate, and so the craftsman has deteriorated. Indian architects must help in his regeneration. They and only they can gather the talents together in a revitalised building tradition. The present babel will continue until they are strong enough to displace the architects imported from abroad and enjoy a long respite from the dominance of a foreign art. They cannot

resist foreign science, of which they acknowledge the value; but what it offers must be combined with those essential elements of their native architecture which best meet the needs of the country. Only by so doing can India once more develop her own logic and her own æsthetic. It will take time, perseverance and much deep thought by the best brains.

India now has an association of architects, and by so banding themselves together they may achieve a synthesis of thought. The training of the student should be their first concern. As long as he seeks that abroad, so long will he return hybridised. His fundamental training should be in his own country. Much good work is being done by the school at Bombay, and by others of which less is heard; but many more are required. The student should not think it is necessary to copy European forms in order to be a modern architect; they mean nothing to his people for whom he will build, and an expression developed from the Indian vernacular will be not only more to their liking, but more expedient in the great majority of the problems with which he will be faced. Let him therefore study the principles of design from the architectural treasures in which India is so abundantly rich, while implementing his scientific equipment from European sources. Above all, let him avoid that obsession with theory which has misled Indian students in so many fields of learning. The essentially practical nature of his calling must be impressed upon him.

A. G. SHOOSMITH.

THE 'ENCHIRIDION MILITIS CHRISTIANI'

By CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS

ERASMUS, of Rotterdam, died just 400 years ago. In his *Enchiridion Militis Christiani* he wrote for a friend a manual of a Christian's duty. Then, as to-day, Christian European civilisation was threatened by the menace of alien powers (in that day the power of the Turks), and Erasmus discusses the policy with which this menace should be met:

Preparation and ordinance is made now for war to be made against the Turks, which, for whatsoever purpose it is begun, we ought to pray not that it may turn to the profit of a few certain persons, but that it may be to the common and general profit of all men. But what think you should come of it if to such of them as shall be overcome (for I do not suppose that they shall all be killed with weapons) . . . they shall see . . . great doctors and teachers of religion and holiness so far disagreeing and of so sundry opinions among themselves that oftentimes they dispute and reason so long with one another, until they change colour and revile one another, spitting at each other and finally dealing buffets and blows at each other? . . . And if they shall see and well perceive our ambition and desirousness of honour by our gorgeouseness, more than ever any tyrant did use; our avarice and covetousness by our bribing and pollyng [extorting], our lecherousness by the defiling of maidens and wives, our cruelty by the oppressions done of us? With what face or how for shame shall we offer them the doctrine of Christ which is far away contrary to all these things. The best way and most effectual to overcome the Turks should be if they shall perceive that thing which Christ taught and expressed in His living to shine in us. If they shall perceive that we do not highly gape for their empires, do not desire their gold and good, do not covet their possessions but that we seek nothing else but only their souls' health and the glory of God. That is that right true and effectuous divinity, the which in past time subdued unto Christ arrogant and proud philosophers,

and also the mighty and invincible princes; and if we thus do then shall Christ ever be present and help us.

For truly it is not meet nor convenient to declare ourselves Christian men by this proof or token, if we kill very many but rather if we save very many; not if we send thousands of heathen people to hell but if we make infidels faithful; not if we cruelly curse and excommunicate them but if we with devout prayers and with all our hearts desire their health and pray unto God to send them better minds. If this be not our intent it shall sooner come to pass that we shall degenerate and turn into Turks ourselves, than that we shall cause them to become Christian men. And although the chance of war, which is ever doubtful and uncertain, should fall so luckily to us that we had gotten the victory, so should it be brought to pass that the Pope's dominion and his Cardinals' might be enlarged, but not the Kingdom of Christ, which finally flourishes and is in prosperity, if faith, love, peace and chastity be quick and strong . . . Nor Christ did not die . . . that goods of the world, that riches, that armour and the rest of ruffling fashion of the world be now in the hands and rule of certain priests, which things were wont to be in the hands of the gentiles, or at least among lay princes, not much differing from gentiles. But in my mind it were the best, before we should try them in battle, to attempt them with epistles and some little books; but with what manner of epistles? Not with threatening epistles, or with books full of tyranny, but with those which might show fatherly charity and resemble the very heart and mind of Peter and of Paul, and which should not only pretend and show outwardly the title of the apostles, but which also should savour and taste of the efficacy and strength of the apostles. . . .

Therefore in mine opinion the best were that some both well learned men and good of living should have this office assigned and put unto them, to make a collection and to gather the sum of Christ's philosophy out of the pure fountain of the gospel and the epistles and most approved interpreters, and so plainly that yet it might be clerkly and erudite, and so briefly that it might also be plain. These things which concern faith and belief, let them be contained in a few articles. Those also that appertain to the manner of living let them be showed and taught in few words, and that after such fashion that they may perceive that they have gotten fathers and not tyrants, feeders and not robbers, pyllers [pillagers] nor pollers and that they be called to their soul health and not compelled to servitude. Undoubted they also be men, neither their hearts be of so hard iron or adamant but that they may be mollified and won with benefits and kindness, wherewith

even very wild beasts be waxen gentle and tame. And the most effectuous thing is the true verity of Christ. But let the Pope also command them whom he appointeth to this business, that they never swerve nor go from the true pattern and example of Christ, nor in any place have any respect to the carnal affections and desires of men. And such a thing my mind was about to bring to pass as well as I could when I made this book of *Enchiridion*. I did see the common people of Christendom not only in effect but also in opinions to be corrupted. I considered the most part of those which profess themselves to be pastors and doctors to abuse the titles of Christ to their proper advantage. And yet will I make no mention of those men after whose will and pleasure the world is ruled and turned up and down, whose vices, though they be never so manifest, a man may scarcely once wince. And in such great darkness, in such great troublous ruffling of the world, in so great diversity of men's opinions, whither should we rather fly for succour than to the very great and sure anchor of Christ's doctrine, which is the gospel. Who, being a good man in deed, doth not see and lament this marvellous corrupt world? When was there ever more tyranny? When did avarice reign more largely and less punished? . . . When did our iniquity so largely flow with more liberty? When was ever charity so void? What is brought, what is read, what is decreed or determined but it tasteth and savoureth of ambition and lucre? Oh, how unfortunate were we if Christ had not left some sparks of his doctrine unto us, as it were lively and everlasting veins of His godly mind.

Erasmus next goes on to discuss what should be the proper relation between spiritual and temporal authority. Without such a proper relation neither true liberty nor true peace is, he thinks, possible, and it is easy to miss the proper mean by exaggeration either to one side or to the other.

If we have the rule and pattern of Christ's charity, to it we may apply and make meet all other things right easily. But what will ye do when this rule doth not agree with those things which hath been commonly used so many hundred years, and which be ordained and stablished by the laws of princes, for this chanceth very oft? Ye must not condemn that thing which princes do in executing their office, but again do not corrupt and defile the heavenly philosophy with men's deeds. Let Christ continue and abide, as He is indeed, a very centre or middle point unmoved, having certain circles going round about Him; move not the mark out of His own place. Those which be in the first circle next to the centre (that is to say, next to Christ) as priests, bishops, car-

dinals, popes and such to whom it belongeth to follow the Lamb whithersoever He shall go, let them embrace and hold fast that most pure part, and so far forth as they may, let them communicate and plenteously give the same unto their next neighbours. In the second circle all temporal and lay princes be, which, in keeping war and making laws, after a certain manner do service to Christ, either when with rightful battle they drive away their enemies and defend and maintain the public peace and tranquillity of the commonwealth or else when with punishment according to the laws they punish malefactors and evil-doers. And yet because they cannot choose but of necessity be occupied and busied in such things as be joined with the most vile dregs and filth of the earth and with the business of the world, it is jeopardous lest they do fall further from the centre and mark, as lest they should make sometimes war for their own pleasure and not for the commonwealth; lest under the pretext of justice they should use cruelty upon those whom they might reform with mercy, lest under the title of lordship they should pyll and polle those people whose goods they ought to defend. And moreover, as Christ, like the fountain of everlasting fire, doth draw next unto Him the order of priests and maketh them of like nature, that is to say, pure and clean from all corruption of worldly dregs and filthiness, so in like case it is the office of priests, and specially of the highest, so much as they can, to call and draw unto them those that be princes and have power and authority. And if it fortune at any time that war do rise suddenly in any place, let the bishops endeavour themselves, so much as in them is, either to end the strifes and variances without shedding of blood, or, if that cannot be brought to pass by reason of the great storms of worldly business, let them so do that as little blood as may be be shed, and that the war may shortly be brought to an end.

The spiritual authority, Erasmus argues, must have the freedom in extreme cases to condemn the ordinances of the temporal authority, if those ordinances should be in violation of the moral law. But direct and positive legislation about worldly affairs is beyond its business. Thus:

When He (Christ) was desired to divide the inheritance between the two brethren, He plainly refused it as an unworthy thing for Him to give judgement of such gross matters, which did teach things heavenly. . . . Let us not therefore straightway make Christ an author of all things which be done by princes and temporal officers, nor defend it (as we call it) to be done by God's law. They deal and meddle with many things which be low and gross, not

altogether of the very pureness of a Christian man; yet they be not to be rebuked in as much as they be necessary to the maintenance of order to be observed. Nor we be not by the ministering of their office made good, albeit that by them it is caused that we be less evil, and that they which be evil do less hurt and annoyance to the commonwealth. And therefore they also ought to have their honour because they do somewhat serve the justice of God and the public and common tranquillity, without the which sometime those things be troubled and vexed which belong to godly holiness. They must be honoured when they do their office; and, if sometimes they use their power for their own pleasure or profit, yet peradventure it were the best to suffer them lest more hurt should spring thereof; for there appeareth an image, or rather a shadow, of the divine justice in them, which justice yet ought to shine more evidently and more purely in the living and laws of priests.

It is necessary both to hold balanced opinions and to appreciate the balance in the opinions of others. Nothing but harm comes from that misrepresentation which accuses opponents of holding an extreme opinion simply because they have been careful to show that they do not hold the opposite extreme.

If a man should dissuade some such war and battle which now of long time hath been used, worse than was ever any amongst the gentiles, for things of no value, he should be noted by and by of the pick-quarrels to be one of those which thinketh that no war is lawful for a Christian man. For these which were the bringers up and authors of this sentence we have made heretics, because a Pope, I wot not who, doth seem to approve and allow war. And yet he is not suspected nor noted of heresy, which doth provoke and stir up men to battle, and bloweth the trumpet thereunto for every trifling matter against the doctrine both of Christ and His Apostles. If a man admonish that this is a deed truly belonging to the successor of an Apostle to bring the Turks unto religion with Christ's help rather than with war, anon he is suspected as though he affirmed not to be lawful for Christian men to withstand the Turks when they invade us. If a man show and praise the temperance that was in the Apostles, and speak anything against the great superfluity that is used nowadays, he should be noted as a favourer of the Ebionites.

Moralists of every age have seen in their age one especially

corrupt, which has fatally declined from the ancient virtues. Erasmus was no exception.

Search the histories of antiquity; to them compare the manners that be now-a-days. When was virtue and true honesty more despised? When was so had in price riches gotten not regarded whence? In what world at any time was truer that saying of Horacius; verily that lady money giveth a wife with dowry, credence, friendship, nobleness, noble kin and also beauty? And again this saying of the same Horace, nobleness and virtue, except a man have good withal, is viler than a rush or a straw. Who readeth not in good earnest that biting mock of the same poet; Oh citizens, citizens, first seek money, after seek virtue? When was riot or excess more immoderate than now? When was adultery and all other kinds of unchaste living either more appert in the sight of every man or more unpunished, or else less had in shame, rebuke or abomination? While princes favour their own vices, in other men suffering them unpunished, and every man accounteth that most comely and beautiful to be done whatsoever is used and taken up among courtiers. To whom seemeth not poverty extreme evil, and uttermost shame and rebuke? In time past against keepers of queans, filthy nigards, glorious or gorgeous persons, lovers and regarders of money, were cast in the teeth with rebukeful and slanderous scoffings and jestings, yea with authority.[1] And also in comedies, tragedies and other common plays of the gentiles a great clapping of hands and a shout was made for joy of the lay people when vices were craftily and properly rebuked and checked; at the which same vices now-a-days, being evil praised, there is made a shout and clapping of hands for joy even of the nobles and estates of Christian men. . . . How many examples be there in the histories of gentiles, of them which of the commonwealth, well governed and ministered, brought nothing in to their poor household but an honest opinion or reputation; which set more by fidelity than by money, by chastity than by life, whom neither prosperity could make proud, wild and wanton, neither adversity could overcome and make heavy hearted, which regarded honest jeopardies and dangers before voluptuousness and pleasures, which contented only with the conscience of pure life, desired neither honours, neither riches, nor any other commodities of fortune. . . . So we Christian men honour the doctrine of Christ; so counterfeit we it that everywhere now-a-days nothing is accounted more foolish, more vile, more to be ashamed of, than to be a Christian man indeed,

[1] *Sic* in Bydell's (the earliest English) translation, 1533.

with all the mind and heart; as though that either Christ in vain had been conversant in earth, or that Christendom were some other thing now than in time past, or as it indifferently pertained not to all men.

Neither in foreign nor in domestic politics does Erasmus belong to the collectivist school which preaches that it is the duty of every man to concern himself with every remote dispute. He praises rather those who are content sensibly to mind their own limited businesses.

Hear another error; they call him peerless, politic and in all things expert, which, hearkening for all manner tidings, knoweth what is done throughout all the world, what is the chance of merchandise, what the King of England intendeth, what new thing is done at Rome, what is chanced in France, how the Danes and the Sytes [Scythians] live, what matters great princes have in council; to make an end shortly, whoever can babble with all kinds of men of all manner business, him they say to be wise. But what can be farther from the thought of a wise man, or nearer to the nature of a fool, than to search for those things which be done afar off and pertain to thee nothing at all, and not so much as once verily to think on those things which are done in thine own breast and pertain to thee only. Thou tellest me of the trouble and business of England, tell me rather what trouble maketh in thy breast. . . . He is not wise at all, which is not wise for his own profit.

Yet he makes it abundantly clear that, when preaching the gospel of 'minding one's own business,' he does not mean to praise an indifference to the sufferings of those whose condition it is possible to relieve. He imagines the objection of some sixteenth-century Duke of Newcastle, saying concerning his own property, 'I possess it by right and not by fraud, why shall I not use it and abuse it after mine own mind, why should I give them of it any deal at all to whom I owe nothing? I spill, I waste, I destroy, that which perisheth is mine own, it maketh no matter to other men.'

To him Erasmus answers:

Thy member complaineth and grinneth for hunger and thou spuest up partridges. Thy naked brother shivereth for cold, and with thee so great plenty of raiment is corrupt with moths and long lying. One night's dicing hath lost thee a thousand pieces of gold, while in the mean season some wretched wench (need

compelling her) hath set forth her chastity to sell, and is become a common harlot, and thus perisheth the soul for whom Christ hath bestowed His life. Thou sayest again, 'What is that to me? I entreat that which is mine own after mine own fashion?' and after all this, with this so corrupt mind, thinkest thou thyself to be a Christian man, which art not once a man verily?

The conclusion to which he at last comes is that cursed desire for prestige causes men to fight about many things, which are not really worth the quarrel, applying a remedy that is by far worse than the disease. The need of the world is for an abatement of pride.

For in conclusion what end shall there be of injuries on both sides if every man go forth and proceed to revenge his own grief? Enemies increase on both parts, the sorrow waxeth fresh and raw again, and the longer it endureth the more uncurable it is; but with softness and with sufferance is healed now and then, yea even he which did the wrong, and after he is come to himself again, of an enemy is made a very trusty and faithful friend.

Erasmus was not a politician, nor in this book is he primarily concerned with the problems either of war or of politics. Yet the distrust of politics itself implies a political attitude. To Erasmus, as we can see, it meant, not an indifference towards the duty to one's neighbour, but rather a belief that that duty could not be adequately discharged by merely piling upon the State or prince the obligation to tend the sufferings of the unfortunate. It must be discharged directly.

In international politics Erasmus was, for better or for worse, but little touched with patriotism. To him Europe was the unit, and quarrels between European princes all of the nature of a civil war, and one in which the issues at stake were by no means sufficient to justify the sufferings. '*Dulce bellum inexpertis*,' he wrote. Nor, as we see, did he think that the weapon of war should be used even against the non-European save as a last resort. His faith may be summed up in the motto, so often quoted, so rarely in truth believed, but believed by him with his passionate faith in the emancipating power of scholarship with all sincerity, '*Magna est veritas praevalet super omnia.*'

CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS.

ROUND BURLINGTON HOUSE: TRAFALGAR SQUARE

By D. S. MacColl

I. Burlington House

I shall not attempt, in the short time at my disposal and the limited space, to write with any detail about the contents of the latest in a great line of Winter Loan Exhibitions at the Royal Academy: but I wish to say, with all possible emphasis, that it is out and away the best in arrangement that I can remember. It is also, of course, packed with interest, and contains much beauty; but how immensely those qualities gain by skill in the disposition of pictures and other works of art. A tribute for the selection is due to Messrs. E. K. Waterhouse and Isherwood Kay, along with Mr. Francis Dodd; but for the hanging and placing of pictures the academicians to whom we are chiefly indebted are Sir Walter Russell and again, Mr. Dodd. Russell proved his worth in a summer exhibition two or three years ago, when influenza had laid its grip upon others of the Hanging Committee; and I remember the remarkable sense of visual comfort in the general aspect of the walls, due not so much to the merit of the pictures as to the skilful architecture of their shape and sizes, the response of their design and colour as pendants, nearer or more distant, about a centre. How he did it in the time, almost single-handed, but for the carpenter staff, I cannot imagine, though feats of the same kind are performed habitually overnight in auction-rooms such as Christie's; which, by the way, preserves the perfect setting of a rectangle with corners cut off, so as to provide secondary 'centres,' and the old-fashioned and effective lantern roof. Once we had two such rooms at the National Gallery, for English and Dutch pictures, and not too large: they have been swept away and in their place we have halls. where pictures are lost, or deplorable experiments

like the new Duveen Room at Trafalgar Square, gloomy beyond words, and the sort of railway-shed at the Tate Gallery, dismal beyond swearing, to satisfy those who cannot dodge their own reflections in the picture-glasses. A Gallery should not be a Clinic.

It is my faith that given any lot of pictures, reasonably accordant among themselves and not freakish in shape, along with walls which will allow them a not too cramped margin for spacing out, it is possible to reach an ideal disposition after trial, error and re-trial; but I must not dilate upon the topic here. Mr. Leigh Ashton and Mr. M. N. F. Stewart, of the Victoria and Albert Museum, with other helpers in selection and cataloguing, have been equally successful in arranging furniture and other works of art, making a delightful home-like or palace-like mixture, which might have been even more completely stirred, with advantage, and the limitation of range to English sources has defeated overcrowding. What a contrast to the faulty selection and wretched arrangement of the English Retrospective of some years back, to the terrible cramming of the Dutch, Italian and French Exhibitions, and the smothering with ceramic and other junk in the Chinese show!

What shall I say of the contents in brief? We have here a conspectus of grown-up European painting and its accompaniments in furnishing. Here are the Law and Gospel of Graphic Art, not in the shy, stiff charm of its Genesis and Exodus from January to April, or the full blossoming of its June, July and August, but in the Deuteronomy of its ordering, the ripe orchard of its September, and the decline to its Winter fogs and storms.

Velazquez stands for the Law; the full-grown art of contour, tone and colour, with due recession but no upsetting of the picture-flat. Here is the masterly precision of his youth with a beginner's failure to keep his linen-white within the scale; the Duke of Wellington's portrait of his maturity, perhaps of himself; and a last word in completion of round and full-blooded life in the uncourtly, intimate study of his studio-hand. Here he comes close to the New Testament. Over against Law is the Gospel of Rembrandt. Caravaggio had paved, or rather darkened, the place for him; that greatest among vulgarian sons of Painting, who, to vary in

the pronoun Dryden's deliciously decent phrase, 'oppressed his Mother in the Shade.' From that scandalous *stuprum* sprang the early Rembrandt and Velazquez of *The Topers*, to refine out into a noble lineage, Rembrandt the Magus following through fuliginous night a Star, to the stable where a Child was born; recreating the Golden Legend in the Ghetto of Amsterdam, and vignetting upon age-acquainted features the stealing in and out of revealing light, till, in the *Van Tromp* and his like, the Last Trump of Revelation sounded before the dissolution *in favillo* of a crumbling Earth and an ascent into the upper Heaven of pictorial vision.

El Greco, they say, is the painter of Apocalypse; but do those convulsive squiggles of form and that raw quinine of colour really open the Everlasting Doors? Better the celestial-infernal flames that leap and smoulder above and about a Count Orgaz and others of his tribe.

Outside of the Bible are the other Dutch, who in an age when the Church was all things to all women of the harlot kind in its 'Counter-Reformation,' that shop-walker's clearance sale of sacred remnants, carried the art away into the honesty of quiet kitchen, roaring tavern, exquisite bourgeois sitting-room with musical or conversational fillings, in a squareness and stillness well immured against the rampagings of the Baroque.

Outside, also, the Classic Dreamers, Claude and Poussin, in vales of Arcady or strictly ordered pageants of heroic and hieratic heathen or Christendom.

Between the Law and the Gospel were no Prophets, only monsters of the deeps and heights, 'sea-shouldering whales,' wallowing and spouting and curving into diagonal excursions of perspective flight. Of them Rubens, chief in those ways of God. W. P. Ker quoted Job upon Leviathan about Dean Swift; 'He maketh the deep to boil as doth a pot; by his neesings a light doth shine.' Such was the turbulence and vast splutter that came out of the Sistine into a congregation of figures mounting, swooping, sprawling in the upper air of Church and palace ceilings.

Bernini is the last word of this rampage, his common soul, but enormous afflatus, bearing him up, like a dirty sheet, torn from its pegs in a back-garden, to flaunt in the empyrean.

Little of such fine monstering [*sic*] is here: the English sobriety was against them which kept our painters stiff and 'primitive' till Dobson stood up to Vandyke. Bernini himself is here restrained by his architectural sense, the better part of him. On the English, and on much more in single pieces, I am bidden by Time to be quiet; but I am happy in being able to refer my readers to a singularly just review of the painting in the current number of Mr. Tilney's little periodical, *Art and Reason*, one which devotes itself habitually to a rather waspish pricking of Modern Art, but here has secured a critic who puts all that quietly in its place and the Ancients also, with pages which I should be proud to have signed. Here is obviously a painter, but also an excellent writer, at whose identity I can only make a doubtful guess. Another instalment is to follow, so that those two numbers are well worth their trifling cost.[1]

II. Trafalgar Square

But I must turn to another and more immediately pressing subject, that of a threat to Trafalgar Square, under cover of memorials to Admirals Jellicoe and Beatty. People who hanker after strict logic in our public places have the bee in their bonnet of making the Square entirely one of naval monuments, round about the Nelson column. They argue that some of the statues are bad as well as non-naval; they prate about the poor character of Landseer's lions, and some of them are uneasy about the Nelson column itself, as not of scale with the National Gallery. All that is fudge: the Gordon statue by Thornycroft is unusually good: the others innocuous, and George IV, denied a George V to balance him on the vacant pedestal opposite, waits for another George to fill it (at a date we pray may be far distant) and add to the line so delightfully begun by George III close by in Cockspur Street. Landseer's lions are by no means bad: they are not too cat-like and have monumental dignity. The police, it is true, are unhappy because people climb on them at Labour demonstrations, for which the Nelson plinth is so convenient a platform: and correspondents in the *Daily Telegraph* had stories about drunkards kissing them.

[1] Unfortunately my copy has been borrowed, and I am away from reference-works which would give the address of publication.

I have never been so drunk as to do that, but I say 'Hands Off' to anyone who would disturb a group which is the centre of West London for all its citizens and for visitors from the provinces and oversea, fondly familiar in presence, fondly recollected.

The proportion of the Column against the Gallery is so magnificently baroque, a huge uprush into space, that no question of discordance can arise, and there is a musical return to a more human scale in the beloved statue of Charles I. What is wrong is the disastrous South Africa House on the East, and the puddle of shabby self-assertions to the South.

Last, the Fountains. These are nicely adjusted, in their moderate height, to the elevation of the National Gallery, as seen from the level of the Square. There is nothing amiss with them except the polished red granite, a foul material, which ought to be replaced with the unpolished grey of the surrounds.

Now Sir Philip Sassoon, Parliamentary Head at the Office of Works, and charged with the difficult task of finding a place for memorials of the two Admirals, Jellicoe and Beatty, and also, no doubt, pardonably anxious to make a splash in his new office, has decided that fountains are the thing to make a splash with, and has cast his eye on those very quietly splashing jets. We hear vaguely of something to rise out of each of those basins from the design of Sir Edwin Lutyens. Sir Edwin is an architect whose genius we all admire; but in this instance he must have gone badly astray, distracted by the absorbing task of his huge Liverpool Cathedral and other projects.

Well then: if this plan is insufferable, what is to be done? I have suggested what I think is the perfect solution, in an article for the *Manchester Guardian*,[2] which has received support in the *Daily Telegraph* and elsewhere. Unfortunately, the photograph accompanying the article was not explanatory, and I take this opportunity of rendering the scheme more explicit by referring my readers to the photographic elevation of the Admiralty Screen in Whitehall which accompanied the *Daily Telegraph's* paragraph, with crosses to mark the place for effigies of our two great administrative and fighting Admirals in the Great War.

[2] 'London Monuments: their Siting and Re-siting.'

Island sites for statues are becoming scarce, and are undesirable for contemplation in the huge traffic of our streets. No one wants to see the back of a portrait statue, though it is a source of anxious thought to the sculptor. The right place for statues is against a wall or, much better still, in *niches*. In these the effigy will not, naturally, be a free-standing statue, but one in relief, low or high. Those niches on the charming screen of the Brothers Adam complain for statues, at least the central one of three on either side. Could any place be more appropriate? The figures would be 'engaged,' as they say of columns—*i.e.*, the bodies would be in half-relief, and they should be by preference in carved and painted wood, something like old ships' figureheads in technique, though not in form. The difficulty would be to find a man capable of the work, but I believe he could be found, and the result would be a completion of the architects' design, and honour at the Gate of Admiralty for two sons of its mighty line. Surely the Fine Arts Commission will help to persuade Sir Philip, if my words are unavailing, not to forfeit so fine a chance of distinction for himself also in his Sea-change from the Air. But whatever may be done about the Admirals, I warn any tamperers with fountains or statues round about the mast-headed hero that they will be in for a Battle of Trafalgar Square even more determined than that of Waterloo Bridge, since there is no traffic question to confuse the issues and that this time there will be no defeat for the defenders.

D. S. MacColl.

'HORIZONS OF IMMORTALITY'[1]

By Edith Lyttelton

In case any reader of *The Nineteenth Century* has not come across this book or heard any discussion about it—though I may say, in passing, that there is a great deal—I had better describe shortly its curious nature.

There are three personalities concerned whose names are given, and there are others who are alluded to but not described. The three are Baron Palmstierna, still Swedish Minister at the Court of St. James's, but just about to retire; Madame Adila Fachiri, the famous violinist, and her no less famous sister, Miss Jelly d'Aranyi. Adila Fachiri has faculty for the automatic reproduction of words and thoughts. Her method is the well-known one of spreading out the letters of the alphabet and then using a pointer—in this case a tumbler—with her hand placed lightly upon it; the tumbler then moves, often with extreme rapidity, from one letter to another and gradually spells out sentences even when the sequence of the letters is a random one. There are many automatic mechanisms of this kind, used by those who seem to have a gift for operating them. Planchette, for instance, is a heart-shaped piece of thin wood on wheels, which works in the same way as the tumbler, running about the board in a frisky manner, and so spelling out messages which vary, no doubt, with the attitude of those whose hands are lightly poised on it. Then there is table-tilting, automatic and inspirational writing, mind-picturing, and many other automatic and semi-automatic mechanisms that seem to release thoughts, ideas, wishes, which cannot, or do not, find expression in normal ways. The claim is constantly made by automatists that their communications come from discarnate

[1] *Horizons of Immortality*, by Erik Palmstierna (Constable, 10*s* 6*d*. net)

minds, moving in another field of existence, and should therefore be treated with awe and reverence. Anyone who has studied these matters at all, knows that this claim cannot be accepted without serious reservation and examination in each separate case, and must be rejected if it is made indiscriminately for all such supernormal manifestations. One need not hesitate to say that almost all the 'communications' published as emanating from a spiritual world have no more and no less importance than communications of the thoughts of people living in the same moment of time as ourselves. The results of any 'communications' obtained by supernormal methods must be judged first on their content, and not accepted as supernormal because of their origin. When a table raps out the information that Socrates is present and proceeds to ask a question in the well-known manner which may be interesting or uninteresting, it is entirely relevant to remember that his arguments are preserved and published, even though the automatist may not have read them. Nothing seems more certain than that ideas jump from one brain to another with startling rapidity; the dramatisation of such communications is, however, perplexing, and it can easily be imagined that, where personal emotions or desires are concerned, the fatal trick of dramatisation may lead to all kinds of fantasies—puerile, sentimental, dangerous, even elevated.

If this were the beginning and end of the matter, it would be easy to dismiss the whole question by saying that these supernormal practices are nothing more than mechanisms for bringing to expression the hidden and inarticulate thoughts, emotions and desires of a human being, and ignore, as a tiresome trick, the habit of dramatisation. But the matter does not end there. The simplest way to affirm that there is a mystery involved is to state the indubitable fact that there are many examples of information conveyed which was unknown to any living being. I could give many instances, but this article is an attempt to judge of one particular book, and not a treatise on the subject; therefore I refrain.

The whole business, even if the above statement in its most inclusive form be accepted, is extremely complicated and stiff with complexity. Where does infiltration from another mind begin or end? New ideas constantly enter the consciousness of men; are they always generated by some

human brain, or are they sometimes merely received? May not the general process of thought be a combination of both?

It is here that inquiry into the source of any communication becomes of first-rate importance. So long as a human source can be demonstrated—however strange the method by which the thought is expressed—so long should the idea of an extra-human source be rejected. Another aspect must also be considered. Even when the human source of part of a supernormally acquired message can be traced, there is still the possibility of a mixture. How are we to disentangle the elements and decide what are the proportions in which the normal processes of the brain involved have been mixed with supernormal processes? It is probable that all so-called communications of this nature are the result of a combination exceedingly difficult to unravel, even when only living minds are implicated: naturally, if it is a question of elements from an unknown and invisible world, the difficulty is immeasurably increased.

It is the possibility of infiltration from a discarnate mind which lends immense interest to the subject, and the evidence for this action is considerable. Many questions spring into being. How far is what we call genius the result of impressions from another world? Is inspiration a more frequent phenomenon than is supposed? Is the inward voice—a common enough experience of mystics and others—sometimes the voice of a discarnate being, or perhaps the method by which knowledge gleaned from a region beyond human reach is conveyed to the ordinary consciousness?

Serious students of these automatic processes have in the main concentrated on results that seem to offer proofs of the identity of discarnate communicators. The great amount of evidential material is largely unknown and unrealised by the general public, and there are many reasons for this. First, no one case or one message can possibly provide sufficient evidence, and the task of collecting many of them is long and arduous: further, some of the evidence is recondite and difficult, as anyone who has knowledge of what are called cross-correspondences will agree; and perhaps most serious of all is the scattered and sporadic nature of this mass of evidence, which is not held together and regimented, as ... sciences, by well-supported theories based on facts.

understand that in the near future a series of small popular books will be published by G. Bell & Sons in an attempt to assemble some of the evidence for identity in communicators, and for survival, hidden in the volumes of the *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research.* These contain records of numberless investigations, experiments and speculations, apparently so disconnected, and sometimes contradictory, that a collation of them in a condensed and readable form is urgently needed. In this way much evidence may be made accessible.

Horizons of Immortality makes no such attempt to prove the identity of its group—if it be a group—of communicators. It records the messages, and no doubt Baron Palmstierna has edited them in the sense of arranging these scripts in categories and subjects. Dates are not given, and the sequences are probably a matter of selection. The command of the communicators not to search for proofs of identity and authenticity is expressly stated. and the claim is made that these communications must stand or fall on their inherent meaning and influence. This method of presentation is far more sensible than others have been which claim the direction and guidance of some well-known personality, and ask for consideration on that plea.

The messages in this book should be judged just as the thoughts of any other writers who have not employed automatic means of expression.

In this spirit, therefore, we must approach the actual messages and see what we can make of them. This is no easy task, for they are not entirely consistent with each other. Too much can be made of these discrepancies, and they, if pointed out, need not detract from the value of much that has been transmitted. After all, the teachings of the Bible both in the Old and New Testament are not always consistent with each other. To say this is, naturally, not to assert that these messages or utterances come to us with the same authority as those of the Bible, but merely to point out that inner consistency is not the only test of value.

Roughly speaking, the message conveyed by these automatic devices is that the Supreme Being, God, does not concern Himself directly with evil—and suffering. Each human being has a spark from God's Being in his soul, and the aim

and endeavour of all should be for that spark to rejoin its source. Nothing can ultimately destroy it; it always has been, is, and will be, for it is part of the great Light and Breath which is God. But the low conditions of Earth, the power of Evil, the blindness and indifference of Man, even more than his fears and his ignorance, often cut him off from the source of his spiritual life. Christ, being one of the spirits within that source and therefore near to God, desired to bring the knowledge of their divine origin to men and convince them that they are all the sons of God.

Here we must note the first inconsistency. If the Great God who sent out the sparks which afterwards left the source of their being is stated to be aware of their distant state and to desire and intend their ultimate return, how can He be declared to be unaware of the existence of evil or of suffering? He may be beyond it, above it, He may not feel it, but He must be aware. This doctrine is perhaps not very far removed from that of the Christian Scientist's—namely, that evil is an illusion and non-existent—and it is supplemented by a view of Christ's mission which is firmly expressed. The following 'messages' contain the essence of this teaching:

> That Christ is the Son of God, we have repeatedly told you, but we wish to make it clear that He is not more so than all souls or earth. . . . Jesus knew not of evil before coming to earth and hau no discussion with the Great One in a sense you imagine. But H was too swift in His acts and descended too early and therefore H had to suffer, as—once you descend—you cannot avoid suffering Yes, He did come to see the world of sinners, though He himsel knew not of sin. He has now joined the Circle of God and He i one with the Great One, but His waves of influence will go on an on in the universe as long as it is needed. This is what is difficu for you to grasp. [p. 141]
>
> God knew that mankind was not asking for Him wholly an that if Christ came down He would have to go through some of th states of man. This is the only reason why we said 'against H Father's Will.' No one said He sinned. An act under the impul of love and help can never be looked upon as sin. It can be unwi to take a premature action and that is what happened and therefo we say He came down against His Father's wishes. The on mistake—if you can talk of a mistake—He did, was the impulse giving light to mankind without possessing that wisdom whi

sadness or misery, but His all-penetrating light and His omnipotent wiseness knows exactly when men are ready to love implicitly. . . . It is not in reality Christ's crucification [*sic*] or His resurrection, these do and have happened to others, it is His love which resembles most the love of God, which He left behind to mankind in ever-growing waves of circles, that is helping humans and bettering them daily. [p. 145]

We told you that very high up evil is unknown, and so it is, but remember Christ came down to earth and mixed with evil and that on purpose, so as to understand what evil is, how it works and how it is best to purify the fallen, that is to say mankind. [p. 146]

The problem of the existence of evil is, of course, not solved by the statement that God is not aware of it, any more than by the familiar but shallow argument that it is through the existence of evil that we realise the existence of good. Much time is spent by the communicators on combating this latter idea, which, however, has never seemed a solution of the mystery of good and evil. The messages courageously come down on the assertion that there are actual evil forces combating good forces, and, if I understand the teaching aright, that God, while not aware of evil—as is asserted over and over again—is yet certain to overcome it and welcome back into the circle of His light and love the spirits who have turned away and lost themselves.

The messages on the origin and force of evil are the least interesting of any in the book; and the only new element brought into the ancient parable of the struggle between Satan and God is that God is unaware of Satan. This statement really only serves to deepen the mystery, which remains, as before, one of the elements in our universe whose origin we have to ignore because we cannot apprehend it. One surmises that the great Miltonic drama is the origin of the communication. The form of the myth given is that one of God's messengers looked too long into the light which is God, and then desired to be God himself. This idea has run through countless explanations and images of the power of evil. Putting aside, then, the question of the origin of evil, the messages state quite definitely that evil spirits exist—an uncomfortable idea. But if we believe that spirits survive the death of the body, those that have worked evil in the flesh may still work evil when released from it, although one may

hope that much of evil dies with the matter which encases spirit.

The other set of messages, which are more stimulating, concern the ministrations of the messengers, who, according to the book, are what we loosely think of as archangels. Even here there is some contradiction, for we are told first that

> The Great One gets all information concerning man from the highest messengers and leaves the guiding of souls to them. [p. 159]

And a little later:

> Messengers are those who create on earth a new view, new emotions which come to them from above and which none of them denied. Works, acts, resulting from intense use of the brain-system always under control, is not named messenger's work. [p. 161]

We are also told 'there are no single messengers working on earth now, but there is a vast number of very high souls about.'

> Make it clear that all great achievements are decided above and conveyed to those we call messengers, viz., souls with the highest principles, specially sent down to communicate or create great examples from the highest spheres. You call them geniuses, a very inadequate expression, so easily misused. It is nothing of the kind. A genius can be given to the highest interpretative person, but that has nothing to do with what we call a messenger. It is a great achievement to be able to interpret great works, but the actual birth of great works or ideas comes from souls sent directly to earth for the purpose of giving a taste of the realm of perfect beauty. . . . [p. 162]
>
> Inspiration from God to men is sent through the spirits from the higher regions. We receive them and send them to you. . . . Our essential duty is to fill you with continual and fresh inspiration, sent to us by higher powers. . . . When Swedenborg talks as if angels—or what we call spirits—would not know of conditions of earth, he is wrong. [p. 184]

The whole teaching about messengers and spirits is deeply interesting, whether accepted or not. It is an amplification of much that many religions have been aware of as a hierarchy of beings, some of whom work on mankind. I think I may have quoted enough to show the general nature of these

teachings on the moral side. A few words must be given to the messages about waves, because they are the kernel of the whole.

On p. 245 these words are quoted as a message:

The organs of the body are nothing more or less than the instrument for the feelings of your soul to pass through your whole body.

The following is evidently a reply to some question:

Here thought can be seen, so when you come to us, you will be able to see anyone you wish and in a magnificent light. On earth some of you call it 'astral.' The ether is a chemical substance. The spirit bodies are partly woven from ether, but for those who go higher ether is not necessary. You often wonder if one has a *body up here; . . . we have a body up here, but not from flesh* which is material, but is a body of light in waves and in eternal harmony with the spirit which makes it work, and not like on earth where the body makes or prevents the working of the soul.

A few words must be added about the description given in these communications of how the influences from another world of being reach us:

The whole real existence is living by waves. The subtle invisible work of the wave system cannot yet be understood by mankind. The thought creates waves. Every emotion has its circular wave. [p. 167]

After some description of these waves the messages state:

We shoot out waves from ourselves . . . You receive waves which influence you from the world of the spirits; . . . the waves we speak of cannot be registered by machines and differ from such waves. They are spiritual and find contact with the spiritually sensitive.

There is not space to quote more from the chapter called 'The Life of Spirits'; briefly, we learn that 'Spirits cannot at once reach the highest spheres. They must learn a lot before that.' This sounds like common sense. After several more remarks of this kind, the following information is given:

Blue is the colour of the first stages of the spirits. Beyond that you get other colours. It is what you would call a permanent

discharge of electricity, though for us it is a different condition and not explicable in words. . . . The blue you see does not actually represent the spirits, just like the rays of the sun are not actually the sun itself but shoot out from it. Exactly the same happens with the discharge of spirits. What you see is the coloured rays or carpet of the spirits. The spirits of the blue spheres are the ones nearest earth. [p. 190]

Now, these are empirical statements, and we are free to believe them or not as we like, for there is no claim to authority and no attempt to impose identity by evidential matter in these communications. Some of the statements will find an echo in certain individuals who have experienced vision of blue lights, and white light of a blinding and dazzling intensity. These experiences are subjective: we can only accept statements about such impressions as being sincere, even if we feel them to be allied to illusion.

In conclusion, let me say that one of the interesting features of this book is the evidence that acute and far-reaching questions were put by those who were receiving and recording the messages. Here is no uncritical belief or docile acceptance of authority.

I cannot conclude without a short summary of two very curious and interesting cases. Baron Palmstierna, no doubt bearing in mind the direct command given in one of the messages (on p. 345) that evidential details were not to be sought or stressed, places these incidents at the end of his book, and does not on their account claim a special authenticity for his statements. This, as has already been said, was wise; nevertheless, it is impossible to overlook them in any account of the book.

In March 1933 (p. 351) a communication stated that Robert Schumann wished Miss Jelly d'Aranyi to play a posthumous work of his for the violin. She knew nothing about such a work. She made unsuccessful inquiries, and after two weeks was advised by the communicator, announced as Schumann himself, to apply to Sir Donald Tovey. She therefore wrote to him. The reader must follow for himself the repeated efforts through messages to urge the somewhat unwilling violinist to find the concerto, and subsequently when one copy had been found, to search for the right one This was in 1934. It was not till February 1937 that the righ

copy was at last procured. It is announced that Miss d'Aranyi will perform the work sometime this spring. There are some further points—which, I have been told, cannot yet be given to the public—that also point to the intervention of Schumann himself.

The other case of the Bach sonata seems to me quite as inexplicable and interesting.

Miss Jelly d'Aranyi was practising the Sonata in E Minor by Bach, using David's edition of the work. The first movement was marked 'allegro.' Quite spontaneously a message was received telling her to play

> that prelude very slowly Imagine or rather hear it in octaves, then you will get that majestic sound Bach wishes for it, like a Cathedral with immense width and the columns hammered out one by one. Space would become telescoped if speed is used. The whole of the prelude must sound heavy and supernatural. [p. 347]

There were other instructions, notably (p. 343) about 'a low tremolo fitting with or in the harmony' and suggestions for getting the right *tempo*. As these instructions did not tally with the edition by David, Miss d'Aranyi was of course uncertain. Other requests to consult the original work were made, and after more than one failure she at last succeeded. She then found that there was no indication as to *tempo* in the first movement, so that David's *Allegro* could not be accepted as authentic. Further, the 'low tremolo' had been changed to a single note as the editor said Bach could not have meant the other. Apparently an adherence to the original version prevents the prelude being played fast.

Of course, it may be said that unconsciously the sister, Madame Fachiri, or Miss Jelly d'Aranyi herself, might have a notion that the prelude would be better played slow, but she had never seen the original copy. In order to explain this message as emanating from a living mind, one has to assume that an elaborate search was unconsciously staged and the instructions as to *tempo*, etc., dramatised. Somehow this does not seem a convincing explanation.

It is difficult summarily to dismiss the two cases described above, which seem to give evidence of the survival of certain personalities. In a dim way many people are prepared to believe in survival; when it comes to direct teaching about

another world which there is no means of testing, the situation is different. If any idea or thought is based on what is believed to be divine authority or an older legend, myth or vision, then it is stated that there is nothing here but the clothing of memory or suggestion. If, on the other hand, any idea or statement is new, then complete proof of its truth, or at least the possibility of its truth, is demanded.

We may welcome this book without necessarily agreeing that it is a direct and authoritative revelation, because it is serious and is stimulating to thought and wonder. In this age there is a widespread dissatisfaction with doctrinal precepts, and a sense that although the direct teaching of Jesus Christ may be truly inspired, yet it has been so overlaid with ritual, legend and fantasy, that a whole-hearted uncritical acceptance of the New Testament becomes impossible to many minds, especially among the young. I heard a great and well-known divine declare the other day that some years ago he had come gradually to feel that the evidence in the Bible for the resurrection, and therefore for immortality, was weak, a conclusion which greatly disturbed him. He had then begun to study writings on psychical matters, and especially the *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*, and the evidence he found there for communication with the dead, and for happenings similar in kind to Christ's miracles and to His appearances after death, removed his doubts completely. He was thus able to go back to the teaching of the Bible with renewed reverence.

Something of this sort is happening to many people. The more evidence that can be accumulated of events demonstrating the existence of extra-sensory powers in human beings, of the possibility of a portion of man's mind reaching out beyond his body, tentatively searching for contact with another kind of life, the greater will be the response to al spiritual influence.

The whole truth is probably beyond our grasp. But we are still learning, and no religion should be static. We canno know. We can only see through a glass darkly. Every nov and again gleams of light seem to cross the glass. This boo may well be one of them.

EDITH LYTTELTON.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Augustus, by John Buchan (Hodder and Stoughton, 21*s*.).

John Buchan is certainly one of the most versatile writers of the day. History, modern and ancient, Scotland in all its aspects, biography, fiction, 'thrillers,' ghost stories, in all these literary forms he has indulged, yet he is distinguished in all and is superficial in none.

In the present volume he shows himself a profound student of Roman history, for he has given us far more than a biography of the founder of the Roman Empire. In his brilliant style he has set before us the transformation of Rome from a city republic, vigorous and splendid, expanding and conquering in all directions, but still spiritually a city-state, into a vast world-embracing empire. This implied a radical change in the Constitution and in the methods of government. Augustus did not set out deliberately to effect these changes; his own predilections were conservative and Republican, and he would have liked to return to the old system. But he was no doctrinaire theorist, and he soon realised that the long civil wars had dealt a death-blow to the 'good old days.'

What Rome and Italy needed first and foremost was a restoration, not of past systems, but of law and order. This could not be effected democratically by the people—'for a mob,' as Buchan says, 'cannot govern'—nor by the Senate, which had proved incompetent and could not hold the soldiers' loyalty. 'Only a man could meet the need, a man who held the undivided allegiance of an army, and that the only army.' Thus Rome developed first into a nation, and then into an empire, almost without realising it and without any imperial plan. Under the new conditions the old Constitution had become unworkable. Julius Cæsar had thought of decentralising, of making Rome only the greatest of many autonomous cities with citizenship available for all who desired

it. He died before his scheme could materialise, and his successor—a successor by adoption to a position of great power, but not yet defined by law—had great doubts as to its possibilities. The author attributes Augustus's practical spirit to his bourgeois business origins, and that spirit showed him the way to solve the problem. He was no doctrinaire and knew how to adapt his policy to the necessities of the time. He realised the great importance of the army and the value of military conquests, but he was not predominantly a soldier and was not inspired by military considerations alone, and in this he showed his greatness as compared with other founders of empires who have been soldiers first and foremost. That is why his structure lasted as long as it did.

John Buchan guides us with admirable skill through the intricacies of Augustus's character and policies, his relations with Mark Antony, developing from collaboration, through suspicion and rivalry, to open hostility, and ending with Actium and the suicide of Antony, the second-rate man failing when offered a first-rate destiny.

Augustus took part in the proscriptions of the year 43 B.C., and this was the darkest stain upon his record. Buchan attributes it to his character, 'which had in it strange depths of good and evil,' but perhaps the explanation is that even to the best of the Romans of that age such deeds, if regarded as politically necessary, were not repugnant. Augustus had Cleopatra's sons put to death, as a further and last act of political violence, but after his assumption to supreme power he never again committed any other deed of the kind, and was justly regarded as one of the most humane and fair-minded of all the emperors.

The most valuable part of the book is the account of the achievements of Augustus. He not only created for himsel and his successors a recognised legal position as Princeps legal through innumerable legal quibbles and compromises but he reconstructed Rome materially and spiritually, settle his veterans on the land of Italy without confiscations, firml established Roman rule over his far-flung empire, created a efficient bureaucracy and army which was not only efficien but loyal and obedient, exalted the importance of the famil and of religion, as the twin bases of true civilisation, an above all, saved the world from disintegration—restorin

peace, prosperity and happiness to his peoples, conferring on them the '*immensa Romanae pacis majestas.*' He put down banditry and piracy, built marvellous roads and created a network of communications more perfect and rapid than any which existed before or since until the age of steam. In many parts of the Near East a standard of security and comfort was attained which is not reached to-day.

The Barbarian invasions were, it is true, already menacing the safety of the frontiers, and the destruction of Varus's legions in the sinister forest lands beyond the Rhine occurred in Augustus's lifetime, harbingers of far worse evils in days to come. But his spiritual structure was long to outlast his material Empire, and the ideas inspiring it were to influence the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and our own times. His institutions provided the basis of the Roman Church, destined to spread over a far wider world than he had dreamed of. The system of law, of which he was neither the founder—for it dates from Republican times—nor the layer of the coping-stone, for that honour was to be Justinian's, but whose framework he created, has endowed the world with that greatest of gifts, respect for the law. That system, those institutions, and that respect are still the foundations of the legal order of all the most civilised countries to-day, even of those who have not accepted the whole body of Roman law.

This year the Augustan bimillenary is being celebrated in Rome with an exhibition of astounding interest. It does far more than commemorate Augustus the man and the Princeps; it shows us the evolution of Rome from the mysterious Etruscan age to the triumph of Christianity, and is the glorification of that Rome which was raised from its humbler origins to world domination, and established as an example to all future ages of that city,

'*cui par est nihil et nihil secundum.*'[1]

LUIGI VILLARI.

Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, by Professor Yoshi S. Kuno: Vol. I., University of California Press (Cambridge University Press, 1937, 18*s*.).

Japan drives farther and farther into the heart of China.

[1] Martial, *Epigr*. XII., 8

Whatever the outcome of a war between two peoples of Asiatic stock, or the value of speculations based on preconceived doctrines and hopes, this first instalment of Professor Kuno's study of Japanese expansionist tendencies will help us to understand the psychological background of the conflict. The average Englishman's knowledge of Japanese history contrasts painfully with the familiarity of many Japanese with the traditions and manners of our own nation. Professor Kuno's work will help us to remedy that deficiency by showing the rhythmic expansion and retraction which is such a clear feature of Japanese history. Long residence in the United States as professor at California University has enabled the author to achieve an independence of vision fairly in contrast with the attitude of many Japanese historians, especially with regard to the earlier period. From the tangled documents of a time when Japan and China used different calendars, and when tradition mingled fact with myth, he has produced an extremely interesting account of the relations between Japan, Korea and China. If there is an occasional appearance of repetition, it is for the reason that pains have been taken to avoid overburdening the reader with a mass of names, to give first importance to broad demographical movements, and to emphasise the conclusions to be drawn from them. The generous appendices include many interesting and, to Western eyes, quaint documents concerning the diplomatic relations between the Chinese Emperor and his tributary States.

Over a period of some 2000 years Japan has repeatedly flooded over Eastern Asia and then receded. Each wave of expansion has at first been attended by military success; soon the wave has expended itself and a sort of material and moral exhaustion has set in, compelling withdrawal. The movements are not always well defined. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Chinese of the maritime provinces are constantly subject to the depredations of Japanese pirate bands, which evolve the perfect gangster technique of showing a desire for normal trade when confronted by superior forces, and, when themselves superior, displaying their rapacity and valour to the full. At another time the desire for expansion is formulated into a plan of conquest such as the grandiose but unsuccessful scheme contrived by Hideyoshi in the

sixteenth century for the systematic subjugation of the world.

We are shown in the book the great similarity between the stage setting of the present struggle and that of the imperialist expeditions of the *Samurai*. The trade problem, the alternate desire for and the shunning of foreign cultural influences, even the population question, bear striking resemblance to modern Pacific problems. For instance:

> As a result of the long peaceful administration of the Emperor Seimu the Empire was firmly established and the national wealth and strength had been greatly augmented. Therefore . . . Japan was both militarily and financially strong enough to proceed with a new national undertaking. The need was awaiting the opportunity. Because of the remarkable increase of the population national expansion seemed imperative.

The similarity between the course of Sino-Japanese relations many years ago and the emergence to-day of Japan as a challenge to European ascendancy in the East is striking. A Chinese emperor, looking down haughtily from heaven, discovers 'the Barbarian People of the East.' The Japanese in turn decide that Chinese culture is a good thing. Whereupon they welcome it with the same eager appetite with which they have devoured Western scientific knowledge within the last seven decades. Having learnt all they can, having maintained friendly relations as far as they prove useful for the purposes of trade, they then remind their tutor—by force if necessary—that they will accept no dictation. Japan failed through lack of weight to smash the mediæval Chinese Empire; will the future record as unsuccessful her present efforts to create for herself a position in Asia which Western Powers would not long ago have desired for themselves?

Japan has always presented to the world an appearance of national unity which has usually been belied by protracted feudal wars such as those which ravaged the islands before the firm establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate, and more recently by the struggles between army and navy and between both and the Diet. The Japanese are a people extremely liable to internal dissension, but in the face of invasion, or anything that can be construed as a national emergency, these quarrels are laid aside. So we read that at the time of the attempted invasion of Japan by the great

Kublai Khan in the thirteenth century the Japanese as one man flung defiance in his face, lined the coasts with protecting walls, and fitted out fleets against him. Professor Kuno's comment on the failure of this expedition has a peculiar significance to-day:

> Ever since . . . it has been the national belief that Japan is a divinely protected nation, and that she can never be conquered by a foreign Power. So strongly are the people imbued with this faith that there is absolute national confidence in the ultimate success and justification of all her causes and claims in any dealings with foreign nations.

Concluding, he points out what the West has found convenient to forget, that

> the Sino-Japanese war, which was a one-sided struggle ending in complete victory for Japan, without the loss of a single battle either on land or on sea, encouraged the young Japanese to believe that they were destined to finish the uncompleted work of Hideyoshi. It may even be said that the Seven Years' War [Hideyoshi's great campaign] was the first chapter in the national expansion of Japan that began toward the close of the nineteenth century.

There are those whose wishes have fathered the conviction that Japan is bluffing, that her social system is fundamentally unstable, and that her part in the present struggle has only the support of a few militarists. To those who hold this opinion this study should be of interest.

W. DROWER.

Report on British Social Services, PEP: June 1937 (10*s.* 6*d.*, cloth bound; 7*s.* 6*d.*, paper board cover, postage 6*d.* extra).

Since the publication of its first Report (on the British Iron and Steel Industry) the research work of Political and Economic Planning has attracted growing interest. Here we have indeed a body of young and ambitious economists approaching problems of wide importance with unbiassed minds and unburdened by exaggerated theoretical arguments which, when questions of urgent social importance are at stake, are apt to hamper rather than to facilitate decisions and action. The latest Report is a further example of this body's diligence and ability. It sets out to give a bird's-eye

view of the scope and administration of existing social services in Great Britain; it shows clearly what are their relations to each other and what problems are faced by each. After dealing with the historical development of what in general is called 'social reform,' the Report draws the distinction between: (1) 'Constructive Community Services,' such as Public Education, Public Medical Service, the Welfare of the Blind, the Mental Health Services, Employment Services; (2) 'The Social Insurance'; and (3) 'The Social Assistance Services,' as Non-Contributory Old Age Pensions, Unemployment Assistance, and Public Assistance. It is to be regretted that, as in other social surveys, the important problems of death benefit, which play an important part in the social services of other countries, has been ignored, as also under Public Assistance we find no mention of the 'pauper funeral.' On the other hand, the Report abounds in interesting critical remarks on many individual points and topics. Thus the Report, in dealing with unemployment insurance, complains very frankly of many evils, private and administrative. In certain areas, notably the Outer Hebrides and Highlands, amazingly high percentages of unemployment are recorded, ranging up to 60 per cent. or more of the insured population, many of whom have systematically acquired titles to benefit and have exploited them to the utmost permissible limit. Such persons often are not, never have been, and do not intend to be genuine industrial and distributive workers. If the State compels the spreading of risks it can hardly shirk the responsibility for ensuring that payments are only made in *bonâ fide* cases. Such criticism, in isolated instances, has apparently largely influenced the conclusions drawn at the end of the investigation. It appears to the authors of the Report, not to be a case for a Royal Commission on the Public Services, but rather for a Permanent Statutory Committee. Such a committee, in the view of the writers, would not be responsible for administration, but should be vested with sufficient authority to make far-reaching inquiries into every aspect of the administration and of the working of the Acts. It would, in fact, act as an advisory General Headquarters Staff, giving thought in the course of its work to the basic principles governing the relationships of the various public services, considering lines

for overhauling the administrative and financial structure of the services in order to secure more efficient as also more economic working, and drawing attention to the main anomalies and gaps to be dealt with. Since the Poor Law Commission reported in 1909 the whole face of British social service provision has changed; social expenditure has quadrupled, social insurances have been created, Local Government and the Poor Law have been considerably changed; there is the new 'special area' problem and the Unemployment Assistance Board. But a comprehensive inquiry with a view to discovering where the several schemes overlap conflict with each other or are deficient is lacking, inquiries having hitherto been concentrated mainly upon special problems. The proposals and suggestions made on this subject in the Report deserve the most careful consideration. It would, in our opinion, be incorrect to suggest that the existing deficiencies in the administration of the social services are due to lack of British administrative efficiency. It is only natural that in a country hitherto little accustomed to administrative interference the State is unable to overcome the initial difficulties at one stroke; the resultant defects ought not to discourage effort to develop to the full those public services which serve to protect the working man and his family against some of the risks and contingencies of his life. What is required is some machinery whereby defects can be swiftly discovered, the remedies prescribed and applied. By disclosing this need the authors of this Report have rendered a notable service to the State.

HERMANN LEVY.

The Mandæans of Iraq and Iran: their cults, customs, magic, legends and folk-lore, by Mrs. E. S. Drower (E. S. Stevens) (Clarendon Press, Oxford. London: Humphry Milford, 25*s*.).

This book, dedicated to Dr. Moses Gaster, is published with the assistance of the Royal Asiatic Society and the Hibbert Trustees. That is, in itself, sufficient testimony to its importance, and to the competence of the writer in this particular field. There are some thirty illustrative plates, some of which are of exceptional excellence; and the proof-

reading has been of the high standard of excellence which scholars have learned to associate with the Oxford Press.

The material which Mrs. Drower has collected, during a residence of nearly a decade in Iraq, is far fuller, far more carefully annotated by personal inquiry and observation, than any of her predecessors in this highly specialised and fascinating field.

The Mandæans, or Subba, of Iraq are mentioned thrice in the Qur'an, in conjunction with Jews and Christians, as people of a recognised religion: there were scholars among them, and sages. Their sacred writings, here for the first time fully analysed, suggest that their origins are older than Christianity and may well antedate Solomon's Temple. Their earliest origins were perhaps in Persia for, like Parsees, they lay their dead so that the head lies south, the feet north, and many of their funeral observances resemble those of the Parsees. They are few in number, not more, perhaps, than 5000, and all the evils of the West which have invaded Iraq—cinemas, cars, 'national' systems of education, 'national' military service and dress, and modern intolerance of all customs, observances and religions that are not those of the majority—are likely within a few generations to prove fatal to their continued existence.

Twentieth-century civilisation has no use for minorities: the fact that they are different from the rest seals their fate; the Parsees of Persia will one day follow them and, perhaps, the Copts.

Yet, in some respects at least, the Mandæan tradition, still alive in Iraq, is higher than any of the West, for 'they delight in Nature, as apart from man.' It is part of their religion to rejoice in the beauty of Nature—the sun, the moon and the stars, birds and flowers. They have joy in life and in marriage, and their views on priestly celibacy are those of lofty commonsense. 'All that the Spirit of Life sends is a good gift, to be used with praise: life is a pleasant thing and the earth a happy prison.' Death has no sting, for living and dead meet at the table of the ritual meal. The good Subbi erects no tombstone over the dead—'The body is dirt and rubbish once the soul has departed' (p. 184); but burial is ceremonious, and nothing is left undone that will show the honour due to the departed, and the funeral feast is elaborate, accom-

panied by traditional ritual, much of it clearly originating in Persia.

Of legends, magic and folk-lore, to which the writer is no stranger, she has much to say in this book which is new, and much that is of great interest to all those who value those traces of continuity in life and thought which Europe has done so much to destroy. Space forbids reference to this part of the book, but it will repay the most careful study by ethnologists and anthropologists the world over. The stories are echoes, or perhaps prototypes, of legends which are current in parts of India and of Africa, of Persia and of Arabia, for the Mandæans have lived long on and between the Two Rivers—the Euphrates and the Tigris—which saw more international traffic during the first two millennia before the Christian era than even the Nile. We congratulate Mrs. Drower on a great book, and her sponsors on their perspicacity in making publication possible in a form so attractive.

Charity Commissioners for England and Wales: 84th Report (for 1936) (Stationery Office, 1937, 4*d*. (Cmd. 5421)).

The following extract from the Report of this important office, whose powers might with advantage to the public be greatly enlarged, speaks for itself:

We think it proper to call attention to the harm done by people in prominent positions allowing themselves to be named as patrons of Charities without ascertaining that such Charities are properly conducted The Report made in June 1916 by the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Report made in 1927 by the Departmental Committee on the supervision of Charities both refer to this matter. In some cases brought to our notice only a very small proportion of the large sums collected from the public reach those for whose benefit the money is supposed to be raised.

ARNOLD WILSON.

WALKS AND TALKS

By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P.

I am often told by lawyers that the evils that arise from the admittedly chaotic state of English Statute Law are apparent rather than real for lawyers, and that the Courts can find their way through the maze without difficulty and might even be confused by a consolidating Act. The Report of the Inter-departmental Committee on the Rent Restriction Acts, published just before Christmas, tells a very different story:

> We have received numerous representations in favour of the consolidation of the various Rent Restrictions Acts from witnesses representative of all those who have to deal with the Acts, . . . which affect a very large number of people in a matter which is often of supreme importance to them. It is frequently essential for these people, who are almost exclusively members of the working classes, to obtain advice as to their position, but in the present confused state of the statutes it is often very difficult for them to obtain exact information on this point except at a price which they are not in a position to afford. . . .
>
> The present time is particularly opportune for consolidation. We know that the recommendation of the Marley Committee in favour of consolidation was not adopted by the Government of the day. We are, however, so impressed by the unhappy results of the present confusion that we cannot contemplate with equanimity the continuance of this state of affairs . . .

This is but an echo of the cry that goes up, *mutatis mutandis*, from every responsible person who has practical knowledge of the doubts, delays, and consequent losses entailed by the utter failure of the Joint Select Committee on Statute Law Consolidation, and of successive Parliaments to whom it reports, to keep the Statute-book up to date. A score of committees have urged consolidation and amendment of the law relating to particular subjects—the Industrial Assurance

Acts, for instance, which affect the rights of millions, the Allotment Acts, the Charities Law, and the Burial Acts. The reply is invariably the same—consolidation is highly technical, and those concerned are already overworked: amendments, however necessary, in the interests of clarity, may be controversial, and the parliamentary system, as now conducted, is a bottle-neck through which only very urgent legislation can pass. The remedy, to appoint more legislative draftsmen and to train them for their allotted task, is clear; the expense would be negligible in comparison with the losses now borne by the public.

How difficult the process of clarification has become is shown by the appointment of a Committee of twenty, including members of Parliament—Mr. Geoffrey Clarke, Mr. Ernest Evans, and Mr. Parkinson, representing the three parties—to consider how best the Highway Acts can be consolidated and codified with a minimum of amendment. A score of equally bad tangles await attention.

It is not a small matter that 'local and private Acts' of Parliament on the Statute-book for the last 150 years or so, numbering scores of thousands, have been catalogued, but not indexed. Most of them are out of print. No one except the local authority concerned can say whether all or any part of a given Act has been repealed by later legislation. Few county or borough councils have followed the example of Sheffield and obtained a consolidated Act embodying in a single document all their powers. There is no sort of uniformity: clauses with similar objects are differently worded, and the Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial Population, now sitting under the chairmanship of Sir Montague Barlow, was unable to obtain, at its first sitting, any clear statement as to the powers of local authorities.

'It is,' wrote T. H. Huxley in this Review for May 1890, 'unjust to require a crossing-sweeper to tell you the way: he has earned his copper if he has cleaned up your immediate path.' Any Government which would do what Huxley asked of his crossing-sweeper would be assured of the praise of posterity.

* * * * *

It was announced on January 5 that a National Institute of Economic and Social Research has been formed for the

investigation of the problems of contemporary human society in order to remedy the inadequacy of existing facilities for research in the social sciences, under the presidency of Sir Josiah Stamp and the chairmanship of Sir William Beveridge. The secretary and first director is Professor N. F. Hall, head of the Department of Political Economy in the University of London. The Institute is to be a national organisation to carry out independent economic research, with the object, it would appear, of providing those who now teach these subjects in our universities with reliable material and, in addition, to pursue its own researches, in subjects of national importance, in collaboration with similar foreign organisations. The news may be welcomed unreservedly. It is to be hoped, however, that the new Institute will not be dominated by professional economists, for, in the words of one of the greatest of them, Professor A. C. Pigon,[1]

> an economist, . . . as a more or less cloistered person, is worse qualified than many others who, maybe, have less knowledge of the relevant facts. A wide experience of men and of affairs and a strong 'feel' for what, with the human instruments available, will or will not work, are needed here. These the present writer, like most academic persons, does not possess; and, unlike some academic persons, he is aware that he does not possess them.

The word 'independent' in connexion with the policy of the Institute was doubtless intended to connote that it would not be subservient to any particular body of political dogma or to any commercial interest. That is as it should be, but Cavour's dictum that the essence of statesmanship consists in *le tact des choses possibles* is equally true of social science. It is true to-day, as Shelley wrote in 1821 in his *Defence of Poetry*, that

> We have more moral, political and historical wisdom than we know how to reduce into practice; we have more scientific and econonucal knowledge than can be accommodated to the just distribution of the produce which it multiplies. The poetry, in these systems of thought, is concealed by the accumulation of facts and calculating processes. There is no want of knowledge respecting what is wisest and best in morals, government and political economy, or at least what is wiser and better than what men now practise and endure. But we let 'I dare not' wait upon 'I would.' . . . We

[1] *Socialism versus Capitalism* (Macmillan, 4*s.* 6*d.*, 1937).

want the creative faculty to imagine that which we know : we want the generous impulse to act that which we imagine.

The concluding sentence, so long as the party political and parliamentary system as we know it endures, involves political action in order to secure the passage of legislation which, if it is to be of value, is of necessity controversial. It involves persistent efforts to instruct public opinion in order to prepare the ground for legislation. This, as the present writer knows by experience, is not easy for a member of Parliament: those who would ultimately benefit from legislation are not vocal; they seldom attend meetings and never write to the papers which they seldom read with attention. The few whose immediate interests seem to be threatened are vocal and well organised, and a member who presses in public the need for controversial legislation which is not included in the current party programme and is not immediately attractive or easy to explain finds that his chosen path, though it leads upwards, is stony.

Popular newspapers do not criticise vested interests which advertise largely. For one pound spent on research, ten pounds must be spent on propaganda in favour of the necessary legislative or social changes, if results are to be secured within a middle-aged man's lifetime.

* * * * *

The lofty shelves in the House of Commons are piled high with the unanimous reports of commissions and committees, consisting of able men and women who have given freely of their time and experience, but 'lack of parliamentary time,' or the absence of any strongly expressed public demand, have sufficed to prevent action. And since 1915 the evidence tendered to such committees has to a great extent been suppressed—*i.e.*, not printed, on grounds of economy—so the public, and subsequent investigators in the same or related lines of research, are unable to obtain access to invaluable material. Sometimes a typed copy is placed in the Library of the House of Commons. The evidence tendered to the Royal Commission on the Gresford Mining Disaster, in which some 260 lives were lost, covered 3000 pages; it was thus deposited, without an index. The lessons to be learned were lost except so far as they were deduced by the writers of the Report.

The same procedure was adopted with the evidence given before the Royal Commission on Tyneside. Moreover, when evidence is printed it is sold at a prohibitive price by the Stationery Office, under the orders of the Treasury, in accordance, I believe, with the recommendation of a Parliamentary Committee, instead of at a standard rate per sixteen pages. The evidence given to the Cohen Committee on Industrial Assurance can be bought for £4—in loose parts, unbound. Yet we complain of the lack of information on social subjects!

It is to be hoped, too, that the new Institute will not neglect the study of Comparative Legislation. Apart from the bulky and often ill-digested reports of the I.L.O. there is no place in this country to which a student or professor can resort in order to discover the law of foreign countries, or even of the Dominions. On this subject, too, there has been no lack of committees or reports; but nothing has yet been done, for Lord Chancellors are or are reputed to be, busy men.

* * * * *

Having written these lines, I laid down my pen and went to one of the finest parts of North Hertfordshire to inspect three pairs of sixteenth-century cottages which had been condemned under a Slum Clearance Order and were scheduled for demolition. Each pair occupied a separate site upon a different road, and were in no way connected with each other. They were well placed and bore ancient names. They had been condemned because the former owner could not afford to put them in repair: they were let for 3*s.* a week each, a sum which did little more than cover rates and taxes and periodical structural repair. On the strength of a Slum Clearance Order the occupants had been rehoused in newly-built subsidised cottages. The old cottages had changed hands. The new owner wished to convert them into residential property; and was willing to spend money freely on them under an architect's advice. But the Demolition Order was apparently final, and there could be no reprieve. Those ancient timbers, still in perfect condition, must be thrown down; the old fireplaces smashed. The rural district council was sorry: the cottages were an asset to the beautiful village of which they were an integral part. They would have

gladly seen them reconditioned, but neither they, nor, it seems, the Minister of Health, had power to reconsider their decision. Thousands of such cases occur annually, including hundreds of dwellings which could be made fit for occupation. Old England is disappearing before our eyes, by Act of Parliament: new England will consist of council houses.

I walked on for ten or twelve miles, stopping twice to cal on constituents, and twice for light refreshment. A newly appointed vicar lamented the steady shrinkage of the village population. Though within thirty-five miles of London, it had shrunk by one-third since the beginning of the century and the number of children in the school was less by two thirds. Every social and educational activity was handicapped and a vicious circle created from which there could be no escape except by governmental intervention. The roads were incomparably better; there was a good village hall, and an excellent schoolmaster; housing was good, with water and electric light. But the migration to towns continued.

I called on a farmer, one of the best in the district—the tenant of a landowner who was able, and content, to invest fresh capital as necessary in new farm buildings and to obtain far less return on his money than banks or dairy companies for example, think necessary and reasonable. The farmer was thus able to invest his own capital in live-stock, machinery and labour—the last a big item, for it takes months to bring crops, and years to bring live-stock, to market, and labour must be paid weekly. The cost of imported foodstuffs was rising fast (as also, he gathered, the dividends of the great importing firms)—faster in proportion than the wholesale price of meat or milk, though there was a shortage of the latter.

The subsidy on lime and basic slag was good, but it had been swallowed up in increased prices charged. On balance things were no better for farming than in 1929: the emphasis on milk production had tended to unbalance production though the output on his own farm per acre was higher. Local councils selected good farming land for building purposes, instead of looking for land with low agricultural value and the new aerodromes had swallowed up some thousands of acres of first-class arable land. He was 'hanging on' to farming, but it was uphill work in comparison with the 'easy money' that some folk seemed to make in towns.

An old gamekeeper, with twenty years' service in the Army in many lands, kept me company for some miles. He had his own small-holding, and with his wife managed it so well that he had to buy few vegetables and not much fruit. He knew every field and wood and almost every family for miles round: he was a choirman and bellringer, a parish councillor, and unpaid agent for one of the smallest and best Approved Societies in England. His four children were grown-up and doing well; the girl was married to a butler and doing nicely. This was not his part of England; he came from Yorkshire and sheep was his line: he had been brought down here nearly twenty years ago, after the war, and was well content. But he did not like the way things were going: the best training for girls, the best preparation for marriage, was domestic service in a good family; they went into factories now, six miles or more a day each way on a bicycle, and Austrian maids were, to his knowledge, brought in to fill the gap. The drift of men to the towns ended too often at the labour exchange; cowmen, in particular, were hard to get: a cow was an animal one had to live with seven days a week, and regular milking meant a sixty-hour week, and 45*s*. a week, even with a cottage at 3*s*. a week, was not enough for men who could earn more than £3 a week for semi-skilled labour or laying water mains and electric cables or making aerodromes. Water and electric light were welcome till they had to be paid for, and the new water scheme had put a heavy burden on small ratepayers—for the rest of the lives of most of them

The land would not recover until the nation changed its mind: it was town-minded now, and that was all there was to be said.

* * * * *

The following announcement appeared in the *Court Circular* of November 1, 1933:—

The King has graciously signified his intention of offering each year a Gold and Silver Medal for poetry in the English language published in volume form within the Empire by British citizens.

The following Committee was appointed by the King to act as judges:

Mr. John Masefield (Poet Laureate), Chairman.
Mr. Laurence Binyon, C.H.
Mr. Walter de la Mare.

Professor Gilbert Murray, D.Litt., LL.D.
Mr. I. A. Richards, M.A.

A small sub-committee will be appointed abroad to recommen books from India, the Dominions and Colonies.

The medals will be awarded towards the end of each year fo works published during the preceding year. The first awards wi be made in December 1934, for works published during 1933.

The medals will be given either for a poet's first or secon volume of verse, or to a poet still under 35 years of age.

The Committee is empowered to withhold any recommendatio for the medals in any year in which they consider the work submitte is not of a sufficiently high standard.

Only works that have been published in volume form will b considered, and all communications relating to these medals shoul be addressed to the Poet Laureate.

There was no award of the Gold Medal for Decembe 1933. The first award was made in May 1935 (for 1934), th recipient being Mr. Lawrence Whistler (aged 22).

There was no award for 1935.

It was recently announced in the *Court Circular* that th King had presented Mr. W. H. Auden with the medal fo 1936; no reasoned statement was made with regard to th award, nor was it explained whether it was for his first or hi second volume of verse, or because he is still under 35.

The Silver Medal was never awarded and has bee abolished; on the other hand, if a medal is not awarded i any year, the Committee may now recommend two awards i the following year, provided that the average is not exceedec

The Committee has never announced how many con petitors submitted verse for adjudication from Great Britai or the Empire, nor have they explained why the Silver Med was abolished. They have not said by whom and to whor eligible volumes of poetry should be submitted; and it woul not be fair to assume that the Committee obtain for then selves and examine all eligible volumes printed in the Empir What might have been a matter of public significance ha never been more than one of private, almost personal, interes What was intended as a very interesting and encouragin step towards the recognition of what is, *pace* Rousseau, th most ancient, if not always the most respectable, of the art seems to have failed.

ARNOLD WILSON.

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER

1877 1938

Founded by JAMES KNOWLES.


1938 MARCH No. 733. Vol. CXXIII.

LONDON : CONSTABLE & CO., LTD., ORANGE STREET, LEICESTER SQUARE, W.C.2.

Registered for Canadian Magazine Post.

Price Three Shillings. *Annual Subscription (Home and Abroad)* 36/- *post free.*
U.S.A. and Canada, 75 cents. ,, ,, *U.S.A. and Canada* $8.75.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN



THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY *AND AFTER*

No. DCCXXXIII—March 1938

THE JEWISH PLIGHT IN EUROPE

I.

By Norman Bentwich

The Jewish problem is again forcing itself upon the attention of a world harassed by problems. The warning given recently in the House of Commons by Mr. George Lansbury about the plight of the Jews in Poland and South-Eastern Europe, and his suggestion that, unless something were done on a much larger scale to relieve it than has yet been attempted, the position would become desperate, were timely. A few days after he spoke, a new Government came into power in Rumania with an avowed anti-Semitic policy which threatens with ruin or expulsion a large part of the 900,000 Jews of that kingdom. What has happened since 1933 to the 500,000 Jews of Germany is dramatic; it attracted at first the attention of the world, and called forth the solidarity of the Jewish communities for a planned overseas emigration.

What is happening to the millions of Jews in Poland, Austria, Hungary, and Rumania is less dramatic, but more terrible; it has so far not attracted the serious attention of the general public, nor has it evoked in equal measure the solidarity of outside Jewry. The problem is that of over 5,000,000 men, women and children, full of energy and the will to live, intelligent and talented, who are not only denied the possibility of developing their capacities in their own country, but also increasingly deprived of the means of existence, and, in a narrowing world, denied the possibility of emigration. Of the 10,000,000 Jews in Europe, only 3,000,000, who are citizens of the Soviet Union, enjoy equality of opportunity, but without individual or religious freedom; and 1,000,000 in the Western democratic countries, who enjoy both that opportunity and individual and religious freedom, have a fair chance in life. Of the rest, over 3,000,000 are in Poland, nearly 1,000,000 in the kingdom of Greater Rumania, another 1,000,000 divided between a reduced Austria and a reduced Hungary, some 400,000 in Czechoslovakia—who are relatively well off—350,000 in Germany, and 250,000 between Latvia, Lithuania and Yugoslavia. They constitute an international social problem which cannot be solved by philanthropy alone, or by any efforts of the Jewish community alone, but requires the united efforts of the nations, such as was made by the States members of the League when 2,000,000 Greeks in 1922 were uprooted from the Ottoman Empire.

In Germany the destruction of the Jewish community by a thorough anti-Semitic policy has been carried out during the last four years, and has been declared to be a part of the present four years plan. The Jewish population of 510,000 in 1933 has declined by over 150,000, mainly through emigration, but partly through a declining birth rate and rising death rate. The Jew is already forced out of all public and liberal callings, and he is being rapidly squeezed out from every economic activity. As Mr. James McDonald, the former High Commissioner for the refugees from Germany, wrote two years ago when he laid down his office, 'It is being made increasingly difficult for Jews and non-Aryans in Germany to sustain life. Condemned to segregation within the four corners of a legal and social ghetto which has now closed upon them, they are increasingly prevented

from earning their living. In no field of economic activity is there any security whatsoever.' The pressure is constantly increased. Jewish merchants and industrialists are ousted in various ways. If a merchant is unwilling to give up his business voluntarily, he may be arrested on some charge or other, and detained in a prison or concentration camp until he acquiesces. If a Jewish manufacturer resists the demand to transfer his factory, he is refused supplies of the raw material which is controlled by the State administration.

Recently the representative Jewish authority in Germany made a moving appeal to the Governments of overseas countries to admit a larger number of useful immigrants by liberal interpretation of their immigration regulations, and to the German Government not to curtail further the possibilities of earning a living for the Jews who remain in Germany. Is it too much to hope that the appeal will be answered in the spirit in which it was made?

The cause of the plight of the Jews in Central and Eastern Europe goes far back in history. Persecution and expulsion from Western Europe in the time of the Crusades and the Black Death drove them eastwards to Poland, Lithuania and Hungary, where they were admitted as middlemen between the nobles and the serfs. They were protected by the Polish kings and granted a large measure of autonomy; but they were restricted in their callings, prohibited from holding land, and excluded from the craft-guilds. The principal congregation of Jews, however, between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries was in Poland. The partition of that kingdom between three States broke up the cohesion of the community, and led to the abolition of its communal and cultural autonomy. The largest part fell under the rule of Tsarist Russia, which, with a short interval of liberalism, maintained under the influence of the Orthodox Church a policy of ruthless oppression and rigid exclusion. The Jewish mass was congregated in what was called the Pale of Settlement, which was a portion of the empire comprising provinces of the old kingdom of Poland and of Lithuania and White Russia. They were still for the most part excluded from the soil and congested in the larger and smaller towns: the great majority were engaged in petty trading and in the secondary industries of tailoring and

cabinet-making. The communities which came under the rule of Austria and Prussia were better off, but were far from enjoying equal opportunity. While the door was opened to the liberal professions, and Jews with their keen intellect quickly rose to prominence as doctors, lawyers, writers, the mass of the people continued to be concentrated in the commercial and financial callings and in the secondary industries, and had a relatively small proportion working the land or engaged in heavy industries or the public services.

The war and the peace-making brought about a radical change in the Jewish position in Central and Eastern Europe. In the restored Polish State, which includes a considerable part of the Pale, the Jews comprise nearly one-tenth of the total, and nearly one-third of the urban population. Poland and the other Succession States of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Baltic States which were cut off from the old Tsarist Empire, were bound by Minority treaties to assure to their Jewish subjects not only complete civil equality, but also cultural national rights. The Jews and the other minorities fondly believed that a new era of civic equality and cultural autonomy was assured to them by the League of Nations. The recent years have brought a tragic disillusion, and exposed the vanity of the international guarantees. Even where the States allow the minorities to speak their language and pray according to their religious rites, they have contrived to take away from them work and bread. The new conception of the totalitarian State denies not only liberty to the individual, but the right to live to minority groups. For the Jews, particularly, who were in a peculiarly precarious position, because they were cut off from the soil, the economic basis of life is being rapidly destroyed, so that they are reduced to hopeless poverty. Their middlemen's function is impaired, because on the one hand the development of State enterprise and of State-aided co-operative association, which is sound enough in itself, has dispensed with their activity in many callings, and on the other hand a growing middle class from the racial majority of the new nations resents and crushes out the competition of any minority people. At the same time their industrial activity is fatally crippled by the breaking up of the big territorial conglomerations in which they found a market,

and particularly by the severance of Poland from Russia, which used to be the chief outlet for Polish industry. Scarcely anywhere in the world can such material misery be seen as in the Jewish quarters of the chief Polish towns—*e.g.*, Warsaw and Lodz—or in the smaller towns and larger villages in which the Jews are herded.

The physical and economic distribution of the Jews is, owing to the repression of centuries, ill-balanced. Too large a proportion are gathered in the capitals; in Vienna, for example, with its population of 1,800,000, close on 180,000 (10 per cent.) are Jews, and they constitute over nine-tenths of the total Jewish population in Austria. In Budapest the 200,000 Jews form one-fifth of the total population of the town, and nearly half of the Jewish population of Hungary. In Warsaw the 330,000 Jews, though not such an abnormally high fraction of the total Jewish population of Poland, constitute one-third of the population of the capital. The urban massing involves, and is the outcome of, a restriction of their callings. Thus in Austria, while less than one-fifth of the workers as a whole are engaged in commerce, over half the Jews are so engaged; in Hungary, out of a community of 420,000 persons who in 1930 were engaged in different commercial callings, nearly half were Jews. In Poland the disproportion was still greater. The total number of commercial enterprises was under 400,000, of which, in 1933, 207,000 were conducted by Jews. The Governments in the different States have taken over activities which were formerly Jewish monopolies, such as transport, the tobacco and the liquor trade. The State control eliminates the Jewish element from these activities, where before they were predominant; the under-representation of the Jews in State employment is as marked as their over-representation in what remains of private trade. Thus the municipality of Vienna has in its service but 154 Jews, less than ½ per cent. of its employees; and the municipality of Warsaw employed a year or two ago fifty Jews in a total staff of 50,000. The replacement of private monopolies by State enterprise or State control may be salutary; but the position becomes insupportable when the Jew is made the victim of the reform of the old, and debarred from participation in the new, order.

The anti-Semitism of man is added to what has been called the anti-Semitism of things; and the double impact means ruin. There is a rabbinical saying which applies to the Jewish economic position in Central Europe: 'The pot falls on the stone, woe to the pot; the stone falls on the pot, woe to the pot.' Whether the economic change comes from above or below, from new forms of association of the people or the reaction of the Government, whether from the internal control of industry or the external policy of other States in erecting tariff barriers against imports, the Jew always suffers. He is crushed between the upper millstone of national economy and the nether millstone of economic nationalism, which nowadays applies to persons as well as to goods.

The same discrimination against the Jews in the universities and the liberal callings is apparent in most of the new States; and, having regard to the growing pressure of the middle classes of the majority population, it is inevitable. In the years following the war the numbers of Jewish lawyers, doctors, artists and students of the universities were disproportionate to the Jewish ratio in the general population. To-day that disproportion is drastically corrected. But when the Jews, seeking to redress their unequal professional distribution, turn to industry and endeavour to train their young generation for technical trades, fresh and rigid barriers are erected against them. Thus in Poland the percentage of Jews in the Government technical schools was reduced from over 3 in 1930 to 1 in 1934. Likewise, when the Jew, already inadequately settled on the land, seeks to turn to agriculture, the State obstructs. The expropriation of large estates, which was carried out as a part of the necessary agrarian reform, was directed particularly against the Jewish big landowners; and to that objection cannot be made. But at the same time the Jews are denied any part in Government credits for the assistance of the settlement of smallholders, and every attempt is made to force their small landholding class off the soil. So it comes about that, driven from their old callings and excluded from new, an inordinately large proportion of the population is destitute and prevented from working. In communities which are already cruelly impoverished one-third of the workers have to be maintained by the communal charity of the other two-thirds.

The situation becomes graver because of the curtailment of the possibilities of emigration.

In the pre-war period the United States primarily, and to a less extent the countries of South America and the British Dominions, afforded an outlet for a substantial stream of the population; and the outflow at least offset the natural increase. The most striking demographical feature of the Jewish people during the half-century before the war was the mass movement to the Americas. Between 1881 and 1905 over 2,500,000 Jews from Europe found a home in the United States; over 100,000 in Canada; over 300,000 in South America. Since 1925 the gates of all the countries overseas, except only Palestine, have been half closed or wholly closed. Thus from Poland the emigration, which was before the war 60,000 a year, has in the last fifteen years averaged less than 25,000, and a very large proportion of the 25,000 has made its way to the Jewish National Home. In 1935 that 'least of lands' accommodated at least three-quarters of all the wandering Jews who set out for a new home. In 1936, however, a year of riot and rebellion, the Palestinian immigration fell to less than half of the figure for 1935. In 1937 it has been restricted by the Government to less than half of what it was in 1936. The system of immigration quotas, which was started in the United States and has been copied in South American countries and in South Africa, is designed particularly against emigration from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Jewish population suffers most hardly by such restrictions, because in greater degree than the rest it comprises a proletariat, partly industrial, partly commercial, partly intellectual, that lives on or over the verge of economic catastrophe and is forced to seek a new home.

The situation, already desperate, is aggravated by a frenzied anti-Semitism of reactionary parties in the States. The infection of Nazi Germany was sedulously carried by agents and propaganda to the neighbouring and remoter countries, and has seized on sections of the population suffering themselves from economic distress. The anti-Semitic parties have now come to power in Rumania; they have been growing in strength in Poland; they threaten and perpetrate violence everywhere. The violent pogrom accompanies the

cold pogrom, and breaks up the Jewish life—now in one place, now in another. The Jew is the ready scapegoat for all troubles; and the position of the common people in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is so wretched that it is easy enough to rouse feeling. Vested interests which are opposed to methods of radical reform, whether agrarian or industrial, divert attention by stirring up violent attack upon the helpless Jewish minority, and find a handle for that attack in the abnormal Jewish economic distribution. Anti-Semitic measures hamper at every turn the attempts of the Jewish communities, and of outside bodies, to secure reform of that distribution. The Government's proclaimed policy in Poland and Rumania is a mass emigration of the Jews. It is a parrot cry: for there are no countries to-day which can receive hundreds of thousands of immigrants. Emigration has been a possible alleviation for the calamity of German Jewry, both because the numbers concerned were much smaller and the community had an extraordinary high level of intelligence and training, and, in spite of severe Government restriction, could salve a small part of its wealth. Emigration, however, is impracticable as a main solution for the much larger and the much poorer mass of Eastern Jewry.

It may take a small part of the surplus, something near the annual natural increase, if the decline in the birth rate, which has been marked during the last decade, is continued. If the gates of Palestine are again opened according to the economic absorptive capacity, if the quota restrictions in the United States, South America and the British Dominions are withdrawn, emigration would make a more substantial alleviation. Recently attention has been drawn to a project for the colonisation of the vast French colony of Madagascar by Jews and non-Jews from Poland. A Commission from Poland which investigated the country reported that it might be possible in time for 30,000 families to be settled. But before this could be done an expenditure of millions of pounds would be required for roads, railways, dams on the rivers, and irrigation schemes. It is not clear whence the vast capital will come: From the French Government? From the Polish Government? Immediately, anyhow, any colonisation in undeveloped countries can provide only for very small numbers, and at great expense. It is a popular

fallacy that emigration is easiest to an empty land. In fact, it is most difficult and more expensive; and it may be said that emigration, like Nature, abhors a vacuum.

The primary solution of the Jewish problem in Central and Eastern Europe must be found within each country, *e.g.* Poland, Rumania, where the mass of the Jews live. And the essential condition is to restore effectively the 'Rights of Man,' the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That, of course, cannot be done by fresh declarations; it requires a large programme of economic reconstruction in each country, which will give the Jew the opportunity of taking his part in every branch of the economic life, and will at the same time create fresh opportunities for the general population. Palestine and also Soviet Russia have shown what the Jew can achieve in agriculture and in industry when given a fair field. The retraining of the young Jewish generation of Germany for the simple productive occupations and the settlement of 100,000 of them overseas, where they are engaged largely in these occupations, have pointed the same lesson. The Jewish masses in Poland and in Rumania could in the same way be made productive in the cultivation of the soil and in industry. Experience shows the baselessness of the fear that an increase in the number of producers will take away the bread from existing producers; if the Jewish capacities were freed and directed to new occupations, they would add to, and not detract from, the national economy.

In the economic reconstruction the efforts of the Governments and of the Jewish associations, which are anxious to help, must be combined. Loans will be required for new industries; and technical schools and large schemes of training must be established. The settlement on the land and in industry in the Hellenic kingdom of the 2,000,000 Greeks who were thrown out of the Ottoman Empire shows what can be achieved if there is national and international co-operation. The loan of £10,000,000 which was floated with the help of the League of Nations, and was subscribed largely by banking houses in England and America, was a main instrument in that work of reconstruction. To-day it may be extravagant to hope that the League would initiate a successful loan; but England, France and America, and

perhaps some other democratic countries, could take their part.

The matter is one of grave international concern, because, unless there is economic reconstruction, panic emigration seems inevitable. The problem of the refugees in Europe, which embraces hundreds of thousands of Russian and Armenian exiles since 1920, besides those driven from Germany, Spain and Italy, is already scarcely manageable. The remedial efforts would break down altogether if there were a fresh exodus on a large scale from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Despair, too, threatens to drive masses to Communism and to revolutionary efforts, as it did in Russia. Self-interest as well as humanity calls for united action to deal with a problem which is primarily, though not exclusively, economic, and must be met primarily by economic measures.

NORMAN BENTWICH.

THE JEWISH PLIGHT IN EUROPE

II

By Israel Cohen

The proclamation of their anti-Semitic policy with which the Government of Rumania under M. Goga inaugurated their régime did not denote any change in the attitude of that country towards its Jewish inhabitants. It represented but a further and reactionary development in its system of discrimination. In a few countries of modern Europe have the Jews suffered oppression over as long a period or so continuously as in Rumania, and in few countries have official promises for the betterment of their conditions been so frequently and cynically broken. The solemn assurances extorted from time to time that justice will be done to the Jews have served to appease that section of the civilised world that still insists upon the practice of humanity by Governments, but within the confines of Rumania the old traditions of intolerance have steadily gathered increasing strength. The new decrees now threatened will, unless averted betimes, not only bring disaster upon the Jewish community in that country but also cause serious repercussions in other lands.

Rumania acquired her independence by the Berlin Treaty of 1878, which stipulated, among other matters, that differences of religious belief should not preclude anybody from the enjoyment of civil and political rights. The article embodying this condition was inserted in the Treaty because the Jews, although they had been settled in the country for over 1500 years and had shed their blood in its defence, were treated as outlaws and subjected to continual persecution. The Berlin Congress had intended by means of this article to effect the complete emancipation of the Jews, but Rumania, while professing to accept this among the conditions of her

independence, immediately declared all the Jews to be foreigners, whose status could be improved only by the laws pertaining to the naturalisation of foreigners. Thus were such astute statesmen as Disraeli and Bismarck, the directing spirits of the Congress, duped and defied, and the Jews were condemned to remain in their state of bondage. Down to the outbreak of the Great War scarcely 300 native Jews altogether were admitted to the rights of citizenship, in each case by a vote of both Chambers of Parliament, while all other Jews continued to be treated as outlaws, harassed by a multiplicity of oppressive decrees.

During the Great War the position of the Jews became much worse, even though they fought for their step-mother country with singular bravery. Those who were at the front were treated like spies and enemies, while the Jewish population in general was subjected to deportations, false imprisonment, plundering, requisitions, extortionate fines, forced labour, and flogging. Hence when the war was over the opportunity was again seized to endeavour to deliver the Jews from their prolonged servitude, more especially as Rumania's Jewish population was now to be increased, through the annexation of territory from Austria, Hungary and Russia, from 241,000 to 851,000. Consequently the Rumanian Government was made to sign a Minorities Treaty similar to those signed by several other States in Central and Eastern Europe, which were designed to secure and safeguard the complete civil and political equality of religious and racial minorities. This Treaty finally swept aside the verbal quibbles by means of which the Jews had been denied their rights so long. It declared that 'all persons born in Rumanian territory who are not born nationals of another State shall *ipso facto* become Rumanian nationals,' a stipulation applying both to the annexed territories as well as to the whole of Old Rumania. In order not to allow any doubt to be raised as to whether the Jews were also included, there was inserted a special article, in concise and unambiguous terms: 'Rumania undertakes to recognise as Rumanian nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirements of any formality Jews inhabiting any Rumanian territory who do not possess another nationality.' These articles had been worded so circumspectly that it was deemed to be impossible

for Rumania this time to wriggle out of her pledge. But the statesmen of the Western world had underestimated the resourcefulness of Rumanian statecraft, or rather craftiness.

By the terms of the Minorities Treaty all persons habitually domiciled in the country on the date when it was signed, September 4, 1920, were entitled to citizenship without further ado; but on February 23, 1924, a nationality law was passed which made the acquisition of citizenship subject to proof of ten years' continuous residence in the same place (known as *Heimatsrecht*) before December 1, 1918. Many Jews, owing to their compulsory migrations and the misfortunes of war, were unable to show this qualification and were thus condemned to being 'Stateless,' with all the handicaps and disabilities this status entails; on the other hand, those who were granted civic rights were liable to lose them upon the protest of a third party. At first a period of twenty days was allowed within which a protest could be lodged, after which the grant of citizenship held good; but on March 31, 1932, a further law was passed, extending the period for protest to thirty days.

The result of this Treaty violation is that in the Bukowina there are still about 20,000 Jews who are 'Stateless,' besides many thousands in Bessarabia and Transylvania. But even this number was far too small for the anti-Semitic reactionaries, for in October 1936 they demanded that the Government should order a further revision of the grant of citizenship accorded to the minorities in the annexed provinces, on the ground that many persons had obtained it illegally. The Government refrained from seeking parliamentary authority for this inquisition, owing to representations that were made from foreign quarters against what would have been a manifest breach of the Minorities Treaty, but decided to achieve the same object by administrative decree. Accordingly, it was announced that the law of 1932 applied not merely to cases of naturalisation conferred after that date, but also to all that had been dealt with since 1924, and that consequently thirty days' grace would be allowed within which protests could be lodged against all applications that had been disposed of since the earlier date. In short, the Attorney-General had the right, without any parliamentary sanction, to rescind the citizenship of members of the minorities who had

received it twelve years ago, in all cases in which he might deem the ground of protest to be valid. The inquisition was aimed at primarily, if not exclusively, against the Jews, and the result was that tens of thousands of protests have been lodged against the Jews in the Bukowina, and similar proceedings will follow in Transylvania and Bessarabia. Over 4000 persons, the great majority Jews, in Czernowitz had thus already been deprived of their citizenship before M. Goga came into power.

Even the majority of the Jews, whose citizenship cannot be impeached, have been made to realise daily that theirs is but a second-class citizenship. They are not allowed to hold positions in the Government or municipal services, though they are obliged to pay more than their due share of the income-tax revenue by which those services are mainly supported—a burden that presses with even greater injustice upon those who are 'Stateless.' There is no law sanctioning this discrimination, for that would be a flagrant violation of the Constitution and the Minorities Treaty, but it is the common administrative practice. Many a Jewish merchant and tradesman in Czernowitz, Cluj and Temesvar complained to me (in the course of a journey of inquiry) of the petty persecutions to which they are subjected by prying officials bent upon bribes. Bribery is the order of the day, practised from the highest circles to the lowest and prevailing throughout the country. On the other hand, the Jewish community is denied an equitable share, to which it is entitled, of the sum provided out of State funds for educational and religious purposes.

Nor is it only from the public service that Jews are excluded. They are equally barred from positions in the army, although they are obliged to discharge their military duties. They are largely represented in chambers of commerce and stock exchanges, but they are kept out of the governing councils. They may provide the bulk or even the whole of the capital of a limited company, but they are required by law to reserve a number of administrative posts for persons of Rumanian race. They cannot obtain credit from a Rumanian bank; and they have difficulty in obtaining the requisite facilities for importing goods and raw materials from abroad. Jewish landowners, like others,

were expropriated through the Agrarian Reform of 1926, but the Jewish peasants, of whom there are a large number in the Bukowina, Transylvania and Bessarabia, have been denied their proportionate share of the expropriated lands.

Of all the forms of anti-Jewish persecution the most persistent and ruthless has been in connexion with the universities. Ever since the Rumanian students held their first Congress on December 10, 1922, for the purpose of demanding that the admission of Jews to the universities should be restricted to a small percentage, they have continued their violent agitation year after year. Every Government has resisted the demand for a law for a *numerus clausus*, as that would involve a gross infringement of the Minorities Treaty, but the universities have been allowed to impose such a limitation in practice. Nevertheless, the students continue their crusade, which is directed not only against students but against Jews in general. It takes the form of savage attacks with knuckle-dusters, knives, and even revolvers, upon students, both men and women, in the universities; of assaults in trains upon Jewish passengers, who are often forcibly ejected; of concerted and armed raids upon Jewish quarters. Countless persons have been injured or robbed in the disorders of the last fifteen years, and two tragic episodes stand out in the sinister record. In 1924 the police prefect of Jassy, a Christian, was shot down in the local court of law by a student, Codreanu, and in 1926 a Jewish student, David Fallik, was also shot dead in the Czernowitz law court by a Rumanian student. Both assailants were tried and acquitted, and thereupon acclaimed as national heroes.

The 'spiritual' founder of this crusade is a professor who once held the Chair of Economics at the Jassy University; for the past fifty years he has conducted anti-Semitic agitation, during which time he has poisoned the minds of successive generations of students and, although he has now passed his eightieth year, he is as energetic a force for evil as ever. The Government have always made a show of condemning these disturbances, but they have so far taken no effective steps to suppress them. Indeed, they are partly responsible, for they give special grants for the congresses, which are invariably the prelude to anti-Jewish riots, and

provide free railway travel to enable academic hooligans to career about the country. Some Cabinet Ministers have even defended the misconduct of the students on the ground that they have carried into civic life 'the spirit of the trenches' and are animated by a strong national consciousness. The outbursts of this spirit have repeatedly interrupted the work of the universities, where the comparatively small number of Jews have literally to fight for the right to study, as they are beaten and bludgeoned in the corridors and courtyard. The disorders at the Universities of Bucharest and Jassy, of Cluj and Czernowitz, have often been so grave that police, and even soldiers, have had to be drafted into the buildings to maintain order during the lectures, and when these efforts have failed the seats of learning have been closed for weeks and even months. As recently as October 28 last, in the medical faculty at Bucharest, where out of 400 students sitting for examinations there were only fifteen Jews, the latter—including some girls—were pounced upon by fellow-students, who tried to evict them from the building; and when the victims lodged a protest with the dean of the faculty he advised them not to present themselves at the examinations, but to wait a few years until the anti-Jewish agitation died down! No wonder that in many faculties there is no longer a *numerus clausus* but actually a *numerus nullus*.

Although, since the war, the students have been the most spectacular element in the practice of Jew-baiting, it has had and has its votaries among other sections of Rumanian society too. There have been several incidents in which Jews have been shot dead or seriously injured by Rumanian soldiers, who have been allowed to escape scot-free so that the honour of the Rumanian army might remain unblemished. All the anti-Jewish excesses that have occurred since the end of the war (assaults upon people in streets and cafés, schools and synagogues, law courts and election booths, trains and trams, the damaging and plundering of shops, the desecration of places of worship), of which there is a long and appalling catalogue, have been followed by Government statements expressing condemnation, promising investigation, and announcing that the guilty will be punished. But then the Government departments concerned indulge in dilatory

tactics, the local authorities make little or no effort to arrest the culprits, and so the situation remains as before.

Alarming as the agitation was until a few years ago, it has become both more extensive and intensive since the advent of the Hitler régime in Germany, for the apostles of National-Socialism are ceaselessly busy spreading their doctrines in Rumania as in so many other countries. Professor Cuza preached anti-Semitism even before Hitler was born, but the National-Socialist movement has given a powerful stimulus to Jew-baiting in Rumania and made it more violent than it was before. The change has been largely furthered by the founding of anti-Semitic newspapers, ultimately designed to win Rumania over to the side of Germany in the international struggle. Bucharest alone now has over a dozen daily papers of this category, all distinguished by the *swastika*, while there is hardly a single town of any importance without one. None of these publications could exist without a regular subsidy, and no secret is made of the fact that the money comes mainly from Germany (through German business firms dealing with Rumania), and, in certain cases, from Italy (to foster the propagation of Fascism). The common refrain of all the anti-Semitic Press is : 'Boycott the Jews and drive them out!' The leading *rôle* in this sinister campaign is played by the *Universul*, which constantly accuses the Jews of engaging in Communism and in the 'diabolical plots of Freemasonry.' The most rabid journal is the *Porunca Vremii*, which belongs to the same proprietors as the *Universul* and models itself upon the unsavoury *Stürmer*, adorning its pages with slanderous and provocative anti-Jewish caricatures and enlivening them with poems permeated with hatred.

Far more menacing, however, than students or journalists, artists or poets are politicians, who pursue the Jew with a vindictiveness that knows no scruple. Foremost among them are Cuza and his disciple Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, who leapt into fame twelve years ago through the tragedy at Jassy. After collaborating for some years, Codreanu broke away from his master and founded his own party, the 'Archangel Michael,' from which sprang the terrorist organisation the 'Iron Guard.' This body attracted a vast number of followers, students anxious for jobs and peasants eager to

despoil the Jews, and it perpetrated so many excesses that it was banned in 1933 by the Liberal Premier, M. Duca, who paid for his courage with his life; but it immediately reappeared under another name, '*Totul pentru Tara*' ('All for the Fatherland'), and continued to grow in numbers and influence. So formidable a position has Codreanu attained that the Government has made no attempt to curb his activities. Even when he addressed a memorandum of astounding insolence in November 1936 to King Carol, requesting that his Ministers should declare that they would answer with their heads if their foreign policy involved their country in war, and that the King should make a similar declaration, nobody dared to lift a hand against him. Close upon the party of Codreanu comes the National Christian Party of Professor Cuza and Octavian Goga, the late Prime Minister and formerly Minister of the Interior. Goga and 'Gaga,' as the two are called, were joined at the end of 1935 by Alexander Vaida-Voivod, a former Prime Minister and founder of the 'Rumanian Front' Party, but the combination was short-lived.

The 'Liberal' Party, which had been in power during the last few years, is entirely devoid of any liberal outlook, and yielded to the clamours and threats of the extremist parties both in trimming its policy and closing its eyes to public scandals. That is why it agreed to revise the naturalisation of the minorities in the annexed provinces, and proposed in the spring of 1937 to pass a Bill for the 'protection of national labour.' The object of this Bill was to require that at least 75 per cent. of the employees in all industrial, commercial, and allied undertakings should be citizens of Rumanian race, while 20 per cent. might be Rumanian citizens belonging to the minorities (including Jews) who had been naturalised in consequence of the Peace Treaty, and the remaining 5 per cent. might be foreigners. The reason advanced for this measure was that there was a large amount of unemployment among pure Rumanians, who must be helped at the expense of the rest of the population; but the total number of unemployed throughout Rumania, which has a population of over 18,000,000, does not exceed 50,000, of whom 10,000 are intellectual workers. As such a measure would have been a gross infraction of the Minorities

Treaty, the Government did not venture to submit it to Parliament, but M. Valeriu Pop, the Minister for Trade and Industry, who was responsible for the project, issued a circular to all the leading commercial and industrial enterprises urgently recommending them to increase their employees of Rumanian ethnical origin to 50 per cent. in the case of administrative and technical workers, and to 75 per cent. in the case of clerical workers, by the end of the year.

A similar drive was also begun, months before the Goga Government came into power, against Jews engaged in the liberal professions. This step was taken by various professional organisations without any interference on the part of the Government, which must have realised that their action was a violation of the Minorities Treaty. Thus, the Congress of Rumanian Lawyers adopted a resolution last May to exclude from membership all persons not of 'pure Rumanian blood,' and struck out the names of many Jewish lawyers from the register on 'technical grounds.' Jews and members of other minorities were refused admission to the Bar in Bucharest and other cities; while Jewish lawyers who went to the courts ran the risk of being attacked by the so-called 'lawyers' police,' young barristers entrusted with the task of forcibly ejecting them. The Congress of the National Federation of Liberal Professions decided last June to exclude all Jews and members of other minorities from the vocations they represented; and the Association of Secondary School Masters passed a similar resolution.

No justification of any kind has ever been advanced for this hostile crusade, which has been vigorously fostered not only by rabid politicians but also by ecclesiastical dignitaries of the highest rank. Even the new Premier, the Patriarch Miron Christea, formerly a member of the Regency Council, has given it his blessing and accused the Jews of 'living on the back of other people and on our own back, on the back of Rumania, like parasites' (*Curentul*, August 19, 1937), while the Bishop of Hotin has urged his flock to boycott the Jews in order that 'they shall die of hunger' (*Universul*, September 5, 1937). The only body whose leaders have uttered a word in defence of the Jews is the National Peasant Party, who were responsible for King Carol's return to his

throne. Dr. Julius Maniu, their supreme head, has more than once denounced the evils of anti-Semitism, while Dr. Nicolas Lupu, vice-president of the party, declared :

> We have 10,000 villages without doctors : we have districts where there are no roads. We have work for all, and we need not be chauvinistic in regard to the Jews, who are the friendliest minority in Rumania and represent no danger at all to the Rumanian State. [*Jewish Chronicle*, July 9, 1937.]

But the National Peasants have been denied the opportunity of administering the country, and a period of reaction has set in.

Serious as the position of the Jews was before, it became considerably aggravated through the advent to power of the National Christian Party, which, although it polled less than *10 per cent. of the votes in the general election last December*, was placed, by the singular act of King Carol, in charge of the destinies of the country. This party has always displayed the greatest enthusiasm for the doctrines and practices of Nazi Germany ; indeed, it had adopted the *swastika* as its emblem some years before the war, although it prefers blue shirts to brown. The programme that M. Goga announced, and the actions that he and his fellow-Ministers immediately took, under the slogan of 'Rumania for the Rumanians !' left no doubt that the oppression of the Jews was to form the most distinguishing feature of their policy. A Government containing that veteran and virulent anti-Semite Professor Cuza could hardly be expected to show the Jews either justice or mercy. Hitherto the Governments of Rumania had indignantly denied that they discriminated against the Jews ; now, for the first time, there was an Administration that loudly and proudly proclaimed its determination to deprive the Jews of their rights and to drive them out of the country, and it promptly carried several of its iniquitous proposals into effect. In an interview by telephone with the *Evening Standard* (December 30, 1937) the late Premier said : 'There are 1,500,000 Jews in Rumania out of a population of 18,000,000. Now I intend to clear them out and to re-establish Rumanians in their jobs.' A week later he considerably reduced the number whom he proposed to expel. To a correspondent of the *Daily Herald* (January 6) he said :

'We have 500,000 vagabond people whom we cannot regard as Rumanian citizens. My first measure will be to declare that we cannot take responsibility for retaining this people in our State life.' King Carol, in an interview with the same correspondent (*Daily Herald*, January 10), contented himself with the smaller figure of '250,000 who invaded the villages and are not a good element,' but he gave the assurance: 'There is no question of expulsion.'

Exaggeration of the number of Jews in Rumania has always been a favourite trick of the anti-Semitic politicians, who pay no regard to the statistical returns of their own Government. The *Demographic Bulletin* of Rumania, issued in March 1936 by Dr. Sabin Manuila, Director of the Central Statistical Institute of the Ministry of the Interior, shows that the total population of the entire country, according to the last census, taken on December 29, 1930, was 18,053,000. The figures are not given for the various religions, but only the percentages that they form of the total, and as the members of the Jewish religion constitute 4·2 per cent., they number 758,000. There has thus been a considerable decline of the Jewish population since Rumania annexed the neighbouring province at the end of the war, for the numbers of Jews, according to the official statistics of the respective States in 1910, were as follows: Bessarabia, 267,000; Bukowina, 103,000; Transylvania, 64,000; Banat, 26,000; Marmures, 150,000; and Old Rumania, 241,000—that is, a total of 851,000.

It was, therefore, manifestly absurd for M. Goga to say that there is a Jewish population of 1,500,000, or—as he stated to the *Paris Soir* (January 10)—that 500,000 Jewish 'undesirables' have illegally immigrated into Rumania since 1914. He told the correspondent of this journal that there were four waves of Jewish immigration into Rumania after the war. The first was that of the Jews of Galicia into the Bukowina, but this occurred at a time when both Galicia and the Bukowina were part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and the Jews were at home in the Bukowina long before it came under Rumanian rule. The second wave was in 1921, when some tens of thousands of Jews escaped from Russia in consequence of the Soviet régime, but the great majority of them moved on to more distant destina-

tions, mostly to North and South America. According to a Report of the Nansen Office published on September 3, 1936, an investigation conducted by its representative in Rumania showed that there were then not more than 11,000 Russian refugees, Jews and non-Jews combined; and as they enjoy the protection of the agreement concluded under the auspices of the Nansen Office they cannot be expelled. The third wave is said to have brought Hungarian Bolsheviks, but this is a figment of M. Goga's poetic fancy; on the contrary, there has been emigration from Rumania into Hungary. The fourth wave is said to have consisted of 30,000 Jews who fled from Hitler's Germany; the fact is that only a few hundred Jews, for the most part Rumanian Jews who had lived in Germany until 1933, settled in Rumania. Besides, the year 1933 showed the lowest immigration figure during the past seven years—namely, 2527. According to the official statistical returns, the total immigration into Rumania from 1930 to 1936 inclusive was only 29,058, and the emigration was 38,999, which means a diminution of nearly 10,000.

Despite these facts, however, the Rumanian Government announced that there is to be an extensive revision in order to ascertain whether the Jews are entitled to their Rumanian citizenship. Jews in the annexed provinces must produce documents showing that they were permanent residents there before December 1, 1918, and those of Old Rumania must submit proofs that they are not foreign subjects, and that they complied with the military conscription regulations or were mobilised during the war. The local courts, with the help of over 150 newly appointed magistrates, are to decide in each case whether a Jew has the right to Rumanian nationality, and if it should be found that it was obtained 'fraudulently' or by error he will lose it. The whole of this inquisitorial procedure (like the decree of 1936) is utterly gratuitous, in view of the application of the Naturalisation Laws of 1924 and 1932; but, considering the temper of the Government departments, it may be expected that bureaucratic zeal will not err in the direction of leniency. Those who are denaturalised may not be expelled, as King Carol has declared, although M. Goga facetiously told the *Paris Soir* that they can be transported to Madagascar, where 'warships of all nations could keep watch over the island to

make sure that they stay there.' But the consequent loss of civil rights will deprive them of their labour permits and of the means of earning a livelihood.

Even before this vast inquisition could be carried out, or even begun, a number of harsh and oppressive measures were put into effect that render the Rumanian Jew's already modified civic rights quite illusory. As in Nazi Germany, the first to suffer were those engaged in the liberal professions. Three well-known Jewish owned democratic newspapers in Bucharest (*Dimineatza*, *Adeverul*, and *Lupta*) have been suppressed; several purely Jewish papers in the Bukowina have been likewise suppressed (contrary to a promise given by M. Goga to a Jewish delegation that such papers would not be interfered with); 200 journalists have been dismissed; and 120 have been deprived of their free railway passes. No Jew may henceforth be employed on a Rumanian paper. All Jewish lawyers have been suspended until the revision of Jewish citizen rights has been completed. All Jewish doctors have been removed from the State insurance panels. All who obtained their diplomas abroad are to have their licences examined; and no more licences for the practice of medicine are to be granted to doctors who are not of Rumanian ethnical origin until the revision of citizenship is over. The Engineers' Association has expelled all its Jewish members, and the Architects' Association has done likewise, with the result that Jewish architects can no longer submit plans in open competition. All Jewish actors and actresses are forbidden to appear in Rumanian theatres and opera-houses. The only three Jews engaged in the diplomatic service, as commercial attachés, have been discharged, and all Jews employed in the broadcasting services are also to be cleared out. All Jewish libraries and many Jewish-owned bookshops in Bessarabia have been closed down by the Government on the ground that they are ' centres of Bolshevist propaganda '; on the other hand, anti-Semitic publications of Nazi Germany that were previously prohibited in Rumania are now allowed to circulate without restriction. No Jew may teach Rumanian history and literature even in a Jewish school, while the teaching of the Jewish religion in State schools is forbidden. No State subvention is to be granted for religious or educational

purposes, and in several cities the slaughter of animals according to the Jewish ritual method is prohibited.

The system of repression was also to be applied in the sphere of industry and commerce. A special department, with a large staff of inspectors, was to be created solely to look after 'the protection of national labour.' M. Goga's Government decreed that 90 per cent. of the personnel of all industrial and commercial undertakings must consist of 'ethnical Rumanians.' This law was bound to prove impracticable, for, since 80 per cent. of the Rumanian people are villagers and peasants, there are not enough Rumanian urban workers with the requisite qualifications to provide nine-tenths of the personnel of all commercial and industrial undertakings. Indeed, under the preceding Government it was found impossible to get enough 'pure Rumanians' to occupy even 60 per cent. of the positions in such firms. Meanwhile the Distom Company, a large Jewish concern engaged in the distribution of State monopoly products (tobacco and soap), has been dissolved and is to be replaced by a purely Rumanian enterprise. M. Goga announced that the licences for the sale of liquor would be withdrawn from all Jews and transferred to war invalids (*Curentul*, January 2), and three days later the *Neamul Romanesc* reported that 150,000 liquor licences had been withdrawn from Jewish inn and store keepers in the villages 'because they poison the public health in the country districts.' Not only is there no such total number of Jews in the villages, but there is no such number of liquor licences throughout the kingdom. The figures afterwards published by the Department of State Monopolies (which include alcohol) showed that the total number of licences issued was 39,000, of which Jews hold only 3180, and they are for the most part invalids and orphans of the war themselves.

Inured as the Jews in Rumania had long been to petty persecution, they were appalled by the suddenness and severity of such a multiplicity of harsh and degrading measures. The situation was aggravated by the action of many of the newly appointed provincial prefects, who had been chosen for their anti-Semitic record, and who hastened to anticipate some of the published projects that had not yet become law. The most malevolent of these prefects was

M. Robu, already known as the 'Rumanian Streicher,' who spread terror among the large Jewish community in Czernowitz. He immediately put into force the decree issued by M. George Cuza (son of Professor Cuza), Minister of Labour, to the effect that no Jew might employ a Christian woman servant under the age of forty. The reason given for this prohibition, obviously inspired by the National-Socialist code, was the slanderous allegation that Jews engaged such servants for immoral ends. As its enforcement would have meant that 60,000 women and girls, mostly of the peasant class, would have been thrown out of employment, and would have aroused an outcry throughout the country, the Government found themselves obliged to postpone the execution of this offensive law until the beginning of the agricultural season. In Czernowitz numerous properties belonging to Jewish institutions and private individuals, including the imposing 'Jewish House' (comprising the offices of the Jewish Community and of many organisations), were expropriated by decree 'for public utility purposes' and transferred to the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan Church, and the owners were consoled with the promise of compensation. Similar cases of expropriation have occurred in other places in the Bukowina.

The alarm felt by the Jews was greatest in the rural districts, where the peasants had been promised during the general election that the Jews would no longer be allowed to live on the land and their property would be divided among them. Without awaiting any law to this effect, the peasants in many districts adopted such a menacing attitude towards their Jewish neighbours, with whom they had previously been on friendly terms, that the latter, who had been settled on the land for generations, fled to the nearest towns, where temporary shelters and soup-kitchens were provided for them by local Jewish committees. Panic prevailed in the cities too, and it was by no means confined to the Jews. Christian manufacturers complained that their sales were declining as a result of the fear of Jewish merchants to invest further capital in their businesses. There was a run on the banks of unprecedented magnitude. In the first week of January alone it was estimated that at least 4,000,000,000 lei (about £6,000,000) had been withdrawn from 138 banks, a

large proportion by non-Jews (*Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, January 8). The Governments of all the neighbouring countries, fearing that there would be an invasion of Jewish refugees, immediately gave instructions that their frontiers should be closed. Thousands of Jews in despair, knowing that Palestine was for the present closed to them, resolved to emigrate overseas: they applied to the Italian consulates for permission to settle in Abyssinia, they besieged the consulates of Mexico and of various States of South America.

Soon after M. Goga had announced his Cabinet's anti-Semitic policy, which clearly involved gross infractions of the Minorities Treaty, the Governments of Great Britain, France, and the United States, which were signatories of that Treaty (the others being Italy and Japan), instructed their diplomatic representatives in Bucharest to remind him of the interest they had always taken in its proper observance. Their action was based upon Article 12 of the Mandate, which reads as follows:

> Rumania agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles, as far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified, without the consent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. . . .
>
> Rumania agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take any such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

The Soviet Government also made representations, with particular reference to its interest in Bessarabia, and threatened to reopen the question in the event of any ill-treatment of the population of that province.

As the diplomatic representations had no effect, the executive of the World Jewish Congress, the Anglo-Jewish Joint Foreign Committee, and other Jewish bodies, submitted petitions to the Council of the League of Nations to deal with the question at the meeting opened on January 26 in accordance with the urgency procedure. Mr. Eden and

M. Delbos had long talks at Geneva with Rumania's Foreign Minister, M. Micescu, in which they emphasised that their Governments considered Rumania's anti-Jewish policy a violation of the Minorities Treaty which would have to be dealt with by the League. They sought to secure from him a promise on the part of his Government that the projected anti-Jewish measures would not be carried out before the new general elections in March, but M. Micescu would give no such promise.

Despite this failure, the Council decided that the Jewish petitions should not be dealt with under the urgency procedure, as 'the position could not be usefully considered until the observations of the Rumanian Government were available.' The ordinary leisurely procedure will therefore be observed. A Committee of Three, consisting of the president (M. Adle, the delegate of Iran), Mr. Eden and M. Delbos, will study the Jewish petitions and subsequently the observations that have been invited from the Rumanian Government, and they will report to the next meeting of the Council, which will be held in May. The president further announced that he and his British and French colleagues were studying 'whatever unofficial action can be taken immediately to help the Jewish situation in Rumania at once,' which was understood to mean renewed diplomatic representations in Bucharest. But M. Micescu no sooner returned home than he made a statement that was ominous. A Reuter's message (February 4) reported:

> It could be stated without prejudice to any final solution, he said, that there was hope for the re-establishment of the integral sovereignty of Rumania in all questions of internal policy The solution of the Jewish minority problem, which for the past two months had been a foreign policy issue, would, he hoped, return, as it was before 1919, to that of an internal matter.

But only a week after M. Micescu's return from Geneva, M. Goga and his Cabinet were compelled to resign owing to the ruinous effects of their policy. During their brief régime of forty-five days they had spread such a feeling of distrust and uneasiness, not only among the Jews, but throughout all commercial and industrial circles, that the economic life of the country was paralysed and the Government Treasury

was depleted, while the friendship of Great Britain and France was seriously jeopardised. King Carol therefore dismissed this incompetent and reactionary Ministry and created a new Government of 'National Union,' which included six former Prime Ministers, with the Patriarch Miron Christea as Premier. The selection of this ecclesiastical dignitary as head of the Administration unfortunately affords no prospect of any improvement in the treatment of the Jews, as he belongs to the same fanatical anti-Semitic school of thought as M. Goga and is an intimate friend of M. Codreanu, the leader of the Iron Guard. Only last summer he published a virulent attack upon the Jews (which purported to be his reply to an official Anglo-Jewish delegation, including the Chief Rabbi, whom he received on a visit to London), in which he said: 'Don't exploit us Rumanians, and don't exploit the other nations whose wealth you seize and appropriate unto yourselves with your ethnical and Talmudical cunning' (*Curentul*, August 19, 1937). Some of the new Ministers are hardly likely to exercise a moderating influence, and any hope that the new Government will abandon anti-Semitism as a policy is dispelled by its first official statement, which contains some of the most obnoxious features of M. Goga's programme:

> The Government will re-examine all naturalisations granted after the war. This will be carried out with justice. The Government will organise the departure of all the foreign elements which fall into the illegal class. Rumania will co-operate with other countries which have large Jewish populations, in order to find new homes for them.

This transparent threat to disfranchise and expel Jews is in no way mitigated by the futile proposal to 'find new homes.' It clearly shows that Rumania is still bent upon violating her pledges in the Minorities Treaty, to which she owes the generous enlargement of her territory. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the League's Committee of Three to act with the utmost energy and speed in order that the catastrophe that overshadows the Jews of that country shall be averted.

ISRAEL COHEN.

THE INDIAN CONGRESS CLAIM FOR INDEPENDENCE

By Sir Michael O'Dwyer, G.C.I.E., K.C S.I.

The object of the Indian Reforms, as defined by the Socialist Prime Minister (the late Mr. MacDonald) at the first Round Table Conference in 1921, was to transfer responsibility for the government of India from the British Parliament to Indian Legislatures, Central and Provincial, with due safeguards during the period of transition. These safeguards were to be exercised under the control of Parliament by the Governor-General in the new Central or Federal Government and by the Governors in the new autonomous provinces. Put baldly, the object was ultimately to replace British by Indian rule.

The principle on which the All-India Federation, embracing British India, with a population of 260,000,000, and the Indian States, with 80,000,000, was to be carried out was thus laid down by the Secretary of State at the close of the third Round Table Conference :

> We have been confronted with the problem of reconciling the claims of *three partners* who have for many generations been united in an undertaking of far-reaching ramifications : Great Britain, British India (the Provinces), and Indian India (the States). The old Articles of Association were getting out of date ; a new bond of union had to be formed. . . . The new bond must be the bond of an All-India Federation *with the rights of each of the three parties effectively safeguarded.*

These principles were clearly embodied in the White Paper of March 1933, which was the basis of the subsequent legislation. It (par. 26) laid down the very essential, if self-evident, condition—'that every endeavour will be made by those responsible for working the Constitution to approach the

administrative problems which will present themselves in the spirit of partners in a common enterprise.'

The Bill was framed and passed on that 'basic assumption'; the criticism raised in the parliamentary debates that the powerful Congress Party repudiated the spirit of partnership with either the British Government or the Indian States, and claimed complete independence for India, was met by the arguments that responsibility would alter those extreme views, and that, apart from the Congress, there was a great body of 'Moderate' opinion among the Indian politicians which would take advantage of the generous measure of self-government given by the Act and readily help in working it.

Unfortunately, both these specious arguments have so far not been realised. The Indian 'Moderates,' who in the Round Table Conferences and in the Joint Committee were accepted as the 'voice of India,' were almost completely wiped out in the first provincial elections held last year under the new Act; while the Congress secured a majority—in some cases sweeping—in seven out of the eleven provinces with two-thirds of the population of British India. Elated by their triumph—as unexpected in India as here—they are pressing the demand for severance of the British connexion with increased emphasis.

The Congress victory at the polls is due to two facts: (*a*) The Congress is almost exclusively Hindu, and with its widespread organisation was able to capture all the provinces in which the Hindus preponderate—*i e.*, all of India except Bengal and Assam in the north-east, the Punjab and Sinde in the north-west; while even in Bengal and Assam it is the strongest single party. (*b*) The Congress electoral manifesto of October 1936 made a special appeal to the cupidity, racial and religious prejudices of an ignorant and credulous electorate, raised at a stroke from 7,000,000 to 35,000,000, of whom at least four-fifths were illiterate and had never voted before. A few passages may be quoted as showing the nature of those appeals:

The struggle for freedom is still being continued and must continue till India is free and independent. . . . Only independence can give us power to solve our economic and special problems and to end the exploitation of our masses. . . . The purpose of sending Congress-

men to the Legislature is not to co-operate in any way with the Act, but to combat it and seek to end it, . . . to resist British Imperialism in its attempts to strengthen its hold on India and its exploitation of the Indian people.

Then follow the promises to the electorate. To the peasantry, reduced rent and land-revenue, no rent or revenue on uneconomic holdings, a *moratorium* on suits for debt or ejectment, scaling down of indebtedness, cheap State credit, progressive taxation on large agricultural incomes, and (later) the expropriation of landlords with or without full compensation. To the industrial worker, shorter hours, a higher wage, protection against sickness and unemployment, old-age pensions, recognition of labour unions, State settlement of industrial disputes. While on the political side the programme (which has since been carried out in the Congress provinces) included the repeal of repressive laws (security legislation), release of political prisoners and *detenus*, restoration of land confiscated for refusal to pay the State dues in the Civil Disobedience movements. Finally, the prohibition of the sale of liquor and drugs—a policy which, if carried out (and it has already been begun), would reduce the income of the provinces by some £12,000,000, or one-fourth of the total.

The framers of these cunning appeals must have realised that while they might for once capture an ignorant electorate, mainly composed of 'have-nots,' they could not, even in the most favourable conditions (political and economic), be realised for generations. Hence the manifesto very cleverly ends on the following note :

> The Congress realises that independence cannot be achieved through these Legislatures, nor can the problems of poverty and unemployment be effectively tackled by them. . . . But it places its general programme before the people of India so that they may know what it stands for and what it will try to achieve *whenever it has the power to do so.*

In other words, it said : Enable us to get rid of British Imperialism, put us in power, and, as the leaders of an independent India, we will give you all that we have promised.

The manifesto has been quoted at some length because it formulates the considered Congress policy, and, as such, its

main points were restated and expanded at the All-India Congress at Faizpur in December 1936, at the All-India Congress Committee at Wardha on February 27, 1937, and at Calcutta in October 1937.

It may be urged that the Congress, by accepting office in seven out of the eleven provinces, has shown a desire to work the Act 'in the spirit of partners in a common enterprise.' Unfortunately, there is little prospect of this. The Congress programme is still to wreck the Act. Pandit Jawahir Lal (the Congress President, whom his worst enemy cannot accuse of prevarication) stated on December 31, 1936, at the Faizpur Congress:

> The Constitution cannot be wrecked by action inside the Legislature only. For that mass action outside is necessary, and that is why we must always remember that the essence of our freedom struggle lies in mass organisation and mass action.

How successfully he carried out that policy was proved in the subsequent elections. Again, on July 10, 1937—after the Congress, having failed to bluff the Secretary of State and the Viceroy into giving an assurance that the safeguards would not be worked, had agreed to take office—the Pandit made this public declaration:

> Acceptance of office does not mean by an iota acceptance of this sham Constitution. It means a fight against the coming of Federation by all means in our power inside and outside the Legislature. We are not going to be partners and co-operators in this Imperial firm.

While the Congress Working Committee on July 2 passed this resolution:

> *The Working Committee is unable to subscribe to the doctrine of partnership.* The existing relation between the British Government and the people of India is that of exploiter and exploited.

There is, however, some ground for satisfaction in the fact that the Congress, where in a majority, has accepted the responsibilities of office, that some of the Ministers are able and reasonable men who, *if left to themselves*, would, with the Governor's advice and the willing co-operation of the Services, work for the good of their provinces, and that so far an open conflict between the Governor and the Congress

Ministers has been avoided. One would be more hopeful if the Ministers were not under the dictation of an outside and, so far as the provinces are concerned, irresponsible authority —namely, the All-India Congress Committee.

After the elections, on March 18, 1937, all the Congress representatives (between 700 and 800) were summoned to Delhi, where the following oath was administered to them by the Congress President:

> I, a member of this All-India Convention, pledge myself to the service of India *and to work in the Legislature and outside for the independence of India* and the ending of the exploitation and poverty of her people. . . . I pledge myself to work under the discipline of the Congress for the furtherance of Congress ideals and objectives to the end that India may be free and independent and her millions freed from the heavy burdens they suffer from.

This very stringent oath was intended to prevent any backsliding from the Congress goal of independence or any compromise with British Imperialism. But all those Congressmen, when they entered the Legislatures in July 1937, were required to, and did, take the following oath of allegiance:

> I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty the King-Emperor, His heirs and successors.

The Congress Ministers took an oath of allegiance even more strongly worded. The question was, and is, asked—here and in India—How can you reconcile an oath to work 'for the independence of India'—*i.e.*, ousting the King-Emperor—with an oath of 'true allegiance' to His Majesty? Mr. Gandhi in his accommodating way, and with an eye on Mr. de Valera's *volte face* in 1927, offered the following solution in his paper the *Harijan*:

> I hold that it is open to the legislator, consistently with his oath under the British Constitution, to adopt measures in the Legislature for complete independence.

Minds less supple and subtle may still ask, 'When is an oath not an oath?' Perhaps it is hoped to get rid of the oath as Mr. de Valera did.

But to the Congress legislator or Minister the overriding oath is that he has taken to the Congress. That was made clear at the All-India Congress Committee in Calcutta

on October 29, when the Congress left wing—strongly Socialist—arraigned several of the Congress Ministers for backsliding. The Madras Premier was violently attacked for having allowed the prosecution of a dangerous agitator for sedition, and only the plea of Pandit Jawahir Lal that the Premier was absent through illness and unable to defend himself saved him from censure. The Pandit himself was accused of co-operating with the Act. His defence was significant. All their endeavours (he said) were being directed to wrecking this unwanted Constitution. It was a matter of tactics and organisation. A good commander would not force a major and decisive war until his forces were properly organised and sufficiently strong to secure victory. But the subservience of Congress Ministers to the dictation of an outside junta was emphasised by the Premier of the United Provinces (Mr. B. G. Panth), who said that 'the Congress Committee has every right to sit in judgment on and examine the actions of the Congress Ministers, who were, after all, the creatures of the Congress and were there to carry out the behest of the Congress Committee.' Thus, not the interests of the Province, but the dictation of an outside junta, is to prevail. Is this democratic self-government?

There are, however, indications that some Congress Ministers are inclined to resist this dictation. The Premier of Bombay (Mr. B. G. Kher), in hoisting the Congress flag on a public building at Poona in December, said: 'Whatever may be the defects in the present Act, it has enabled us to wield power for the good of the masses, in whom real sovereignty rests.' The Madras Congress Premier (Mr. Rajagopalachariar) has also incurred odium by what appears to be an unwise attempt to make Hindi (the vernacular of Northern India) take the place of Tamil and Telugu in Southern India. For this, and for the failure to legislate for opening the temples to the untouchables, his Minister of Education (Dr. Subharoyan) was stoned at a public meeting at Salem on December 26, when there was a serious disturbance. Similar attacks on Congress Ministers by the masses, rural and urban, and by students, for failure or delay to carry out their reckless election pledges are now of almost daily occurrence. Both Mr. Jawahir Lal (the Congress President) and Mr. Gandhi are being kept busy in trying to reason with

the strikers, who for months have been paralysing industry in the great industrial centres (Bombay, Ahmadabad, Poona, Cawnpur, Calcutta), and the peasantry, who in the United and Central Provinces, Bihar and Orissa, have stormed the Council chambers demanding the promised reduction—one-half is the usual demand—of rent and land-revenue and the abolition of the landlord (zamindari) system.

The 'No Rent' campaign and the agrarian agitation have gained such strength that in Bihar one hundred of the great landlords have petitioned the Congress Government to take over their estates at the present valuation and deal directly with the tenants. A few years ago such a request would have been unthinkable; but all the wild talk of the Congress agitators has created a general feeling of insecurity in the Congress provinces, and land is said to be depreciating in value almost as rapidly as in the Irish Free State since Mr. de Valera's party came into power. The unrest in the industrial centres is even more serious, as it takes the form of intimidation and violence, such as the recent murder of an overseer of the Elgin Mills, Cawnpur. The Congress Ministers who have tried, so far without success, to effect agreement, as well as Mr. Nehru and Mr. Gandhi, have admitted that the strikes are largely fomented by outside Communists, and even by the left wing of their own party, which is rapidly becoming more powerful and aggressive. Sir C. Sitalvad, presiding over the National Liberal Federation at Calcutta a few weeks ago, said: 'The greatest danger, not only to the Congress but to the whole country, lies in the growing progress of Communism under the name and guise of Socialism.'

All this unrest reacts on the financial situation. With the falling off in land-revenue (roughly one-half of the provincial income) due to the Congress policy and the 'No Rent' agitation, and in income tax receipts owing to the industrial strikes, the Congress provinces must in any case find it difficult to balance their budgets. But they have had the folly to pledge themselves to a policy of prohibition of liquor and drugs, regardless of the lessons of America, and of the Bhopal and Baroda States in India itself, where the attempt to enforce such a policy has been a hopeless failure and has been abandoned. The excise revenue, which the Congress is prepared to sacrifice, comes to about one-fourth of the

total provincial income. No Congress Minister has yet made any practical proposal for making good this deficit by new taxation—which would arouse a storm of opposition. But here, too, Mr. Gandhi has had a 'brainwave'—namely, to use the present expenditure on education to make good the deficit, and in future make education self-supporting. Mr. Gandhi in his time has admitted more than one 'Himalayan blunder'; but here he is piling Pelion upon Ossa, Everest on Kinchinjunga. No one takes his proposal seriously.

Faced with the prospect of bankruptcy, if they attempt to redeem their electoral pledges, the Congress leaders have hit upon a subtler solution of their difficulties—namely, increased subsidies from the Central Government. The Centre has its separate sources of income—Customs, Salt, State Railways (generally in deficit), Income Tax (halved with the provinces), Posts and Telegraphs, etc.—from which it defrays, and with some difficulty, the cost of all-India services, including the service of the debt, pensionary and other charges in England, and, above all, defence. Already customs income—over half of the total—shows a serious decrease owing to the very high tariff imposed for the benefit of the Indian manufacturer. There is little prospect of expansion anywhere. The Congress members in the Central Legislature have therefore recently proposed to find the money for the provinces (*a*) by cutting down the emoluments of the Indian Civil Service by one-half, and (*b*) by a sweeping reduction of defence expenditure, and in particular by getting rid of the British element in the Army (some 60,000 out of a total of 220,000). A resolution covering (*a*) was defeated in the Upper Chamber (but Madras has already cut provincial salaries by from 5 to 30 per cent.—a doubtful move); while the Assembly, heedless of the arguments that not less but more money was urgently needed for defence, carried (*b*) by 70 votes to 51. Fortunately, the Assembly as yet has no power over military expenditure, and the same Assembly, alarmed by Japan's triumphal advance in China, two months later (January 30), is found denouncing the Government for its delay in mechanising the army and in starting great munition factories in India. But that the Congress, in the present international situation, should carry such a resolution for army reduction proves a reckless disregard for the peace and security of the country.

Their attitude has called forth a strong protest from H.H. he Maharaja of Gwalior (one of the leading Princes), for the rinces, now as always, have been the strongest supporters f the British connexion, realising that the Crown is the uarantor of the integrity and internal sovereignty of their States, which would be seriously imperilled by a reduction f the military forces. His Highness said publicly on December 5 :

> It makes me shudder when I hear some politicians of this ountry—men who should know better—talk of the desirability f reducing the strength of the Army in India. I wonder how many f our people realise the real extent of the weakness of our country's ast land and sea frontiers against the danger of attacks by watchful, ungry and angry rival nations ? Our destinies are bound up with hose of Britain. We must therefore look ahead and strengthen ur defences in such a way that we may be able to stand firmly y the side of the Emperor to face any eventuality.

There speaks the true voice of loyal India. What a ontrast to that of the Congress leaders, who look on England's difficulty as India's opportunity, who last year esolved to boycott all Coronation celebrations in India, and isapproved of His Majesty's granting honours, and whose President (Mr. Nehru), when asked what would be the Congress attitude towards a Royal visit, said (see *Hindu*, August 12, 1937) : 'The best way to avoid any clash is to eep the King in England' !

Unfortunately, our desire to secure the co-operation which they repudiate) of the Congress at any cost and our ecent weak toleration of the demand for independence—which previously had been rightly treated as seditious—have lisheartened our erstwhile supporters and encouraged all the ubversive forces in India. Even some of the Congress Ministers are now becoming alive to the growing dangers, ut are admittedly unable to control them. Referring to the ontinuous strikes, Mr. Gandhi wrote in the *Harijan* of November 25 : 'The Sholapur affair and the labour unrest n Cawnpur and Ahmadabad show how uncertain is the ontrol of the Congress Government over the forces of lisorder.' One may ask : Was the British Parliament wise in rematurely abandoning responsibility for the peace and ecurity of 260,000,000 of people to hands which in at least

two-thirds of British India are unequal to the task, and whose declared object is to sever the British connexion?

In the one-third of India where the Congress is not in power the Ministries, notably in the Punjab, are making valiant efforts to work the Constitution in the spirit of 'partners in a common enterprise.' But they have to face the open hostility of the Congress, both within and without the province, who seek to discredit them as being unpatriotic and subservient. The Congress in the United Provinces not only released the notorious conspirators in the Kakori murder case, but arranged for a public ovation to them on their return to the scene of their crimes, while one Minister entertained them at a public banquet! As a result of this hero-worship some of them have taken the field again preaching sedition, and six have now been re-arrested and convicted at Dehli for defiance of the law. The Congress in Bengal are violently attacking the non-Congress Ministry there for delaying to release *all* of those convicted of the most serious terrorist crimes there. Many think clemency has already gone too far in Bengal, and the position of the magistracy and police as responsible for law and order is everywhere being made more difficult.

But perhaps the worst result of the change is the growing communal hatred. The Calcutta *Statesman*, the most influential newspaper in India and a consistent supporter of the new order, wrote in an October editorial: 'Every lover of India must feel disturbed at the fierce communal political controversy which *has broken out since the advent of provincial autonomy*.' Again in the issue of November 27, while opposing the suggestion of the writer of this article that Parliament should at least keep itself informed of the Indian situation, the editor wrote: 'We feel that the terrible outburst of the communal spirit is as dangerous as it is depressing.' The situation must be indeed critical to have provoked from the Muslim Premier of Bengal (*Statesman*, October 24) the following public outburst: 'If the Hindu Congress Ministers continue to follow a policy of repression in the other provinces I declare from this platform that I shall retaliate in Bengal, even if it costs me my life.' How long can Parliament shut its eyes to these facts?

So far this article has dealt only with the provinces. But

provincial autonomy was meant to pave the way for an All-India Federation including the provinces and the Indian States. It is well known that from the start the Princes as a body had no love for Federation, though some of the most important accepted it in principle, while all were, and are, anxious to meet the wishes of the British Government provided that their rights are adequately guaranteed ; and only a strong Central Government with an adequate defence force can ensure that. But within the last year the triumph of the Congress in two-thirds of British India, their hostile attitude to the Crown as well as to vested interests in land, and their insistent demand for independence—which is the last thing the Princes desire—have made the Princes even more hesitant as to joining a partnership in which the other partner desires to squeeze them out of existence. Moreover, they see that in October 1937 the All-India Congress Committee at Calcutta and the Muslim League at Lucknow—the two most influential political bodies in India—while at issue on everything else, were unanimous in denouncing the proposed Federation and repudiating any attempt to bring it about. Even before this hostility had become so marked, H.H. the Maharaja of Patiala, as Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, asked them in January 1935 :

> Seriously to consider whether we should put ourselves in the position in which practically every important body of opinion in British India considers us unwelcome partners and looks upon our entry into Federation with suspicion. The benefits of Federation to the Indian States are not so overwhelming that, whatever the opinion of British India, it would be our interest to join it

Instead of trying to force on a spurious Federation between unwilling and even hostile units (some provinces have already decided to send no members to the Federal legislature) would it not be wise for Government to take note of their declaration in par. 13 of the White Paper ?—viz. :

> If causes beyond their control should place obstacles in the way of their programme they will take steps to review the whole position in consultation with Indian opinion.

Admittedly the Indian States should in future have a voice in matters of ' common concern '—*e.g.*, Defence, Currency, Customs, Tariffs, Posts and Telegraphs, Railways. But there

are other ways of securing this than by partial cession of their sovereignty to a Federation which no one at present (except the Hindu Sabha aiming at Hindu supremacy) seems to want. The Simon Commission's proposal of a 'Council of Greater India'—composed of representatives of British India and the States in the ratio of 2 to 1 under the Viceroy—would probably furnish a solution more acceptable to all concerned. Federation could come later if the consent of the units concerned were secured and when conditions were ripe for it. A Federal Government established now would be divided, weak, and liable to speedy disintegration.

The foregoing review of the situation shows that our Indian Empire is in a serious state of *malaise*. There will be no going back on provincial autonomy, as limited by the statutory safeguards, unless it is proved unworkable; but the British Government will not tolerate the Congress demand for Independence, which is a flat repudiation of the Act of 1935 and is in fact sedition. It has just been held by the Chief Justice of Mysore that a man taking the Congress Independence pledge is guilty of an act of disloyalty to H.H. the Maharaja inasmuch as the latter has by treaty acknowledged the supremacy of the King-Emperor (the *Statesman*, December 16). If the Independence pledge is seditious in an Indian State, how much more so in British India. India in the past has never been independent; and if Britain were so mad as to give her independence, she would speedily become again the prey of the foreign invaders or predatory war-lords who held her in thrall before British rule. 'The question is' (in the words of a well-known French observer), 'not whether England has the right to keep India, but rather whether she has the right to leave it.'

The late Lord Cromer, with his unrivalled knowledge of and profound sympathy with Oriental races, went to the heart of the matter when he wrote:

> It will be well for England, better for India and best of all for the cause of progressive civilisation, if it be clearly understood from the outset that however liberal the concessions which have now been made we *have not the slightest intention of abandoning our Indian possessions.*

It is high time we made that clear to everyone in India. It would have a most reassuring effect on all but the wreckers.

M. F. O'Dwyer.

THE STORY OF THE EGYPTIAN CRISIS

By P. P. Graves

The signature of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Great Britain on August 31, 1936, seemed to presage a new era of security abroad and stability at home for the kingdom of Egypt. The seventeen years' struggle with the British Government was over at last. Egypt had become a sovereign independent State guaranteed against foreign aggression by the might of the British Empire and against British interference by the terms of the Treaty of Alliance. Egyptian public opinion rightly ascribed the chief credit for this triumph to the Wafd, the most popular, in every sense of the word, and incomparably the best organised, of the Egyptian political parties. After six years in the wilderness of Opposition—which it voluntarily entered by boycotting the election of 1931—it had wrung from King Fuad the restoration of the Constitution of 1923, which the masses still regarded with a sort of mystical reverence as a talisman against every ill. Seven of the thirteen Egyptian delegates who negotiated the Treaty with Sir Miles Lampson and his advisers were Wafdists; Mustapha Nahas Pasha, the chairman of the Egyptian Delegation, was the leader of the party, the successor and once the devoted lieutenant of the national hero Saad Zaghloul Pasha. He had become Prime Minister in the course of the negotiations after a free general election in which his party won a complete victory over the disunited Opposition; his personal relations with the British Ambassador were most friendly; and the leaders of the Opposition had no inclination and no excuse to adopt an attitude of hostility towards the Wafdist chiefs with whom they had co-operated to restore the Constitution and to bring the negotiations with Great Britain to a triumphant close.

There were, however, not a few critics who doubted

whether the Wafdists would be as effective in office as they had proved in Opposition. They pointed out that when in power the party had initiated the practice, afterwards imitated by anti-Wafdist Governments, of dismissing or transferring judges, mudirs (provincial governors), and other high officials for purely political reasons, and had thus alienated the independent elements in the bureaucracy. When in Opposition they had made a practice of encouraging the 'students'—a term which comprised not a few agitators who had abandoned their studies years ago—to go on strike, brawl and riot in support of Wafdist policy whenever Ministerial hesitancy promised concessions to turbulence. Far too many of these young men looked forward to rewards for their prowess in the shape of comfortable official jobs for all their hopes to be fulfilled. Much had been promised to the fellaheen and the urban workmen: the fulfilment of these promises would be costly; so, too, would be the fulfilment of the military clauses of the Treaty. The formation in the last months of King Fuad's life of a party army of Blueshirts, which was to resist the police in the event of another attempt to counter demagogy by the assertion of the royal prerogative, aroused anxiety and distrust, and not among non-Wafdists only. These emotions increased as the students, who had been strong in the Blueshirt ranks during the turbulent last months of 1935, gave way to recruits drawn from the 'tougher' elements in the towns. Last, but not least, the critics pointed out that the Wafd had been formed to secure Egyptian independence and had united men professing the most diverse political opinions in a common national struggle. Now that the battle had been won, would the party maintain its unity? Perhaps foreseeing this possibility, Nahas Pasha had found a second string for the Wafdist bow in an attack on the use (or abuse) of the royal prerogative. While King Fuad lived, the campaign was unsuccessful but not unpopular, for that masterful and astute ruler could never quite conceal a certain Turkish disdain for the mass of his subjects, and his choice of agents and the treatment of the members of his family often gave the Wafd unexpected if uncertain allies. But when he died (game to the last) and the kindly and sentimental hearts of the masses overflowed in welcome to their young King Farouk, the second string had obviously

lost its immediate utility. Nahas Pasha and his chief adviser and confidant, Makram Ebeid Pasha, did not realise the obvious fact. Instead of preparing to guide, counsel and conciliate their young and inexperienced King as soon as he came of age, they prepared, first quietly and then openly, for battle. And they made the mistake of supposing that the British Government would support such a policy, although it was certainly not the intention of Parliament, which had voted for the Treaty, that His Majesty's Government should henceforth intervene in the domestic affairs of Egypt.

One more step, the abolition of the Capitulations, was required before Egyptian sovereignty was complete. The negotiations at Montreux last spring ended well for Egypt. Steadily supported by a British delegation led by Captain Euan Wallace, M.P., Nahas Pasha and his colleagues, among whom were Makram and Ahmed Maher Pashas, showed a moderation and tact that left the best impression on the foreign delegates and were rapturously welcomed on their return to Egypt. Unfortunately, this success, so far from spurring the Egyptian Prime Minister to undertake a comprehensive programme of social and administrative reform, seemed to have the reverse effect. Administration had never been the Wafd's strong suit; on returning to power the Wafdists had scrapped most of the measures imposed by decree law during Ali Maher Pasha's Premiership, for no visible reason save that they were the work of a non-Wafdist, though neutral, Prime Minister governing without Parliament. They produced no reforms of importance. Their appointments followed the old rule of the spoils to the victors. In the words of an Egyptian critic, 'they lay back happily in their arm-chairs and enjoyed their success.'

This happy lethargy did not, however, content all their leaders. Two in particular regarded it with angry impatience. Mahmud Nokrashi Pasha had shown marked ability in organising the political campaigns of the Wafd. As Minister of Communications he had shown an administrative ability which was rare in his party and had won the respect of the British officials who had been prejudiced against him—for reasons that will be set forth later. He was connected by marriage with Madame Saad Zaghloul, a Circassian lady popularly known as the 'mother of the nation,' who enjoys

an esteem, which is by no means confined to Wafdist circles, both as the widow of the national hero and as a gentlewoman of good counsel (when well-informed), dignity and character. Ahmed Maher Pasha had carried out his duties as President of the Chamber with an impartiality and competence that had favourably impressed all parties; and both men had played an important part in the Treaty negotiations. Their political past had been stormy. They had belonged to the more extreme wing of the Wafd in its revolutionary days, and they were among the seven prominent Wafdists who were tried in 1926 by Judge Kershaw and two Egyptian judges on a charge of complicity in the political murders of 1922. Six of the accused were acquitted, Nokrashi and Maher among them; but the acquittal was followed by the resignation of Judge Kershaw, on the ground that in four cases the verdict was contrary to the evidence, and by a protestatory note from the British Government. The four names were never published, and most men of sense will now agree to leave the matter there.

Both these leaders, and other Wafdists for that matter, had for long resented Nahas Pasha's extensive delegation of authority to Makram Pasha and the excessive influence which the Coptic Minister of Finance exercised in the councils of the party. Makram Pasha has great oratorical gifts. His knowledge and command of classical Arabic (still a great asset in Egypt) are remarkable and rare among his Christian co-religionists, whose education in American or English missionary schools too often confers on them the doubtful advantage of speaking two languages very indifferently. Many Egyptians and some British observers consider him to be more effective in Opposition than in office—an active fighting politician rather than an administrator, often imprudent in speech and untaught by his years at Oxford to distinguish appearance from reality. In fairness to Makram Pasha, it should be added that the Coptic community is still regarded by the Moslem majority with the same jealousy that the Jews incur in many European countries—a sentiment which is intensified in Egypt by the disproportionate strength of the Copts—numbering some 9 per cent., at most, of a population of 15,000,000—in the Civil Service. Nahas Pasha, too, had incurred criticism on the

ground that success was making him overbearing, and Ahmed Maher Pasha had felt himself obliged to protest, after the Montreux negotiations, against the interference of the Prime Minister's young and energetic wife in Government appointments.

On July 29 last year King Farouk came of age. A few days after his accession to the throne Nahas Pasha formed a new Cabinet, from which he excluded Nokrashi Pasha and three other Wafdist Ministers. The exclusion of Nokrashi deprived the Government of one of the few Wafdists of marked administrative capacity. It alarmed many members of the party, and all the more since it had become known that Ahmed Maher Pasha did not see eye to eye with his chief. Nokrashi Pasha refused the lucrative consolation of an Egyptian directorship on the Board of the Suez Canal Company. He did not, however, go into Opposition at once, and abstained from any public or private criticism of the Government, until on September 13 the Wafdist executive expelled him by eight votes against that of Ahmed Maher Pasha. His expulsion was the signal for a revival of party politics. At a time when the Government had to fulfil a number of important international undertakings, such as the building up of a new army and the construction of barracks, roads and bridges, it turned joyfully to partisan strife. Nokrashi Pasha was subjected to a series of violent attacks in the Wafdist newspapers, which at the same time overflowed with the naive panegyrics in honour of Nahas Pasha and his perfect Government which so often do duty for leading articles in Egypt. To prevent an increase in the limited number of the sympathisers with the rebel, the Blueshirts, with or without orders, attacked the houses and beat the persons of individual Wafdists whom they suspected of sharing the views of Nokrashi Pasha, whom they accused, perhaps with some reason, of having left the Government because they would not disband this disorderly party army. Nahas Pasha himself disapproved of these assaults, but allowed himself to be persuaded by his advisers not to disband the Blueshirts. In spite of their violence, Nokrashi Pasha acquired the sympathies of independent Wafdists who disliked the Government's policy, or lack of it, and of the 'Saadist' Wafdists who had rebelled against Nahassite

control before 1935. Dr. Hamid Mahmud, who represented the Wafd in London in the early days of Sidky Pasha's dictatorship and had been Under-Secretary for Health in 1936, was one of the former. The latter group included Ali Shamsi Pasha, a respected ex-Minister who had taken part in the Treaty negotiations as delegate of the Saadist Wafd. Ahmed Maher Pasha continued to show his independence in the inner councils of his party. But as yet there was no outward sign of any serious rift in the Wafd.

Meanwhile, the relations between the Government and the young King had taken a bad turn. Nahas Pasha, in forming his new Cabinet after the King's accession, had proposed the name of Yusef el-Gindi Bey as Minister of Education. King Farouk objected to the appointment. Gindi Bey had had a turbulent and revolutionary past and for this and, perhaps, for other reasons was not regarded by the King's advisers as an ideal Minister. He was therefore appointed Under-Secretary of State for the Ministry of the Interior, where he was largely responsible for the maintenance of public security.

Later in the summer the King expressed a wish to appoint Ali Maher Pasha Chief of the Royal Cabinet. This office is important. The duties of its holder include the maintenance of communications between the King and his Prime Minister, and also between him and the representatives of foreign Powers. The choice of Ali Maher Pasha might well have commended itself to the Government. During the four months of his Premiership the Pasha had shown conspicuous impartiality, had issued several useful and constructive decree laws, and had adhered strictly to the Constitution. He had made no attempt to interfere in the election of 1936, which was conducted with a fairness acknowledged on all sides: his past justified the belief that any advice which he might give the King would be prudent and constitutional; and the fact that his brother Ahmed Maher Pasha was one of the pillars of the Wafd should have made him a *persona grata* with the Wafdist General Staff. Nevertheless, the Wafdist chiefs objected to his appointment, perhaps because they would have preferred their own nominee to act as the King's liaison officer—more probably because Nahas Pasha and his adherents had already realised that Ahmed Maher Pasha was

regarded as the destined successor to the leadership of the party by an increasing number of its members. He opposed the appointment; the young King refused to give way, and from the deadlock sprang the political crisis that came to a head in December.

The differences between the Government and the King and between Nahas Pasha and Ahmed Maher Pasha were not known to the public. Nokrashi Pasha had endured attacks in dignified silence. Ahmed Maher Pasha, protected by his office as President of the Chamber, kept silence publicly, and tried to prevent the quarrel between Government and Palace from taking a more acute form. He failed, however, to induce his chief to adopt more conciliatory tactics towards the King, to improve the Administration, and at least restrain the overbearing Blueshirts. The tactful mediation of the British Embassy in the dispute might have succeeded had the Embassy been in close contact with the Palace during the summer and early autumn. This absence of touch was ascribed to the fact that no Chief of the Royal Cabinet had been appointed; whatever its reasons, it gave the impression that the Embassy was entirely with the Wafd, and when at last it tendered its good offices to the Palace they came too late. On October 20 the King, tired of waiting, appointed Ali Maher Pasha Chief of his Cabinet. His action aroused great excitement in Nahassite circles. The Prime Minister made a number of demands involving the restriction of the royal prerogative, notably in the appointment of the Palace staff; the Ministerial Press opened a campaign of protest against the (unspecified) threat to the national liberties and seasoned it with eulogies of Nahas Pasha. The students, however, who had once been mainly Nahassite in their sympathies, now took sides and demonstrated for or against Nokrashi and Makram Pashas, engaged in conflicts with Blueshirts or police, and drove the rector of the Egyptian University, Lutfi Said Bey, a liberal and broad-minded man, to resign his office in despair. On October 26 the Prime Minister went to Alexandria from Cairo to defend the national liberties before the King, and was somewhat illogically saluted at both cities by mass parades of Blueshirts. King Farouk assured him that he had appointed Ali Maher Pasha because of his own personal confidence in him; and added

that since the King was above party politics, the Chief of his Cabinet was also necessarily above them. Comforted by these gracious assurances, Nahas Pasha returned to Cairo, to find Makram Pasha far from convinced that all had gone well. Subsequent developments proved that the doubt was justified. During the interval between the visit to Alexandria and the opening of Parliament the relations between King and Government went from bad to worse. The wild words of prominent members of the Wafd reached the Palace and provoked the King and/or his advisers to obstruct various measures which required the royal assent by invoking the sometimes doubtful rights of the monarch under the Constitution of 1923.

Thus baited, Nahas Pasha retorted by attempting to obtain the modification of the army oath to the King to one of allegiance to the King and Constitution, an attempt which the Palace resisted. He seized the occasion of Ali Maher Pasha's resignation of his (nominated) seat in the Senate to try to persuade his sovereign to nominate a Wafdist of the least importance for the vacant place, to which the King retorted by pressing the claims of a judge who was an ornament to the bench but a well-known adversary of the Wafd. Nahas Pasha's refusal to disband the Blueshirts, who were now turning their attention from rebellious Wafdists to members of the Opposition, supplied his opponents with the political ammunition which they needed. The irresponsible language of prominent Wafdists, the visit of Nahas Pasha to Germany after the signature of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, and various episodes in the stormy history of the party were raked up in support of the theory that the Prime Minister was preparing to establish a party dictatorship in which the King would play the part of a rubber stamp. It must be added that the subsequent conduct of the Government added colour to this lurid picture. In the writer's opinion, Nahas Pasha had no such intentions; but bad advice and his own pride persuaded him against his own instinct to maintain the unconstitutional Blueshirt army rather than admit defeat by disbanding it in compliance with the desire of the King and the Opposition. Had he decided to give way on this point, to jettison Makram Pasha and to make peace with the dissidents, he might have weathered the coming storm. But

he would not throw over Makram Pasha—for reasons that were far more creditable to him as a man than as a politician; and he attempted to fend off Ahmed Maher Pasha and the dissidents instead of satisfying their demands for a change of policy. Nor did he prevent the Ministry of the Interior from persuading workmen employed by the State Railways and the Government Printing Press by promises or cash to join the Blueshirts in intimidating members of the Opposition by attacking them and stoning their houses. At the same time the return in November of Sir Miles Lampson, who cut short his leave in consequence of the dispute between the Wafd and the Palace, unfortunately gave rise to the rumour that he had come back to support Nahas Pasha. This and similar stories encouraged a general (and erroneous) belief that the British Government were committed to the support of the Prime Minister against all rivals inside or outside the Wafd.

On November 18 the King opened Parliament. The Speech from the Throne was a recital of what the Government had done or hoped to do. Nahas Pasha did, indeed, inform the Chamber that student disturbances would be put down, but said nothing about the Blueshirts or the Government workmen who had been used against his opponents. He proposed the re-election of Ahmed Maher Pasha to the Presidency of the Chamber—no doubt to the Pasha's secret disappointment—in the most flattering terms and made some changes in the Cabinet which did not materially strengthen it. Mohamed Mahmud Pasha, Ismail Sidky Pasha, and other leaders of the Opposition seized upon the occasion to submit a petition to the King. They drew his attention to the Cabinet's claim that they alone were responsible for obtaining the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, though it was the fruit of the co-operation of all parties in the United Front, suggested that he might urge his Ministers to keep alive the national spirit in which the negotiations had been conducted, and protested against the intimidation practised by Blueshirts and Government workmen.

It was now becoming evident that the situation was moving too fast for Ahmed Maher Pasha's dissidents. They would have preferred to wait until Nahas Pasha's position grew weaker before they asserted themselves, but they began

to realise that if they gave no sign the King would before long dismiss the Government and invite Mohamed Mahmud Pasha, the leader of the Constitutional Liberals, instead of a Wafdist to form a Cabinet. The logic of the situation called for a change in leadership rather than a direct frontal attack on the Wafdist Party, strongly entrenched in Parliament, and still supported by the masses, who knew next to nothing of what was happening behind the scenes, and by the Arabic Press, which was mostly under Government control. But the King and some of his less responsible advisers were becoming anti-Wafdist rather than anti-Nahassite, and events confirmed them in their attitude. Ten days after the opening of Parliament a disgruntled member of an organisation known as the Greenshirts fired four shots at Nahas Pasha's motor-car without hitting him.

The Greenshirts were a small body fostered by King Fuad as a counterpoise to the Blueshirts. It had become still smaller after his death and was kept alive with some difficulty by a few extreme Nationalists who disliked the Treaty, some religious enthusiasts, and, it was alleged, by foreign subventions. The would-be assassin who had been helping the Palestine terrorists defended his action on the ground that the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was a betrayal of Egyptian rights. The first result of the attempt was to rally support to Nahas Pasha. Unhappily for him, Makram Pasha and Gindi Bey tried to exploit the crime by accusing very nearly all their chief opponents of having instigated it. A large number of persons were arrested, and bands of workmen from Government establishments, armed with crowbars and supported by Blueshirts, attacked the houses of Mohamed Mahmud Pasha and other notables. They met the attack by calling up bands of Saidis armed with *nabuts* (metal-shod quarter staves) from their estates in Upper Egypt, and the ensuing tumults alarmed peaceful citizens and injured the Government's reputation. Nahas Pasha in the meanwhile had planned a Bill for safeguarding the Constitution. According to trustworthy sources, its main purpose was to render liable to draconic penalties any Prime Minister who, if he had no parliamentary majority on his appointment by the King, should fail to hold a general election within the two months prescribed by the Constitution. A Bill on these

lines, providing, *inter alia*, for a maximum sentence of ten years' hard labour on any peccant Prime Minister, had been presented to King Fuad, and its rejection by him led to the fall of Nahas Pasha's second Ministry in June 1930 and the setting up of Sidky Pasha's dictatorship. Ali Maher Pasha is understood to have warned Nahas Pasha that a similar Bill would be disallowed by King Farouk as being based on the offensive assumption that the royal nominee would necessarily violate the Constitution. Independent critics added that no judges would impose such severe penalties as the Bill was believed to contain.

Thenceforward events moved rapidly, assisted by misunderstandings and miscalculations, to a strange conclusion. A visit paid by the British Ambassador and members of his staff to condole with Nahas Pasha, who was suffering from complications of a distressing complaint, had been widely interpreted as evidence that the British Government had anchored their hopes to the Wafd. On December 13 Ali Maher Pasha therefore informed Mohamed Mahmud Pasha, who had believed that he would be the King's nominee when Nahas Pasha was dismissed, that Ahmed Maher Pasha was to succeed Nahas. Mahmud Pasha, though naturally annoyed at this change of front, patriotically offered his and his party's support to any Prime Minister whom the King should appoint in Nahas Pasha's place. Negotiations followed between Ali Maher Pasha and his brother, but the Diplomatic Body does not seem to have known of them at the time, and it was not until December 17, when *The Times* published a message from its Cairo correspondent giving the facts of the situation, that it was understood that the quarrel between the Palace and the Nahas Government had gone so far. Two days later Ali Maher Pasha seems to have authorised the publication by Reuter's well-informed Cairo correspondent of a statement that Nahas Pasha would soon be dismissed. On December 20 Sir Miles Lampson, who feared that a constitutional crisis might cause agitation and rioting which would imperil British and foreign interests and prejudice the fulfilment of the military clauses of the Treaty, had an audience with the King in which he is believed to have drawn the royal attention to the inconveniences, if not the dangers, which might follow precipitate

action. The King, however, assured the Ambassador that he had the situation well in hand, and the Palace put it about that the 'intervention' of the Ambassador had not changed the situation. It would seem, however, that the Ambassador's action did have the unintended result of causing the Palace to swerve away from the idea of appointing Ahmed Maher Pasha. On the following day Makram Pasha was attacked by a mob of students from Al Azhar who were demonstrating in the King's favour outside Abdin Palace, whereupon Nahas Pasha convened a meeting of the Wafdist Parliamentary Party, where all present were invited to take an oath to follow no Prime Minister but himself. Ahmed Maher Pasha attended the meeting and spoke his mind, but only a few Wafdists declined to take the oath.

Several days of suspense followed, and it was not until December 27 that Ahmed Maher Pasha learnt that, in view of this oath and of what the King's advisers professed to believe was the attitude of the British Government, there was no chance of a reconstituted Wafdist Ministry. He refused to form a coalition Government and was supported by Nokrashi Pasha, who, with the support of Sheikh Maraghi, the rector of Al Azhar, urged the Palace not to allow Nahas Pasha's errors of tact and judgment to bring the young King into direct conflict with Parliament. But his efforts were in vain; a week earlier Makram Pasha and the Minister of Justice had been unable to give a direct reply to the King's demand for the disbandment of the Blueshirts, and it is not yet certain whether the alleged offer of the Wafdists to convert this body into a 'gymnastic' society was ever officially made. On December 28 Mohamed Mahmud Pasha met Ahmed Maher Pasha, and told him in the presence of his brother that in this crisis he would serve under him or support him as Prime Minister if he would assume that responsibility. Ahmed Maher Pasha would not form a coalition Ministry: he agreed, however, to support any constitutional Government which might be formed. Later in the day, however, he withdrew his agreement after a meeting with Nokrashi Pasha, who seems to have taken the strongest objection to the probable inclusion of Sidky Pasha in Mahmud Pasha's proposed Cabinet, and doubted Mahmud Pasha's constitutionalism, since he had governed without Parliament during

the greater part of 1928–29. A last attempt was made at the suggestion of Ali Shamsi Pasha, the Egyptian Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations, to postpone an irrevocable decision by submitting the differences that had arisen between the King and his Government on constitutional questions to the judgment of an *ad hoc* Council of State composed of constitutional lawyers, judges, and senators and others, whose ruling should be final. But the committee's proposal was rejected by Nahas Pasha, on the ground that the majority of its members were likely to show an anti-Wafdist bias. He also rejected a Palace proposal for the reconstruction of his Cabinet on a coalition basis. On the morning of December 30 he was dismissed from office by a royal rescript, which justified the King's action on the score of the evidence that the Cabinet methods of governing were no longer supported by the people, who blamed it for having deviated from the spirit of the Constitution and from having failed to protect public liberties. The King named Mahmud Pasha Prime Minister and ordered the prorogation of Parliament for a month.

Mahmud Pasha's Cabinet was ready. It included Ismail Sidky Pasha (Finance), Abdel Fettah Yehia Pasha (Foreign Affairs), and several well-known Liberals and Independents. He informed the correspondent of *The Times* that the first task of his Government would be to restore confidence in public security and to make it clear that no disorders or organisations capable of producing disorders would be tolerated. The next task would be to set going the wheels of government, which were at a standstill owing to the excessive concentration of authority in the hands of the Prime Minister and the preoccupation of Ministers with novel interpretations of the Constitution to the detriment of public business. This done, the Government would improve the efficiency of the Administration, introduce reforms to benefit the fellaheen and the urban working classes, implement the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, and submit to Parliament various measures necessitated by the abolition of the Capitulations and the independence of Egypt. The new Prime Minister ordered the disbandment of Blueshirts and Greenshirts. Both ' armies ' vanished overnight. Complete calm prevailed, in spite of the forebodings of members of the Diplomatic

Body and the Press. On January 3 Parliament met to hear the royal rescripts read by an official of the Chamber. Ahmed Maher Pasha refused Nahas Pasha permission to speak before they were read. After an altercation, during which the lights were turned out, the police cleared the Chamber, where the rescript of prorogation does not seem to have been read, while a large majority of the elected senators passed a resolution expressing dissatisfaction with the Cabinet and requested the King to reconsider the situation. Subsequently the Wafdist executive expelled Dr. Ahmed Maher and other deputies from the party.

The new Government turned at once to their task. Mahmud Pasha appointed the first Egyptian Inspector-General of the Army in the person of Aziz el-Masri Pasha, a gallant and experienced officer who had served with distinction in the Turkish army against the Italians in Cyrenaica, had narrowly escaped death at the jealous hands of Enver Pasha, had subsequently espoused the Arab cause, had shown great ability in training young officers of the police, and had been selected to assist Sir Ahmed Hassanein Pasha in supervising the education in England of King Fuad's heir. The appointment was criticised by some senior Egyptian officers, but was welcomed by public opinion. Meanwhile, Labour began to stir. Nabil Abbas Halim Pasha, an energetic and attractive Turk who had served in the German army during the war, had incurred the displeasure of King Fuad on account of the sympathies he had evinced for Egyptian Labour and had been deprived of the title of 'Nabil,' which is given to the younger sons of princes of the House of Mohamed Ali. The royal displeasure did not prevent him from becoming a Labour leader of importance. He was trusted, and deservedly, by the members of the embryonic trade unions but distrusted by the Wafdists, who, indignant at his refusal to bring his followers into the party fold, accused him of Fascist intentions. After King Fuad's death he was reconciled to the young King and withdrew for a time from politics. He now appears to have re-entered the fray. Over thirty trade unions recently announced their secession from the federation formed in the Wafdist interest. That Nahas Pasha saw his hand in this seems to be proved by the fact that the ex-Prime Minister included his name in an unsuccessful petition to the Pro-

curator-General wherein he sought to connect Mahmud Pasha and many other prominent Egyptians with the attempt on his life. This attempt to revive popular passions did not, however, prevent a drift of Wafdists to the '*Saadist*' *Wafd*, as Maher and Nokrashi Pashas called their party to show its adherence to the principles of Saad Zaghloul. By January 12 the dissidents from less than a dozen in number had reached a parliamentary total of nearly fifty, in spite of the oath of December 22. Then the drift ceased, and, though several deputies were expected to abandon the official Wafd when Parliament met, it was far from certain that Mahmud Pasha would obtain a majority on a vote of confidence in the Chamber. The chances that a general election would be avoided grew more remote. Then came the happy interlude of the King's marriage, which was celebrated throughout all Egypt with becoming pomp and most fervent demonstrations of loyalty to the young and popular King. These festivities were followed by the resignation from the Wafdist executive of Ahmed el-Amr Pasha, who had taken Nokrashi Pasha's place. The blow was little lightened by the Pasha's statement that he would not join the Saadist Wafd.

Nevertheless, the expected trial of parliamentary strength was not made. Mahmud Pasha had intended to meet the Chamber on February 2, when the Government professed to be confident that with Saadist aid they would defeat the 'no confidence' motion which Nahas Pasha was expected to propose. But, learning that the Wafdists were preparing to organise disorders, and 'even to fire revolvers,' in the Chamber, and apprehending that the dignity of Parliament would suffer, Mahmud Pasha obtained a royal decree dissolving the Chamber and convoking a new Chamber on April 12. The Wafd could not contest the legality of the decree, which conformed strictly to the Constitution, but they naturally claimed that Mahmud's unwillingness to meet Parliament gave them a moral victory, since it showed that he anticipated defeat. The general election will be held on April 2, by which time the formalities will have been completed to enable new constituencies to vote. All parties are now preparing for the struggle. The Nahassites, although they have petitioned the King to form a neutral Cabinet to superintend the election, which they fear might otherwise be

held unfairly, seem to have no intention of boycotting it as they boycotted Sidky Pasha's election. The result is likely to depend not a little on the Saadists. If they are as strong as they believe, and if they co-operate with the constitutional Liberals and other non-Wafdist groups, as the formation of a joint election Committee of Saadists, Liberals and supporters of Sidky Pasha has led the public to expect, the official Wafdists may well be defeated. The immense popularity of the young King, the public knowledge of the rift within the party, and widespread disappointment at their administrative slackness are against them. On the other hand, no rebel against the Wafd has yet made good against the party machine. The fellaheen may still be under the spell of the almost mystical belief in the party which brought Nahas Pasha back in 1936; and it is doubtful whether the average voter is fully aware of the extent to which the dispute with the Palace was mishandled. The contrast between Nahas Pasha's conciliatory and statesmanlike moderation during the Treaty negotiations and the Conference at Montreux, and his, or his advisers', treatment of the King, the Saadists and the Opposition during the recent crisis, is indeed inexplicable.

Whatever the issue of the elections, it is impossible not to feel misgivings as to the future. Democracy and constitutional Government are young plants not yet fully acclimatised in the rich soil of Egypt, and their survival might be equally threatened by the victory or the defeat of the Wafd. In the one case Nahas Pasha might be unable to prevent a revival of the Blueshirts, while the failure of the Opposition to provide an alternative Administration would prevent the development of other parties and, by making parliamentary power the monopoly of a single party, pave the way to a 'totalitarian' State. On the other hand, the defeat of the Wafd might lead, after a constitutional interval, to thinly disguised Palace rule. The present social and economic conditions of Egypt contain elements of danger. The increase of population is pressing hard on the countryside, which is already densely inhabited. The contrast between the poverty of the masses and the more ostentatious than solid wealth of the classes is striking; it is far from certain that the extension of perennial irrigation has not done nearly

as much harm as good by promoting the serious increase of water-borne parasitic diseases. No very large addition can be made to the cultivable area of Egypt; and, so far, the Egyptian peasant, a highly specialised creature, has shown no disposition to emigrate. These problems will begin to become urgent before many years have passed, and they are unlikely to be solved by a Wafdist caucus or a combination of ambitious Palace officials and pliant bureaucrats.

For the present, however, there is no reason to distrust the capacity of Mohamed Mahmud Pasha to deal with the situation. His integrity, experience, and ability guarantee that the Administration will recover its tone under his hands: his pro-British sentiments are pledges for the fulfilment of the Treaty; his courage and firmness inspire the belief that he will resist any Wafdist attempts to foment disorder—a possibility, should Nahas Pasha's advisers apprehend a serious defeat—and will check any attempts, of which there have been indications, to revive the potentially dangerous Greenshirt organisation in the interest of El Azhar or Abdin. That influences connected with the Palace may bring undue pressure to bear upon him is a possibility for which he is fully prepared. It may be added that he is too able a statesman to commit the error of staking too much on the popularity of the young and still inexperienced King. British diplomacy can lose nothing by maintaining friendly contact with a leader who has the support of some of the best elements in the country and is no fair-weather ally. It should not be forgotten that, but for a Labour manœuvre, he would have concluded a treaty with this country in 1929 which would have differed in no essential from that signed in 1936, and that he did not allow personal or party feeling to deter him from inspiring the formation and maintaining the cohesion of the United Front in the negotiations that finally placed Anglo-Egyptian relations on a friendly and rational basis.

P. P. Graves.

THE COURTAULD INSTITUTE

A DISCUSSION OF ITS POLICY

By D. S. MACCOLL

THE policy pursued at the Institute, which is incorporated in the University of London and grants diplomas and degrees for students of artistic history, has resulted in the resignation of its well-known Director, Professor W. G. Constable. Mr. Constable was, before the War, Fellow and Economic Supervisor at St. John's College, Cambridge. His health suffered under war service, and he turned afterwards to the study of painting as a pupil at the Slade School. He was recommended by Professor Tonks as first holder of the lecturing-post at the Wallace Collection, but after brief office there was snatched away by the National Gallery, where he was ultimately Assistant-Director. Lord Lee of Fareham had, while he was still at Hertford House, secured his services as Secretary to the 'English Primitives' Committee and Exhibition; furthered his career, and finally secured his appointment as Courtauld Director. He has played a nearly irreplaceable part in the cataloguing of Loan Collections and other work of the sort. Of his unusual range of knowledge, and strenuous study as a scholar-in-art, there is no question. There has been a doubt whether he sufficiently delegated matters of administrative detail, and did not over-anxiously cultivate the foreign liaisons and prestige of the Institute, with absences involved, and consequent loss in tutorial supervision; but these were excesses of zeal judicious pressure from his co-managers would have corrected. They appear rather to have encouraged a dissipation of his forces.

His successor, Mr. T. S. R. Boase, lately Dean and History Tutor at Hertford College, Oxford, takes over at a difficult moment in the Institute's career, and is so far an unknown

quantity in London and abroad as a scholar-in-art, though he is well qualified, as historian and administrator, by Oxford testimony. His friends, among whom I hope I may already reckon myself, are aware of his sensitive appreciation for works of art and wide study at home and abroad. All of us, therefore, will wish him a fair field while he finds his feet, takes command and has leisure to review the situation.

The policy pursued at the Institute, with a friction between Director and Managers which has come to a head with Professor Constable's resignation, was the subject of debate in three numbers of *The Burlington Magazine*, November to December 1937, following an editorial protest in the October issue which was supported in letters by two scholars of authority, Professor Talbot Rice and Mr. E. K. Waterhouse. Lord Lee of Fareham and Sir Robert Witt wrote in defence of the Governing Board, and Mr. Constable intervened to correct the former on a point of fact. At the invitation of the editor, I am to discuss the past, present and possible future conduct of this potentially important foundation.[1]

I am myself, I fear, by nature tepid about scholarship in art, because I care greatly for the beauty and significance of its masterpieces, but little for attributions, dates and other circumstances of their origin. Yet as a critic, and especially as former Keeper of two Galleries, I have had to take a modest hand in such research. Like all detective work, this investigation of finger-prints and other records by the policemen, incarcerators and guardians of the masters and their shadier followers is fascinating as well as necessary, and there is no doubt that we need in this country a competently staffed and directed school of what we awkwardly call art-historians, whose task is to weave works of art as elements and illustrations into the general web of culture, the record of man's imagination and activities; to increase our meagre crop of additions to the European literature on such subjects and to meet unblushingly the foreign visitor within our gates.

I contributed, in 1914, to a French publication, the *Revue de Synthèse Historique*, an account of our teaching institutions in this branch of learning. I could then only muster the Chair at Edinburgh, well occupied by Baldwin Brown,

[1] A briefer treatment, written for the January number, was held over for amplification and fuller consultation with those principally concerned.

the lectureships, without tutorial discipline, held for brief periods by the Slade Professors at Oxford and Cambridge,[2] *and the lectureship at the Slade School, London, which I had* the privilege to inaugurate. It has since become a university professorship with tutorial teaching. I therefore welcomed Mr. Samuel Courtauld's creation of an Institute, and in an article written for the *Week-End Review*[3] and not contradicted by its proprietor, Mr. Courtauld himself, took for granted that here at last, with unlooked-for financial backing, was the school we had desired, from which a steady stream of officials and scholars generally might be expected to proceed. Further reflection and discussion renders the training of officials a more disputable function. Certain heads of great Museums prefer men to come straight from the Universities or elsewhere, to receive their training on the spot. Sir George Hill, recently Director of the British Museum, put it bluntly that he would not regard a degree from the Courtauld Institute as qualification for a post. This might narrow, but not necessarily confine, the academic function of Mr. Courtauld's foundation to the special training of scholars in the history of Art. England is, especially, a country of amateurs, often blessed with genius, in contrast with the professionals of Germany and other countries. A notable example of the museum-trained man was the late Sir Hercules Read, who had little schooling and no university upbringing, but became an authority of European rank.

I had been a member of the committee at Oxford which, under Michael Sadler's ardent impulsion, had planned the formation of courses in Art-history within the framework of its Schools. But it became clear that London, with its vastly richer opportunities for the study of works of art as well as books, was the right place for the new foundation. I had no part in its preparation, in which Lord Lee was the predominant spirit, nor in its subsequent activities, and was not alone in wondering a good deal, during the five years of its existence, what, exactly, its governors had actually set before them as its objects, since the fruits of their direction were not very visible, in spite of the unusual qualifications of its head and

[2] Simultaneously with the above publication the Cambridge Chair was attached to an Architectural School.

[3] November 1, 1930.

the stream of eminent foreign specialists who gave sporadic instruction by lecture.

The reasons for this unsatisfactory outcome of so promising a foundation have now been disclosed by the virtually enforced retirement of the Director in the course of last year. There had been, since the early days, with a growing cleavage, a divergence of views between the academic and the lay members of the Board—namely, the Chairman (Lord Lee of Fareham), Sir Robert Witt and Mr. Courtauld himself. I had named him last, because I doubted whether he had at starting a very clearly defined idea of what function his generous benefaction was to perform, nor did I think him likely, of his own motion, to revolt against the idea we had attributed to his initiative. That deflection I had attributed rather to the preferences of his two eminent colleagues, eager for a diffusion of culture, but less concerned with a severe academic discipline.

Mr. Courtauld, as we know and applaud, has been a munificent disposer of his wealth, and along with his wife devoted much of it to the endowment of the arts of painting and music. It was he also, as I remember gratefully, who rescued Gerald Barry and his colleagues, when they were jettisoned from the old *Saturday Review*, by chartering for them the new but, alas ! short-lived craft to which I referred above. It only survives, as a name, in the list of shipwrecks which amplifies the title of *The New Statesman*. Mr. Courtauld is genuinely sensitive to pictures, dates his active interest in them from a tour in Italy, extended to Paris, where he fell in love with Manet, Degas, Renoir and other nineteenth-twentieth century French masters. A result was the notable Courtauld gift of pictures to the Modern Foreign Gallery, supplementing the Lane bequest, and the subsequent formation of a trust, to hold and lend yet more examples. He is modest, and shyly reserved in expression of his preferences, so that I have been in doubt as to what they were ; and I imagine that he is easily influenced in matters where he does not trust his own judgment. His integrity of purpose I knew ; but judged it to be, in the matter of the Institute, a somewhat puzzled integrity. I learn, however, from himself, that from the first his main idea was a spread of interest in the Arts among our people, meaning by that chiefly an induce-

ment, under guidance, to visit galleries, rather than attendance on courses of lectures.

The other two are men of a very different temper, notable, both of them, for high abilities and public spirit, possessed, both of them, by a devouring and driving and dominating energy, and Sir Robert Witt, certainly, has a mastering desire for the popularising of studies in art, and the compelling or persuading to come in of all who are still in the outer darkness of indifference to pictures, so that those lost sheep may find salvation in the fold of curiosity about the arts, which is his own very honourable passion.

I got to know him first when the National Art Collections Fund had been launched, with a subsidy from that gifted lady, Mrs. Herringham. The indispensable Lord Balcarres (now Crawford) had been secured as Chairman, but a Secretary was wanting, and the Herringhams suggested to me this young City solicitor, connected with one of them, whose name I only vaguely knew as a contributor of book-notices to *The Saturday Review*. We took him on that recommendation, little knowing what a radioactive force had entered the baby society, one which was to develop its size and range of action to an undreamed-of degree, till it became the large and fruitful organ that we know.

After some preliminary trouble on which I will not dwell, but which might have led one with an ominous augur's mind to forecast recent events, I entered into cordial relations with both Chairman and Secretary, and Witt became an invaluable and tireless ally in an association with Charles Aitken and myself as a sort of 'Three Musketeers' in various campaigns, such as that for a new administration of the Tate Gallery and for retention of the Lane pictures. With all his City work, he would find time for any call; would, for example, attend Lord Curzon at midnight, the earliest hour at which that equally indefatigable statesman was able to turn his mind to our affairs, and he bore the heavy end in them all. I recite those shining virtues of his to show how far from prejudiced I am against an old comrade. I remember too fondly early days at the Old Clergy House in Alfriston, where he and Charles Aitken were joint tenants, and fresh moves plotted during tramps over the Downs, or water-parties for bathing-picnics at Cuckmerehaven, with as yet

uninvaded beach, through the fields of Exceat Farm, with its ancient charm of plowing oxen. Witt, naturally, had worldly ambitions, being a man of action, out for power. Aitken, pure-hearted as few men are, almost self-less in his desires, and altogether self-effacing, was eager and resourceful in good works. I, intermittently stirred, in periods of illumination, as an egger-on of others, was lazy or otherwise absorbed when it came to carrying on.

Witt's passion for the arts is of a peculiar kind. He is endlessly curious *about* pictures, without having a marked sensibility for their value, except as objects of historical and other secondary interest. In that he is like a great number of our estimable scholars, who see pictures and drawings, as such, through their ears rather than their eyes. He is the author of a very popular book, *How to Look at Pictures*, but I suspect that the way of looking least native to him is *seeing* them. He knows more about them, their date, authorship, school, subjects and present abode, than many of our officials, and his collection of photographs is the freely opened study-ground for students of all nations. He wishes that old and young should enjoy what gives such intense pleasure to himself, and that the young, particularly, should gain at least an ample smattering of information at the Institute without too daunting a standard, so that those lambs may win not only some culture, but a diploma, or be able even to bleat B.A. after their name. He protests his approval of an encouragement to sterner courses of discipline for scholars of another type, but he is ready to sacrifice staff and strict study if his darling, the desire for knowledge of art 'in widest commonalty spread,' should be threatened with a background place, even if the spreading should be a little thin.

My acquaintance with Lord Lee has been neither so long nor anything like so intimate, but our relations, whether official, on the 'English Primitives' Committee, which he brought together, on the N.A.C.F., on the Fine Arts Commission, and as guest or fellow-Clubman, have been uniformly pleasant. I watched, with an unwilling admiration, how he shepherded his witnesses at the Bridges Commission towards a predetermined conclusion, and induced the representative of our Defence Committee, Lord Crawford, to acquiesce in a compromise I detested, the mutilation of the Bridge as the

price of its preservation. He is a notably shrewd collector of pictures, but leaves me puzzled about the workings of his mind in acquiring them, for he told me once that he had no interest in modern art. For one who sees the same eternal characteristics in good painting, old or new, that attitude is unintelligible. Lord Lee, famous as the donor of 'Chequers' to the nation, and the holder of Government office and many other administrative posts, has won his way to these by native ability, but he did not himself, I think, go through the mill of a University course, unlike Sir Robert, who had an Oxford training and would be expected to appreciate its advantages as the preparation for specialist studies. Both men have as accompaniment of the remarkable qualities to which I hope I have done justice a domineering disposition, and can be ruthless in their treatment of those who resist their will. Lord Lee, it has been said, must be not only trustee but director, and his colleague, with a more diplomatic manner, is little less determined.

The existing system at the Institute, over which the difference came to a head, may be briefly outlined. The 'diploma' is granted to graduates after one year's study and examination; to others after two. It is over the B.A. degree and non-graduate candidates that conflict has been chiefly waged. At present students, taken on after matriculation, are given a year to pass the 'Intermediate' University of London examination. Two further years at the Institute complete the course. Mr. Constable has held that this preparation is insufficient, that the education is not thorough enough for the production of fully equipped scholars, and that the full grind of a B.A. course or its equivalent should be exacted before students enter on the two-years' study at the Courtauld. His contention appears to be justified by results, since it is the students thus qualified who have made good after leaving the Institute.

Sir George Hill, a member of the Board, had independently put this view before the Governors, and a sub-committee was formed in 1936 to report upon his proposal. To this Sir Robert Witt was added, and submitted a counter-memorandum, with some sharp criticism of the Director. Professor Ashmole, and other academic members, supported Sir George. Professor Constable, a better scholar than tactician,

followed with a counter-statement, ending up, to the dismay of his supporters, with an announcement of his resignation. He ought, of course, to have held on and awaited the eventual retirement of Lord Lee and Sir Robert Witt: but a sensitive man had suffered too much in a trying atmosphere; had even, not very wisely, taken on the Slade Professorship at Cambridge to escape from it, for one day in the week, to a more congenial air.

The University representatives, who should have been champions of the academic ideal, played a weak hand, influenced, doubtless, by fear of offending Mr. Courtauld, who supported his lay colleagues, and of forfeiting the benefits hoped for from an ultimate donation or bequest of pictures and photographs from the latter. The photographs, indispensable for study, could not be housed in the existing building, and are not legally assigned to the Institute. The pictures it would be an entire mistake to make over to the Institute, where the nucleus of yet another National Collection would be out of place. What is wanted is enough examples of painting, complete or unfinished, for demonstrations in technique, with illuminating specimens of copies and fakes. A section for research in technique has been added to the Institute by the bequest of Mr. Norman Wilkinson. It is no business of mine to advise Lord Lee about the disposition of his treasures; but my dream for their ultimate use would be that they should remain in the White Lodge, Richmond Park, endowed as a second Kenwood, to rejoice South-western visitors, as that bequest does North-westerners. The question of the Director's resignation was adjourned, but he persisted. He had refused a tempting offer from another institution, and a higher stipend, to remain at his post in Portman Square, but after his resignation his own Cambridge failed to provide him with a refuge at the Fitzwilliam Museum.

The mischief of the tyranny I have indicated has not been limited to the Courtauld Institute. Under the same chairmanship, that of Lord Lee, a most valuable public servant, Mr. Collins Baker, also resigned from the post of Keeper at the National Gallery. Both those eminent scholars were faced with an uncertain future, and Mr. Baker forfeited his pension; but the United States, with a keener apprecia-

tion of their merit, have provided them with congenial and distinguished employment—one on research work for the Huntington Library at Pasadena, where the study of great English Houses in the Eighteenth Century is encouraged, as it is not at home; the other as head of the painting department of the Boston Museum. But two out of our scanty band of such scholars have been expatriated, with a digging up of their roots, and to the loss of their friends. One asks uneasily who is next on the list, I will not say of proscription, for there is no such list, but of resignation. Nor is that all; the terror has led to the withdrawal of one scholar, in addition to Mr. Baker, from the National Gallery, and a scarcity of candidature for the Institute.

Lectures by eminent outsiders continue; but lectures, after all, are a mediæval form of teaching, no longer necessary now books are to be had, though at times stimulating from the gift of exposition or personal charm of the lecturer. What is chiefly wanted is a library of slides after works of art (with tutorial exposition), and that, under Mr. Constable, was being rapidly built up. One solid lecturing feature, however, is the steadily attended course on Chinese art by Dr. Perceval Yetts; another that on painting technique by Mr. Thomson, on the lines of the Fogg Institute at Harvard. At present there is no one equal to Mr. Constable in wide range of book and museum knowledge to fill the really important part of tutorial director of studies: his former able seconder, particularly in mediæval art, Mr. J. G. Mann, has gone over to the Wallace Collection; the bright spot in the Institute's present plight is its undeserved luck in securing Mr. Boase.

I return to the case of Mr. Baker. I knew him first as a friend and admirer of Steer, an ex-student from the R.A. School, and a neighbour in Hampstead Way. Sir Charles Holroyd's papers and letters had overflowed from a stuffed roll-topped desk into receptacles which recalled the bath described by De Quincey; he called for someone to sort them, badgered, as he was, by criticisms of his National Gallery catalogue, and otherwise overwhelmed. I suggested Baker as a redder-up: that task he quickly and successfully performed, and then was taken on to continue the catalogue, begun by Mr. Maurice Brockwell on an eternal scale, with

no visible prospect of conclusion. This also he accomplished, and, having proved his value, succeeded to the office of Keeper. A predecessor had resigned, unable to endure gross personal rudeness from a singular specimen of the Trustee kind, now happily departed from troubling, and from a ludicrous existence, but not before he had persecuted Holroyd into illness, which ended fatally. Holroyd, like all Directors, had made mistakes, and full advantage was taken of these by the person I refer to and his party on the Board.

The Trustees of the National Gallery have suffered from some miasma, peculiar to the place.[4] Men who outside of the Board are pleasant-spoken, reasonably kind and intelligent people, have become, in association, a kind of corporate cad. Baker, a dour man externally, but as that diviner of character, Charles Aitken, always maintained, with 'a heart of gold,' is also a man of unshakeable loyalty and unflinching will. The fire had burned within him during Holroyd's trials, and he was determined that, if he could prevent it, Charles Holmes should not have to undergo a renewal of such handling. He therefore arraigned the Chairman, Lord Lansdowne, and other noble Lords at a meeting of the Board. The late Lord Plymouth, the timidest-*voiced* man who ever, and too rarely, spoke out his firm conviction, followed with a quiet, but sufficient word—he 'hoped that sort of thing would not be repeated.' Lord Lansdowne had to swallow his medicine, but the physician did not endear himself to the Board. He must tell the whole story himself, if and when he chooses, but resentments came to a head, and under intolerable provocation he resigned, with one defender among the Trustees. He had established himself, under the impulsion of Charles Holmes, as a leading authority on the history of English portraiture, with several books to his credit: his natural destination, indeed, seemed to be the National Portrait Gallery: but in his obstinate fashion he had preferred to remain at Trafalgar Square.

There is a moral to be drawn from this sorry tale. The

[4] My own experience of Trustees, I perhaps ought to say, has been a pleasant one they freely delegated their authority, and supported its exercise My successor at Hertford House, however, had to suffer under a fresh infusion Happily at the National Gallery there appears to have been a complete change of manners and perhaps of heart since the present Director was installed

officers of the Gallery have, at present, no court of appeal against their masters. The Treasury stands neutral, and when, as in this case, a Premier, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, was a trustee, the First Lord of the Treasury is also out of question, rarely attending, committed in absence by his colleagues, and, however amiably disposed, ineffectual. Prime Ministers, as well as dealers, and, I venture to add, royalties, unless specially endowed by knowledge and taste, are better away. I must not be misunderstood if I add the last. The Duke of Windsor (then Prince of Wales) preserved, as he was bound to do, a detached attitude, but one eminently fair-minded.

What may appear to have been a digression is not really so. The problem of despotism and its victims affects closely the Courtauld argument, as it does that of government generally at the present day. I am fully conscious that in attacking a despotism, I am very much a Satan rebuking sin; that in the place of our two tyrants, were that conceivable, I might have been little less autocratic. I should doubtless have made mistakes, but not, I trust, have been betrayed into their kind of mistake. It would be customary, at this point, to deprecate the high-handedness of our masters as 'the defect of their qualities.' That is pestilent nonsense; but a mean idea makes of an autocrat first a tyrant, then a bully. Against such a disaster in government some counter-check, democratic in the last resort, is necessary. The ideal of Sir Robert Witt and Lord Lee is not 'mean' in the usual sense, but it is in the sense of 'middling,' or 'mediocre.' Our Triumviri, if Mr. Courtauld be included, have not a fine ideal, but a flat one. Like the Mussolinis and Hitlers, they are ironing out excellence in favour of dead level, in a sort of kindergarten where the pupils dabble in scholarship, and learn to regard pictures mainly from behind.

So much by way of attack. What, I shall be very properly asked, is the alternative? Sir Robert Witt, in his winding-up letter to the '*Burlington Magazine*' correspondence, argued that there was none; that no 'Pious Founder' existed for a really scholarly Institute, Mr. Courtauld having declared for the 'popular' ideal, as opposed to the academic. That may be true, but so enlightened a benefactor is not petrified in his intentions. A highly relevant fact is that an event which does something to restore the depleted forces of our scholarship is

another instance of his ready and generous help: I mean the transfer from Hamburg to London of the Warburg Institute, a Jewish foundation no longer welcome in the land of its birth. Here is an institution representing the highest standards of Germanic culture within its chosen field—namely, the literary sources of Italian painting (*e.g.*, the subject of the recently acquired Giorgione idyll, identified at once). Mr. Courtauld has provided for the temporary housing of the staff, with their magnificent library.

An example nearer home and more nearly bearing on the Courtauld Institute, is the foundation at Birmingham of the Barber Institute, amply financed and admirably directed by Professor Thomas Bodkin, who has added to Irish grievances by quitting Dublin to take control. In this, as well as in the Courtauld, there is an over-obsession by pictures. Of the Visual Arts, the fundamental, constructive member is Architecture, with its adjuncts of carved ornament, mosaic, glass-painting, fresco, and decoration generally. Next to that comes Sculpture, in the round or relief. Coexistent with them, but anterior in time, are the Crafts. Then come tempera and oil painting, detached from building, the Graphic Arts generally with that mixed art, the Cinema. These, because they are arts of an imagery beyond the scope of sculpture, take a peculiar place in the history of culture, as illustrations of literature and history. But they ought not to shoulder out the others. Beside the Visual Arts is that of Sound, Music, and the mixed Arts of Verse (including Crooning, like Mallarmé's), Prose, the Dance, Theatre and 'Talkies.' All are a part of human culture. The firm lines on which Lady Barber's Institute is proceeding are that the history of all the arts should be a concurrent study with University courses in political and social history. The illusion that talk to young people about the history of pictures will open their eyes to painting has not deluded the Birmingham Director.[5]

Now no one wants to rule out the access of amateur students to lectures on art. Anything that keeps them for a few minutes looking at a work of art or a slide may awaken a sleeping instinct; but talk is no substitute for such

[5] See his excellently wise inaugural lecture, 'The Place of the Fine Arts in the University' (James Cond, Great Charles Street, Birmingham, 1935). Price one shilling.

an instinct, which is either inborn, or absent. Proportion, in the matter of 'popular' and 'academic,' at the Courtauld, has gone wrong. Lord Lee, the originator of the scheme, was under the impression that his original emphasis had been, as now, on the popular side. His memory had played him false; his statement in *The Times*, on which my article immediately following was based, put scholarship in the forefront, and the popular side in the background. The statement of aims, in the current prospectus, reverses that order of importance.

What is more, there were ample funds, had they been carefully husbanded and applied, to meet both demands.[6] As Sir Denison Ross, an academic member of the Courtauld Board, has argued, money was wasted in setting up a separate institution, with costly clerical staff, instead of grouping the new school with the existing Professoriat at University College, not to speak of the woful Committee super-tangle, with University traps for business-despatch, that was involved. A lovely house, a museum-piece of the Adam Brothers, is cluttered up with bookcases for a superfluous Art Library, a fresh drain on the endowment, when all that was required was a limited number of books for immediate reference, to the hand of staff and pupils. The house in Portman Square provides no proper lecture-room: University College has the spacious and convenient Botanical Theatre and other class-rooms, to which additions could be made in the vicinity from the dormant building-fund. The resources were squandered.

The upper floor at No. 20 affords room, delightfully situated, for the residence of a Director, and office accommodation for his secretaries. The house, restored to its former appearance, and adorned by pictures from the 'Home Trust,' might save a remnant from the beauty, eaten into and further threatened, of old Portman Square.

I had vainly hoped to be done with controversy and spend what years may be left to me on my own proper business of painting and poetry. I had my lesson from the last of the diversions in a much dissipated life. I took up the lead in the

[6] The endowments are Mr Courtauld's benefaction, yielding £3500 a year, and the Senate's annual grant of £2500 In addition there is the building fund, which brings in £2500, and is now accumulating

'ten years conflict' over Waterloo Bridge at a point when the original defenders were throwing up the sponge: a forlorn hope was, with the aid of Lord Crawford in organising an unexampled national appeal, carried through the reversal of a Government decision and through other vicissitudes to a cheap and perfect solution in the design for a road bridge at Charing Cross by Mr. Dalrymple Hay, the true expert in such matters, and from that to a final triumph in the House of Commons: but the stupid obstinacy of the again dominant 'Labour' Party in the L.C.C. defeated us; Mr. Herbert Morrison had the solatium to his *amour propre* of dancing on the ruins of the bridge, and his æsthetic is to be illustrated, through the complaisance of a former P.R.I.B.A., in a structure which will be neither plain engineering, like Hungerford Bridge, nor good architecture, like the old, but a mongrel, masking its real structure with a sham of stone spans, which would break their backs if they were indeed arches. The old bridge was doing its business, such as can conveniently be done at that point, even had it been insufficient, it would have been preserved as a monument in European Capital Cities, not only of the first, but of the second or third degree. There is to be a wide bridge in the wrong place: none is in view for the right. With such a record of wasted time I have been reluctantly drawn again into the fray, but my conscience has pricked me over the fate of two public servants who are also my friends, and over the decline of an Institute, from which much had been hoped, and a lamentable waste of money, of zeal and of the best intentions

D. S. MacColl

EMANUEL SWEDENBORG: THE SEEKER

By Baron Erik Palmstierna

True greatness of spirit cannot be measured in time, of which it is independent; nor with other qualities, for it is unique. But we mortals need centres for our thoughts which hesitate to take lofty flights, and it is natural to us to keep alive in our minds the memory of the great on the anniversary of their entrance to or departure from the earthly scene. Ourselves moving inside time and seldom aware of the timeless, these dates serve as a frame to a great life—like a heavy curtain which portrait-painters of old were wont to depict as a background on either side of their subject. Biographies thus limited only contain what we have been able to record of a short span of life progressing from one point to another. Neither the original driving force of the great individual nor his ultimate goal—if we may speak of anything as ultimate—is within our comprehension. We only see a shooting star as it passes through our atmosphere, not knowing whence it came nor where it went.

Such must be our thoughts when we try to penetrate the secret of a life like that of Emanuel Swedenborg, who arrived on earth 250 years ago and departed out of view in the year 1772, his remains being buried in the vault of a small Swedish church once standing in St. George's Square, in the City of London, where children now play about a stone which reminds the passer-by of Swedenborg's last resting-place in British soil, though, after 136 years of forgetfulness, Sweden claimed him, and his remains were at last brought back to his native land with full military honours on a Swedish warship for interment in the ancient cathedral of Upsala.

My own first experience of Swedenborg's eminence was in the course of a debate in the Swedish House of Commons in 1908, when a vote was taken for a contribution to a green

sarcophagus which was to receive his body. I then heard a memorable speech by that great statesman and leader Hjalmar Branting, who lashed with genuine anger and subtle irony the ignorance and narrow-mindedness of those who did not acknowledge Swedenborg's genius or understand the honour Sweden was doing itself in thus atoning for the long neglect to recognise his devoted services to mankind. Many a Swede for the first time realised that his country had sheltered one of the very few spirits who have trodden the soil of this evil-haunted earth with innocence in their hearts and the light of unearthly purity in their souls.

All the relevant dates of Swedenborg's life are accurately registered, the details carefully noted and commented upon, for Sweden is a land of order. The exterior frame is set, but when essaying the task of sketching his life one encounters the difficulties that are the lot of any man who meditates on the real character of a great genius.

Some biographers have used methods reminding us of the 'behaviourist' school among biologists and fastened upon the circumstances which surrounded him and are supposed to have played a part in moulding Swedenborg's life. They speak of his pious father (a famous bishop and poet) and his maternal inheritance, his early upbringing and training at the hands of scientists and philosophers, and the religious movements which he encountered when travelling through many lands. It is true that Swedenborg was more than usually receptive and sought knowledge eagerly. His mind absorbed experiences from many quarters during that great age of thought in Europe, especially in the England of Queen Anne. His ideas were influenced by Newton's cosmology, Flamsteed's and Halley's astronomical researches, and Locke's essays. The Neoplatonists of Cambridge impressed him profoundly, as did the Dutch scientists Huygens and Boyle, the German philosopher Leibnitz, and the French scientists De la Hire and Varrignon. Milton fired his imagination, and he was attracted by the 'brotherhood' founded by Count von Zinsendorff. But we cannot obtain a correct impression of Swedenborg by a minute examination of the sources from which he drew sustenance and inspiration. The method is too narrow and exclusive. The figure of the man himself and his own life-force disappears under such treatment It

was, after all, Swedenborg who braved the journey to England in 1710 and was nearly wrecked when approaching the shore; it was Swedenborg who was attacked by pirates who boarded the vessel and was fired on by a British guardship which mistook them for the pirates; it was Swedenborg who narrowly escaped death on the gallows for landing, contrary to strict regulations, in a time of pestilence. The moral force in him is not explained merely by stating that he came under a variety of influences. The dogged determination which, as he wrote to his brother, 'made him change his lodgings and turn them very often,' his sustained efforts to surmount each successive obstacle—these, the very basic character of Swedenborg, escape biographers of this type.

Biographers of the modern school of psychology, on the other hand, have eagerly examined the mental state of Swedenborg during his later years. He is brought into their clinics and classified as a specimen of particular interest. They tell us that hysterical symptoms showed themselves in his early childhood, when Swedenborg, unaware of Yoga exercises, tried to limit his respiration to a minimum in order to transcend the range of our senses. They inform us that during his last twenty years he showed unmistakable signs of mental disease which ended in paranoia. His visions were hallucinations accompanying the progressive derangement of his mind, but he was harmless, and therefore not certifiable although not 'in his right mind.'

Yet the period of Swedenborg's visions, which began in the year 1736 and lasted until his death in 1772, was one of great activity in his life. He took a lively and influential part in the Swedish House of the Nobles, presenting memoranda which displayed an extraordinary lucidity of mind. In one such document, dated 1761, he energetically defended my own great-grandfather's policy and demanded his reinstatement to office after Sweden's disastrous war against Prussia. One of our leading statesmen, von Hopken, has declared Swedenborg's memoranda on currency to be the best that the Swedish Diet ever received, while Swedenborg's plans for social reform and for the betterment of industrial methods were published during the years in which he was supposed to be on the verge of insanity.

Yet what made so deep and lasting an impression on the

world was, not Swedenborg's scientific works, but the spiritual teachings, recorded in his elaborate Latin during these years of 'mental aberration.' His books influenced the young Blake and, through Goethe, reached Carlyle, Coleridge, the Lake school of English poets, Coventry Patmore and Emerson. Helen Keller, the blind and deaf genius, talks of the 'thrill she feels when she places her fingers upon her Braille edition of *The Divine Love and Wisdom*, that great river of light.' H. de Balzac was also manifestly influenced by Swedenborg, whose vast output of religious literature has been translated into some twenty different languages.

The psychologists have led us astray; they have thrown no light upon the source of their subject's great genius.

It is not a matter of surprise to us that devoted partisans of Swedenborg's doctrines figure also among his biographers, for the Church societies founded on his revelations number about 170 and are spread over fourteen countries. They emphasise his visionary teachings and their origin, which Swedenborg himself never doubted to be genuine messages from the spiritual world. In such circumstances it is easy to realise that every word of Swedenborg becomes precious, and that his doctrines are apt to become dogmatically accepted as expressions of ultimate truth.

But an unbiassed reader of these as of other scriptures is struck by the abundance of imagery and allegory therein, showing with what difficulty a seer translates his visions into human language. Music is a better vehicle of expression than words which limit and distort their meaning. His teachings open fresh vistas and afford new inspirations; but we must not ask for minute exactitude in all respects.

Swedenborg's claim to possess the gifts of telepathy, clairvoyance, and prevision are well established, but he attached little importance to such phenomena. His balanced and discerning mind understood that what nowadays engages psychic research workers must be subordinate to the main purpose of bringing human life into harmony with its origin. It is of interest, though, to remind English readers of Swedenborg's letter to John Wesley, in which he correctly said that he knew of Wesley's wish to see him, and asked him to call before a certain date, because otherwise he would not find him, as he would have left the earth by that time, a statement

which proved to be accurate. Such psychical knowledge was not miraculous in the eyes of one who proclaimed that the human spirit has access to the spiritual world just as our minds receive through the bodily brain information with regard to life on the earthly plane. Many agree with the late Professor J. J. Thomson that if telepathy can be proved to exist between human beings it is not unreasonable to assume that it also may be a means of communication between the living and the dead so called. Many more will say that, in the light of present-day knowledge of a living universe and contact with the beyond, the claim of Swedenborg to bring messages from the spiritual world has lost much of its novelty, and that the close correspondence between his recorded impressions and those of others shows such a degree of accuracy in essentials—if we discard the time colouring of the messages—as to afford convincing proof of their intrinsic veracity.

Swedenborg founded no Church; he was a very modest and humble man, who only related what he actually saw or heard. He did not preach, and it is strange, indeed, that his writings—in a language which only the learned could read—have such a force as to bring a change of life in thousands and to continue to do so centuries after his passing. But a student of his works recognises many features which have their root in the medium himself and the age in which he was living. That seems to be inevitable in all communicating entities from another form of existence. Absolute clarity cannot penetrate our obscurity. We are not entitled to hope that we may experience the splendour of undisguised truth or grasp its meaning. But this general and, I hope, justified reservation with regard to biographies issued by disciples of Swedenborg diminishes nothing of his real greatness.

What, to my mind, characterises him above everything else, and constitutes the strength and greatness of his genius, is the steady simplicity of purpose which held him from early age until his last breath. He was the most typical seeker the world has ever seen. He set his feet on that road which the Poet Laureate so beautifully described:

> We travel the dusty road till the light of day is dim,
> And sunset shows us spires away on the world's rim,
> We travel from dawn to dusk, till the day is past and by,
> Seeking the Holy City beyond the rim of the sky.

Nothing could deflect Swedenborg from that road. Neither all the allurements of earthly fame and position nor the risk of poverty and derision caused him to hesitate. He had made up his mind and carefully mapped out the route he intended to follow; he carefully watched and noted the progress he made and never for a moment lost sight of the ultimate goal. A true interpretation of Swedenborg's life is the epic story of a yearning soul who pursues his way through and enriches all the accumulated knowledge of his day, but never looks back or hesitates at cross-roads. The secret of Swedenborg's life is the divine restlessness of a man ever in search of the truth about Reality, the *Perpetuum Mobile* in his soul which constantly spurs him on. Lord Chesterfield's saying in a letter of 1784—'Seek and you will find, in this world as well as in the next'—sounds like a faint echo of his remarkable contemporary.

No picture of Swedenborg is complete or accurate which does not show him constantly on the move, for he was himself an exponent of pragmatical views. The inanimate matter and mechanical laws first engaged his attention. He was so devoted to learning that he missed no chance to acquire skill in any trade. He lived with craftsmen in order to explore their secrets. He could, when in need, make his own instruments, for he was a bookbinder and watchmaker and learnt engraving. He made copious notes of all he saw and heard—'noting down in my diary what I heard from the learned'—and took an early resolution never to be drawn into disputes. 'I will fix my attention,' he said, 'upon data and facts and follow where I see truth, or the cause supported by experience and reason. If what I say be true, why should I be eager to defend it? Surely truth can defend itself. If what I have said be false, it would be a degrading and foolish task to defend it.' His mind was exact and his method empirical. He would not pursue knowledge simply for the sake of knowledge alone, but 'always desired to turn his studies to some practical use,' and the results of his efforts were stupendous. Even we of the twentieth century, inured to the output of mechanical devices, cannot fail to admire the young Swedenborg's indefatigable inventiveness.

At the age of twenty-six, whilst abroad, he sent to his

tutor in Sweden a list of his mechanical inventions. They had been 'scattered about on pieces of paper; but nearly all are now brought into order,' he says, 'so that, when opportunity offers, they may be published.' The list included an amazing number of various objects: a plan to construct a submarine; a hydraulic machine, raising weights by means of water; a water clock which registers not only the hours but the movements of the heavenly bodies as well; a flying-machine; new methods of constructing cords and springs; a fire-driven machine for throwing water; a musical instrument by which the unskilled may play any kind of music, etc. His versatility seemed to know no bounds. He produced the first book of algebra printed in Sweden, and also made 'an attempt to find the east and west longitude by means of the moon.' He did a signal service to King Charles XII. of Sweden in 1718 by transporting two galleys and a few small ships seventeen miles across hilly land in order to assist the troops which were besieging the Norwegian fortress Fredrikshald.

Swedenborg proceeded on his self-chosen road and intended to 'traverse the whole mineral kingdom,' with the result that the late Professor A. G. Nathorst, the great paleobotanist, speaks of him as 'the first Swede who described plant-fossils and interpreted them in a manner satisfactory for those times. . . . His contributions in the field of geology are such in their significance and sweep that they alone would have been sufficient to have secured him a respected scientific name.'

A man of his inclinations towards mathematics and powers of imagination was naturally attracted by the stars, and in 1718 he published a treatise 'On the Motion and Position of the Earth and the Planets,' arriving very tentatively at conclusions which have proved correct. He had perfectly clear conceptions of the nebular hypothesis: 'How many myriads of heavens may there not be? How many myriads of mundane systems? We might say that the infant heavens and earths were successively coming into existence as the others declined in age, grew hoary with years and fell into decay.' Sir James Jeans could not express it better in his popular writings. The late Professor Svante Arrhenius declared Swedenborg to be a forerunner of Kant and Laplace, who adopted his theory that the planets of our solar system

originated from the solar matter. Yet amidst all this vast learndom the genius meditates : 'In this consists our highest wisdom—that we know how small is the extent of our knowledge.'

Constantly on the search for truth, Swedenborg could not remain in this field of physical science. He felt he must penetrate into the very heart of the matter and find out its innermost secrets. What is matter? he asked, and turned to chemistry, long dominated by alchemists, for an answer. He wanted 'to trace out Nature to the least things,' and so another series of practical results accompanied his researches which only experts can follow. A large section of his *Principia* deals with magnetism.

Even these pursuits came to an end; once they had led him to higher ground. True to his early plans, he now set out to obtain knowledge concerning the relation between body and soul He started a series of intensive studies in anatomy and physiology. They bore fruit in two groups of big volumes on the *Animal Kingdom*, of which the last was published in 1744. The president of a Congress of Anatomists said of him in 1903 that 'he was far in advance of his contemporaries on fundamental questions,' and at the Swedenborg Congress of 1910 in London Dr. Max Neuburger, Professor of Medicine at Vienna, declared 'the crown of Swedenborg's physiological achievements to be his views on the functions of the brain, especially of the *cortex cerebri*.' In harmony with modern science, he taught that the various motor functions are specifically localised in the brain. Long before *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* appeared Swedenborg sought for the junction of the soul and the body, and concentrated his efforts around the organ which seemed to present the connective link. Hence his assiduous researches into 'grey substance' and the nerve system emanating from it.

It seems to the editor of *Horizons of Immortality* that Swedenborg was in another respect far in advance of his time, and, perhaps, still ahead of us. Biologists as well as psychic research workers would do well to study one of his papers which bears the title 'Arguments showing that our Vital Force consists mostly of Little Vibrations.' He forestalls the theory that life itself emanates from waves of ultra short length, and that the human soul acts on the body

through waves which affect the nerve system. 'I have written a little anatomy of vital forces,' he says, 'which, I maintain, consist of undulations. For this reason I have made myself thoroughly acquainted with the anatomy of the nerves and the membranes, and I have proved the harmony which exists between that and the interesting geometry of undulations.' It would not be at all surprising if the Psychic Research Societies the world over should one day find Swedenborg's thoughts on telepathy and clairvoyance in complete accordance with facts. He explains these phenomena as follows: 'It frequently happens that a person falls into the thought of another person, that he perceives what another is doing and thinking—that is, that his membrane trembles from the tremors of the other person's cerebral membranes, just as one string is affected by another, tuned in the same key.' Swedenborg was very likely on the right track; but we would rather say that when the functions of the brain are low, and the waves of the soul can reach out more unhindered, these psychic phenomena take place, as witnessed under trance conditions, or else with specially endowed persons. Students of telepathy or dowsing may find in Swedenborg's writings suggestions for further research.

In his long quest for the truth about reality he had at last reached the 'Kingdom of the Soul.' Seven times he had run round the arena, like the competitors in ancient times, before he ventured an attempt to reach the ultimate goal; he found that he had 'directed the course thither both too hastily and too fast,' but was nevertheless determined to allow himself no respite 'until all the swathings of the soul had been successively unfolded.' 'I hope,' he said, 'by bending my course inwards continually, I shall open all doors that lead to her, and at length contemplate the soul herself—by the Divine permission.'

He renewed his efforts and investigations, but quiet hours of meditation convinced him that scientific methods were of no avail any longer. 'That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the spirit is spirit.'

It has been asserted, with little justification, that this experience caused a deep life-changing crisis in Swedenborg. His earlier studies had led him to regard the universe as an outcome of a Being of Infinite Love. Life and love were

identical in thought, and the object of man a free reciprocating of the Divine Love. The new turn of the road did not frighten or unsettle him. He calmly noted the experience he had reached and set out again to continue the pursuit in spite of having lost his old bearings. He now proceeds 'inwards,' in the same quiet, philosophical mood as of old, watching, investigating, and noting all he heard or saw.

He could not remain in office under the new conditions of life, and later withdrew from public activities altogether in order to develop the means of communication he traced in his soul. Vistas into the world of reality now opened up to him, and soon he found himself conversing just as easily with the other side as with friends on earth. He continued, as always, to collect the harvested material in systematic order, and the great volumes on his spiritual travels show that his intellectual powers did not flag.

In fundamental respects Swedenborg's views correspond to the teachings of all great messengers who have brought light to mankind. He taught that love is God, and that the love in us is part of God's spirit; that a correspondence exists between a spiritual life and life on earth; that our sense of perception is a 'specialised and narrow perception'; that earth is our 'seminary of education'; that we are 'exposed to mundane influences and influences from vibrating elements' in the universe; that our 'free will,' with which 'omnipotence does not meddle,' acts in the balance between the counteracting influences and that 'like draws like.'

This has been said by others during the passage of centuries, although in different clothing; but we have need less of new knowledge than of grace to live in accordance with the light we possess. In that respect Swedenborg set up a great example. He was not only an undaunted seeker, but lived up to the standard which grew steadily higher.

This towering genius was a humble man, this carrier of truth was tolerant, this man of high experience was of a gentle and lovable nature, breathing an atmosphere of purity and charity. In a book, printed in 1758 in England, he wrote the memorable words: 'Willing and doing good to a neighbour without hope of reward being the object is heaven in a man.'

ERIK PALMSTIERNA.

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CHURCH AND STATE IN GERMANY

By The Rev. A. J. Macdonald, D.D.

The conclusions offered in this survey of the present situation in the German Church dispute are not based entirely or even mainly upon observations made during my ten days' visit at the beginning of December 1936. They had been, to a large extent, formed partly by a close study of documentary evidence since the dispute began three years previously, and partly during longer visits to Germany in 1933 and 1934. But my visit last December supplied fresh evidence for the conviction already held that in the German Church dispute, as in every other human dispute, there are and have been, at any rate for nearly two years past, two sides to the question.

I am anxious to emphasise this proviso, *for nearly two years past*, because down to the point when Herr Kerrl and Dr. Zöllner took office in the autumn of 1935 there is no doubt that the Pastors League, of over 7000 members, and the *Bekenntnis*, or Confessional Church Party, were fighting against measures which threatened the freedom of Church life, and perhaps the integrity in Germany of the Christian faith. However, by the autumn of 1935, after the failure of Dr. Jaeger's drive in Wurttemburg and Bavaria, police action was almost entirely withdrawn, save in a few instances where it was proved that the pastor had indulged in unwise political speech or writing. A new situation was created when Bishops Marahrens, Wurm and Meiser called upon their pastors in Hannover, Württemburg and Bavaria to co-operate with the committees about to be set up by Herr Kerrl. The result was that by December 1936 only 3000 of the 19,000 pastors, of all shades of theological or ecclesiastical opinion in the *Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, were standing out in opposition. The great majority were working quietly and

effectively in their parishes. This is a significant fact which has not, perhaps, been sufficiently noticed in this country.

During my ten days' tour I had lengthy interviews with pastors and laymen representing all types of Church opinion, Confessional Church, *Deutsche Christen*, Free Church, as well as representatives of the large body of Lutheran pastors, whose theological views differ but little from those held by pronounced members of the Confessional Party, but who have not been drawn into the controversy, or who have abandoned it during the last year or two, in order to concentrate upon quiet work in their parishes. If the representatives of this class of Lutheran pastor, whom I met in Hamburg and Berlin or its neighbourhood. are typical of the great majority of pastors no longer in opposition to the Reich ecclesiastical authorities, there appears to be ground for a more hopeful view of the whole situation, in spite of apparently sharp differences, which, since my visit, have been manifested between leading personalities at headquarters.

I found clear evidence that pastors who teach the whole Lutheran faith have not been hindered in their work from the beginning of the dispute. In other cases pastors who were formerly engaged in the dispute have abandoned it and are conducting progressive work in their parishes. Some of them testified that even amongst the children no hindrances had been placed in the way of their ministry. In one case a member of the Nationalist Socialist Party has sent his children to the Lutheran pastor to be prepared for confirmation. In another case the official leader of the local branch of *Hitler Jugend* work amongst girls co-operates with the pastor in the instruction of her charges. Repeatedly I saw members of the National Socialist Party, in the uniform of the party or wearing its badges, present at public worship, or religious meetings, obviously taking part as devout Christian people. In no single case could I find any evidence, even when members of the militant *Bekenntnis* Party were questioned, of any interference on the part of the civil authorities when the pastor confined his preaching and teaching to the proclamation of the Gospel. The trouble arises in those cases where the pastor feels it necessary to apply this teaching in the form of sharp criticism of the present régime in Germany.

The evidence of pastors belonging to the Huguenot Church and the Lutheran *Frei Kirche* supported these conclusions. At no time had any opposition or criticism been offered to their labours. Their social work, as well as direct spiritual ministry, has been conducted without interference or hindrance. In one of these cases a pastor, of vigorous personality and pronounced Fundamentalist views, is carrying on a magnificent evangelistic work in the centre of Berlin, but he tempers evangelical zeal with tactful consideration for prejudices which might break out into criticism.

In all these cases the value of a conciliatory attitude and the avoidance of a defiant attitude appears to reap a reward—freedom to do the work of a Christian pastor, evangelist and minister.

On the other hand, I came across clear evidence of a forthright, uncompromising spirit in the attitude of several members of the Confessional Church Party. In one case this appeared to be the reaction of a personality hardly suited to the ministerial office, a highly-strung and now disheartened pastor, who would probably find himself ill at ease in any ministerial sphere. Such a one gathers a small circle of lay folk of a similar type around him, and the vigour of their protests is apt to be out of proportion to the difficulties originally experienced, but tends to call into action opposition, and hostility which might have been avoided by a more conciliatory attitude. At the same time, there are pastors in Berlin, belonging to the *Bekenntnis* Party, men of mild temperament, though of pronounced theological views, whose opposition to the Reich ecclesiastical administration is as definite as that of the more radical critics, but who express themselves with less violence. However, they appeared to me to be mainly senior men, whose habits of thought had become fixed, and so no longer adaptable to new ideas and methods.

Pastor Niemöller has the quiet, firm, courteous presence of an officer of the British Senior Service. His theological views are clear-cut and simple, as might be expected in the case of an ex-naval officer. Yet he has the martyr spirit, and honestly believes that he is engaged in a cause as vital as that upheld by Martin Luther. His personality is such that he would fill any church, no matter what gospel he preached.

But my impression of him was that so gifted and so well-equipped a pastor might, by a fair attempt to estimate the difficulties of others, achieve a great deal to heal the wounds in the German Evangelical Church.

Among the *Deutsche Christen* I found a similar type of pastor, gifted mentally and physically, natural leaders, whose views on the Old Testament were no more pronounced than that of Liberal Evangelicals or Modern Churchmen in this country, yet holding orthodox views on the Person and ministry of Christ, loyal to the Scriptural doctrine of Atonement and Resurrection. In one case, at least, such a leader does not appear to have been wisely handled by some of the Church authorities, although in another case it appeared that a rather bluff and not too well-educated pastor of this party might with justice be misunderstood by people of orthodox theological views. It appeared that with sympathetic treatment many of the *Deutsche Christen* might be won over to some compromise whereby the bitterness of their criticism of the Confessional Party might be abated and a return to quiet ministerial work secured.

Indeed, one of the fundamental causes of the failure of Herr Kerrl's ministry to bring about a larger measure of reconciliation than it has yet secured lies in a radical centrifugal tendency and policy among the different parties or movements or 'fronts' engaged in the dispute. The use of the term 'front' at this stage in the dispute is significant. I had the unhappy feeling that there is no deep-rooted desire for conciliation, but rather an instinct to continue a fight well begun, well maintained, but no longer of moral significance. In reply to my suggestion that these leaders should quietly meet together and, in an atmosphere of charity and prayer, try to understand each other's points of view, and so compose their own difficulties as well as to try to understand the most difficult situation which confronts the central Reich ecclesiastical ministry, I found not merely disinclination but blank refusal to entertain such an idea. Although the idea of 'leadership' and of following a lead appears to be thoroughly understood and appreciated in the political sphere, there is a notable absence of a proper recognition of these principles in ecclesiastical matters, as is natural in a Church organised on non-episcopal lines, in which leadership can

only be local. Local leaders should be brought to realis that acceptance of the lead of the territorial bishops, and i turn of the central administration, would do much to eas the existing tension. Indeed, in those territorial churche where such a lead has been followed there is peace. Th splitting up of the German Evangelical Church into con flicting sections is largely the result of the absence of a well established system of bishops whose wise counsels might hav secured the support of the local leaders.

Another apparent need is that the pastors should confin themselves to a simple preaching of the Gospel, such as I heard in the Dom at Berlin one Sunday morning, leaving politics aside and trusting to the word of the Gospel to win its way. Modern Germany, like modern England, requires to be re-evangelised, and so long as that need exists the pastors have a full programme before them without entering into disputes about other matters. To say, as some pastors said to me, that Gospel preaching is not enough suggests a failure to understand, not merely the present situation, but the proper function of the ministerial office. A pastor is called to the preaching of the Word and the administration of the Sacraments. If these are not enough, then the responsibility is no longer his. He is certainly not called upon to introduce another content or method into his preaching. But I found in several cases that such a ministry does, as in England, fill the churches and create peace in the parishes.

These impressions were confirmed after my interviews with leading laymen. During the course of half an hour's talk on December 8 with Herr Kerrl, who told me that he was converted to Christ at the age of thirteen and had read his New Testament ever since, the minister said that conditions in the world to-day resemble those in the Roman Empire 2000 years ago. Everything is in ruins, and now, as then, delivery can come only through Christ. The great act of Christ was to lead men back to God. Christ did not introduce a new religion, but He negotiated for men an approach to God. There is no need to compare Hitler with Christ—indeed, there is no comparison between them; but Hitler had been sent by God, and authorised by Him to raise up the German people from the ruin in which it stood, and

to make possible for it a new historical future.[1] In addition, Hitler had attempted to make clear to the German people that God is there, although in wide areas the conception of Him had completely disappeared. Many Germans had abandoned the idea of God altogether. He lamented that the Church had not grasped its duty. It opposed itself to the National Socialist endeavour and was lacking in a psychological understanding of the people (*Volk*). It adhered much more strongly to its own dogmatic opinions instead of to the single great duty of only preaching Christ again to men, and of bringing Him close to them. What do the people know of confessions and dogmas? When they have again accepted Christ, there will then be an opportunity for them to understand these things (namely, confessions and dogmas). Therefore the pastors must leave aside everything which obscures the figure of Christ or makes it difficult to understand Him. It is fatal to true Christianity that the Churches should be in opposition and hold their own views to be more important than Christ and His life and teaching. In place of Him they prefer to talk of Abraham and Old Testament personalities, and are excited if the people are weak in the understanding of such things.

The Jewish question is prominent. Mommsen described the Jews as 'the ferment of decomposition.' They are indeed the medium of destructive ideas in the modern world through the *Aufklärung* (eighteenth-century theological Liberalism), Marxism and Bolshevism. They have overthrown Russia to the ground, and the Russians know it. Therefore it is difficult for the German people, before it has recognised Christ, to occupy itself with Old Testament figures, or with human conceptions.

Herr Kerrl claimed that he was striving honourably on behalf of the Church, which should unite with him and with Hitler in a great struggle against the forces of evil; but co-operation was difficult so long as good will is lacking in many clergymen, both Roman Catholic and Confessional. He concluded by saying that he would be very grateful if the English people could be brought to see this situation with

[1] A precisely similar estimate of Herr Hitler has been made in a little book recently published by Professor Ernest Barker—*Oliver Cromwell and the English People* (Camb Univ. Press), p. 77.

the tolerance and patience to be expected from a nation which had experienced such troubles before and had solved them by a close interweaving of the functions of Church and State.

The value of this statement by Herr Kerrl on the urgency of bringing the German people back to a knowledge of God, by simply preaching Christ to them, has been seriously diminished by a pronouncement attributed to him on February 13, 1937. But the date of this pronouncement should be carefully noticed for reasons which will be given below. On that date he is reported to have said:

> Bishop von Galen and Dr. Zollner wanted to bring home to me what Christianity really was, that it was a question of the acknowledgment of Jesus as the Son of God. That is ridiculous,[2] quite unessential. All that matters is to let the character of Jesus work upon one, to translate Christianity into action. In the course of history an *Apostolicum* has been built up. That the recognition of this *Apostolicum* should be a token of Christianity is nonsense. There has risen a new authority as to what Christ and Christianity really is. This new authority is Adolf Hitler. I do not want by this to attribute divinity to Hitler. God speaks through men, through history, through living words. If this, which has been said before, had been recognised, there would have been no split between Christianity and National Socialism. All could have worked together to carry out the will of God, which is to secure the survival of our people.

Elsewhere in the alleged address Herr Kerrl says that he proposes to rule without Church Committees, either national or provincial, and that individual members of the Church could henceforth 'place themselves under the direct authority of the Church Ministry' (Kerrl's ministry at Berlin). Moreover, he said: 'In no circumstances will there be elections. Nor would they have any success.'

Two days after the delivery of this address to the Presidents of the Provincial Church Committees—an address outlining the policy which Herr Kerrl was about to promulgate—Herr Hitler, on February 15, brushed it aside and announced that elections would take place:

[2] It is now understood that what Kerrl said was: '*If* I should say that it was a question . . that would be ridiculous'—a very different version.

> The Church shall now, in complete liberty and along the lines determined by the congregations themselves, give itself a new constitution, and therewith a new organisation. I authorise the Reich Minister for Church Affairs (Herr Kerrl), with this object in view, to prepare the election of a General Synod and take all the necessary measures.

With these words the *Führer* brushed aside the proposals made in Herr Kerrl's address of February 13 and by implication any expressions in it, practical or theological or otherwise. Thus, even if Herr Kerrl made the statement criticising the doctrine of the divine Sonship of Christ it was not approved by the *Führer* and is therefore no longer germane to the controversy. It falls back into the limbo of discredited sayings and incidents, and ought no longer to be regarded and appraised as possessing current significance in the dispute.

Moreover, coming from Herr Kerrl, the statement, although serious, should, in justice, have been discounted by the fact that Herr Kerrl is not a theologian. He was appointed to assist in the practical work of framing a new Church constitution, and in all probability what he meant was that as a practical man he was not concerned with theological issues, but desirous that the preaching of Christ should be a simple evangel that the masses could understand. The failure to create a new constitution, completed by the resignation of Dr. Zollner the day before (February 12), lies behind his speech on February 13. His main difficulty is not Christology, but quite clearly the fear that the Roman Church and the Evangelical Church, following in its track, are attempting to set up a State within a State :

> Witness the inflammatory speech of the Pope against National Socialism to the German pilgrims who visited Rome. If a Catholic bishop came to the State and said, 'We want to do everything to create good relations with the State,' then we would be much more inclined to listen to complaints. Our party and our leader want to have perfectly good relations with the Christian Confessions. We stick to the speeches of our leader at Potsdam and elsewhere. But the Church must recognise the primacy of the State. That ought not to be difficult, as the party expressly represents positive Christianity. . . . If, however, the Church wants to be a State within the State, then the Church will

> soon find itself standing alone and isolated. . . . The fundamental principle is that the peoples are the handiwork of God. Imperialism and curialism are both in conflict with these principles, and with the nation.

These practical questions form the burden of Herr Kerrl's address on February 13, and his unfortunate Christological reference should not be allowed to have the significance which has been assigned to it. Herr Kerrl impressed me as belonging to a type of Christian layman with whom many of us are familiar in this country—a robust and kindly personality, a man doing his best in a difficult situation, and ready to meet sympathy with sympathy. For example, in the summer of 1936 he secured a grant of 30,000 marks for the erection of a Greek Orthodox church in Berlin. His views on the attitude of the Confessional Church, on the Jews, and on Bolshevism I found to be generally held by other laymen and indeed, on the Jewish and Russian questions, by the pastors as well. In a conversation with the late Dr. Simons, a former President of the High Court of Justice at Leipzig, an almost identical attitude and account of the situation was presented to me. The same views were expressed by an ex-ambassador. Here are devout men, who contend that with growing experience the rough corners of administrative action are being smoothed away, and they all deplore the fact that the pastors do not make allowances and try to work with the new Church authorities. This state of affairs is especially regrettable since, they say, the pastors, as Christian leaders, should now show an example in conciliation and a desire to co-operate in the difficult task of preaching Christ anew to Germany. An opinion is growing among the lay folk that a solution of their difficulties will come only if the laymen —Church officials and others—assume, as in England, more responsibility in Church affairs. This appeared to be the conviction of several leading business men, as well as of officials at the different ministries.

Bishop Heckel, the head of the foreign relations department of the German Evangelical Church, appears to be carrying on a policy exactly suited to the needs of the situation. While loyally supporting the Government on all political matters, and on all questions of Church organisation, he avoids raising issues on points of sharp theological differ-

ence, and seizes every opportunity to show friendship and kindly Christian brotherhood to all who approach him. His care of me when I was in hospital and afterwards was extremely generous. He has written a most important pamphlet on the Conferences at Oxford and Edinburgh which ought to be translated and read by everyone.

Bishop Marahrens very kindly met me at the railway station at Hannover on my return journey and stayed until the train left. He sent cordial greetings to the Anglican Church. We had little opportunity for close discussion, but he told me that the situation in the Church questions was still fluid and that it was unsafe to prophesy about it. He impressed me as being a leader with most of the qualities which the situation requires—personal, spiritual and mental, a man of great vigour of body and mind.

I had long interviews with officials at the Foreign Office, Propaganda Ministry (Dr. Goebbel's office), at the *Hitler Jugend* headquarters, and at the Winter Help headquarters. The personnel in every case impressed me as a fine body of bright, honest young men, trying to do their duty. They resembled the best type of Boy Scout master and Scout assistant commissioners in this country. At each of these ministries the idea was prevalent that the Confessional Church minority, like the Roman Church, was not backing up the Government's efforts to restore prosperity to the German people. At the *Hitler Jugend* office I was informed that the movement only takes charge of the children for fourteen week-ends in the year, and while I was in Berlin Herr Baldur von Schirach issued an order that during the other Sundays of the year the children were not to be engaged in *Hitler Jugend* activities during the hours of church services on Sunday. In their scheme of instruction a very large part is occupied with physical exercises and organised games. I received the impression that any intelligent and tactful pastor should be able to co-operate with these bright, open-hearted young men.

There can be little doubt that the reports of *The Times* Berlin correspondent down to the time of my visit have represented a one-sided view of the Church question. Little attempt has been made to ascertain and set forth in the English Press the exact aims and policy of Herr Kerrl's

ministry, or of the Prussian Church departments supervised by Bishop Heckel and Herr Banke. These reports cause misunderstanding between the two countries and are strongly resented by all types of people in Germany. Even when reporting facts, an unkind twist often appears to be given to the statement. For example, this attitude appears in the report of Winter Help and the annual street collection on December 5, when five and a half million marks were gathered in. The organisation of Winter Help, of which the street collection is a mere detail, would have made a column of interesting matter, and a sympathetic report would have done something to show the human side of National Socialism to people in England. The Berlin correspondent of *The Times* gave it some three inches with a sneer at the end that this was propaganda. If feeding hungry and clothing needy people is mere 'propaganda,' elsewhere than in Germany, then indeed Great Britain has earned the reputation it enjoys abroad for its skill in this new art. On the afternoon of the great street collection (December 5) I saw no compulsion exercised against the public to compel them to contribute. Berlin was in a happy holiday mood and people were contributing willingly.

If we may rely upon Bishop Heckel's statement that only some 3000 of the 19,000 pastors are now standing out in opposition to the existing ecclesiastical organisation, it would seem that we should be very cautious in intervening at the present time. Letters of protest to *The Times* and manifestoes forwarded to Germany, which may have been helpful at an earlier stage in the controversy, are now regarded as a hindrance even by people who formerly welcomed this kind of intervention. Herr Kerrl's term of office expires this autumn, though, of course, he may be continued in office. In the meantime, it will be wise if we leave the conflicting parties to themselves, hoping that yet more of the majority may find some means of co-operating with the Church authorities. Certainly the regulations made for Church finance, clergy discipline, and such matters throughout the past year appear to be sound and helpful to clergy and laity alike.

Since I left Berlin, Dr. Zöllner's resignation has taken place, and the *Führer* has sanctioned the election of new

Church Committees and Synods. On the merits of the case in dispute between Herr Minister Kerrl and Dr. Zöllner it is hardly fitting for a foreign observer to comment. But it did appear to me, when in Berlin, that possibly the veteran theologian and lay-minded minister might have difficulty in understanding each other—a difficulty which not infrequently occurs when strong personalities differ on points of administrative action.

One of Dr. Zöllner's chief reasons for resignation appears to be the failure of Herr Kerrl's ministry to create Church Committees in certain specified areas. However, in the official Gazette of the German Evangelical Church, dated December 23, 1936, the difficulties which hindered the formation of a unified ecclesiastical administration were set forth in detail. It is clear that the fundamental trouble has been the existence—sometimes in the same area, notably in Hannover—of two types of Church organisation: the Lutheran, based upon the local congregations and functioning through the deans and provosts who are permanent officials, and the Reformed, based upon the local synods, which are Presbyterian in character. Thus the ancient cleft between Lutheran and Presbyterian still creates trouble.

The official Gazette points out that three methods of election of the new territorial synods are possible: (1) direct election by the members of the churches; (2) election by the local congregations; and (3) election through the local synods (Presbyterian). The first method is regarded as impracticable, since it would be an attempt to revive the process of parliamentary voting which has broken down in Germany. The third method would work very well in areas where the Reformed Church flourishes, and this method might also be adopted elsewhere, but for the fact that in Lutheran districts the local synod is not sufficiently central, nor is it of sufficient significance in Church life to be entrusted with the election of representatives to the territorial synod. Probably it would be better to base the election in these areas upon the local congregations and to introduce a system partly of election by them and partly by nomination. Thus a double system of election was contemplated, although the Gazette made it clear that the ideal system would be election in the first instance by local election committees to the local

synod or presbytery, and from this body to the territorial Church Synod. Apparently the election of the National Church Synod would be in the hands of the ten territorial Church synods.

This statement is not quoted as a draft of what the new constitution will actually be, but in order to illustrate the difficulties which Herr Kerrl's ministry has had to face on the question of the formation of a new Church constitution.

At the headquarters of the Prussian Church the view is held officially that Herr Hitler's intervention now offers to the Church an excellent opportunity of putting its house in order. The hope has been expressed that the leaders of the minority opposition will make a sympathetic attempt to co-operate in the elections. Responsible Church leaders have expressed the hope that opinion outside Germany will make it clear that there are limits to the support which a minority has a right to expect from friends abroad on this question. Moreover, the Government are concerned because a majority of earnest Church people may not come to the polls. Pastor Niemoller is reported to have announced that the Berlin-Dahlem group of the *Bekenntnis Kirche* will not vote. If a mere fraction of the members of the German Evangelical Church record their votes, the Church will be faced by the possibility of being brushed aside as of no importance, on the ground that it represents a small minority of the German people. I have it on good authority that the Party desires a complete and honest vote, which will reveal the true strength of the German Evangelical Church.

In conclusion, while it is becoming more and more clear that the *Fuhrer's* demand for unity in the Evangelical Church, in order that it might become the National Church of Germany, was and is grounded upon an accurate estimate of the practical needs of German life and religion, yet such a unity can only be achieved, and such a National Church can only come into being, when the Government realise that the Church in Germany must be a Christian Church, preaching faith in Jesus Christ as Son of God, incarnate among men, dying on the Cross and rising from the dead : living under the guidance of the Divine Spirit, and offering spiritual service to the German people.

A. J. MACDONALD.

THE NEW AFRICA

II. A New Statute for Colonies and a New Status for Africans: A Plan

By Tracy Philipps

The preceding article[1] sought to lift for a moment the lid of tropical Africa in order to disclose some of the real and typical conditions of everyday life voluntarily or involuntarily created in Africa by Europe—democratic, dictatorial or 'Dutch.'

When 'Europe' is written, Europe is meant, not England. It is unnecessarily misleading to understand the part when what is intended is the whole. The sources drawn upon were those of locally common knowledge or of published official reports. This is a tiny fraction of the known and available information.

When in Europe a Royal Society which specialises solely on Africa, and one of whose principal objects is '*to investigate the religions and history of the African races*,' is, after more than thirty years of such investigation, unable to provide one of its own members with even a rough estimate of the numbers of the three religions—Animists, Christians and Moslems—in that continent, it is not unreasonable to surmise that the people of at least one democratic colonial Power in Europe are being left unaware of the political and social conditions of life prevailing among the colonial millions of Africa, for whose lives and destinies they remain responsible and for whom they call themselves trustees.

At the same time it is most necessary for us to be on our guard against drawing from these premisses false or exaggerated conclusions. During the past year statements have been made in London to influential gatherings by educated

[1] The *Nineteenth Century and After*, November 1937.

West Africans, by a member of an Advisory Committee of the Colonial Office, and by an eminent educational expert with experience of both Eastern and Western Africa, that 'under British rule the African has never yet had a square deal.' Such sweeping assertions are usually to be found in the mouths of little or disappointed men, or of those who have not had experience of Africa and Africans *as a whole*, or who lack means of direct communication with the masses. In these cases, the assertions could only have been founded upon impatience with local or occasional events. Such distorted assumptions do not rest upon common and typical conditions, which alone afford a fair and firm basis for the opinions of men of moderation, good will and constructive counsel. The verbal and written protests which one is able to make on such occasions are seldom able to overtake, and still less to counteract, the poisoned barb which speeds abroad to a world which so often prefers to believe the worst. Whatever may be the motives or intentions of such utterances, there can be no manner of doubt that at no time within the Christian era, nor in any country of Europe, has there existed a more general or more earnest desire to do right and to seek justice for the colonial people than exists to-day in England.

Nor has the standard of public life and the sense of duty of the present-day British official ever been surpassed.[2] Nevertheless, it sometimes happens that conservative old men forget that to conserve youthful vigour, so that the furthest limbs (even of an empire) may continue mutually to function or support the body with spontaneous health and harmony, it is nowadays necessary, as with treaties and with currencies, periodically to overhaul and to refit—to revalue, to revise and to renew. In Africa, we need to overhaul our conceptions, to install more supple 'machinery' of government, and above all to rehumanise our relations with the colonial peoples. The best hope for ensuring the development of African education and adequate social services lies in the development of the country's dormant resources. The larger the capital and more reputable the

[2] The European officials of no nation have a prouder record than those of England in Africa just for plain, straightforward decency Neither in the part of Asia which is Palestine nor in the part of Africa which is British were the scribes and pharisees Europeans

company, the more willing and able they will be to assure good terms and conditions of employment for Africans. New Eurafrican economic association, an overdue call to consultation, and a new political justice may then have some chance of inspiring and creating in the still subject races an appreciative consciousness of the value in practice of *British* ideals. Only moral education and *European* instruction can hope to help the still undiscriminating peoples to attain such stature as to reach up, pick and distinguish the poisonous from the life-giving fruits of the tree of knowledge-of-good-and-evil of European ways. We have in the past suffered a good deal from the curious myth that in non-self-governing colonies all sense of direction should be abandoned to a magical 'man-on-the-spot,' who is, after all, only another functionary in the field. This triton among subject minnows who emerged from the tropics about once in three years was, until the advent of air travel and the radio, through no fault of his own, sometimes cramped in mind and body within the mentally narrowing group-limits of a distant colony. He was not infrequently ill, and often isolated, under a tropical sun.

On matters of common colonial principle, the metropolis, so long as it has to bear the political responsibility and to ensure the relations with other Powers, has a duty to guide, co-ordinate and direct. The rest must depend upon a resilient interlocking gear of give and take. If on this score the British Colonial Office is open to reproach, it is on grounds exactly opposite to the classical complaint. If they have been blameworthy, it has been because they have intervened too little, not too much. If they have, as is so often alleged, interfered, it has been on matters of petty cash, of rules and sub-rules, and of routine. There has been far more anxiety for precedence and precedent than for principle and policy. They have in the past failed to co-ordinate colonies. They have failed to assure that unison and cohesion which alone make decentralisation safe, and ensures that the differing dog-team pulls as one dog. In Egypt, one may observe an ass, a buffalo and a camel harnessed to one plough. Even such a yoke can drive a straight furrow with even effort towards the same goal. But if a superior and more far-seeing power had not trained and co-ordinated their

varying efforts by the same principle to the same objective, the furrow would be criss-cross and the field foul. If British Ministerial conduct of affairs has been open to criticism, it has been for the ineffectual clerical timidity of their dealings with colonial Governors in matters of planning and policy. Situated as they are, holding in their hands the threads of the vast nexus of all our scattered Empire, with a wide synoptic view over other national horizons (which is unavoidably denied to any colonial 'man-on-the-spot'), they have failed to use their privileged position to sort out the jumbled jigsaw of wasteful sporadic development and, by harmonised multiplicity in unity, to inspire and direct the team.

We may pay dearly for their lack of wide, clear vision. Is it lack of money, lack of imagination or lack of knowledge which prevents the scrapping and replacement of the no longer effective, and therefore often dangerous, machinery of colonial government? If British Governments, through their permanent officials overseas, are to blame for colonial conditions, they are blameable for unawareness and for ignorance, and not for lack of conscience or good intent.

One of the fundamental differences between the parts of that Whitehall building which houses the hives of the Foreign and Colonial Offices is that the former's widely-travelled and polyglot men-of-the-world know far more than they can divulge or utilise in an ill-informed and sentimental democracy, whereas the over-worked officials of the Colonial Office have to send a series of special Commissions, which ought never to have been necessary, to report, in terms of almost monotonous insistence, on such of the conditions imposed on Africans as have already ripened to open riot. They observe time after time the officials' '*failure to educate*,' their '*lack of contact with the people*,' their '*lack of effective supervision of native officials*' (chiefs), their '*inaccessibility*' (however involuntary), the '*lack of realisation of the seriousness of the situation*' and the administrators' '*lack of knowledge*' of what is going on around them, owing to the 'indirect' conditions prescribed for their work. Officials in the European capitals of the colonial Powers will scarcely wish to maintain that, despite the unawareness of their administrators on the spot, they themselves are nevertheless well aware

of what is occurring. If, however, administrators are *not* unaware of what is going on, we are faced by a far more embarrassing dilemma when we are forced then to inquire why, in that case, they fail in their duty to deal with the causes of these native resentments before they come to a head in 'unexpected' revolts, to suppress which life is lost. That is why, before putting forward any series of constructive suggestions, it has been necessary to set out, in the preceding article, the real and *typical* peace-time conditions of Africans even under the régimes of the democratic Powers. It serves at least to illustrate the fact that the time has come for Europe to create another status and statute for colonies, and new forms of governance for new Africans. If we wish to understand the attitude of colonial peoples to the continuance or choice of European dominations, it is not with the eyes of the 45,000,000 British of the British Isles, but with the eyes and feelings of 160,000,000 Africans (mentally nearer the British before the aggression of the Germanic Angles and Saxons) that we must make comparisons and try to surmise their conclusions.

The appearance of the portraits and the nucleus of the cult of Mussolini in Nationalist households in Palestine, of Hitler in Morocco, and occasionally of the Mikado in the Union, is not due to the propaganda of those Powers, but to their 'dynamic' spirit, to their world attitude towards the patronising patrons and the old landed proprietors, which the democratic colonial Powers are believed to be. The significance of these phenomena is not that these Asian or African peoples wish to change *masters*.

In passing, let us examine a specific instance. In British East Africa, if anywhere, one would, whether by South African suggestion or by European logic, expect to find, among Africans, anti-European and anti-Italian sentiments as the result of the conquest of Christian Ethiopians by Christian Europeans. In British East Africa, just as after the Soviet seizure of government in Russia, the news reached the natives of the adjoining countries through the hair-raising accounts of *émigrés* of the small and privileged ruling class, and through the Press and opinions of countries which hated the conquerors' methods or feared an extension of their power. Italian (or Soviet) propaganda simply does not exist among

the illiterate masses of British tropical Africa. Any external influence upon these peoples comes from the (British) Government. Throughout British East Africa such Africans as are literate and also speak a European language can understand no other European language than English. So that, for them, the only non-African reading matter and Press which is open to them is British, which, during the Abyssinian War, was strongly anti-Italian. The native Press copies its news from these.

Furthermore, the solidarity of African sentiment in the vast British African territories adjoining Abyssinia was, by perfectly good European (or even South African) logic, bound to be frankly pro-Ethiopian–African and strongly anti-Italian–European. A well-educated English-reading African, in frequent and friendly contact with English people (and no Italians), with a sound sense of realities and a quick ear for public opinion, writes, on April 27, 1937, from a motor-road centre which carries traffic and news from all the countries round Abyssinia, as follows: 'Please tell me how things are in Europe. Here, everybody speaks but of Mussolini. Here, fashions, walkings and dressings all depend upon Mussolini. If an Indian wishes to make his goods popular to the public, he marks them "Mussolini".' In a long letter full of banalities and news, there is no other mention of the subject.

Here, then, is public opinion of Africans forming and manifesting itself not only quite independently of, but even contrary to, the only Press and European influence with which they are in contact. The fact that democracy and universal voting seem so far to suit Anglo-Saxons with moderate efficiency is no reason for us to deceive ourselves into believing that elsewhere in Europe (and in Asia, Africa and South America) the human race, with other ideals and in poorer or more exposed countries, must necessarily prefer, or can always afford, a parliamentary democracy which to them often appears an unessential or exotic *article-de-luxe*.

Meanwhile, in the African colonies of even the most democratic Powers the vast bulk of taxation is naturally paid by Africans, either indirectly through customs dues or directly by fixed poll-tax which is the same for the salaried

town-worker as for the wealthy or wandering owner of cattle whose products supply him and his family with food and lodging, and income if he wills. But among the colonial peoples of even the democratic Powers the elementary democratic principle of *no taxation without representation* is still withheld. The African, now crossing by thousands the bridge over his Rubicon between old and new, dimly descries the magnified mirage of his bone, that is, his *clan*, which was his sole insurance policy, and his *cult*, which he was wont to practise fully. To-day he is opening his mouth eagerly to snap up a material Europeanism against which he has now no means of insuring himself and of which the material benefits can seldom be fully assured to him. He is earnestly or fashionably fumbling after a non-African religion, of which he feels the Great Spirit to be an Incomprehensible and the application rare. When, in response to his demands, our churches and schools impart to these still undiscriminating peoples the principles of Christianity which we do not practise on him (or ourselves), and the doctrines of democracy which we withhold from him, they are quite logically led to disillusion. But if the people have no voice in their own governance, voicelessness is by no means necessarily synonymous with the lack of vote.

The clear planning of other forms of government, and the search for new containers of our political administration, are needed to meet the wholly new conditions of Africans and the new spirit of the age. Sir Donald Cameron, with all the weight of his wide, long and recent experience, observed in a public utterance this year that 'I think you over-estimate what the primitive African has to build on or contribute. Unless we withdraw from contact with him, his civilisation must come from without. Then perhaps he might have had *the time* and thought to select what he wanted from anything our civilisation has to offer. But now he must be in a position to send his own missionaries into the world to find out what is best for him.'

The African is turning a full corner in history. He is suddenly exposed to the blasts of simultaneous religious and economic, industrial and mechanical revolutions. This cold wind from the north threatens momentarily to throw him off the path of African conduct, and to blow out, or at

least obscure, his guiding lamps of life. There are very few effective means of tempering the wind to this shorn lamb, shorn suddenly of the protection of his native insurance society and of his faith in God and man. To this African youth, to enable him to meet the blustering European conditions on which he insists, it is wiser to give a new European suit several sizes too large than to try in a day to patch his African nightshirt and his bark loin-cloth with heavy European corduroy. From his own wardrobe, at a moment's notice, he has little with which to provide himself; into the European suit he will grow all too soon. In colonial Africa there is no time for quiet evolution. Opponents of the principle and practice of Europeanisation, who have travelled widely, consecutively or understandingly in Russia, may well object that 'the same countries have generally in all times been used to forms of government much of a sort; the same nature ever continuing under the same climate and making returns into its old channel, though sometimes led out of it by persuasion and sometimes beaten out by force.' However true this may be, it is only an additional argument for giving the African European institutions in order that he may become used to them betimes without dislocating the gear of society by too sudden subsequent application.

In searching for new forms and frameworks of government for the rapidly evolving African populations, above all it is not necessary or wise to handicap ourselves with too great a condescension or superiority-complex. Among the most industrially and mechanically advanced white peoples 'mental tests have recently shocked many believers in democracy by showing what a large fraction of the population is sub-normal and what a considerable number are feeble-minded.' We need, first, to gain an open-minded and clear unpatronising perspective for our very testing task. Dr. Austin Freeman's work on *Social Decay and Regeneration* records some interesting comparisons. His experience includes medical observation of Africans in their homes, as well as inspection of some thousands of conscripts in Great Britain. History has not shown that the African peoples, when equally healthy or equally armed, were found to be inferior to Europeans in courage, generosity, endurance,

hospitality, duty towards the clan neighbour or in fulfilment of solemn promises.

This, then, is the African from whom, as an essential part of our progressive policy of westernisation, it is no longer wise or just to withhold the elementary principle of *no taxation without representation.* Such realities as these are of necessity unpopular. They are seldom presented in proper perspective. But, for such a task as this, a proper perspective is quite essential. On the other hand, until in Europe we reachieve harmony, the spirit and the body may stand momentarily dazed or dominated by the still novel and dislocating pressure of the machines which our minds have invented.

But it is just these high mental qualities and restless physical activities themselves which save us, and with us Europe, from condemnation on any hasty and superficial charge of decadence. The redeeming elements of the spirit, of unison and of eugenics—of cult, clan and Nature—are largely lost to modern European democracies by uninformed sentiment or licentious liberty. In Africa, for a little while, all these elements still exist. They still aid the African. Unlike Moslem Africa and India and Japan, inland tropical Africa is deprived of the stabilising sheet-anchor of indigenous religion. Sudden circumstances, nowhere fully paralleled in the history of mankind, have denied to the tropical African the normal (if any) *time* for gradual intermediate evolution. Thus, most unfortunately, the foundations of his own house have been suddenly swept away and his own indigenous material is worse than useless for reconstruction in the new world in which of necessity, but not wholly unwillingly, he finds himself.

In this connexion there appeared in *The Times* of June 30, 1937, a powerful appeal for the establishment, as an annexe to a museum in Rhodesia, of yet another institute for the study of 'the urgent anthropological problem' of Africa. A leading article vaguely interprets 'the problem' as the relations in Africa between Africans and Europeans. But neither this, nor still less any question between so-called 'indirect' and direct rule, is the immediate problem.

Although it is astonishing that so few Europeans speak the easy indigenous languages of the African colonial peoples with naturalness, accuracy and ease, yet institutions for

anthropological and colonial cultural research exist already in all the colonial and ex-colonial States of Europe. Representatives of them have long been at work in Africa. Nor is there cause to presume them incompetent. So much less profound comprehension to feel the 'soul' of a people, so much less genius or imagination to conceive solutions, so much less original and constructive thought, and, above all, so much less moral courage, are called for to dig into the dead past than frankly to affront and firmly to construct a living future and present representation of Africans. Even in our own continent of to-day, any profound and balanced comprehension of the deep currents of the spirit of the peoples, beneath the transient waves of artificial ideologies, can only rise from an understanding of at least one of each of the three great and diverse mediums of their self-expression—namely, a Latin, a Slav, and a Teutonic tongue.

The chief obstacle to our comprehension of the significance of the Soviets has been the paucity of British statesmen who could speak and think that type of Turanian and of Slav. So also in Africa, it is not reasonable to expect (for its far more diverse, less articulate and less intelligible peoples) a solution of the spirit and a way of life from men, already handicapped by being foreigners, who have never attained any direct deep consciousness of the typical mind-matter and thought-processes of at least the majority of the five principal great human groups which compose 'the African.' For as men speak, so they think. As they think, so they are. As they are, so they act.

In a colony's local Parliament, which is the Legislative Council presided over by the Governor, the constitution is often so disposed as to contain an equal number of officials whose votes are commanded or controllable by the Governor, and of elected members. Whenever the latter agree to combine in ordinary Opposition they can only be defeated by the casting vote of the Governor—the implications and delicate possibilities can easily be envisaged.

In an increasing number of African countries the African civil servant chief now enjoys four functions of a European character. Within the area of his chieftainship he is terri-

torial administrator, executive inspector, tax-collector and judge. As a judge, he sits with some half-dozen fellow-justices, thus constituting a native court. In the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, native courts are more accurately known as Chiefs' Courts. Indeed, the justices are usually administrative sub-chiefs and, as such, under the orders of the judge-president of the court. As such, they depend upon his recommendations or his veto for the success or failure of their careers. The more the unrepresented African masses become sophisticated and 'conscious,' the more these Europeanised and the European administrators have to hold together to maintain their authority. They all must logically and loyally 'support the chief'

The judicial function in most African communities was an affair of the people. It was so much more democratic than European democracy that it is not easy for us now to visualise such a system. Like the communicating waves which regulate the relations between an 'ant' community and the termite queen, the delicate interplay of the old African democracy, being a matter of *flair* and of spirit, is no longer easily discernible to the modern Europeanised man.

The heads of the clans, the elders of the villages, were the repository of the uncodified custom which is now becoming a sere and yellow leaf fast falling from the human tree of Africa. The oath was ordeal; but perjury was not an offence against both God and man. The civil was seldom distinguished from the criminal law, nor sin from crime. The protection of the community from offenders was often held to be a gift assured by divination and the divine. Custom, as it evolved, was adaptable and elastic as is unwritten law. It was as pitilessly effective as, in our time, is social ostracism by the community—whether exercised on a cheater at cards in England, on untouchables in India, or on Jews in Germany. The family elders and clan heads were the mouthpiece of the ancestors and of the Great Spirits. The latter were an ultimate (but not the only) sanction so long as they were believed, if shocked or unpropitiated, to be able to shrivel seed-time, to blight the harvest or unleash the lightning. The other, less potent but more practical, sanction was an inexorable public opinion. But the clan chiefs were arbiters, not magistrates or prosecutors. If an offence against the individual

was a crime, it was so because he was an active living cell of the clan body, which was thus itself wounded or deranged. The legal sanctions were thus, at bottom, magico-religious. In such a society, where assurance of justice, the unwritten law and the *prophets* (in the original sense of men who 'speak forth') was an *affair of a community* whose administration was not based on floods of impersonal paper emitted by a horde of sheltered Scribes without interest, and by native Functionaries without faith.

In such a community, where tax and tribute were (in kind and) for the tribe who were self-supporting and could observe their bread return to them in due season, the vesting in the same African person, or body, of the quadruple functions was an entirely different matter. It was not, as now, a combine fraught with menace to the community. Its past existence affords no valid precedent for its petrified preservation or its mock mummification under the misleading and specious guise of Native Custom.

All the quadruple functions of chiefs are nowadays in reality European. In most African colonies at least 80 per cent. of the cases dealt with by native courts are not affairs of abstruse African customs, 'unintelligible' to average Europeans, but simple matters of common law. Native court sentences on compulsory planting or uprooting of cotton, technical veterinary regulations—however salutary in themselves—and offences touching bicycles and motor omnibuses (of which the chief owners, drivers and users respectively are Africans) can find no possible sanction in ancient African custom, of which the Europeanised civil servant chief is increasingly contemptuous or ignorant. They are new wine which needs new skins. Misused or misapplied with the best intentions by Europeans, and administered by such Africans who are in daily practice unavoidably divorced and demoralised from the old (and not yet remoralised by the new) social and spiritual sanctions, African native custom has become a 'cloke of maliciousness' of which the people are often the victims. Hence the popular phrase, in so many lands and languages of Africa, that 'Our chiefs have become the Europeans' office-boys.'

When an official was sentenced to three months' imprisonment for the series of tortures (although many peasants

feared to give evidence) inflicted by him—in his capacities of tax-collector, judge, police authority and governor of the prison—the Chief Justice of the colony, who confirmed the judgment, considered the sentence to be wholly inadequate. But the man's British commissioner, in loyalty and support of his civil servant chief, protested that the man ought not to be placed in the same prison as the common herd.

It is a typical case of a mistaken and well-meaning sense of loyalty and a sense of proportion atrophied or distorted under a tropical sun. Criminal sentences, some 500 in number, were pronounced on public servants of three sub-divisions of some 3000 taxpayers each. In Africa courts habitually sit in open pillared halls accessible to the public, so that conditions and sentences such as these rapidly become matters of public knowledge. Any traveller or passer-by with an easy knowledge of the language may overhear and know the news in any road or market-place. Foreign journalists were at that time, as is not infrequent, touring the country (with interpreters) in search of copy. In colonial Africa, of which the larger area is not British, such abuses are now common. The greater part of them are typical. 'The range of human folly is unlimited. But whereas the number of its instances is incalculable, its patterns repeat themselves with a monotonous reiteration.' Such abuses are committed by chiefs who are paid public servants. They are committed in the exercise of judicial and other multiple functions with European-type powers conferred upon them by European authority. These underground and underhand abuses are far more difficult to detect than submarine piracy. They are perpetrated without the knowledge of European officials. But they are committed, in the eyes of the people, by the officials and agents of a European Power, therefore in the name of its king and country, whose character and reputation is the eventual sufferer. There is no longer any effective public opinion. It has been rendered impotent to act as a check on chiefs.

Nor do the people possess any machinery of collective representation. An average of three European administrators to 250,000 people are insufficient to hear such complaints (which are normally matters for native courts), even if they were not pre-occupied with a multiplicity of other

pressing functions, and even if the people found it 'paid' to complain at all. While the exceptions are notable and numerous, it is the abuses which are the rule. In Western Europe public opinion (manifested as ridicule, publicity or social ostracism), apart from the inevitable impeachment, would render such scandals impossible.

The nation must be allowed to know both the nature and the extent of the trouble before it can be expected to take a serious interest in it. If we do not care to see ourselves as others, such as our own colonial peoples, really see us, it is nevertheless unlikely that as a nation we shall prefer always to see ourselves magically or majestically through the looking-glass of reassuring official reports on our overseas estates, or in the magnifying mirror of a Press which might make us seem much bigger and finer fellows than we really are. It is more charitable to assume that European administrators in Africa often *do not know* what is going on around them, and that they are not always aware of the ultimate significance of their acts.

The task of pointing out our undiagnosed weaknesses must always be as unpopular as it is unpleasing. It can best be accompanied by constructive suggestions for strengthening and for cure. The gentle sneer or the benevolent smile is often enough to obscure an issue or to suggest a motive other than just those simple and tender things which are love of one's country, affection for the still subject peoples, or even a simple sense of duty.

And, if they do this in the green tree of one of the best and most progressively administered of British colonies, what do they do in the dry? Their own nationals have repeatedly called attention to the normally undetected conditions in the foreign colonies in Africa. There, too, those who run have read the sad signs of the times. In common fairness to African chiefs who are so overpowered, for the reputation of European tutelage, and for the safeguarding of the African masses, it is of the most pressing importance that the fiscal functions, and the administrative and executive powers, should be firmly and clearly separated as soon as possible. The general tendency at present in Africa is in the opposite direction.

TRACY PHILIPPS.

A PEOPLE'S ARMY

By Peter Kemp

14th Bandera of the Legion of Spain

The vital issues underlying the Civil War in Spain are, after one and a half years of fighting, at last becoming apparent to Englishmen. It is not a contest between parliamentary government and autocracy, between democracy and Fascism, or between the people and the army, for peasants are for the most part active supporters of General Franco, and the industrial unions are for the most part behind the Government of Barcelona. General Franco is the head of a regenerative movement—religious, political and social; his army embraces the whole nation, and is likewise drawn from every stratum. In these circumstances some account of its composition, by one who, starting in the ranks, has served in it almost from the beginning, may be of value as well as of interest to Englishmen.

The fighting forces of Nationalist Spain comprise four distinct units—namely, the Regular Army, the *Tercio*, or Foreign Legion, the Moors and the *Milicias Nacionales*, and total, in all, upwards of 800,000 men. They are mutually independent in matters of administration, although a brigade or a division usually contains a proportion of each of them.

The Regular Army.—The strength of the Regular Army at the outbreak of the movement was eight divisions; it was sixteen divisions under the Monarchy, but was reduced during the Republican régime. President Azaña, himself expelled on non-political grounds from the Military Academy of Segovia, was responsible for these reductions. Each of these divisions was composed of two brigades, each, in turn, consisting of four regiments of infantry, a cavalry squadron, two regiments of artillery, and various subsidiary units. In addition, and independent of these, there were two 'mixed

brigades' of mountain infantry and seven infantry regiments; four regiments of heavy artillery, four of coast defence and two anti-aircraft groups; also a cavalry brigade and two tank regiments. The air force consisted of only one group. The co-ordinating bodies were the 'Central General Staff' and the 'Supreme War Council.'

Although the development of the war has naturally necessitated some modifications, these basic units have remained substantially unchanged, except that each has been brought up to war strength. Until the capture of Merida, Nationalist Spain was divided into two parts, with no communication between them; this gave rise to the 'Army of the North' and the 'Army of the South.' Indeed, if the Madrid Government had had a disciplined force instead of a disorderly rabble at their disposal, they might have held Merida and prevented the junction of these two armies, in which case this war would have followed a very different course, as it would have, also, if the Madrid Government had known how to use its navy. The Nationalists would have achieved nothing but for the astonishing incompetence of the other side in the first few months.

When, in November 1936, the columns operating along the Tagus valley were held up in front of Madrid, the length and intensity of the resulting battles necessitated the formation of the 'Reinforced Madrid Division.' This, together with the Division of Avila and Sovia operating in the mountains to the north of the city, was incorporated into the 'Madrid Army Corps,' made up in all of four divisions. This has been united with the 'Army Corps of Aragon' to form the 'Army of the Centre.' So much for the organisation of the army.

Military service in Spain was by law compulsory and generally lasted two years. At the moment it is compulsory for all between the ages of nineteen and twenty-nine, and the Regular Army is largely composed of these '*quintas*.' On the other hand, a great number, if not the majority, of those included in the *quintas* were fighting as volunteers before they were called up, while there are still many volunteers who are not included within these ages. General Franco's army is not, therefore, simply an army of conscripts, nor is its spirit that of conscripts—as is proved by the part it has played.

Those who speak lightly of the Spanish soldier make a great mistake: he has an extraordinary power of endurance, and can march and fight for days on end with practically no food or sleep; he can move very rapidly, using the minimum of equipment; his courage is of the highest, and the worst conditions of danger or discomfort cannot depress his spirits.

In January 1937 I was attached to the 8th Battalion of the Regiment of Argel in Carabauchel Bajo, about two miles south of Madrid. We were engaged in street fighting—a very disagreeable form of warfare and a severe strain on the nerves; at one time we had to hold two houses, built, like many Spanish houses, round an open *patio* and connected by a 'tunnel' of sandbags across a street. We were practically cut off by the enemy, who occupied the houses around us, at a distance of ten metres. We were there a week, with little food and less water, and in addition to constant attacks we were subjected day and night to bombardment by mortars and hand-grenades, many of which exploded in the *patios* of our two houses. Had there been any lack of enthusiasm it must have appeared then. Yet the men, most of whom were from Estremadura or Galicia, remained always in the highest spirits until we were relieved; many of them were boys of seventeen and eighteen, but none of them showed the least sign of fear or discontent. In the fiercest battles of this war, in the Jarama, in Brunete and in Belchite, the Regular Army has fought with courage and distinction.

A serious problem of this as of all wars is the training of new officers to replace casualties and to supply the needs of an expanding army. This has been partially solved by the institution of *cursillos*—courses of a month's duration at the various military academies. There are *cursillos* every month for the selected candidates, but, before becoming eligible, a soldier must have served at least four months at the front. There are also *cursillos* for sergeants, though these are a recent innovation.

An army has to develop quickly in war, and the Spanish army needed a great deal of development. There has been neither time nor opportunity for long and elaborate training, but, even so, the Nationalist army of to-day is something very different from that of 1936, and it is still improving. The other side also possesses a 'new model army.' The next

few months will decide which of the two is the better, and those with whom I serve await the test with confidence. There have been four rounds in this struggle up to now. The Nationalists lost the first round, in the failure of the garrisons in the big cities and industrial centres, such as Madrid, Barcelona and the northern coast, and, more serious still, of the navy. The second was a Nationalist victory, with the capture of Irun, Merida and Badajoz, the relief of Toledo and the securing of the passes of Somosierra and Alto-de Leon connecting Old and New Castile. The third round, which lasted, roughly, from November to April, and was fought mainly round Madrid, was indecisive, the Nationalist reverse at Guadalajara being counter-balanced by their capture of Malaga. The fourth was the conquest of the North, a decisive victory for Franco. The fifth round, for which both sides have long been preparing, has begun, and will probably be the last. On this side there is no doubt of victory.

The Legion.—The Foreign Legion was founded by decree on January 28, 1920, and was built up and organised by General Franco and General Millan Astray. Originally consisting of two *banderas*,[1] it contained six at the beginning of the movement; it used to have one squadron of cavalry, but this was abolished by the Republic. There are now seventeen *banderas* and more are in the process of formation. The Legion is modelled on the Spanish *Tercios* who fought in Flanders in the fifteenth century, when 'Spanish discipline' was a proverb in Europe. For this reason it is also known as the '*Tercio*.' It should be understood that the proportion of foreigners in the 'Foreign Legion' is less than 5 per cent., the remainder being Spaniards.

The Legion is the *corps d'élite* of the Spanish army, and is rightly regarded as one of the finest fighting forces in the world. Together with the Moors, it composes the *fuerzas de choque*, or shock troops. During the time of the Republic an order was issued that officers of the *fuerzas de choque* who had served in them for three years might wear the insignia of their corps on their right breast pocket.[2] The motive of

[1] *Bandera* literally means 'flag' But this name, taken from the *Tercio* of Flanders, is now applied to a battalion of the Legion

[2] This period has been reduced, in this war, to one year of active service.

this order came from the high command; the object at which it aimed was to establish a nucleus of reliable officers who could be recognised easily, and who could be counted upon to stand by their leaders in an emergency. Throughout this war the Legion has fought with a desperate courage which has made it the admiration of one side and the terror of the other. Together with the Moors, it has had to face the thickest fighting. The Legion is the only force which, since the beginning of the movement, has never lost a position without retaking it immediately. The Legion has made for itself a history much too long to tell here, and to which each *bandera* has made its glorious contribution—the 3rd *Bandera* in Oviedo, the 2nd at Irun and later in Aragon, the march of the 5th from Seville to the Casa de Campo—these are only a few examples; but

War's annals will fade into night
Ere their story dies.

One must make friends quickly in the Legion, for time is short. To some extent the Legion has changed during this war; that was inevitable with the losses it has sustained. Most of the veterans of Africa are dead, and new men have taken their place. But the old tradition of loyalty and courage has remained, and still the conviction holds that every man, from *comandante* to *legionario*, has one purpose and one supreme duty—to fight and, if need be, die for his *bandera*, for the Legion and for Spain. '*La muerte es un acto de servicio*'—and no more.

The Moors.—The native troops fighting in the Nationalist army consist of the *regulares*,[3] or Spanish 'colonial troops,' who are organised in *tabores*, and the troops of the Khalifa, or Sultan of Morocco, who are organised in *mehala*; a *tabor* or a *mehala* corresponds to a battalion. There were five 'groups' of *regulares* before the movement, each of which consisted of three *tabores* of infantry and one of cavalry. This organisation has been retained, although considerably expanded. It may seem strange that these Moors, who fought so bravely and so bitterly against Spain a few years ago, should now be prepared to fight as shock troops by the side of the men who defeated them. For it is unquestionable that

[3] The term is reserved for these troops, and never applied to the Regular Army

they are willing—indeed, very keen—allies, and there is a close understanding and comradeship between the Moors and the Legion, as nobody can doubt who has seen them fight together. This is easily explained. In the first place, the old hostility was softened by the removal of the Spanish protectorate over Morocco, chiefly through the influence of the Spanish military authorities, who have done all they could to help and co-operate with the Khalifa and his chiefs and subjects. In fact, the Spanish influence in Morocco, like the ancient Moorish influence in Spain, has brought great benefits to, as well as a close understanding between, the two peoples. Secondly, whatever hostility remained after the Riff wars has been swept away by the genuine and even fanatical enthusiasm which the Moors feel for this cause. They are a religious people, and this they rightly regard as the cause of religion against atheism.[4] Lastly, Moors are by nature warriors, and to be given a rifle and the opportunity to use it appeals to them strongly. This was expressed to me forcibly by an old Moor: 'I am here for the love of it. To be given good pay and food and our rifles again, and to have a chance to kill atheists and godless Christians, what more could we desire?'

This warlike spirit extends also to their camp-followers—a strange collection, consisting mostly of old and wounded soldiers who have attached themselves to the *tabores*. As soon as a position is occupied they go off to the nearest Spanish battalion, where they set up a stall (usually an inverted brandy case) from which they sell spirits, tobacco and chocolate to the troops. As soon as fighting breaks out anywhere near, they pack up their wares, seize a rifle, and rush off to

[4] Those English clergymen who said that they could find no traces of an anti-religious movement on the other side cannot have looked very hard. They cannot, for example, have seen the villages of Andalucia and Castilla la Nueva after their occupation by the forces of Madrid. I was quartered with a cavalry squadron last November in one of them (Santa Olalla, near Talavera), and we had to celebrate Mass among the ruins of the two churches which had been entirely gutted by the Governmental forces. There remained only a picture of the Virgin, slashed about with knives. In the province of Granada, before entering a church to sack it, they would pause in the doorway to remove their hats and cross themselves, and repeat the action perfectly seriously upon leaving the church in flames. Atheism, and in particular a hatred of the Catholic Church, is a prominent force in Madrid and Valencia, and friends of mine who have recently escaped from the former city tell me that to confess yourself a Catholic there is to run the risk of being shot out of hand. All this creates a profound impression upon the Moors.

take part in it. It is hardly necessary to add that there is no conscription among the Moors, as the number of voluntary applicants is much greater than can be admitted into the ranks.

These people respect a good soldier and a brave leader, and for this reason they are devoted to General Franco and prepared to follow him anywhere. In the hospital of Grinon was a Moor very seriously wounded in the foot; the doctors decided that they would have to amputate to save his life. But it was necessary first to obtain his consent to the amputation, and this he refused to give, saying that he would rather die of gangrene or all the devils in hell than lose his foot. They called a captain of *regulares* to reason with him, explaining that if the soldier's life was to be saved amputation must take place. The captain was equally unsuccessful, until at last he said: 'Well, how am I to tell the Generalissimo that one of his Moors was afraid to lose his foot?' 'You will tell him *that*?' 'I shall have to,' answered the captain. A long pause. 'They may have my foot, then,' said the Moor with a sigh. The operation was successful.

In that same hospital was a wounded friend of mine, and I went to see him there. I was waiting inside the door when I heard someone shouting outside. I turned round and saw a Moor approaching slowly, led by the hand. The top of his face seemed to have been blown clean off, for from the nose upwards no feature was distinguishable. He was shouting something, and as he passed me I caught the words '*Viva España! Viva el ejercito Español!*' ('Long live Spain and the Spanish Army!').

The two charges most frequently brought against the Moors are those of looting and atrocities, and credit is due to the Valencia Government for the skill with which they have exploited these. They have no foundation in fact, for the Moors are probably the best behaved troops in Spain and immensely popular with all classes. As regards looting, it is strictly forbidden and rigorously punished; in addition, the excellent pay, food and equipment they receive precludes any likelihood of pillaging, which is a common consequence of bad organisation. Equally fantastic are the atrocity stories published in France and England asserting that they rape women and murder children. On the contrary, they treat

women with much greater respect than is common among Europeans. At the beginning of this war, when the enemy were using women's battalions in the field, it was for a long time impossible to make the Moors go into action against them, as they are forbidden by religion to harm a woman. It was not until they had seen something of the nature of these women that they could be induced to fight them. Their generosity to children is well known; when they enter a village recently taken from the enemy they collect all the children and feed them from their own rations, while in Seville they used to bring children to the convents and give the nuns money to feed and look after them.

They are themselves very like children, and very temperamental, wherein lies their weakness as soldiers. This fact is well recognised, and they seldom operate alone, but usually on the flanks of the Legion. Very often on the eve of an attack the officer in charge of the operation will inquire how the *Moritos* are feeling, and if the answer is not satisfactory, will postpone the action.

Milicias Nacionales.—These were united by decree last April. Previously there had been several political parties fighting for the Nationalists; each sent its own militia to the front, paying, feeding and equipping it. The most important were the *Falange*, or Fascists, the *Requetés*, *Tradicionalistes*, or Carlists, and the *Renovación Española*, who supported Alfonso XIII. In addition, each of these had its own party organisation and political programme. By the decree of April 19 all were united into a national party, called *Falange Española, Tradicionalista y de las J.O.N.S.*[5] The two principal militias, *Requetés* and *Falange*, retained their separate military organisations as before, with their own distinctive uniforms—the red *boina* and khaki shirt of the *Requetés* and the blue shirt and forage cap of the *Falange*. The other *milicias* were incorporated into these. By this political unification the rivalry, which might have become serious, between *Falange* and *Requetés* was obviated, while the spirit with which the new Order was accepted assured the Generalisimo of their loyalty.

[5] J.O.N.S. signifies '*Juventud Offensiva Nacional Sindicalista*.' This party was amalgamated with the *Falange Española* during the time of the Republic, and known as '*Falange Española y de las J.O.N.S.*'

The Requetés are organised in *tercios*, each corresponding to an army battalion, and are commanded chiefly by army officers, although there are some of their own officers among the junior ranks. The name *Requeté* is generally reserved for the fighting troops, while the political adherents are called *Carlistas* or *Tradicionalistas*. Their main strength has always lain in Navarre, but they are strong in all the Basque provinces and in Cataluna; they had powerful groups in Valencia and Castellon de la Plana, but elsewhere they were not numerous, although the *Requetés* of Colonel Redondo's column have made a name for themselves in Andalucia Spain owes a great deal to the *Requetés* for the work they have done in this war. They are magnificent fighters—hardy, cheerful, and quite fearless—though they suffer from lack of training, and their discipline in the field is rather irregular, with the result that their casualties are much heavier than they need be. Just before the movement the Nationalist leader asked for an assurance of 8000 men from the *Requetés*; three weeks after the beginning Navarre alone had put 25,000 into the field. Grandfather, father and son were fighting side by side in the same company It was the *Requetés*, together with the 2nd *Bandera* of the Legion, that took Irun, securing the French frontier, and to the *Requetés* must go the credit for the conquest of the North.

From Irun to Gijon they have fought their way, through Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya, Santander and Asturias, leaving the best of three generations dead among those mountains. Of the men who joined up in the first few months scarcely one remains alive to-day; the wounded went back to the front as soon as they were cured (often before), and went on fighting until they were killed. It was one of the greatest tragedies that the Basque Separatists chose to ally themselves with the *Frente Popular* in the elections of February 1936. By this alliance they hoped to obtain their independence; but, as Cromwell said, 'There can be a Covenant with Death and Hell,' and the Separatists were inspired solely by a hatred of Spain. There are four Basque provinces—Navarre, Alava, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya; and since neither of the two former would ever accept Separatism, Basque independence was politically and economically impossible. This may account for the support it received in England from people

like Mr. Lloyd George, though when the latter declared that his sympathy with the Separatists was due to an affinity of race he was talking nonsense. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the Separatists were prepared for a foreign protectorate over '*Euzkadi*,' their patriotism cannot have been very sincere. The conduct of the Basque leaders, in any case, has been indefensible. Many of them were not Basques [6] themselves, and almost all of them, like the Sotas, fled to France as soon as things began to look dangerous, leaving the fighting to others.

When I first came to Spain, more than a year ago, I saw everywhere placards bearing the Carlist insignia—the Double Eagle and the Cross of Burgundy—with the words '*El Requeté el Servicio de España*.' In this phrase is represented the ideal of the *Requetés* as it is to-day and as it has been since the first Carlist war. In Navarre, always the centre of Carlism, resides the strongest and most unselfish patriotism in Europe. Sincere Spaniards and devout Catholics, these men feel that for their God and their country no sacrifice is too great. They have followed Franco, as their fathers followed Don Carlos and his line, not for power or personal glory, but believing that in his cause alone was salvation for Spain. They have given everything they possess (their wealth, their families, and their lives) for Spain and for *La Tradición*—the patriarchal Catholic tradition of Spain in her greatest days. When Mola raised the North they left their families and their work and went out to fight for him. A month after the proclamation of the movement there was not a young man left in Navarre. Victory must then have seemed impossible, but they had already lost three wars for their cause and they were not afraid to fight another. 'Under the skies of empire the Tradition returns,' ran the slogan, and, although the majority of those who set out eighteen months ago to bring it back are now dead or disabled, their memory and the record of what they have done will always live in Spain as it deserves to live in Europe. One testimony at least will always remain—the first orders issued by General Mola to his forces: 'If the movement is unsuccessful, the columns will retire into Navarre, the eternal, inviolable sanctuary of Spain.'

[6] *E.g.*, Ramón de la Sota, one of the principal Separatists, was a Castilian, originally from Santander, which is in Castilla la Vieja

The *Falange* was founded in 1932 by José Antonio Primo de Rivera, a son of the dictator, on a militant basis, and succeeded in putting some check upon the excesses of the Communists and Anarchists in the last two years of the Republic, when all pretence of ordered government had ceased. It has a peculiar organisation of its own, the names of the units having been taken from the Spanish military formations of the sixteenth century. The smallest unit is an *escuadra*, which consists of ten men and its commander; there are three *escuadras* in a *Falange*, and three *Falanges* in a *bandera*; three *banderas* make up a Legion.

Politically, *Falange* represents a form of Fascism adapted to the traditions and peculiar temperament of the Spanish people. Broadly speaking, their ideal is a centralised and autocratic government, such as the rule of Isabel la Catolica, with a functional representation of industry by means of workers' syndicates. '*Iremos al obrero aunque nos reciba a tiros*,'[7] said José Antonio in 1933, and *Falange's* appeal to the working classes received considerable support from them even before the movement. Among the industrial workers in the large cities they were overwhelmed by the Socialists and Anarchists, but in the country and smaller towns they have always had a large number of adherents, while on the outbreak of the movement they carried the whole of Old Castile with them. Their soldiers are to be found on every front, men and boys of all ages, ranks and classes, while behind the lines others, notably the women, are working the social organisation of the country.

It is said that for every man fighting at the front ten are required to work behind the lines, and in the *retroguardia* there is a great body of men and women working devotedly to ensure the efficiency of those services, such as supply, communications and hygiene, which are vital to an army in the field, and it is to this efficiency that the Nationalist army owes its success.

From the other side come stories of women fighting beside their men, which make a strong appeal to romantic imaginations; but the women of Nationalist Spain are giving

7 'We shall go to the workman, even though he receive us with bullets'

as much, and more. Especially in the hospitals, of which I have visited a good many, these women are doing heroic work. With the exception, perhaps, of a mental hospital in a highly civilised country, there is no place on earth where more horrors assail the eye and ear than a hospital in war-time. All honour to those women and girls of every class in the country who nurse there, often working thirty-six hours on end without food or sleep, and seeing only the horrors of war without its consolations.

I said that some knowledge of the composition of General Franco's army might be of value and of interest in England, for it seems that little is known about it there. I doubt if much more is known about the army of the other side or what it represents. It certainly does not represent the Spanish people. It is composed of artisans enlisted by their unions—some of them genuinely convinced that they are fighting for a better ordering of society, others because they are told to; of peasants believing that they are protecting their homes from a military despotism and from 'Fascist atrocities'; a small portion of the Spanish Regular Army; and, lastly and most important, the real strength of the other side—foreigners, French, Russians, Czechs, British, Germans, Italians, Poles and Americans, known as the *Brigades Internacionales*. It was the arrival of this force in Spain at the beginning of November 1936 that first gave rise to the problem of foreign volunteers. It has been continually asserted by Left wing elements in England that the Madrid Government was compelled to solicit the help of the 'people of Europe' to defend 'the Spanish people' against a kind of Italo-German invasion, engineered by a few Spanish generals; in fact, that the International Brigades were simply a counter-measure to the use of foreign troops by General Franco. In England this story has obtained wide credence, and the whole blame for foreign intervention has been thrown upon the Nationalists. I am satisfied from personal observation on the spot that, with the negligible exception of about 100 in the Legion, there were no foreign troops in Spain before the arrival of the International Brigades. The Moors are in no way in the position of foreigners, since they have a very

direct and personal interest in this war, large numbers of them being under Spanish rule. Even so, Franco did not employ the Khalifa's troops—as distinct from the *regulares*—until the middle of November, and in October he refused the offer of 3000 Irish volunteers, although after the arrival of the International Brigades he admitted a battalion of about 800.

It is the boast of the *Brigades Internacionales* that they saved Madrid from falling into Nationalist hands, and there is no doubt that they did. They were, and are, excellent soldiers, with plenty of courage and some military experience, and their technical equipment, including tanks and artillery, was first class. Their organisation must have been carefully prepared for months beforehand, for it is clearly impossible to collect such a force and put it into the field at a moment's notice. In fact, it must be assumed that their intervention was the result of a definite plan, put into operation as soon as the *Movimiento Nacional* developed a serious aspect, and they must bear the responsibility for the long duration of the war, with all the extra misery it has entailed, as well as for the international difficulties which have arisen over it.

The war is nearly at an end now, and this round will probably be the last. For the Nationalists this is not a war, but a crusade to defend their religion, their traditions, and their homes from disruption by the forces of Communism and anarchy, which are the only organised forces on the other side. Here beneath the flag of the Catholic kings is organised a whole people in arms, all inspired by the determination that by their efforts Spain shall once more be ' United, Great and Free.'

PETER KEMP.

WALKS AND TALKS

By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P.

An invitation to lecture at certain German universities on 'Problems of Africa' took me during February to Berlin, Breslau and Essen. The lecture-halls in each city were crowded, the audience quick to take points, and to laugh at the right moment. I made it clear that German colonial claims were outside the scope of what I had to say as being a problem of Europe rather than of Africa, which had recently been the subject of exploration, to be followed, I hoped, by negotiation. It was, moreover, a subject on which I had spoken and written to my own constituents and countrymen; the less said on the point, by an Englishman in Germany, the better. The real problems of Africa were the impact of Europeans on Africans (who were asked to adopt within fifty years what we had absorbed in as many generations, industrialisation), the spread of disease by improved communications, soil erosion and exhaustion, and the limits of colonisation by Europeans—these were fundamental questions.

Each lecture was followed by informal and fruitful discussions with refreshments in an upper room lasting till the small hours. My audience were most courteous, but ill-content or, at least, disappointed, with what I had to say. The impression I gained was that the German colonial claims would soon be described as demands, that the question was regarded as one of national honour rather than of national economy and was in no sense a bargaining counter or a cloak for ambitions elsewhere.

Breslau, once a focal point, midway between Warsaw and Prague, is now the centre of a peninsula of German soil, with Czechoslovakia on one side and Poland on the other: it has regained but little of its former prosperity. The minority

problems of Upper Silesia and the *Sudetendeutsch* are uppermost in the minds of many who live close to them.

The cathedral of St. Elizabeth was well attended on Sunday morning, as also the Roman Catholic churches I visited. The conflict between Church and State is as real in Germany to-day as in England 400 years ago, but it is being fought out at the top. The worshippers seem little affected. A bookshop at Essen carried a large stock of German Bibles and little picture-books of high quality and real beauty, and restaurants and hostels described as 'Christian' are to be seen in the main streets of most cities.

The boycott of the Jews, on the other hand, is as cold as ever: its effect necessarily increases as the years pass, and it is extending, as Mr. Bentwich notes elsewhere in this issue, to other countries which have a proportionately larger Jewish population. So long as it was peculiar to Germany it was possible for some persons to regard it primarily as a domestic problem: now that it is spreading it is revealed in its true light as a major international issue. In the British Empire and the Americas alone are vast areas of an essential raw material of which the supply is strictly limited—namely, land fit for growing food or cattle; and there is a tendency to look to Britain and the United States, as the spokesmen of Jewish rights, to take the lead in, and the responsibility for, finding a solution. But Britain has still to do justice to the Assyrians, and President Roosevelt has not suggested that he would view with favour any increase of immigrants into the United States, or would do anything to help open the door of Brazil.

Apart from this ever-present spectre, the abiding impression of Germany to-day is one of purposeful activity. New buildings, finely planned, are being built in every city; new roads are being made; working-class housing is everywhere in the forefront, and the standard seems to be in some respects in advance of ours. Agriculture alone seems to have disappointed the hopes of National-Socialists: it is an industry which, as Soviet Russia has discovered, does not lend itself to planning.

At Essen I spent some hours in the new Huyssens Hospital, standing in its own grounds outside the city. It is a masterpiece of architectural planning: the kitchens in the basement are light and airy, with ample cold storage; the chapel, with

fine stained-glass windows, has its own simple dignity: on every floor was an open space with windows and balconies overlooking the garden, where visitors and patients could sit, surrounded by palms and fresh flowers. No wards held more than six patients. What principally interested me, however, was the section devoted to orthopædics, the systematic rehabilitation of men injured in industrial accidents. Some of the equipment was elaborate, but much of it was quite simple: the principle that the authorities seek to apply is that before a man is discharged he shall receive, here or elsewhere, such training as will minimise the effect, not only on his wage-earning capacity but on his daily life, of the disability that he has suffered. The one-armed or one-legged man is taught to use his remaining limb, in conjunction perhaps with an artificial one, until he has acquired fresh skill and put through exercises to strengthen the remaining arm, leg or eye. The *Berufsgenossenschaften*—medical benefit societies run jointly by men and employers—are responsible for placing him in employment, usually in the same firm, and it is seldom in practice that a job on full wages cannot be found for a disabled man. The prejudice created, fostered and enforced in this country by insurance companies, whether commercial or mutual, against the employment of partially disabled or previously injured men is unknown, as it would be financially unprofitable for the *Berufsgenossenschaften* not to ensure that injured men are, if by any means possible, re-employed.

I saw, in the same hospital, the week's production of babies—thirty asleep—in one room: most women now prefer to have babies in hospital, and I was told that there is always room. The charges are met by the contributions paid under the Bismarckian legislation which inspired our National Health Insurance Acts—the most enduring monument in the sphere of domestic legislation to Mr. Lloyd George.

I also saw one of Krupp's garden cities—the firm's employees number 35,000 or more—and witnessed the preparations being made for the State Flower Show which will run from April till October and promises to be 'the greatest ever.'

Then, by night train, to Hamburg, whence I journeyed to Lübeck, returning by omnibus along the beautiful *Autobahn*. Our Roman roads are far straighter than any Continental roads: yet they seldom weary the eye. They are not so broad,

but are seldom flat for any distance, and the vista is broken by a change of gradient as effectively as by a curve; we still have great trees by the roadside here and there, though these are less numerous by half than twenty years ago. The German roads are new: the trees planted in such vast numbers have not yet had time to grow; if they are allowed to reach their full height, properly thinned, and not cut down, on sound commercial principles, so soon as they reach any size, the monotony of the new arterial roads will disappear, but scarcely in this generation.

Hamburg seemed concerned only with the forthcoming Schmeling-Foord fight: it was busier than when I last visited the city. Thence to Malmo in Sweden, *viâ* Copenhagen, took less than three hours. Few air trips are of greater interest. On a fine day one can see most of Germany's seaboard, and several of her greatest rivers. The elaborate system of dykes, the care taken to utilise every scrap of land, alike in Holland, Germany and Denmark, seem to an Englishman a symptom of land hunger which throws some light upon political discontents.

Malmo was bleaker than it need have been, thanks to the waiters' strike in Sweden. I might have seen a great display of Northern Lights that evening, before I entered the train for Oslo, but the cold kept me under cover. I saw them twenty-three years ago on my way from Ararat to Basrah on November 10, 1914, in the last ship to leave Archangel that winter *viâ* the North Cape with a cargo of Russian and Siberian eggs which I had seen brought on sleds by reindeer to the ship as it lay in midstream on the ice in the Dwina. The sight was unforgettable: there was no sound, but an impression of force and speed which was almost terrifying. We were far within the Arctic circle and the lights were right overhead: one could have read a book on the deck, though the sun did not rise that day: they lasted for two hours. With such memories I do not regret that I missed a more distant view.

Oslo, where I was invited to address the Anglo-Norse Society, was basking in sunshine; children were everywhere in the parks and on the hillsides on skis and sleds. The city itself, standing at the northern end of a great fjord, is dominated to-day not by the hills behind but by the vast city hall—a

twenty-storey brick-faced building built on the water-front, which would do honour to Chicago, but seems out of place here. The Ethnographical Museum of the University is a worthy setting for a really fine *Volksmuseum* which is completed by the really magnificent viking ships housed outside the city in a special building. I know no museum which has devoted more space to coins and medals or displays them better. The show-cases exemplify how widely men and goods travelled 1000 years ago: here are Chinese and Sassanian, Arabian and Byzantine gold and silver pieces all found in Norway along with contemporary money. The history of all Europe may be brought to mind by the successive exhibits culminating in the beautiful medallion struck to celebrate the separation of Norway in 1905—a mother raising her child aloft with the words 'cheers for Norway.'

Another feature of Oslo, of great interest to me—who saw Port Sunlight being built and represents Letchworth and part of Welwyn Garden City in Parliament—was the Freia chocolate factory of Throne Holst, a man of ideals and ideas, who has made a success of co-partnership combined with piecework, has housed his own employees in good conditions in a garden suburb, and contrived to develop an export business besides catering for the needs of Northern Europe. The factory was a marvel of order and cleanliness; the dining and recreation hall decorated by great artists.

After the lecture, and a pleasant dinner in a private house, I took the train to a small hotel up the hill to enjoy the stars, and the lights of Oslo 2000 feet below, before I went to bed and to watch the sun rise, close to the waning moon next morning. I was not disappointed. The following evening I was dining with my constituents.

* * * * *

I found awaiting at home, among other joys, a little book, *Translations*, by Basil Blackett, whose posthumous essay on 'Economic Developments in Post-War Britain' was published in the issue of this Review for December 1935. The printing, by Guido Morris and his assistants at the Latin Press, reaches a high level even for this country, whose private presses have few rivals. 'A translator,' says Dryden, 'should not lackey by his author but mount up beside him.' The identity of

spirit and stature which the advice implies was not lacking in Basil Blackett. He has mounted up successively beside St. Gregory of Nazianzus in Cappadocia (329–389), Prudentius (348–410) of Tarraco in Spain, 'the Homer and Virgil of the Christians,' and Pietro Damiani of Ravenna (1007–1072) and Hildebert of Vendôme (1055–1133), whose *Epistolae* were used in the fourteenth-century schools in France and Italy as classics. These poets were patriots and gentlemen; but they were inspired by and in turn gave fresh life to Western thought by infusing Christian dogma, then far less narrow than now, with a philosophy which it is unjust to describe as pagan because it was not Christian. The translations from the Latin (of those from the Greek I can form no judgment) will bear comparison with anything that has been attempted elsewhere. One of them—Prudentius' *For the Burial of the Dead*—I have reprinted below, by permission. To those who would drink deeper at the same stream I commend Raby's *Christian (and Secular) Latin Poetry.*[1]

Blackett's goal was, in his own words, 'more freedom for the spiritual and intellectual individuality of all.' He held that planning was valid only so far as it could bring freedom for that part of man which lives in the realm of mind and spirit; he was lecturing in Germany in 1935 when he met with the accident that caused his death. He was, as observed by Miss Helen Waddell, herself steeped in the same period, in a discerning introductory memoir, 'a humanist tempted by asceticism'; he was also a scholar profoundly interested in philosophy, yet he consented to contest Marylebone in 1931.

He knew the truth of Burke's observation that—

> Those who would carry our great public principles must be proof against the most fatiguing delays, the most mortifying disappointments, the most shocking insults and, what is worse than all, the presumptuous judgment of the ignorant

But he retained his faith and his enthusiasm. *Mortuus loquitur.*

ARNOLD WILSON.

Now, Earth, to thy keeping we send him:
In thy fostering bosom we leave him.
'Tis a man: to thy care we commend him:
He is dead, he is noble; receive him.

[1] Clarendon Press (London Humphrey Milford, 1927 and 1934, 21s and 35s)

In this body a soul had his dwelling,
By the breath of His Maker was fashioned :
In wisdom and knowledge excelling :
For the Christ and His Kingdom impassioned.

In thy mantle enfold him and shield him,
In trust : for His Author and Maker
Ever mindful shall bid thee to yield him
His own, of His image partaker.

When the Day of the Just comes in splendour,
When hope is fulfilled, from thy portal
Even such, as I give, thou shalt render
Him again, unto glory immortal.

What if time with his mouldering finger
His bones under ashes shall smother,
And of dust but a handful yet linger—
But a handful of ashes our brother—

What if flesh that to atoms is shattered,
And on wind blowing whither it knows not
Through the empty inane shall be scattered,
That a man be destroyed, God allows not. .

For the faithful a highway is builded :
Unto Paradise bright it shall guide them :
And the keys unto men have been yielded
Of the garden the serpent denied them.

There, hallowed in house of His Father,
Whence outcast he wandered and weeping,
To Thy bosom, we pray Thee, Lord, gather
This soul, this Thy servant, here sleeping.

Heap violets, bough blossom-laden,
Many leaves on his resting place strew :
Cold stone with his epitaph graven
With perfume and fragrance bedew.

BASIL BLACKETT.

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER

1877 1938

Founded by JAMES KNOWLES

1938 APRIL No. 734. Vol. CXXIII.

LONDON : CONSTABLE & CO., LTD., ORANGE STREET, LEICESTER SQUARE, W.C.2.

Registered for Canadian Magazine Post.

Price Three Shillings. *Annual Subscription (Home and Abroad)* 36/– *post free.*

U.S.A. and Canada, 75 *cents.* „ „ *U.S.A. and Canada* $8.75.

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

No. DCCXXXIV—April 1938

GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

[*On March* 14 *His Majesty's Prime Minister in Great Britain made the following statement, expressed in language of rigid restraint, and characterised by his habitual economy of words, but giving to those who heard it the impression of a background of iron determination. We here reproduce, in full, by permission of H.M. Stationery Office, the official record of Mr. Neville Chamberlain's speech, which took less than half an hour to deliver, and includes documents of historical importance.*—Ed.]

The main sequence of events of the last few days will be familiar to hon. Members, but no doubt the House will desire that I should make a statement on the subject. The result of the meeting at Berchtesgaden on 12th February between the German and Austrian Chancellors was stated by the former to be an extension of the framework of the July, 1936, Agreement. Hon. and right hon. Gentlemen will recollect that that Agreement provided, among other things, for the

recognition of the independence of Austria by Germany and the recognition by Austria of the fact that she was a German State. Therefore, whatever the results of the Berchtesgaden meeting were, it is clear that the agreement reached was on the basis of the independence of Austria.

On Wednesday of last week Herr von Schuschnigg decided that the best way to put an end to the uncertainties of the internal situation in his country was to hold a plebiscite under which the people could decide the future of their country. Provision for that plebiscite is made in the Austrian Constitution of 1934. This decision on the part of the Austrian Chancellor was unwelcome to the German Government, as it was also unwelcome to the Austrian National Socialists themselves. Matters appear to have come to a head on the morning of 11th March when Herr von Seyss-Inquart, who had been appointed Minister of the Interior as a result of the Berchtesgaden meeting, together with his colleague Dr. Glaise-Horstenau presented an ultimatum to the Chancellor. They demanded the abandonment of the plebiscite and threatened that if this was refused, the Nazis would abstain from voting and could not be restrained from causing serious disturbances during the poll. The two Ministers also demanded changes in the provincial Governments and other bodies. They required, so I am informed, an answer from the Chancellor, before 1 o'clock in the afternoon. The Chancellor declined to accept this ultimatum, but offered a compromise under which a second plebiscite should be held later, with regular voting lists. In the meantime, he said, he would be prepared to make it clear that voters might vote for his policy as against him personally, in order to prove that the plebiscite was not a personal question of his remaining in office. Later that day, feeling himself to be under threat of civil war and a possible military invasion, the Chancellor gave way to the two Ministers and agreed to cancel the plebiscite on condition that the tranquillity of the country was not disturbed by the Nazis. There seems to be little doubt that this offer was referred to Germany. In any event, the reply which the Ministers returned was that this offer was insufficient and that Herr Schuschnigg must resign in order to be replaced by Herr Seyss-Inquart. It appears that the Austrian Chancellor was given until 4.30 p.m., Greenwich time, in which to reply

and was informed that if his reply was not satisfactory, German troops would be ordered to move at 5 o'clock. This fact seems to show that Germany was behind the ultimatum.

Later in the day a fresh ultimatum was delivered, which appears to have been brought from Germany by aeroplane. The demands made were the resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds were to be National Socialists, the Austrian Legion to be readmitted to the country and given the duty of keeping order in Vienna, and the total readmission of the Nazi party. A reply was required before 6.30 p.m., Greenwich time. To these demands the Austrian Chancellor announced, a little later on the wireless, that he had, in view of the German threatened invasion, yielded in order to avoid the shedding of German blood. He said that he wished the world to know that the President and he had yielded to force and that Austrian troops had been instructed to oppose no resistance to German troops if and when the latter crossed the frontier. The subsequent entry of German troops into Austria and the visit of the German Chancellor to Linz will be known to hon. Members.

His Majesty's Government have throughout been in the closest touch with the situation. The Foreign Secretary saw the German Foreign Minister on 10th March and addressed to him a grave warning on the Austrian situation and upon what appeared to be the policy of the German Government in regard to it. In particular Lord Halifax told him that His Majesty's Government attached the greatest importance to all measures being taken to ensure that the plebiscite was carried out without interference or intimidation. Late on 11th March our Ambassador in Berlin registered a protest in strong terms with the German Government against such use of coercion, backed by force, against an independent State in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independence. Such action, Sir Nevile Henderson pointed out, was bound to produce the gravest reactions, of which it would be impossible to foretell the issue. Earlier that day I made earnest representations in the same sense to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, with whom my Noble Friend also had two further conversations on that day.

To these protests the German Government replied in a

letter addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin by Baron von Neurath. I think I should read the terms of that communication in full. They are as follow:

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

In your letter of March 11th your Excellency stated that news had reached the British Government that a German ultimatum had been delivered in Vienna demanding the resignation of the Austrian Chancellor, his substitution by the Minister of the Interior, the formation of a new Cabinet with a two-third majority of National Socialist members and the readmission of the Austrian Legion. Should this news be correct the British Government protested against such coercion by force against an independent State in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independence.

In the name of the German Government, I must state in reply that the British Government is not within its right in claiming the role of a protector of the independence of Austria. In the course of the diplomatic conversations regarding the Austrian question the German Government have never left the British Government in doubt that the form of the relations between the Reich and Austria can only be regarded as an internal affair of the German people which is no concern of third Powers. It is superfluous to recapitulate the historical and political bases of this standpoint.

For this reason the German Government must from the outset reject as inadmissible the protest lodged by the British Government, even though only conditional. At the same time, in view of the information quoted in your letter that the Reich Government had made demands of the character of an ultimatum in Vienna, the German Government does not desire to omit, in the interests of truth, to make the following statement respecting the events of the last few days.

A few weeks ago the German Chancellor, recognising the dangers resulting from the intolerable position which had risen in Austria, initiated a conversation with the then Austrian Chancellor. The aim was to make yet another attempt to meet these dangers by agreement upon measures which should ensure a calm and peaceful development in consonance with the interests of both countries and with those of the whole German people. The Berchtesgaden agreement, had it been loyally carried out on the Austrian side in the spirit of the conversation of 12th February, would in fact have guaranteed such a development.

Instead of this, the former Austrian Federal Chancellor, on the evening of 9th March, announced the surprising decision, taken on his own sole authority, to hold within a period of a few days a

plebiscite, which having regard to the surrounding circumstances and in particular the detailed plans for the carrying out of the plebiscite, was intended to have, as it could only have, as its purpose the political repression of the overwhelming majority of the population of Austria. This proceeding, standing as it did in flagrant contradiction to the Berchtesgaden agreement, led as might have been foreseen to an extremely critical development of the internal situation in Austria. It was only natural that those members of the Austrian Government who had taken no part in the decision to hold a plebiscite should raise the strongest protest against it. In consequence there ensued a Cabinet crisis in Vienna, which in the course of the 11th of March led to the resignation of the former Federal Chancellor and the formation of a new Government It is not true that forcible pressure on the course of these developments was exercised by the Reich. In particular the statement subsequently spread by the former Federal Chancellor—to the effect that the German Government had delivered an ultimatum with a time-limit to the Federal President, in accordance with which he was to appoint as Federal Chancellor one of certain proposed candidates and construct the Government in conformity with the proposals of the German Government, failing which the entry of German troops into Austria would have to be contemplated—is pure imagination. As a matter of fact the question of the despatch of military and police forces from the Reich was first raised by the fact that the newly formed Austrian Government addressed to the Government of the Reich, in a telegram which has already been published in the Press, an urgent request that, for the re-establishment of peace and order and for the prevention of bloodshed, German troops should be despatched as soon as possible. Faced with the directly threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria, the Government of the Reich decided to meet the appeal then addressed to it

Such being the case it is completely inconceivable that the conduct of the German Government, as is stated in your letter, could lead to unforeseeable consequences. A general review of the political situation is given in the Proclamation which the Chancellor of the German Reich addressed at noon to-day to the German people. In this situation dangerous consequences could only come into play if an attempt should be made by any third party, in contradiction to the peaceful intentions and legitimate aims of the Reich, to exercise on the development of the situation in Austria an influence inconsistent with the right of the German people to self determination.

Accept, etc.,

Freiherr VON NEURATH.

That concludes the letter by Freiherr von Neurath in reply to the protest of the British Government. I do not wish to enter into any long argument about the historical narrative of events as described by Baron von Neurath, but I am bound at once to refute his statement to the effect that His Majesty's Government were not within their rights in interesting themselves in the independence of Austria, and that, as in the opinion of the German Government relations between Austria and Germany are a purely internal affair, His Majesty's Government, as a third party, have no concern in them. The interests of His Majesty's Government in this question cannot, however, on any tenable ground be denied. In the first place, Great Britain and Austria are both members of the League, and both were signatories, as was also the German Government, of treaties which provided that the independence of Austria was inalienable except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.

Quite apart from this, His Majesty's Government are, and always must be, interested in developments in Central Europe, particularly events such as those which have just taken place, if only for the reason, as I stated in the House only a fortnight ago, that the object of all their policy has been to assist in the establishment of a sense of greater security and confidence in Europe, and that that object, as I said then, must inevitably be helped or hindered by events in Central Europe. Throughout these events His Majesty's Government have remained in the closest touch with the French Government, and the French Government have, I understand, also ent red a strong protest in Berlin on similar lines to that lodged by His Majesty's Government. It seems to us that the methods adopted throughout these events call for the severest condemnation, and have administered a profound shock to all who are interested in the preservation of European peace. It follows that what has passed cannot fail to have prejudiced the hope of His Majesty's Government of removing misunderstandings between nations and promoting international co-operation.

It might seem unnecessary to refute rumours that His Majesty's Government had given consent if not encouragement to the idea of the absorption of Austria by Germany, were there not evidence that these are sedulously being

put about in many quarters. There is, of course, no foundation whatever for any of these rumours. The statement which I have already made shows clearly that His Majesty's Government emphatically disapprove, as they have always disapproved, actions such as those of which Austria has been made the scene.

The attitude of Czechoslovakia to these events is a matter of general interest, and in this connection I can give the House the following information. The Czech Government have officially informed His Majesty's Government that though it is their earnest desire to live on the best possible neighbourly relations with the German Reich, they have followed with the greatest attention the development of events in Austria between the date of the Austro-German Agreement of July, 1936, up to the present day. I am informed that Field-Marshal Goering on 11th March gave a general assurance to the Czech Minister in Berlin—an assurance which he expressly renewed later on behalf of Herr Hitler—that it would be the earnest endeavour of the German Government to improve German-Czech relations. In particular, on 12th March, Field-Marshal Goering informed the Czech Minister that German troops marching into Austria had received the strictest orders to keep at least 15 kilometres from the Czech frontier. On the same day the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin was assured by Baron von Neurath that Germany considered herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention of October, 1925.

The House may desire me to repeat what our position in regard to Austria was. We were under no commitment to take action *vis-à-vis* Austria, but we were pledged to consultation with the French and Italian Governments in the event of action being taken which affected Austrian independence and integrity, for which provision was made by the relevant articles of the Peace Treaties. This pledge arises from agreements reached between the French, Italian, and United Kingdom Governments, first, in February, 1934, then in September of the same year, and finally at the Stresa Conference in April, 1935, in which the position was reaffirmed, to consult together in any measures to be taken in the case of threats to the integrity and independence of Austria. We have fully discharged the pledge of consultation with both the French

Government and the Italian Government, to whom we made an immediate approach when Austrian independence seemed to be threatened by recent events. As a result of that consultation with the French Government, His Majesty's Government and the French Government addressed similar protests to the German Government on the action that had been taken. From the Italian Government we received no full exposition of their views, but their attitude has been defined with great precision in the statement issued on behalf of the Italian Government which appears in the Press to-day.

It is quite untrue to suggest that we have ever given Germany our assent or our encouragement to the effective absorption of Austria into the German Reich. We had, indeed, never refused to recognise the special interest that Germany had in the development of relations between Austria and herself, having regard to the close affinities existing between the two countries. But on every occasion on which any representative of His Majesty's Government has had opportunities to discuss these matters with representatives of the German Government, it has always been made plain that His Majesty's Government would strongly disapprove of the application to the solution of these problems of violent methods. It must have, as I have constantly pointed out to the House, a damaging influence upon general confidence in Europe.

In appraising recent events it is necessary to face facts, however we may judge them, however we may anticipate that they will react upon the international position as it exists to-day. The hard fact is—and of its truth every hon. Member can judge for himself—that nothing could have arrested this action by Germany unless we and others with us had been prepared to use force to prevent it. I imagine that according to the temperament of the individual the events which are in our minds to-day will be the cause of regret, of sorrow, perhaps of indignation. They cannot be regarded by His Majesty's Government with indifference or equanimity. They are bound to have effects which cannot yet be measured. The immediate result must be to intensify the sense of uncertainty and insecurity in Europe. Unfortunately, while the policy of appeasement would lead to a relaxation of the economic pressure under which many countries are suffering to-day, what

has just occurred must inevitably retard economic recovery, and, indeed, increased care will be required to ensure that marked deterioration does not set in.

This is not a moment for hasty decisions or for careless words. We must consider the new situation quickly, but with cool judgment. I am confident that we shall be supported in asking that no one, whatever his preconceived notions may be, will regard himself as excluded from any extension of the national effort which may be called for. As regards our defence programmes, we have always made it clear that they were flexible, and that they would have to be reviewed from time to time in the light of any development in the international situation. It would be idle to pretend that recent events do not constitute a change of the kind that we had in mind. Accordingly we have decided to make a fresh review, and in due course we shall announce what further steps we may think it necessary to take.

THE CRISIS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

By PROFESSOR R. B. MOWAT, Professor of History in the University of Bristol

THE most remarkable thing in the history of the last five years is the recovery of German power. When we think of the feeble and distracted Weimar Republic and the way that its Government was ordered about, and when we contrast all that with the impressive mass of the present military Reich and the alarm with which every action of its Government is viewed, we see how far we have travelled since January 30, 1933. Whatever other judgments historians may make, they must all agree that this recovery of power, this re-creation of something like a German military domination, is one of the most astonishing achievements on record.

Looking back, however, some seventy years, the inquirer can find a comparable achievement, that of Bismarck in the period 1862–71. Bismarck found Germany weak and divided. In nine years he made it compact, powerful, enthusiastic, a military empire with the King of Prussia as Emperor. He 'made,' as he once boasted, three wars: Schleswig-Holstein; Austro-Prussian; Franco-German. Then he was satisfied and he worked successfully for peace until his fall in 1890. And after that, peace still endured for nearly another twenty-five years. Looking back to the whole period 1871–1914, we regard it as a Golden Age of Europe. And yet this relatively long period of peace and prosperity came after one of the most disturbed periods (1864–71) in European history.

It may be, notwithstanding the menacing prospect of the present time, that Europe still has an opportunity of entering upon a period of peace and prosperity after the terribly disturbed era that has ensued since Herr Hitler took office on January 30, 1933. Perhaps future historians will even aver

that many of the things that happened in that period had to happen. It is generally conceded that arms equality could not be indefinitely denied to Germany. Many people believed that reparations and inter-State debts would have to be cancelled; that the Saar would be restored; that the 'unilaterally' demilitarised Rhineland could not permanently be retained in that one-sided condition. It was difficult to see, once the great Habsburg Empire was destroyed, how the tiny remnant of Austria could artificially be kept separate from Germany merely by a protocol. If the Austrian *Anschluss* were to be the end of the Hitler international revolution, people would probably become as reconciled to it as they did to the Bismarckian. This, then, is the question which all the anxious scanners of the European horizon are asking: Is it, can it, be the end of these violent 'revisions' of the treaties?

In his Reichstag speech of January 30, 1937, Herr Hitler said: 'The time of so-called surprises is at an end' (*die Zeit der sogenannten Ueberraschungen abgeschlossen ist*). Among these surprises were the proclamation of conscription throughout Germany on March 16, 1935, and the entry of the Reichswehr into the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936. It must in fairness be remembered, however, that all through the era of surprises Herr Hitler was making peaceful offers which were either ignored or rebuffed. One offer was to be content with an army of 300,000 men (provided the other Powers adopted a similar limit) and an air force equal to 50 per cent. of the French air force This was rejected by M. Barthou, French Foreign Minister, on April 17, 1934. The next was in a Reichstag speech of May 21, 1935, and was really a group of offers, chiefly in respect of limitation of armament and non-aggression pacts; this group became known as Herr Hitler's 'Thirteen Points.' No general step was taken to respond to these points; though the British Government made the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935, which is believed to have worked and to be working well.

While opportunities for reconciliation with Germany were being missed, the international situation was made infinitely worse by the Italo-Abyssinian War, which inevitably brought the League States into antagonism with Italy. The effort of Sir Samuel Hoare and M. Pierre Laval in December

1935 to solve this terrible dilemma was ruined by premature disclosure. The result was the formation of the 'Berlin-Rome axis' and the present international chaos.

Curiously, in spite of the persistence of the Spanish Civil War and of the Sino-Japanese War, at the turn of the year 1937–8 there was an improvement in the European situation. Mr. Eden mentioned this in an address to the Foreign Affairs Committee of members of Parliament supporting the National Government. The Prime Minister drew attention to it in the House of Commons. President Benesh in a New Year's message declared his belief that the coming twelve months would be a period of negotiations. *The Times* drew attention to the improvement as an affair of 'atmosphere' rather than of any specific event to which an observer could point; but atmosphere is something to which statesmen and diplomatists are very sensitive. The year 1938 started promisingly. The visit of Lord Halifax to Berlin in the previous November 1937, and the conversation of M. Delbos and Baron von Neurath at the railway-station in December, seemed to be having good results. The Van Zeeland Report presented to the French and British Governments on January 26, 1938, seemed to offer another means of international appeasement from the economic approach. As if in response to this improvement of atmosphere, Herr Hitler in his Reichstag speech of February 20 repeated emphatically his previous declarations that Germany had no territorial grounds of controversy with France in Europe, no reasons of quarrel at all with England, because the colonial question could never provoke a conflict. The well-informed *New York Times*, looking forward into 1938, declared (January 30): 'More immediately it should be smoother road with fewer pitfalls than Europe has escaped, more by luck than good management, in the last five years.' Lord Halifax said in the House of Lords (February 16, 1938):

> I do not believe, and I have never believed, in the imminence of war, and in more directions than one I believe time to be on the side of peace. Greater progress would in my judgment be made if we could rid our minds of the catastrophic conception of Europe on the brink of the abyss—which I think is itself largely responsible for maintaining the background which makes the whole picture look so dark.

As I see it, the truth is that Europe is not so much dangerous as confused.

It is impossible to believe that all these authorities were mistaken in their view of the immediate future and that the European situation, if handled with reasonable *sang-froid*, would suddenly become desperate, hopeless.

While Lord Halifax was making the above reassuring declaration in the House of Lords the hand which for two years, in circumstances of unparalleled difficulty, had been directing British foreign policy was relaxing its grasp. For some time there had been rumours of divergence of point of view between Mr. Eden and the Prime Minister. The rupture came on February 20 when both the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State resigned from the Government. The cause of the resignations was a dispute over the question whether conversations with Italy, with a view to a new Mediterranean Agreement, should be begun at once or should be deferred. The Prime Minister was in favour of the beginning of conversations at once; so Mr. Eden resigned and was succeeded at the Foreign Office by Lord Halifax. Historians, who naturally like to have definite landmarks, will probably date the present crisis from this, though whether it has been caused by the Eden–Chamberlain controversy and the change at the Foreign Office is, of course, highly disputable. 'Pertinax,' who is always lucid and positive, makes no doubt about it. Writing in the *Echo de Paris* (March 12), and referring to the alleged German ultimatum to the Austrian Government, he declares: 'The event of March 11 is the fatal consequence of the resolution taken by Mr. Neville Chamberlain, on February 18, to separate himself from Mr. Eden and to give credit to the pacific intentions of the two dictators.'

The *Anschluss*, as carried out by the German demands of March 11 and the invasion of Austria on March 12, has not the appearance of having been premeditated. For if Herr Hitler had intended to bring it about now, he would not have arranged the Berchtesgaden meeting with Herr Schuschnigg on February 12, nor would he have made the agreement of February 15. These things served no purpose with regard to an immediate *Anschluss*, but rather, when it

came about, enhanced its aspect of violent intervention and employment of *force majeure*. Most people, after the event, seem to be of opinion that a more or less close union of Germany and of the German Austrians was inevitable. I remember, before the war was ended, Professor Dreyer, who had left his Oxford Chair to join the Air Force, saying that the result of the war would be to make Germany stronger, for it would take over the German Austrians. The Allies could not reasonably expect to destroy the Austrian Empire and then, merely by a treaty or protocol, artificially to prevent the German-speaking remnant from joining with Germany. It is objected that the Allies did not destroy the Austrian Empire, but that it destroyed itself, or simply dissolved: it broke up before the Armistice. This is true as a matter of chronology. The Allies, however, did destroy the Austrian Empire by continuing the war against it after the Emperor Charles, through Prince Sixte of Bourbon-Parma, had offered to make a separate peace in 1917. They may have been perfectly right to do so, but they must have known that, in the event of their succeeding in destroying the Habsburg Monarchy, they could not expect the German-speaking remnant to remain for ever—a powerless, poor community—on the middle Danube.

The present laments of *Finis Austriæ* do not ring true. The little republic which has just disappeared had not the remotest likeness to the historic Austria. This was a great empire, imperially minded, just, tolerant, progressive, maintaining peace, trade, law and culture from the Alps to the Carpathians. Vienna was an imperial city, its magnificent palaces thronged by a powerful aristocracy, its complaisant bureaucracy administering the polyglot affairs of a dozen peoples. The Vienna of the Austrian Republic was a vast sad collection of houses and empty palaces; polite people; civil and apparently innumerable policemen; half-empty restaurants and cabarets; needy, tireless, ceaseless gypsy musicians; unemployed workers; children trying to play their old games without equipment in the courts of the vast tenements for workmen. Whether the Austrians will be any happier inside the German Reich than outside it is doubtful. This depends on whether the Germans keep the peace or not. The Austrians have exchanged one authori-

tarian Government for another still more authoritarian. If Germany remains at peace they—except the unfortunate Jews—will probably be better off, more satisfied with life, than they were before. The workers who were 'shot up' by the troops of Dr. Dollfuss in February 1934 are not likely to be shot up by Herr Hitler, and they may find work more plentiful in the Reich. According to *The Times* correspondent, who cannot be suspected of prejudice in favour of Germany, the enthusiasm with which Herr Hitler was met was tremendous :

> No adjective suffices to describe the jubilation which greeted him in Linz. . . . His arrival in Linz, which had never seen such crowds, was unforgettable. . . Vienna, as it awaited the arrival of Herr Hitler, resembled a town which has just received news of a great victory . . .

To say all this, which is only fair, is not to excuse the making of the *Anschluss* at the present time or the way of making it—the denial of the Schuschnigg plebiscite, the breach of the Treaty of Versailles, the defiance of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the invasion of the country. 'It seems to us,' Mr. Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons on March 14, 'that the methods adopted throughout these events call for the severest condemnation, and have administered a profound shock to all who are interested in the preservation of European peace. It follows that what has passed cannot fail to have prejudiced the hope of His Majesty's Government of removing misunderstandings between nations and promoting international co-operation.' *Le Temps*, March 13, had a statement much to the same effect :

> In whatever way we may wish to envisage the affairs, and whatever may be the possibilities of to-morrow, we are obliged to conclude that these events mark the end of a political order on which for twenty years the peace of Europe has been founded.

The peace of Europe—that is what everybody is interested in, and a doubt about this is the question in everybody's mind. For Austria itself—especially an Austria with a majority of people who probably want to be in Germany—the British people obviously had no intention of fighting. Anybody who was in London or who travelled across the

country on March 12 could not fail to realise this. There was literally no reaction. Some newspapers had posters about Austria; but there were just as many posters about a prize fight and about winners at races. In the 'tubes' nobody—as would have happened if a crisis had been realised—was talking to his neighbour; there was no more reading of the news than usual. It was the same in the express train across country: no reaction—some interest, but nothing special. There was less interest than when Herr Hitler invaded the demilitarised Rhineland on March 7, 1936, and there was no excitement at all.

It is unquestionable that the democracies are completely peaceful, and only invasion, or something little short of invasion, will stir them to employ force. Moreover, there is a kind of fatalism in the public mind concerning certain conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, conditions in regard to which there seems no escape from revision, 'unilateral' if not by agreement. The public have watched the disappearance of German disarmament, reparations, demilitarised zones, and now of independent Austria. When the Reichswehr marched into the Rhineland on March 7, 1936, there was no more stir among the French public than there was in Great Britain. Some time after the march into the Rhineland I was at Lille, a great provincial city with many memories and experiences of the World War. Meeting a number of the university professors—intelligent, able men, deeply interested in present events and problems—I inquired about the attitude, the state of feeling of the French public on March 7. They all made the same laconic answer: 'No reaction.'

The truth seems to be that the French and British public are convinced that these conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, already referred to, were, though not unjust, incapable of long duration, unless some further agreements could be reached among the interested Powers. Many people felt that German limitation of armament, German demilitarised zones, could not go on for very long without some degree of reciprocity The question of the Austrian *Anschluss* is in a different category; but the mismanagement by the League of Nations of the innocuous Brüning proposal of a Customs Union in 1931, and the undemocratic basis of Dr. Schuschnigg's Government, made the Entente public feel perplexed and uncertain

regarding this question also. Although the democratic peoples in this hemisphere and in America naturally condemn all repudiations of treaties and violent steps like marchings into the Rhineland and Austria, they feel a genuine perplexity about the moral factors underlying some of these things. They look for clear explanation and guidance from their statesmen and do not always receive it. They wonder why some of the disturbances to the European system were not foreseen and obviated by timely discussion, agreement and action. The phrase 'general settlement' occurs like a refrain in nearly every speech of British statesmen, and yet, since the lamentable fiasco of the World Economic Conference of 1933, not the slightest approach seems to have been made even to the discussion of possibilities of a general settlement. Thus, instead of general settlement, there is a chaotic process of deterioration little by little, a detrition of the European system, to which the public can see no end. And yet it is well to bear in mind Lord Halifax's remark. The situation in Europe may be not so much dangerous as confused. Of course it is both, but not in the same degree.

Peace is recognised as the chief interest of all peoples and of all democratic Governments. It is the chief interest also of the dictator Governments, and perhaps is recognised by them as such. It may be worth while, accordingly, to attempt a survey of the forces which make for peace, of the means which still remain for promoting the stability of Europe. These means are anything but inconsiderable; they require, however, concerted direction, clear guidance, and that they assuredly do not have at present They are the League of Nations, the Dual Entente, the Little Entente, and whatever tradition there still exists of a Concert of the Great Powers.

The League of Nations, in spite of the loss of Germany's and Italy's membership, is at any rate potentially a powerful association. Any genuinely concerted action on the part of the League, even on the part of only the European members, would command enormous physical resources and also powerful moral resources in almost every region of the world. It is true that Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant, which guarantee the territorial integrity and political independence of member States, are for the time being practically in sus-

pense. That is to say, the articles involving 'automatic' commitments are not operative; but there are articles providing for voluntary co-operation which an active leadership might call into being. Critics might object that if there were any readiness for such co-operation between States it could come into effect without the League of Nations. This, however, is not so. An international conference is a very difficult thing to arrange. The League is an existing and technically very efficient organisation, with a highly skilled secretariat and an established tradition for holding conferences and making conventions. The Prime Minister said in the House of Commons on February 22:

> I believe that if the League would throw off shams and pretences, which everyone sees through, if it would come out with a declaration of what it is prepared to do, and can do, as a moral force to focus public opinion throughout the world, it would justify itself and it would be a real thing. It might draw unto itself again some of those who have lost faith in it in the past, and the future of the League might be assured for the benefit and salvation of mankind.

This is a modest estimate of what the League of Nations could achieve if a conference of member States were held and if each were asked to state precisely what they were prepared to do to ensure peace in Europe.

In view of the present international situation, which obviously calls for agreement, the consensus of the numerous peace-loving European member States might surprise all observers. Mr. Churchill expressed something like this view in the House of Commons on March 14:

> If a number of States were assembled around Great Britain and France in a solemn treaty for mutual defence against aggression, if they had their forces marshalled in what you may call a grand alliance, and if they had their staff arrangements concerted, and all this rested, as it can honourably rest, on the Covenant of the League of Nations, agreeable with all the purpose and ideals of the League of Nations, and if that were sustained as it would be by the moral sense of the world, and if it were done in the year 1938—and, believe me, that may be the last chance there will be for doing it—then I say that you might even now arrest this approaching war. Then perhaps the curse which overhangs Europe would pass away.

The Dual Entente is also a bulwark of peace. The Entente

has become, in effect, an alliance, according to the Leamington declaration of Mr. Eden, November 20, 1936, and the complementary declaration of M. Delbos in the Chamber of Deputies, December 4, 1936. The peacefulness of the Dual Entente is undisputed. This inspires trust and enhances its prestige in the United States and among the other democracies of the world. The combined physical resources of the Dual Entente are obviously of considerable magnitude for sustaining either a sudden or a long-drawn-out effort.

The Little Entente has been for years the staunch upholder of stability in Central Europe. It has a 'statute,' a secretariat, a council, and a common policy. In the last months of 1937 some doubts were occasionally expressed concerning its solidarity. There appeared to be some degree of attraction on the part of the Yugoslav Government towards Italy, and on the part of the Rumanian Government towards Germany. It need only be observed, however, that friendly relations with neighbours are not incompatible with solidarity in the Little Entente. The Polish Government, though not a member of the Little Entente, has been in general on good terms with it. There appeared also, from the early months of last year, some possibility of co-operation between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. For, notwithstanding some undeniable grounds of controversy, the 'Successor States' have also some undeniable common interest. None of them, even singly, is a negligible quantity. In a well-informed article entitled 'The Bastion of Europe,' the *Economist* for March 12 declares: 'The military strength of Czechoslovakia is one of the guarantees of European peace.'

Italy, as being, in Southern Tyrol, a Successor State of the Habsburg Monarchy, has a common interest, with other Successor States, in Central European stability. Accordingly, the inauguration and the continuation of Anglo-Italian conversations contain, at any rate, possibilities for good. The *Economist* (March 12) writes:

> If Signor Mussolini could really be relied on—in spite of past words and deeds—to stand up with us and our friends for the principles of self-determination and security for small nations, there would be a magnificent assurance of a peaceful Europe.

These words were written before the events of March 12

brought Austria suddenly within the Reich; but the possibilities which they indicate still remain.

Lastly, it may be asked whether any tradition of the Concert of Europe remains. In the nineteenth century there was, in effect, a Directory of the Five or, after the union of Italy, of the Six Great Powers. Not always effective, it did on many occasions render great services to the peace of Europe. The World War shattered this Concert of Powers. The League of Nations was to be in substitution for it. M. Briand, in 1930, endeavoured to supplement the League with a Committee of European Union, which, however, came to nothing. In 1933 Signor Mussolini proposed to Ramsay MacDonald, then Prime Minister of Great Britain, a Four-Power Pact which was to take into account Article 19 (Revision of Treaties) of the Covenant of the League of Nations. MacDonald went to Rome and adopted the plan, to which the French and German Governments also acceded. The Four-Power Pact was signed but never ratified. To suggest that it may be brought into operation now may appear vain. Yet, since the destruction of the Treaty of Locarno in 1936, the British Government has frequently declared its aim to be to bring the French, German and Italian Governments, with itself, to the same council table—in effect, to frame a 'new Locarno' or to enact a Four-Power Pact.

R. B. MOWAT.

PICTURESQUE ITALY—A RETROSPECT

By Edward Hutton

If we ask ourselves how our predecessors in the nineteenth century as a whole regarded Italy, I think we shall be right in saying—and it is worth while remembering it at the present time—that they never forgot the past in the hullaballoo of the present.

In the great moment of high civilisation in which they lived Italy appeared to them to be a country apart, the cradle of their civilisation and culture, a place of pilgrimage. There they found their past visible before their eyes, enshrined in a golden light, and when they came thus face to face with it for the first time—when they saw the landscape of Theocritus, the fields and vineyards of the Georgics, the ruins of the classical world of which they considered themselves citizens, when they saw the Rome of the Popes, the capital of that Christianity from which, whatever their wanderings, they were sprung, when they saw the little cities of the saints on their cypressed, olive-clad hills, Siena, Assisi, and how many more—they were moved by a deep nostalgic emotion, seeing, as it were, their home.

It might surely seem that so long as our civilisation in some sort endures this Picturesque Italy of theirs (attested as it is by the poets, the painters, and the historians of all countries and of all times) can never die. It is immortal, its heavenly beauty coloured and informed by that dream of the past through which we, like they, see it. That, at any rate, would seem to be how the nineteenth century regarded things. Though Italy then was the theatre of a great national movement which seemed not only to establish unity within her natural borders but Liberty, it in no way compromised the larger view. While applauding or cursing the *Risorgimento*, the world looked to Italy for something quite other than the *Risorgimento* could give.

What, then, was their justification for looking thus upon Italy, and, if we still propose to do the same, what is our justification?

Much more than 1000 years before Childe Harold appealed to Rome,

> O Rome, my country city of the soul,

Sidonius Apollinaris and Fortunatus and Avitus when the empire was beginning to fail could not but pour out their filial affection for Rome, 'the only city in the universe where none but slaves and barbarians are strangers.' And the dream was safe when the pilgrims of the twelfth century sang on the ruined Via Sacra:

> O Roma nobilis, orbis et domina,
> cunctarum urbium excellentissima,
> roseo martyrum sanguine rubea,
> albis et virginum liliis candida,
> Salutem dicimus tibi per omnia,
> Te benedicimus—Salve per saecula

And long before then Bede tells us our own countryman, having seen the Eternal City and the tombs of the apostles, made a song too:

> Quamdiu stet Colosseus,
> Stabit et Roma
> Quando cadet Colosseus,
> Cadet et Roma
> Quando cadet Roma
> Cadet et mundus . .

But Picturesque Italy is older far than that.

When Italy first swims into our ken in the pages of the *Odyssey* she is already Picturesque Italy. Not picturesque only from our point of view, reading the greatest of stories 2000 years old, but picturesque from his, from Homer's, own. When Odysseus first bursts into the unknown Tyrrhene sea, it is in Italy he finds the Elysian Fields and the gateway of Hades where he speaks with the dead. There, too, the Sirens sang and the mysterious enchantress Circe dwelt; there the one-eyed Cyclops Polyphemus kept his flocks; there Æolus reigned in his windy kingdom; there were the clashing rocks and the terrible strait where Scilla howled and Charybdis

sucked down hapless sailors and their ships. Surely there we have the first appearance of Picturesque Italy.

A more tender, because a more loving, hand, near 1000 years later gives us another account less charged with marvels, but full of all the delights that have moved men ever since so strongly. The nineteenth century certainly could not unmoved read those lines of the praise of Italy in Virgil's second Georgic, where he sings of the snowy flocks of Clitumnus and the cities piled high on the steep craggy hills and the rivers which glide beneath their ancient walls:

> Adde tot egregias urbes operumque laborem,
> tot congesta manu praeruptis oppida saxis,
> fluminaque antiquos subterlabentia muros

In what other words could we better describe Narni or Orvieto, Cortona, Perugia and Volterra? Such lines the nineteenth century learned by heart at school, and they and certain odes of Horace opened a window on Italian landscape. I say at school—but even in the nursery we heard their echo:

> From many a lonely hamlet
> Which hid by beech and pine
> Like an eagle's nest, hangs on the crest
> Of purple Apennine. . . .
>
> From lordly Volaterrae
> Where scowls the far-famed hold,
> Piled by the hands of giants
> For God-like Kings of old . . .
>
> From where sweet Clanis wanders
> Through corn and vines and flowers,
> From where Cortona lifts to heaven
> Her diadem of towers. . . .
>
> The harvests of Arretium,
> This year old men shall reap;
> This year young boys in Umbro
> Shall plunge the struggling sheep;
> And in the vats of Luna
> This year the must shall foam
> Round the white feet of laughing girls
> Whose sires have marched to Rome.

There are many passages, too, in the Georgics descriptive of country life in the *poderi* and farms which were as true in

the nineteenth century as when they were written—and even to-day.

And it is—though with a difference—much the same with Horace, who gives us many an unforgettable vignette of that life in the country he must have delighted in, he writes about it so well. Let me recall that one in the second book of the Odes about the Galesus which drew Gissing to Calabria. And there is that most perfect one about the Bandusian Fount, which, alas! you will find it hard to discover in San Gervasio to-day.

Eustace, writing in 1815 (tour in 1802) in his great book on Italy, *The Classical Tour*—one of the best books ever written upon Picturesque Italy—advises his readers to carry with them the Latin poets and historians. 'Virgil and Horace, Cicero and Livy,' he says, 'ought to be the inseparable companions of all travellers, they should occupy a corner in every carriage and be called forth in every interval of leisure to relieve the fatigue and to heighten the pleasure of the journey.' Few of us to-day follow that advice, but the earlier eighteenth and nineteenth century travellers did. Virgil, indeed, was as clearly the Magnanimo, the Verace Duca, the Caro Pedagogo of the eighteenth-century traveller in Italy as he was of Dante in *The Divine Comedy*. Yet I think something, if only a faint melody, comes back to us still as we go, and echoes in the heart: perhaps it is

> Propter aquam tardis ingens ubi flexibus errat
> Mincius et tenera praetexit arundine ripas.
>
> Smooth sliding Mincius crowned with vocal reeds.

Or that lovely Sicilian eclogue,

> Extremum hunc Arethusa mihi concede laborem,

which, beside that Fount at Syracuse, makes Milton one for us with Theocritus and Virgil.

It was this classical world of Roman ruins and sites, and cities and memories, which underlay all the other delights of Picturesque Italy, and that is surely why Dr. Johnson declared that 'the grand object of travelling is to see the shores of the Mediterranean'; and why Walpole remarks to Gray, 'Our memories see more than our eyes in this country.'

Of course, Italy has been the home of learning, of litera-

ture, of the arts and of an unique polite society, the home of manners—even table manners, as Coryat and Sir Thomas Hoby show, and the refinements of civilised life. But there is much more than that. To begin with, we went to Italy on pilgrimage, to visit the tombs of the apostles, the shrines of the saints, the Holy House of Loreto, St. Francis at Assisi. The earlier Anglo-Saxon kings seem to have made almost a tradition of going to Rome at the end of their lives, really to die in the Eternal City, and several of them were buried in Old St. Peter's. Already, in 727, King Ina of Wessex had founded a hospice for English pilgrims beyond the Tiber. Others frequented the universities of Bologna, Padua and Salerno, and among them, many hundreds of years apart, were St. Thomas of Canterbury and William Harvey, the discoverer of the circulation of the blood. Chaucer, going to Italy in the fourteenth century on the king's business, discovered there Italian literature, Dante, Petrach and Boccaccio —Italian poetry and *novelle*, that is; buds that, grafted and regrafted on the English stock, have so transformed the whole tree.

For the Tudors Italy was the Renaissance and Machiavelli and Castiglione, and later Ariosto and Tasso. Italy, indeed, offered then, as she does now, the doctrine, and even the spectacle, of absolutism, which they were inclined to accept at its face value. William Thomas did, and Henry VIII. is rather like a bad dream of Machiavelli's. And the spectacle of Italian cities of marble and stone, of Italian civilisation and society, fascinated and astonished the foreign traveller. Hence, later, the Elizabethan view of Italy; hence Iago and Shylock, the White Devil and the Duchess of Malfi and 'Tis Pity She's a Whore; but hence, too, the beautiful Italian comedies of Shakespeare, in which Verona, Venice, Padua, Palermo, and of course Rome, became almost household names.

Milton goes to Italy and remains homesick—he says so—all his life, and writes not only Italian verses, but comes to use a sort of incomparable Latin English for his great epic.

But when all the pilgrims had passed by, when the great revolution of the sixteenth century had stripped and ruined our shrines at home and the subtlety and loveliness of the Renaissance had withered in the Great Rebellion, when Evelyn made the journey, Italy remained, clothed with all her

new beauty of art and poetry and manners, and was still the home of the classical world out of which, like flowers from a tomb, these new perfections had sprung—where not only the ruins of that world might be seen and touched, but where, in an air suddenly all gold, the life described in the poetry of Virgil and Horace might still be seen.

This mood—I was going to say this consolation—came to its fulness with the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is Gibbon who tells us that 'the footsteps of heroes, the relics not of superstition but of Empire,' were then 'devoutly visited by a new race of pilgrims from the remote and once savage countries of the North.' Goethe, for instance, is a very surprising example of this. He describes how he climbed the hill to Assisi on purpose to visit the Portico of the Temple of Minerva, with its six Corinthian columns, the façade of the Church of S. Maria della Minerva, which so delighted him that he would not mar the impression by any Christian associations, and left unvisited San Francesco, that triple church which not only contained the shrine of St. Francis, but was and is one of the most precious Gothic buildings in Italy, where Cimabue, Giotto and his followers—Simone Martini and Pietro Lorenzetti too—awaited him.

And there was this. When a man—like Evelyn, say, who left England at the beginning of the Great Rebellion, 'fleeing,' as he says, 'from the ill face of things at home,' or even Goethe in 1786, on the brink of the Revolution, wandering the Sabine or the Alban Hills, visiting Tibur or Nemi or Hadrian's villa or Tusculum—when such a traveller saw a peasant ploughing with his oxen in those fields among the olives and the stones where Virgil had walked and Horace was at home, he saw again exactly what they describe. If he asked what the plough was called and its various parts, so carefully detailed in the first Georgic, he heard words which appeared to be those he knew by heart from Virgil's poem.

This must not only have pleased him æsthetically and historically, but I think—when we consider the changes that had passed over most of the world, and not least England, and were then beginning everywhere, even in the country places of his home, which were soon to threaten the whole structure of the society he knew—must have given him a

sense of security. It must have seemed, though perhaps he was not wholly conscious of this, an assurance of continuity, an assurance against that change and decay which are, unfortunately, a condition of life. It must have enhanced his idealism and was part of that eternal romanticism which is as evident in the historian Livy as in Dante or Claude or Chateaubriand—a vision, as it were, of the Golden Age, which there in Italy, set as it was in a scene of celestial beauty, touched the heart through the memory and the sentiment and the intelligence.

How fruitful that experience could be, its mood, too, does not lack witness :

> It was at Rome on the 15th of October 1764 as I sat musing amidst the ruins of the Capitol, while the bare-footed friars were singing vespers in the Temple of Jupiter, that the idea of writing the decline and fall of the city first started to my mind

That fall Gibbon—indeed, his whole world—regarded as 'the greatest perhaps the most awful scene in the history of mankind.'

Such was the mood of many, perhaps most, travellers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It had produced by the hand of genius the landscapes of Poussin and of Claude, and is by no means extinct. Already in 1645 Evelyn records that the pictures of a Monsieur Poussin are highly esteemed in Rome, and in the middle of the nineteenth century the great humanist Jacob Burckhardt, the author of the *Cicerone*, first published in 1855, declares (they are the last words of his great book) :

> When one finds Claude Lorraine and the Poussins outside Italy, their works, better than the most brilliant of modern pictures, awaken a nostalgia, sometimes satisfied but eternal, for unforgettable Rome He who writes these lines has had this experience. He wishes to those who read them, who approve them and who take them for guide beyond the Alps, the happiness of spirit which he has enjoyed at Rome, the remembrance of which is so powerfully evoked in him by even the feeblest reproduction of these admirable masterpieces.

Now, in spite of the evidence of these noble pictures, the appreciation of Italian landscape is curiously lacking in the accounts of Italian travel throughout the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries. The exceptions are a few letters of Gray and the really sensitive and exquisite descriptions in the letters of William Beckford, author of *Vathek*. The mood expressed with such perfection by Poussin and Claude might seem to have been implicit in the traveller of the time, too much taken for granted to call, amid so much sight-seeing, so many curiosities, for literary record and expression.

At any rate, there is little appreciation of Italian landscape in the records of English travellers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—Evelyn in 1645, Lassels in 1670, Addison in 1701, Smollet in 1766, or Forsyth in 1802. Eustace, writing in 1815—his *Classical Tour*, in four volumes, had passed into six editions in 1821—writes thus on Italian scenery:

> The general face of the country, so conspicuously beautiful all over Italy, merits from this circumstance alone peculiar attention, and when to its picturesque features we add those charms, less real but more enchanting, which Fancy sheds over its scenery, we give it an irresistible interest that awakens all the feelings of a *classic* youth. It is not then wonderful that when in a riper age he visits that country and beholds those very scenes which he has imagined to himself so long before, he should feel an uncommon glow of enthusiasm and in the moment of enchantment should add some imaginary to their many real charms. Besides, the scenery of Italy is truly classical; I mean it is such as described by poets and historians. . . . But not to anticipate various observations that will occur, each in its proper place, one advantage at all events the face of nature possesses in Italy, which is that it seldom or never disappoints the traveller or falls short of his expectations however high they may have been: on the contrary, if I may form my opinion of the sentiments of foreigners in general by my own and by those of my fellow travellers, the lakes, the vale of the Clitumnus, the fall of the Anio, the banks of the Nar, the waters of Tibur, the groves of Albano and the plains, the hills, the coasts, the bays of Campania Felix, not only equal but even surpass the descriptions of the poets and the bright pictures of youthful imagination.

Now it is just there that we can note the great and fundamental difference there is in the mood of nineteenth-century Italian travel. Beckford, not only in this, was a prophet, but we can find the change I mean best expressed in a painter —Turner. Nothing implicit, nothing taken for granted

there! His enthusiastic joy and delight in Italian landscape, in all that Italy can give of romantic beauty, floods his canvas with colour and light.

And at last there does appear a poet and a traveller who cannot prevent his enthusiasm, who sings, who almost shouts, his adoration of the overwhelming beauty of Italy:

> Thou art the Garden of the world, the home
> Of all Art yields and Nature can decree;
> Even in thy desert, what is like to thee?
> Thy very weeds are beautiful, thy waste
> More rich than other climes fertility;
> Thy wreck a glory and thy ruin graced
> With an immaculate charm that cannot be defaced

If that is not a declaration of love, there can never have been one; and all the nineteenth century echoed it to the end.

It was Goethe who said: 'The English can say what they like about Byron; he is the greatest talent of the century.' Well, whatever we may think of Byron's poetry, his *Childe Harold* expresses quite a new sentiment, quite a new enthusiasm in regard to Italy. No such pictures as canto iv. of that poem contains had ever been drawn. And then to Byron Italy is no longer a remote land. For it is not only that canto of *Childe Harold.* Many of his poems are devoted to her; there is a wonderful passage in *Manfred*; and in Venice are laid the scenes of *Beppo*, of *Marino Faliero* (act iv. has an exquisite picture of the city), of *The Two Foscari*, and of *Venice: A Fragment*, where there is another picture of the Doge's Palace and San Marco. In *Don Juan* there are many passages about Italy; I may especially note the one about Ravenna's immemorial wood, which has sent thousands of people to the Pineta—I mean the passage beginning

> Sweet hour of twilight. . . .

which Carducci recalls in one of his most famous poems.

And then his letters are crammed with Italy, and in both letters and poetry he is always eager for the *Risorgimento.* He is, indeed, the prophet of the new Picturesque Italy of the nineteenth century.

And Shelley, too. Shelley can express the delicate line and colour of an Italian scene more perfectly than any other poet that ever lived. Who else could describe the magic of

an Italian night as he has done, for instance, in those lines on *Evening—Ponte a Mare Pisa*?

> The sun is set, the swallows are asleep;
> The bats are flitting past in the gray air . . .

or give us the very landscape itself, as in:

> Beneath is spread like a green sea
> The waveless plain of Lombardy
> Bounded by the vaporous air
> Islanded by cities fair.

The very spirit, the very atmosphere of that beloved country, the depths of blue sky, the quivering heat of the burning days, the gray mountains and

> The waves upon the shore
> Like light dissolved in star-showers thrown. . . .

But it is not only the landscape or only the poets—though they never cease to sing of Italy till the end of the century—that alone go to make up this new enthusiasm. She inspires the most romantic political movement of the age, in which all that is noblest in human nature supports, and watches her struggle for Liberty, from Byron's

> Yet, Freedom, yet thy banner, torn, but flying,
> Streams like the thunder storm against the wind . . .

to *Casa Guidi Windows*, *Songs before Sunrise* and Meredith's wonderful scene in *La Scala* when Vittoria suddenly sings the forbidden aria:

> Italia, Italia shall be free.

And then all Europe begins to pour out a treasure of love and devotion at her feet.

Poets, men and women of letters, professors, students from every country devote their genius or their love, their learning, their time and money and lives to her, to a detailed study of her incomparable loveliness, of her history, her poetry and prose, her architecture, her painting, her sculpture, her music. New pilgrims come, thousand upon thousand, to see the treasures she has made and worship at the shrine of her beauty. Never was a land loved like this land. It is as though at last she is recognised as the spiritual home of all mankind.

The century opens, characteristically enough, with the glorious sonnet of Wordsworth on 'the Extinction of the Venetian Republic.' This was written in 1802, the year of the Peace of Amiens. In the interval, before Napoleon's declaration of war against England in May of the following year, we find Chateaubriand in Italy and Madame de Stael, who had set out with Schlegal, von Humboldt and Bonstetten, to return in 1805 to write *Corinne*. Eustace and Forsyth, too, were in Italy during the interval of peace.

But it is only after Waterloo that the flood begins. In 1816 Byron arrived in Italy as a sort of exile, and never left it till he set out for Greece to die at Missolonghi. In 1818 Shelley also flies to Italy and dies there in 1822. And Keats, in London, longs for Italy, and has his wish and dies in Rome at last in 1821. In 1817 Landor had come to Italy, not to leave it for twenty years: 1818 sees the arrival of Lamartine; 1825, of Heine; 1828, of Longfellow; 1830, of Stendhal, of Mendelssohn, and also of Disraeli, who gives excellent glimpses of Italy in *Contarini Fleming*: 1833 sees Hans Andersen, Fenimore Cooper, and Emerson in Italy; in the same year De Musset and Georges Sand were in Italy together; and in 1835 John Ruskin, aged sixteen, made his first visit.

In 1837, Wordsworth, aged sixty-four, made a tour with Crabb Robinson as far as Rome, and heard the cuckoo at La Verna and was touched by the Franciscan friars. In the following year Robert Browning made his first journey and was in Italy for forty-five years; in that year (1838), too, Macaulay made his journey; 1840 sees Ruskin again in Italy—in Rome and Naples, in 1841 comes Edward Lear; in 1844, Thackeray; in 1845, Ruskin again—in Lucca, Pisa, Florence and Venice; in 1846, Charles Dickens; in 1847, Mrs. Jameson, to write her admirable studies of the saints in Italian art; in 1848, Ampère, to write his *Voyage Dantesque*; in 1850, Théophile Gautier; in 1852, Gregorovius and Ozanam; in 1858, Hawthorne; in 1865, Taine; in 1874, John Addington Symonds; in 1883, Charles Lenormant; and so one might go on to the end of the century.

It will perhaps be more useful to glance for a moment at a very few of the works all this enthusiasm actually produced The two presiding geniuses, one in verse and the other in prose, are, I think, Byron and Ruskin. Byron's *Childe*

Harold (canto iv.) appeared in 1818, Ruskin's *Modern Paint* in 1843, *Seven Lamps* in 1846, *Stones of Venice* in 1849, *Gio in Padua* in 1855, *Mornings in Florence* in 1875, and *St. Mar Rest* in 1877.

The earliest guide-book, pure and simple, was M Starke's—not a very serious compilation. Amid a medl of classical lore from Lemprière is embedded a theory of t origin of Devonshire cream, which, she thinks, was broug by the Phœnicians into the West of England. But there is good deal of useful information culled on the spot all the sar The first serious guide-book in our sense was *Murray's R Handbook for North and South Italy* (two volumes), publish in the 'thirties. It pre-dates, as do all the Murray handbook the similar volumes of *Baedeker*, which were modelled upo them.

Then in the 'seventies followed the very readable compil tions of Augustus Hare, with their anthologies of quotatio from other well-known travellers and their charming illu trations. These books were the very necessary tools of tl resident, the visitor, and tourist alike. Burckhardt's wonderf *Cicerone*, published in 1855, was at once a history, a critic commentary and a guide to architecture, sculpture ar painting in Italy. In its way, it still stands quite alone its complete and comprehensive survey of Italian art as whole.

Of the histories of painting, Lanzi's was published 1806, and Rio's *Christian Art*, so often quoted by Ruskin, 1836. There followed in 1847 Lindsay's *History of Christi Art*, and then in 1864 the most valuable work ever writte on Italian painting, Crowe and Cavalcaselle's History, wonderful achievement at any time, but before the advent the photograph almost a miracle.

Morelli's volumes on Italian painters appeared in th 'nineties, and were succeeded by Mr. Berenson's admirabl essays and lists and a whole opus of superb criticism in whic he has, more than any other writer, established a theory connoisseurship of the Italian masters and schools which probably permanent. He and his disciples and friends reall discovered the Sienese masters, and gave them their rightfu position in the history and æsthetic of Italian painting, whic Vasari had for so long obscured and that was hidden eve

from Crowe and Cavalcaselle. Nor can Walter Pater's *Studies in the Renaissance*, published in 1873, be forgotten. It gives a better appreciation of the atmosphere of the time than any other work, and is a work of art in itself.

A whole host of historians and students flung themselves upon Italian mediæval history. Very many of them were foreigners, and it would be quite impossible to name them all here. Among the Italians we certainly ought not to forget Pasquale Villari, and among the foreigners Gregorovius, whose *History of Rome in the Middle Ages* remains an indispensable and standard work everywhere. The same may be said for Hodgkin's *Italy and her Invaders*, published in 1880. Nor can we afford to pass by in silence John Addington Symonds' great *History of the Renaissance*, nor Burckhardt's *Civilization and Culture of the Renaissance*, nor Ranke's nor Pastor's *History of the Papacy*, nor Sismondi's *History of the Italian Republics*, nor Lenormant's *La Grande Grèce*.

Then, again, the innumerable works on Dante—more often than not by foreigners—would require a whole essay, or even a volume. They begin with Ampère's charming *Voyage Dantesque* and include Vernon's monumental works, and may be said to end the century with Moore's text and with Toynbee's volumes. Cary's translation of *The Divine Comedy* was published in 1814, Longfellow's in 1867, and Rossetti's *Dante and his Circle* appeared in 1861.

Ozanam in 1852 had published his volume on the Franciscan poets and Émile Gebhart in 1890 his on *Italie Mystique*; but it was Paul Sabatier in his *Vie de St. François*, published in 1893, who may be said almost to have begun the documentary study of Franciscan history. In fact, Monsignor Faloci-Pulignani's *Miscellanea Francescana* only begins in 1901, eight years after the publication of Sabatier's fruitful volume. A whole literature has sprung from that work, including translations into many languages of the many original sources, and a new understanding and enthusiasm for the study of the Middle Ages, their history, literature, poetry and art, so much of which in Italy seems to have sprung from the tomb of the Little Poor Man in the rock of Assisi

But beside these major energies there is an innumerable host of famous works— indeed, whole libraries of studies and essays in history, in the arts, in travel and in fiction, all of

which sprung from this nineteenth-century enthusiasm fi Italy.

In 1828 Crawford Tait Ramage published his admirab account of his journey through Calabria, *The Nooks and Bywa of Italy*—a work of great interest and still delightful rea ing. Some, like Edward Lear, spent years in Italy simp recording her beauties of city and solitude, mountain ar plain in thousands of drawings. Even Charles Dickens to himself away from his London in 1846, and wrote with much vision of Italian scenes that his pages on Venice see to have served as inspiration for some of the most eloque passages of D'Annunzio's famous *Fuoco*.

In 1850 Gautier, for whom the visible world existed for anyone, cannot withhold his hand from painting Ita and in 1862 Storey, an American, publishes that enchanti volume *Roba di Roma*, and from 1874 to 1883 Symon writes his admirable *Italian Sketches*, which still are the delig of every traveller; and I think I should not forget here Pa Bourget's *Sensations d'Italie*.

In 1839 Stendhal's *Chartreuse de Parme* appeared. I suppc it to be the greatest of all novels about Italy.

In 1858 Hawthorne went to Italy, aged fifty-four. I ha a feeling that Hawthorne began by disliking Italy, y he ended by writing *The Marble Form* or *Transformati* which is one of the best works of fiction in English abo Italy. I wish I could say the same of George Elio *Romola*. That great writer, in my opinion, missed l way altogether in that book, which I cannot read. It w published in 1862.

George Meredith's *Vittoria*, which I can read, w published in 1867. Another woman novelist, Ouida, hac far better knowledge of Italy than George Eliot, which beautifully expressed, especially in her short stories.

Then in 1880 comes that very strange and even uniq book, *John Inglesant*. Shorthouse was never in Italy, but profoundly had the Italian atmosphere filled the Europe spirit that no one has been more truly successful in suggesti the Italian scene.

Finally I must mention a writer who had, since 18 till her death the other day, written constantly and admiral of Italy. I mean Vernon Lee. Her *Studies of XVIII. Centi*

Italy is unique and so admirable that it was, and still I think is, read as a text-book in the Italian higher schools.

In fact it is true to say that very much of what was best and most civilised, most cultured, most delicately aware of beauty in the nineteenth century turned to Italy as a spiritual home.

And now this is the twentieth century. Will Italy continue to fill the place in our culture she has held till now? I wonder.

Italian civilisation and culture combine in themselves—or used to—both the sources of European culture, the Greco-Latin and the Hebrew, in a new and acceptable beauty. There we find all that can be saved of antiquity together with something she has added, without which our civilisation would perish. For she has not only preserved from antiquity its culture and learning and art, but has organised, if not created, a world-wide religion which, whatever its provincialisms here and there in this country or that, has given us in some exquisite way possession of a Christian soul, while not wholly stripping off what could rightly be preserved of an older beauty and ceremony.

She has been the school, more the university, of mankind, and we can never wholly escape that experience, even if we wanted to, or cast away or neglect the treasures she holds.

What the nineteenth century found in Italy was, not merely a museum, but an experience—above all, a certain simplicity and beauty of life that was ever increasingly lacking in an ever more material, industrialised and mechanised world. And this amid a scene not only of celestial beauty but of living tradition and sacred renown. Alas!

> non semper idem floribus est honor
> vernis neque uno Luna rubens nitet
> voltu: quid aeternis minorem
> consiliis animum fatigas?

EDWARD HUTTON.

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN ITALY

By J. S. Barnes

Mainly owing to lack of mineral wealth and of those raw materials required for modern industrial processes, Italy must be counted a poor country. In modern times she has especially suffered from a dearth of capital for the development of even such meagre national resources as she possesses. In the face of more remunerative opportunities elsewhere, little foreign capital has been attracted to her shores. Her own capital means have consisted for the most part in the accumulation of countless, tiny marginal savings by a large class of small producers, living, on the whole, not badly, but very simply and everlastingly from hand to mouth. The number of people in Italy who appear to live on bills of exchange discounted in anticipation of precarious future profits is still disconcerting; and the number of small consequent bankruptcies and disputed bills of exchange have always been high. These conditions are chronic in Italy; and in the circumstances Government finance has been forced to play a conspicuous part in the development of the country, notwithstanding the ever-present difficulty of balancing budgets. Taxation, as a result, has always been heavy, and, because there is no large rich class to pay for the high standard of public services, it presses hard upon even the lower incomes.

Progress, nevertheless, has been astonishing, when it is remembered that less than eighty years ago the new Italy of the *Risorgimento* had to start practically from nothing (only in the north—in Piedmont and the Austrian provinces—had some beginnings been made in the way of modernisation). There were few roads, scarcely any railways, no well-equipped harbours, hardly any industries—the topography for the most part a ganglion of mountains with interspersed areas devastated by malaria; 85 per cent. illiterate; popular schools,

hospitals, hygiene, water supply, public and social services for all intents and purposes non-existent; a country without a middle class, disunited politically, the Church and State at war, an utter confusion of differing regional laws, customs and degrees of civilisation. Yet, in this comparatively short interval, Italy has risen to the rank of a first-class Power; her population has doubled; illiteracy has been practically abolished; she commands a magnificent mercantile marine and a magnificent scholastic system; her fleet, army and air force are strong and second to none in quality and equipment; she can vie with any country in the world as far as her social and public services are concerned (working-class insurance, hospitals, convalescent homes, holiday homes for children, and means of popular recreation; hygiene, water supply, electricity, irrigation, roads, railways, housing, etc.); she has built up an important industrial system and a truly scientific agriculture; she has enlarged and equipped her ports, rebuilt her cities, dealt successfully with slums, reclaimed immense areas of malarial swamps; she has become a thoroughly united nation and is at peace with the Church.

Meanwhile, she has fought four successful wars and achieved an empire; and, despite the fact that the latter still represents for her a severe economic burden, she has brought about in recent years the same signs of orderly and progressive development within her older colonies as she has brought about at home. Nor is the pace being slackened. On the contrary, it is being accelerated. The signs of continued progress keep on growing up. Unemployment, which has always run into the hundreds of thousands and reached 1,200,000 during the pit of the depression, is now well below the 500,000 mark. The index number of employment now, compared with the boom year 1929 (100), is 96. The curve of crime statistics has moved steadily down ever since the March on Rome (1922). Bankruptcies have fallen from 17,171 in 1933 to 9955 last year, and continue to show a descending curve. They now stand at about the same figure as in 1929, the boom year. Their value in money has correspondingly decreased. Disputed bills of exchange have fallen within the same period from 861,875 to 685,254 (1936). The index number of Post Office Savings Bank deposits with reference to 1928 (100) have risen steadily from year to year, until

now it stands at over 200. The index number of the ordinary savings bank deposits has risen, on the other hand, only 19 per cent. The total of credits in current account payable at sight has risen 25 per cent. since 1934. These figures, however, must be discounted in some degree by the realignment of the lira.

The index number of the cost of living, in relation to 1928 (100), is now 89, while the index number for salaries, in relation to 1930, is 85. Seventy-two per cent. of the disputes between capital and labour, which have, in default of settlement by negotiation, come up for adjudication by the courts, have been settled in favour of labour; 13 per cent. in favour of capital. The remainder have resulted in compromise. The index number of the hours of work in industrial undertakings, compared with 1929 (100), now stands at 80·5, partly owing to the introduction of the forty-hour week in certain industries.

The birth rate in Italy is now just over 23 per mille, the death rate just over 13. In 1922 (the year of the Fascist Revolution) the figures were, in round numbers, 30 and 18 respectively. At the actual moment the death rate is decreasing more rapidly than the birth rate, owing to the steadily improving hygiene and housing, to the effects of social insurance against accidents and disease, to the measures taken to promote maternity and infant welfare, physical training and the protection of the people from such scourges as tuberculosis and malaria, to the legislation enacted to encourage births (family allowances, marriage loans, premiums on large families, bachelor tax, etc.). Nor are these measures appreciably affecting the average age of the population (25·7 compared with 28 in Great Britain), because, despite the slow but steady decrease in the birth rate and the diminution of adult mortality, the decrease in infant mortality is very important. In 1930 the infant mortality was 144 per mille, last year it was 99; and it is confidently expected to be able to reduce it within the next ten years to the rate reigning at present in Great Britain (about 60). The reproduction rate is still 1·25, compared with only 0·75 in Great Britain. The net figures for emigration are also eloquent. Owing to restrictions on both entry and exit, emigration to foreign countries has fallen to about 40,000 (in 1906 it amounted to no less than 750,000, and even as late as 1924 to 190,000). While, therefore, the

decrease in the growth of the population in Italy may be said to be following the same tendency apparent in all civilised countries in recent years, the danger mark cannot be said to be yet in sight as it is with us. There is in any case no probability of the birth rate decreasing as rapidly as it has in England, since the figure for the latter stood at 23 per mille, where it stands in Italy to-day. The conditions are different. Urbanisation is neither excessive nor markedly increasing. The half-share farming system accounts for a large percentage of the population and sets a premium on large families (in that large families save the cost of hired labour and provide no prudential counter-check, as exists under small ownership owing to divided inheritance). Catholic morality and Fascist race pride are diffused and powerful deterrents on family limitation. The prospect of better economic conditions compared with the past are not only good but are beginning to be consciously realised by the people, they are not frightened of the future for their sons.

These statistics certainly reveal considerable economic progress, but they also reveal the chronic difficulties—that the progress is one of tooth and claw. The figures are not sufficiently remarkable to throw into bold relief the startling changes. The reason is that the real gains are not susceptible to illustration by monetary tables, for, although the individual on the average is not, as far as money incomes are concerned, very demonstrably richer than before, the common patrimony—making for the greater dignity and well-being of the nation—has increased prodigiously; while the lot of the lower classes—not so much in cash but in amenities and in opportunities—has been ameliorated beyond expectation or previous experience.

The chief causes that have brought about the results are the following:

(1) The development of Italian industry is chiefly due to the high state of development and remarkable integration of the country's water-power resources. There are now approximately 4,000,000 kilowatts installed—one to nearly every ten inhabitants. The technique of this development is a model for the world. The load factor over the whole country averages no less than 35 per cent. Electric power is abundant and cheap. Electric light, to be found even in the tiniest and most

remote villages, costs less than 5*d.* per unit, despite a high Government tax of about 80 per cent. Electric current for other domestic purposes costs under three farthings per unit. The rates for the varying requirements of industry or traction (nearly all Italian industry is electrified and over 4000 miles of the railways) are proportionately low (from half a farthing to under three farthings).

(2) Italy, like Great Britain, can boast, relatively speaking, a very considerable favourable balance of invisible exports over invisible imports. In this department she pays little tribute to the foreigner. Interest, dividends and insurance premiums payable abroad weigh lightly. The profits, on the other hand, of her mercantile marine are estimated to stand at about £5,000,000 net ($25,000,000), though this figure may have to be offset now by the losses on the special services to East Africa. Remittances by Italians resident abroad, though much less than they used to be, still amount to a useful figure (the actual sum is not available). Finally, the tourist traffic accounts for something between £15,000,000 and £30,000,000 annually. This year it is expected to yield in real money (for the German and Austrian tourist traffic does not represent real money, as the receipts are set off against Italian purchases in those countries) about £18,000,000, after allowing for the 10 per cent. premium on tourist cheques. Altogether, Italy's favourable balance in 'invisibles' is estimated at present to be round about £25,000,000, as against the estimated deficit in 'visibles' of about £40,000,000.

(3) Unemployment is well distributed. There are no 'distressed areas.' Its effects are also less demoralising than in the United Kingdom, for climatic reasons and because the great majority of the unemployed are not idle. The large proportion of the population that lives by agriculture (47 per cent.) and the widespread system of subsistence farming enables large numbers of unemployed to keep their stomachs full and their muscles strong by doing odd jobs for their relatives on the land. In times of depression coats may be out at elbow in Italy, but few people go without nourishing food. Those who receive a dole must work for it. The introduction of the forty-hour week spreads the burden, which is distributed between the State, the capitalist and workers in employment.

(4) The socialisation of wealth was a constant operating factor in Italy even before it became a consciously pursued policy under Fascism. This fact is of capital significance and deserves special study, for the technique is not orthodox Socialism. It is more akin to the theory of Distributism. Private initiative remains as active as ever, especially for the large class of independent workers, owning or sharing their own means of livelihood, whom the Government protect and encourage. This is true despite ubiquitous Government control and supervision, especially with regard to big industry, and the large measure of Government initiative. Credit operations are now practically a Government monopoly. Fascism has immensely potentialised the previous tendency imposed by circumstances: the corporative system has provided a perfected technique, which is still in course of elaboration. Whatever the merits of the old competitive capitalistic system, it is wasteful and tends towards great inequalities. In Italy there is surprisingly little waste, and wealth is well distributed. Profits are carefully, nay meticulously, canalised to provide the public needs, to which private luxuries and even many private comforts are subordinated. Imports are likewise rationed to keep pace with exports—those imports representing national needs receiving preference.

There are, as a consequence of these conditions, few great private fortunes in Italy, such as may be met with in England and America, or even in France. The richer class in Italy is really no more than well-to-do. It should be admitted, however, that, partly owing to the elimination during the slump of its weaker elements, partly owing to the creation of the Industrial Reconstruction Institute and to the manner in which the Government has perfected its technique with a view to eliminating speculative business as distinct from genuinely productive business and to rationalisation, Italian banking and industry to-day are in a very much healthier state than they were during even the relatively 'prosperous' period previous to the world economic depression.

(5) The astonishing capacity for work of an extremely gifted people. People in Italy must work hard in order to keep their heads above water. Habits of hard work are also due to the social system where so large a proportion of the people own their own means of livelihood. A man works

with a passionate interest when it belongs to himself; leisure then ceases to be the aim but only the means of recreation lest the work itself suffer. The absence of strikes and lock-outs under provisions which have won the confidence of both capital and labour preclude wasted hours of enforced idleness. The remarkable vital energies of the Italians, evident to all close observers since the rebirth of Italy during the nineteenth century, must also be held responsible for the results. Nor should the frugal, sober and sane traditions of the people be underestimated, nor yet their creative genius which is the fruit of their ancient civilisation, their mentally stimulating climate and an excellently nutritious food basis.

Turning to the consideration of Government finance, it is not surprising to find that the latter reflects a situation very similar to that occupied by the individual. A Government stands in very much the same relation to the nation as a landlord stands in relation to his property. In Italy both have to face the ever-present difficulty of balancing the domestic budget. Progress in both cases has been, so to speak, by 'tooth and claw,' and neither has yet reached the stage of ease and affluence.

Ever since the unification of Italy the Government has found itself in a position analogous to a person who has acquired an old and beautiful property that had fallen into neglect. The task has been to recondition the property, improve the quality of the stock and of the crops, provide decent houses for the tenants; give them a good water supply, modern hygiene and electricity; equip the estate with new plant and communications; develop its industrial capacities; restore its beauties; expand it so that it may become a more economical unit. Hard work and continual sacrifices, at least as far as cash returns are concerned, are demanded from all who are connected with the estate. Fresh capital is required that can only be obtained by mortgage. Steadily, however, the estate assumes a new aspect. Those who live by it become, in fact, very much better off; but it is not to be expected that their cash incomes will increase to a very considerable extent until the debt has been reduced and the reconditioning completed.

The present Government is proving an extremely active

and capable steward, though a strong argument might be made out to the effect that its policy of import restrictions has not been altogether a success—since the total balance of payments this year will be, despite improvement, still an unfavourable one, amounting perhaps to some £15,000,000, which can only be set off by further reducing reserves. On the other hand, it is argued that the continuance of an unfavourable balance of total payments this year is due to two abnormal causes—the failure of last year's wheat crop and the need of Italian industries to replenish their supplies of raw materials, which tended to become exhausted on account of the sanctions imposed on Italy during the Abyssinian war. Moreover, since the policy was inaugurated, the war itself and the sanctions intervened. The results of the policy, in the circumstances, should therefore rather be held to be remarkable, especially as the figure given for the tourist traffic may be regarded as conservative, while no account is taken of any prolongation of the marked tendency towards increasing exports of merchandise, or of the very considerable transfer of French wealth to Italy which has been steadily taking place this year in view of doubts regarding the stability of the franc.

The Government in any case cannot yet afford to be generous. It is a hard taskmaster because it has a hard task to see through. But the will is there, and it has won the enthusiastic co-operation of most of the people, despite the innumerable obstacles and all the attrition attendant on the radical transformation of society which the Fascist Revolution is bringing about.

Turning to the Government budget figures, we find the deficits on the normal budgets for 1934–35 and 1935–36, added to the expenditure of the 'extraordinary' budgets (war expenditure), amounted to 14,716 million lire, of which 12,111 million were accounted for by the costs of the Ethiopian war.

Henceforth the 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' budgets are taken together; and the last financial year ending on June 30 closed with a surplus of just over 1000 million lire, which, however, will be eaten up by the exceptional expenditure for developing the empire and for rearmament.

This considerable 'surplus' has been made possible by the sum accruing to the Treasury as a result of the revaluation

of the gold reserves of the Bank of Italy (following the realignment of the lira in October 1936) and from the gold and foreign bills donated to the Treasury by the Italian people over and above the first instalment of 401 million lire, already entered in the accounts for the previous financial year. At the same time the State has taken over the railways deficit, occasioned by the speeding up of electrification and the provision of new rolling stock, including the new streamline trains (Milan–Naples, for example, averaging 60 miles per hour over 500 miles notwithstanding three intermediate stops and the high gradient over the Appenines).

For the year 1937–38 expenditure is estimated at 25,035 million lire and receipts at 25,072 millions. There will thus be a small surplus of 37 million lire, or approximately £1,800,000.

This expenditure has been met by the issue of 25,288,000,000 lire nine-year 4 per cent. Treasury bonds, 1943; by the 5 per cent. funded loan, which yielded in fresh money 6,804,600,000; by the capital levy (in the form of a forced 5 per cent. redeemable loan) on real estate, which is expected finally to yield altogether 8000 million lire, and by interest bearing current accounts with the bank of issue, the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti and the Social Insurance Institute; by a capital levy on public companies, and by an increased turn-over tax.

Meanwhile the national internal debt (exclusive of the floating debt) has risen from 91,997 million lire on June 30, 1934, to 101,241 million on April 30, 1937. £180 million ($900 million) has been voted for the needs of Ethiopia on a six-year plan by instalments from the Italian Treasury. Presumably the Public debt will in due course be increased by this amount.

Note circulation, which on December 31, 1934, stood at 13,145 million lire, has risen to 15,645 million, whereof 1480 million are circulating in Italian East Africa. At the same time the gold reserves stand at 4023 million, affording a note cover slightly in excess of the 25 per cent. which the London Economic Conference considered adequate.

The marked growth of exports have allowed of the formation of large credit balances in Italy's favour (161,578,764 lire), which have been utilised for the settlement of commer-

cial arrears. Thus, for instance, the commercial debt outstanding with Great Britain has already been reduced by £1,600,000 ($8,000,000). At the same time revenue is showing some comforting signs of expansion.

Italian economic self-sufficiency has recently been placed by Mussolini in the very forefront of his programme. Anglo-Saxons have in many cases reacted towards this announcement by arguing, somewhat derisively, to the effect that, since complete economic self-sufficiency is impossible and, even if it were possible, uneconomic, the whole idea is absurd. But 'foreigners are not fools,' and Italians view the problem in a much less simple manner. More logical, they detect an undistributed middle fallacy in the above argument. The denial of the possibility of complete economic self-sufficiency is seen by them to be really the mere setting of limitations. In this they reveal their essentially realistic mentality; and as for the uneconomicality, so to speak, of the programme, they view the problem, as it should be viewed, synthetically. They are perfectly aware that the world is not a purely economic world, and that political, ethical, social, technical and cultural considerations always have imposed, must and should impose themselves upon and mingle with the economic. It is not for nothing that young Italy is the disciple of that great sociologist Vilfredo Pareto.

In a Europe indulging, moreover, in a race of armaments, where war is, to say the least, an evident possibility, it is no more logical to bear the burden of great armaments than it is to bear the burden of placing each country as far as possible, should war break out, in an industrial condition to face the crisis. Every European country, whether Liberal or Fascist, is in one form or another—each in accordance with its peculiar situation and resources—doing much the same thing. If there are any exceptions, a big risk is being taken. There is also the question—in a country, like Italy, with a population growing each year by some 400,000 souls—of employment. It might be argued, for example, that, in view of the capacity of America to turn out an admirable series of automobiles, which, owing to special circumstances and, in view of the immense output, to the law of increasing returns, can be placed on the European market very much cheaper than any European make, Europe should scrap its automobile industry.

But the fact remains that the highly protected Italian automobile industry is not only able to turn out first-class material—for the Italian has a genius for mechanics (and the same argument applies to Britain, Germany and France)—but it keeps in employment no less than 200,000 men and maintains an export trade worth some £10,000,000. This export surplus, added to what would be required in foreign currency to satisfy the growing national demand for automobiles were the national industry scrapped, is very considerably larger than the present cost of importing the raw materials required for the industry. Self-sufficiency, therefore, in the domain of automobile production, would seem to be, all things considered and with special emphasis on the military, technical and social aspects of the problem, both desirable and by no means impossible. The same arguments apply to a number of other Italian industries, notably shipbuilding, aeroplanes, electrical machinery, agricultural machinery, etc., and the chemical industries.

Another reason for the policy of tending towards economic self-sufficiency, which was definitely initiated in 1934 by the decision to restrict imports, tighten up exchange control, ration foreign purchases in accordance with a scale corresponding with the varying importance of national requirements and, through the corporative organisation of industry, to make bulk purchases of raw materials from abroad from each category of industry taken as a whole, is the paramount need here of balancing the commercial budget, which had become seriously dislocated. The imposition of sanctions greatly speeded up the process, though it retarded its success. This year is, as we have seen, still likely to see a commercial deficit. Exports, however, are rising, and Italy's chief invisible export—tourist receipts—have not only returned to normal, but, on account of the great improvements in hotels, roads, railways and travelling facilities of every description, is well on the upgrade. Next year, accordingly, has a fair chance of seeing the first balanced commercial budget for many years and the vindication of a policy still much criticised by orthodox economists.

Meanwhile, the corporative organisation of the State is gaining a steady momentum and is being used to carry out the new economic policy, feeling its way empirically. But

the underlying theory is also growing into shape. The slogan is: 'Production for profit, possession for use.' The manufacture of credit is already entirely controlled by the State. Usury (the taking of interest on unproductive loans) has been rendered almost impossible. Only in so far as the public authorities may be said to receive a measure of unproductive loans are such loans permissible; and, as this is public money spent on public purposes and thus returned to the public, the principle can hardly be said to be violated. Maximum prices are also regularly fixed, but not on any arbitrary, uneconomic basis, but in relation to costs. Profits by speculation, by corners, by the simple interplay of supply and demand have become very difficult. The middleman can charge a just price, but seldom any more. Co-operative production and consumption is becoming more and more diffused. Property is regarded as a function: 'the land is mine, saith the Lord, and thine are the fruits thereof.' Many of the old maxims of Leviticus have become the order of the day. Christ's saying that He had come to confirm the law, not to destroy it, is officially quoted, and the confirmation is being given an economic connotation.

The principle of the minimum wage has, moreover, been accepted and is related to the index numbers of the cost of living. If real wages have not risen since the boom year of 1929, they have been maintained at a fairly constant level. Better times must be awaited before real wages can be raised to a higher level; but when better times do come, the Labour Charter guarantees the worker a share in greater prosperity.

Italy's chronic difficulty thus mainly lies in the balancing of individual budgets, whether that of the Government or of private persons. The end of Government deficits, moreover, is not yet come for certain. The internal public debt, standing as it does at over £1,000,000,000, is a very high figure for a poor country like Italy, and taxation has almost reached its limits. The debt, besides, cannot fail to undergo during the next six or seven years a still further increase; for the development of the empire in Ethiopia must be financed to the extent of some £30,000,000 annually from the home treasury until at least the completion of the recently promulgated six-year plan. The interest on this debt has to be paid, and paid for dearly. Nevertheless, it may be taken for granted that default

is out of the question. But it will probably take another generation before taxation can be lowered and the belt loosened.

Meanwhile, it is some comfort to note that there are distinct signs of revenue expanding. Industry and banking, it should be emphasised—partly owing to the elimination of its weaker elements as a consequence of the slump, partly to rationalisation and bulk purchases, partly to the excellent work performed by the Industrial Reconstruction Institute, which relieved the banks of their frozen assets and has acted as a benevolent grandmother to industry—are in a very much healthier condition than they have ever been before. Exports, as we have noted, are showing distinct signs of growth. Ethiopia, even if we discount all extravagant hope of mineral wealth, is without doubt destined to provide economic lungs for the mother country, provided a long view is taken. Italy is still a country in the making. There is no reason to question her capacity to win through. In fact there is every reason to regard her future as a brilliant one. It would be difficult to discover anybody with an intimate knowledge of the country unable to share this opinion. There is a wonderful promise in due time of a second Renaissance. But it must not be expected that this still young tree will put forth its buds until another thirty years have passed. The lean years are by no means yet over.

There has been published recently an exceedingly interesting book,[1] written by experts in every branch of Italian economic activity, which, subject by subject, examines the possibility and limitations of economic self-sufficiency. The difficulties are not skirked. Apart from building materials (stone, marble, cement, etc.), sulphur, mercury, aluminium, zinc and lead, Italy possesses little mineral wealth. Though there is iron, it is not abundant and, at the present rate of extraction, supplies would tend towards exhaustion within about fifty years. She has large reserves, however, of iron pyrites, and the new factory at Marghera (Venice) is proving that modern technical methods can extract the iron untainted by sulphur, and, at the same time, useful quantities of phosphates. Copper, chromium, manganese, tin and nickel, on the other hand, are either wholly absent or utterly insuffi-

[1] *Italian Economic Independence*, edited by Luigi Lojacono (Ulrico Hoepli, Milan)

cient to meet the home demand. Italy is also very poor in coal and petroleum. But she possesses useful lignite and bituminous deposits, which, together with substitutes such as alcohol on the one hand and water power on the other, should make it possible for her within a few years to supply in an emergency the whole of her power requirements. Rubber represents another problem. The industry in all its various branches is flourishing and progressing. The raw material, however, comes from abroad, and, though the problem can now be considered technically solved, it is too early yet to speak with complete assurance of the possibilty of substituting the whole of the demand for the natural product by the synthetic.

Wherever, in fact, modern technical methods enter as a predominating factor in industry, Italy is proving herself in the forefront of development. Synthetic rubber is only one case in point. Cellulose, made from esparto grass, straw and broom, bids fair to render the country independent of foreign raw material. It is in the textile industries, however, where Italy has already achieved or is achieving the most remarkable results. The rayon industry is of the first importance, and has been so for many years. Artificial silk has now led the way to the production of artificial cotton (not to speak of the new applications of hemp, which is not only taking the place of jute, but is being applied for the manufacture of many fine materials), and the production of artificial cotton has in turn led the way to the manufacture of wool from milk. This has apparently become a completely successful process. Milk is being imported for the new industry in large quantities, and an export trade of the new wool, 'Lanital,' has already sprung up. The patents have been successfully sold abroad, which is in itself testimony to the high quality of the material.

When all is said and done, the prospects of self-sufficiency within certain limitations, but on a sound commercial basis, are extremely bright. With a fleet and air force sufficiently strong to command at least the narrower seas, Italy has at her disposal further large sources of supply of important raw material. Her newly-found friendship with Yugoslavia is going to prove a very important asset, and this is only one factor in what might be called an improving 'diplomatic' situation which has a definite economic bearing.

Italy, with the conquest of Ethiopia, has at length entere the category of 'satiated' Powers. Whatever some peopl may think of the past history of the case, the result is a facto for peace. Italy needs now a generation of peace to develo her empire and to grow into a more affluent condition. Thi is in turn a condition for the fulfilment of Signor Mussolini' most cherished ambition—the drawing together of th Western States of Europe (*e.g.*, west of Russia) into a forr of unity which would be tantamount to a confederation, t which he hopes and believes Italy will be able to give th leadership. This constitutes his main imperial dream— dream which partly depended on a sufficiency of territoria possessions, now practically satisfied by the conquest c Ethiopia and, for the rest, now mainly depends on th defeat of Bolshevism in Spain and on the success of the presen economic policy, which, apart from other contingent aspect aims at providing the necessary basis for the affirmation c Italy's ever-superabundant cultural potentialities—Christiar Roman and Universal.

J. S. BARNES.

THE IRISH QUESTION—ALLEGIANCE OR ALLIANCE?

By Hugh de Blacam

The Anglo-Irish negotiations, at the time of writing, appear to have reached deadlock on Defence and Partition. 'A comprehensive agreement, which alone would have world significance,' said Mr. de Valera on February 26, 'seems now unattainable.' The Government of Eire refuses to enter a treaty for concerted defence of these islands until Ireland is brought under an all-Ireland Government. In the following essay a supporter of Mr. de Valera, who has been acquainted with the principal Nationalist leaders from Griffith, Collins and Casement to the present Ministry, seeks to explain the Irish case to Englishmen, without intentional offence to their own principles.

How many English Conservatives know that the word *Tory*—conveying ideas of tradition, patriotism, order—is derived from a by-name for an Irish rebel? A man who was flying from the Black-and-Tans in the Donegal highlands cried the warning, '*Tá an tóir ag teacht*' ('the hunt is coming'). His word for the hunt, '*tóir*,' is the root of *Tory*. Men hunted by the Cromwellians were called tories, the hunted folk. In Williamite days the Whig corporations paid rewards for the heads of 'priests, wolves and tories.' A titled Whig writes that 'there never was such a winter for country sports as the past,' and tells how thirteen tories were slain in the man hunts of the season. Who were these human game? Mere robbers? No, but the scions of ancient families; their brothers on the Continent held high rank. These tories were hunted with hounds over hills and moors of which they

might be masters, if they would deny the old religion an acknowledge the new king. Among them were poets c distinction, whose rich-rhymed Gaelic verse was passionatel Jacobite—that is, Tory in the old sense. Disraeli said tha 'the gentlemen of England, sons of the Cavaliers,' ought no to act like Cromwellians towards modern Irish patriotism With intuition, he discerned that the offspring of the Irisl tories were the parallel, *mutatis mutandis*, to the Tories o England—the patriotic core of the community.

In other words, what is noble in Conservatism ought no to find Irish nationalism hard to understand—ought not tc deny it admiration. The long conflict between Ireland anc Britain sprang only in part from material grievances, such as the exactions of absentee landlords or the harsh incidence or an agricultural country of laws made by a Parliament whicl chiefly served English towns. Had Ireland accepted th(Union like Scotland, she might have prospered under it in th(same fashion. That which forbade acceptance was spiritual the craving for nationhood. Because the two lands werc opposed on this principle, the material wrongs of Ireland followed. Irish members in the Union Parliament mingled their material pleas with national pleas which England was resolved to resist.

Now, the Irish movement of our own generation was inspired more intensely by nationhood than that which went before. In 1893 the Gaelic League was founded. The minds of virtually all our political leaders since that date were formed in classes which studied the old language, its ancient literature, and a history which has roots going back to the pre-Roman civilisation of the Celts. Racial pride thus dominated men in whose ears rang poetry which was made before Shakespeare was famous. In 1898 the centenary of the Rising of 1798 was celebrated throughout the Irish world, and the separatism of the United Irishmen was reborn. Next year Arthur Griffith founded his *United Irishman* (later *Sinn Féin*) to advocate repeal of the Union—separation from England under a dual monarchy. A secret movement began which sympathised with the Gaelic League's work for Gaelic culture and Griffith's efforts for industrial revival, but relied on armed revolt, and sought, not independence under the Crown, but an Irish Republic.

In the event, it was the armed movement which prevailed. Persons who never troubled to acquaint themselves with facts called the Rising of 1916 the *Sinn Féin* rebellion, though *Sinn Féin* had depended on mere non-co-operation and had not envisaged the same end. The name, thus wrongly applied, held, and so the Republican movement absorbed *Sinn Féin* and all other 'Irish-Ireland' groups. Indeed, there was no alternative once the armed men struck. Since all had been reared in the Gaelic League, which taught the radical doctrine of nationhood, nobody could renege the men who died. The conflict was renewed in 1919 and continued until Mr. Lloyd George called a truce in the summer of 1921. During those years the race was stirred so deeply that persons of Unionist family, and many with only a drop of the old blood, lent aid at home and abroad. One met rich and poor who rediscovered an Irish connexion and gave enthusiastic help.

Now, if Cork and Kerry were as much part of the English nation as Norfolk and Suffolk, the British Government did right to execute men who sought, by revolt against the legitimate Government, the redress of their grievances or promotion of their ideals. To surrender to rebellion is even more iniquitous than to rebel: it is the prostitution of authority. In 1921, however, the British Government gave up the claim that Ireland and England were parts of the same nation. The moment the truce was called, the principle which had inspired every phase of the Irish movement was admitted—namely, that the people of Ireland are a nationality distinct from that of Britain. I write 'of Ireland,' because never in history before our own times was the essential unity of Ireland denied. In 1921 the attempt to merge Ireland with England was recognised, for good reasons or bad, to have failed. Henceforth Ireland must be treated as a nation. This truth, implicit in the calling of a truce with what claimed to be the Government and army of an Irish Republic, was explicit in the terms of reference on which Irish plenipotentiaries met British delegates in London on October 11, 1921—'to ascertain how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations.' In fine, Ireland's craving for nationhood was to be satisfied, and some arrangement was to be negotiated by which the Irish State would be related to

the community which now is called the British Commonwealth. The *Dáil* unanimously assented.

Here it must be recalled that a Government of Ireland Act had been passed at Westminster in 1920. The Nationalist members of Parliament elected in 1918 never had gone to Westminster—they had set up the Republican *Dáil* in Dublin. The Irish Unionists refrained from voting for the measure. Thus the Act was devised by British statesmen and carried solely by British votes—it had no Irish sanction. It provided for two Parliaments, to which moderate powers of local government were assigned. A Council of Ireland would link them, dealing with certain affairs of common interest; but even this Council would not receive what are called the 'reserved powers,' the powers of sovereignty, such as defence. In other words, both Parliaments were subordinate to that of Westminster. The Northern Parliament was given six counties as its area of jurisdiction—an area not coincident either with the historic province of Ulster or with the Unionist *bloc* around Belfast. That Parliament was opened in 1921 by King George V., and it has operated ever since. The Southern Parliament had not come into being at the time of the truce. In the negotiations the existence of the Six-County Parliament could not be ignored. What the Irish delegates claimed was that the sovereign, or reserved, powers for all Ireland must be yielded by Westminster to Dublin. When the English delegates said that Britain had a responsibility to the Northern minority, and must insist on safeguards, the Irish replied: 'No safeguards are necessary, but Ireland gladly will authorise the ex-Unionist area [to be defined] to continue in possession of minor local powers.' If statesmanship had risen to its opportunity, the Northern Premier—who had met Mr. de Valera already—would have been persuaded to come to a round-table conference and to assent to this pacific compromise.

What the Irish delegation sought, as the basis of settlement, was that Britain should recognise the unqualified sovereignty of Ireland, while sovereign Ireland would be 'externally associated' with Britain. By external association is meant the relation of an *entente* as distinguished from the relation of a common allegiance. The Little Entente and the Balkan League are examples of groups of nations which are

jealous of their sovereignty but recognise that geography has imposed upon them common interests in economics and defence. These associations have permanent committees of Ministers to watch over the common interests. The plan was opposed by Mr. Lloyd George, who wanted Ireland to be bound by the acknowledgment of allegiance to the Crown. The Irish delegation was constrained at last, by methods which the Hon. Frank Pakenham has described in his authoritative book, *Peace by Ordeal*, to sign a treaty which embodied Mr. Lloyd George's principle Before they yielded the delegates were given the Prime Minister's solemn oral assurance that the six counties would be reduced in area by the transfer of the Nationalist districts; this would make the area ruled by Belfast so small that the Northern Unionists would be glad to throw in their lot with the nation. Such patriots as Griffith and Collins never would put their names to a document which entailed permanent partition.

The treaty secured approval in the *Dáil* with the utmost difficulty, and by a narrow majority. It was opposed for two main reasons—the place which it gave the British Crown in the Irish Constitution, and its permission to the north-east area to vote out of the State. The minority did not trust Mr. Lloyd George's promise to secure unity after surrendering it; and in the upshot they were proved right—the promise was not kept. In a desperate final effort to secure agreement Mr. de Valera proposed his famous 'Document No. 2'—an alternative treaty by which sovereign Ireland was to recognise the British monarch as head of the association. This was rejected, by Mr. Lloyd George's pressure. After his entry to the Free State Parliament in 1927, Mr. de Valera succeeded in eliminating the oath of allegiance, the Crown's representative, and then the Crown from the Constitution; but by the Act of December 1936 he associated the State with the Commonwealth, recognising the British monarch as the symbolic head of that 'lesser League of Nations,' as he described his ideal of the Commonwealth. He and all other Republicans regarded the British Crown as a British veto. 'We are not doctrinaire Republicans,' he said, meaning that we are not in action because we hate kings, but because we will not have British power of interference. The State has received a new Constitution which proclaims its sovereign

independence. Thus the 'external association' of Document No. 2 has become accomplished fact, but only for twenty-six counties of Ireland's thirty-two.

Immediately after the inauguration of the new Constitution on December 29, 1937, the British Government issued a statement saying that it had consulted the Governments of the Dominions. With their agreement, it recognised the validity of the new Constitution, saving only the claim to the six counties, and declared that the State's position in the Commonwealth was not affected. This pronouncement by the British Government is of far-reaching international consequence. Before it was made, the doctrine that allegiance to the Crown is the bond of the Commonwealth still was held, although the Statute of Westminster had thrown doubt upon it. To-day we see a State which has no such allegiance in its Constitution, and which proposes partnership solely on the basis of an Act of Parliament which it is within the competence of Parliament to repeal. That basis is announced by the Governments of Britain and the Dominions to be sufficient. Thus the Empire is transformed into an *entente*. A nation that never was under the British flag could enter the same partnership on these terms, without loss to its sovereignty or its pride.

Yet Ireland is not satisfied. The denial of the integral territory remains a rankling grievance. I have shown that the craving for nationhood was the driving force of the whole movement, and that Britain in 1921 decided to purchase Irish peace by satisfying this craving. Now, anyone who has studied nationalism knows that to partition a country is as great a hurt as to subject it. I go farther. I say that partition hurts more than the Union; for we were a nation, if we were not a State, under the Union, but now we have a State at the awful cost of the alienation of one-third of our people and a quarter of our land. As the development of the State progresses, its intensified self-consciousness feels ever more bitterly the curb which restricts it. With the years the lost territory must be ever more intensely desired, and the exclusion of a section of our people from our progress ever more angrily resented. Thus in 1921 Britain decided to recognise Irish nationhood, but did so on terms that nullified the good of what she admitted. 'You shall be a nation,' Mr. Lloyd

George said, 'but a partitioned nation, another Poland.' It was a grudging man's instinct to spoil a deal. I write as one sprung from the Ulster Protestant stock, and declare that the separation of my folk from the national State, the branding of them as un-Irish, embitters me more than any other wrong that ever our nation endured. We Northerners could forgive anything save this.

Observe that 34 per cent. of the six-county people are Catholics and *ipso facto* Nationalists. There are enough in the Presbyterian patriotic tradition to bring the anti-partition total to 40 per cent. Of the remaining 60 per cent. large numbers are anxious for a settlement on terms. I know people in the highest places in Unionist Belfast, and never met one who refused the name of Irishman or confessed that he really desired partition.

Here let me add that no part of Ireland is more sacred to patriotism than the six counties. Ask a man of any remote country what Ireland connotes to him. 'St. Patrick,' he will answer, and aptly so, seeing that the whole English-speaking world, and much beside, has clerics who derive their orders through the Irish national apostle. St. Patrick made Ireland —he is Ireland; but the mountain where as a slave boy he talked with God is in Antrim, his first church is in Down (and there his dust lies), while his primatial see is in Armagh—all in the territory that is denied to us. Tyrone is the homeland of our kings, and Dungannon is where the Protestant volunteers won former Irish independence; Derry is the city of our third patron, Fermanagh the home of our poets and annalists. Belfast itself is the birthplace of the United Irishmen, the place where our harpers last met, and where the Gaelic revival began. To the Protestant breed of the North we owe more than half our chief patriots. The mountains of Mourne and the glens of Antrim are the image of Ireland to millions of our exiles. Lacking the north-east, its scenes, traditions and character, its humour and hospitality, what remains is only a travesty of that Ireland for which we worked, studied, prayed and suffered. Take back your concessions and fight us again, if you deny us what we hold dearest.

Could England have made a clean job of the thing in 1921? Can she make a clean job now? Mr. de Valera, in

an interval of the London negotiations, publicly expressed approval of a plan which I will summarise briefly.

(1) Let Britain complete her recognition of Ireland's sovereign nationhood by surrendering the reserved powers which she exerts over the partitioned territory to the supreme national Irish authority.

(2) Let the six-county area continue to enjoy its present local powers. Let it be represented in the supreme Irish Parliament on a proportional basis.

(3) Let the association provided for by the Irish Act continue. Such association implies three things—(*a*) reciprocal citizenship as at present; (*b*) an *entente* for defence of these islands, in which Ireland acts as the unit which strategically it undeniably is; and (*c*) mutual trade preference, which will ensure for England an immense supply of pure food in war or peace, and a market for raw materials and machinery, while Ireland gains by a profitable outlet for the surplus of her fertile soil.

Such a triple settlement would endure as long as it yielded these benefits. It gives England an ally whose interest lies in Britain's safety and prosperity; it gives Ireland benefits that she never would wish to jeopardise; to the Ulster minority it preserves its advantages in the Commonwealth (*pace* the British Government's statement), and opens immense business fields at its door.

The Nationalists of the six counties might demand a revision of the area and guarantees against the injustices of which the Catholic hierarchy has complained. I prefer not to go into this matter, important as it is, for a bad principle entails wrongs, but unity will make light of consequential adjustments. I will mention, in passing, that there are Nationalist majorities in the counties of Fermanagh and Tyrone, the city of Derry, South Armagh and South and East Down—together accounting for more than half the partitioned area. Either these areas must be transferred, or must be reconciled by the argument that with the passing of partition a new spirit and new alignments will end their grievances.

One of the strongest arguments for the continuance of the six-county area (little as I, a thorough-going Nationalist, care for it) is this—that during seventeen years a divergent

economy has grown up in the two parts of Ireland. Had the Free State operated for all Ireland, its fiscal development would have been slower. Northern industry would have expanded, but protection would have been moderate. Anxious for industries to employ farmers' sons and provide a home market for farmers' produce, constrained also by the 'economic war,' the Free State put up high tariff walls and enjoyed an industrial progress so rapid and vigorous as to turn it into a half-industrial country; but the rapidity of this caused a steep rise in the cost of living. The North, with its exporting mass industries, does not want to come behind that high tariff wall; it wants its low prices still. Hence an instantaneous fiscal assimilation hardly is feasible. The following plan is my own proposal: Let the self-governing area in the North be ceded fiscal powers by the National Government, and let it shape its own fiscal policy. It may continue to favour free trade while the South remains protectionist. However, let each part assent to internal free trade—an Irish *Zollverein*. The North will admit Southern produce, and the South Northern produce (duly vouched as such) free, so that each will extend its free market to the whole island. In a few years business men in each part will cultivate such interests in the other that fiscal unification can follow as it did in all other examples of *Zollverein*.

There will be an immediate merging of some of the Ministries. For example, there is no sense in dividing little Ireland between two Departments of Agriculture. I understand that concerted action already goes on, through informal meetings of officials. The North will have its own education, but must allow Catholics to follow the programme that they prefer; but the co-existence of different programmes is no new thing in Ireland. Defence, the judiciary, the post office, the police, will be unified at once. There will be difficulty over symbols; I need not propose my answers here and now, seeing that the will to peace would solve all.

The settlement might be called 'federal,' save that federation usually takes place between equals, whereas here we have a sovereign State and a local area. The Canadian Confederation—which calls its components Provinces, not States, and gives them proportional, not equal, representation—affords a fair model.

Let me suggest reasons why England ought to exercise its decisive influence in the North to bring about a settlement on these lines. Nations seek three things when they extend their dominion—prestige, profit, and power. England gained prestige by the absorption of Scotland, but lost it by the struggle of Ireland against absorption. In the future all the world resources of Irish nationalism, raised to combat partition, will renew the hurt to British prestige, unless a settlement is reached. A true reconciliation of Ireland would be the greatest gain to British prestige conceivable. As to profit, England cannot gain anything by a quarrel with Ireland, but Irish preference, Irish prosperity, would yield her large scope for trade.

Power is the crucial matter. In the past Continental Powers knew that they could strike England through Ireland, but British sea power baffled Philip, Louis and Napoleon. With the coming of air warfare Ireland without her people's friendship is a graver peril. In a war to-morrow, partitioned Ireland would not be England's friend. A frontier along the tortuous border would need to be manned, and there would be a rebellious Nationalist population behind it. Irish food supplies would be cut off from England. The Irish ports would be seized by force, against which the Dublin Government would protest to the world; while air bases hardly could be established unless ringed with trenches. Once blood was shed in the North, the Dublin Government hardly could restrain sympathetic action; Irish America and Irish Australia would be inflamed. Let us not labour the horrible picture, especially as it never need be realised, if only a brave act of faith and justice transforms Ireland from a sulky neutral to a loyal friend. United Ireland will muster its fighting manhood from Antrim to Kerry to preserve this island intact, and our vast sea-line, our air bases that dominate the waters, will need no anxious watching by a harassed Britain.

Once the sovereign unity of Ireland is established, our patriots will acknowledge this common interest with Britain —that no Continental Power shall gain a footing anywhere in these isles. Alliance for concerted defence against such invasion by sea or air, Ireland would accept. As to overseas affairs, we showed in the Sanctions crisis that we can act with

England where our independent judgment agrees with hers; more she has no right to ask.

England never again will have to deal with as moderate and conciliatory a Nationalist leader as Mr. de Valera. Prolonged partition makes for more uncompromising demands than his. In a recent interview with the Havas Agency he made a remarkable statement, saying, in effect, that Belfast has it in its power to seal, or to thwart, a final peace between the Irish and English peoples throughout the lands in which they have found a common home—the Dominions and America—and so to effect a conciliation 'throughout those democratic nations which desire peace.' While Ireland is naturally a country of the Right, it has a liberal, or rather democratic, bias, in which its national leader is at one with the typical Ulsterman. In the passage which I have cited this democratic idealism proposes to treat the British Commonwealth and America as a vast league, in which Ireland will be a link. Are the spiritual energies of Ireland, her people's rare gifts for the propagation of ideas, to be turned back, instead, to agitation against England because of a stubborn denial of a nation's birthright? The time, surely, has come to discard demands for allegiance in place of alliance, and for statesmanship to build on a sounder foundation than the universally discredited past.

HUGH DE BLACAM.

THE DANUBIAN QUESTION[1]

By PROFESSOR ELEMER HANTOS, former Under-Secretary of State

THERE are, presumably, some countries which can dispens with commercial or friendly relations with the rest of th world, being geographically, culturally and economically inde pendent. There are some who can choose their partners o racial, religious or political grounds and, having made the choice, can shape their economic policies accordingly. Ther are others who are geographically and economically so closel interdependent that they cannot live without each other : the must co-operate, or fight. In this category are the Danubia States—Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Jugo Slavia, Rumania.

These six States have an aggregate population equal t that of Germany, and cover an area of about 1,000,00 square kilometres, being larger than Germany and Franc combined. They constitute a well-defined geographical an economic unit, with a part to play as such in world economics and with reciprocal potentialities and mutual interests hitherto obscured by racial and political differences, of whic external forces have made full use and have exacerbated b commercial policies devised to that end.

A new commercial policy is necessary if the Danub region, in which these six States are comprised, is to reacl higher levels of productivity and of commercial activity Financial aid can bring but temporary relief, and may, even tually, make matters worse. Almost all the Danubian State have received assistance under League auspices and are nc ungrateful ; but it was never regarded as more than a pre liminary to much more comprehensive measures, envisaging far wider measure of economic freedom for Central Europe

Such measures have been often discussed. All th Danubian plans hitherto published agree in predicating close

[1] Written before March 11, 1938.

commercial relations between these countries. This means that the 'most-favoured-nation' clause in a number of treaties must be eliminated, by consent, in order to enable the Six Powers to accord mutual preferential tariff treatment to each other, all other Powers being treated on a basis of absolute equality. Subject to this exception, the most-favoured-nation treatment would in fact continue, just as it continues in England, subject to the Ottawa Agreements.

Why, it may be asked, should not tariff barriers be lowered all round? The answer is that in a world in which power predominates low tariffs can safely be adopted only between States of somewhat similar economic size and political importance. Not until the Six-State group has reached agreement can any one of them safely lower its general tariff wall, and there will be general agreement that each State must, in the general interest, give no special tariff concessions to one great Power which it is unwilling to accord to the others, less a storm arise such as that which wrecked the contemplated Austro-German customs union in 1931. Most-favoured-nation treatment is a vital element in world economics not to be lightly surrendered, but, if it is to endure as a principle, exceptions must be admitted as between small States which are united by specific ethnic, historical or geographical bonds.

The weakness inherent in all League discussions is a predilection for 'regional arrangements'—'collective agreements'—vague formulæ which are, in practice, used as synonyms, or cloaks, for some particular scheme. This insincerity has repeatedly proved fatal to schemes which had intrinsic merits, for it evoked opposition from those who regard the 'most-favoured-nation treatment' as a principle too valuable to be sacrificed to indefinite forms of words or to be jeopardised by wholesale 'regional exceptions.'

The special régime proposed for the Six-State group would not, in practice, imperil the trade of other countries: there is every reason it should bring about an extension of trade outside the group, for the economic unity of the Six-State group would increase credit and instruments of exchange and general confidence.

The United States were, to their credit, the first to recognise the justice of the claim put forward by the Danu-

bian States. The Commercial Treaty of 1935 be| Czechoslovakia and the United States includes a (according to which the Danubian States have the rig accord preferential tariff rights to each other. Will (Britain do likewise?

Germany and Italy are more concerned than eithe United Kingdom or the United States, being respectivel principal sources of imports and destinations of ex| Poland now comes third, though, till 1931, 25 per cent. Polish exports were to this region as compared with 1 cent. in the case of Germany and 7½ per cent. in the ca: Italy. Their concurrence is essential: it should no impossible to secure, once it is realised that such an econ agreement between the Six States is not aimed against 1 and would have no repercussions in the political sp. They will need to be satisfied that their trade will not su they should be formally assured that the tariffs on the (modities in which they are most interested will not be ra but might be lowered. The result would certainly b increase of trade all round and increased consump internally, which would lessen the pressure on ex markets.

Preferential tariffs do not create a common econ(policy, but they help to provide a common interior mar they are not the coping-stone of a building, but a clearing levelling of the ground prior to building operations.

If the British Government would make amends fo fatal intransigence at Stresa and at Ouchy in 1932, and for its claim to most-favoured-nation treatment in the Danu area, it would strike a resounding note in a new harm(The economic reward to be reaped would be rich. '*Il quelque impertinence*,' said Voltaire, '*de se faire brûler pour rêligion.*' Men have always done so since and are doing to-day, but not for tariffs. The alternative is for the Danul States to resign themselves to the position of satellites, worse, of their powerful neighbours, a prospect against wl national tradition, race, religion and self-respect alike rev Co-operation, or dissolution? Collaboration, or collap Such is the dilemma, and the choice must soon be made.

ELEMER HANTO:

EXPENDITURE, DEBT AND TAXATION

By FRANCIS W. HIRST

WHILE business men and members of the Stock Exchange complain bitterly that all their markets are in the grip of politics, that rates and taxes are killing trade, and that wars or rumours of wars have put an end to speculation, it is only too clear from the Estimates that the new Chancellor of the Exchequer will find it very difficult indeed to reconcile his first Budget with the sound principles and traditions of British finance. For if he did, if he rebalanced the Budget and restored the sinking fund—if, in short, he decided that the nation must pay its way like an ordinary individual—he would have to enforce all-round economy, or else raise direct and indirect taxes so high that he would be overwhelmed in a storm of unpopularity.

Public opinion about national and local expenditure has always varied with the ups and downs of trade, revenue and taxation. You cannot expect the nation, or even that comparatively small section of its citizens who combine public spirit with political intelligence, to keep a vigilant eye on Treasury finance, or an active watch on spendthrift departments, when business is profitable and taxes prolific. If there is a Budget surplus, why bother about the debt or posterity? What has posterity done for us? Let Ministers be generous with public money in prosperous times, and when difficulties arise let us borrow. In local affairs it is much the same; but as there is a closer connexion between local rates and local expenditure, a rise in the rates (when unaccompanied by any visible benefit to the community) is more apt to provoke effective criticism and put a curb on extravagance than in the sphere of national politics; for there the voice of the direct taxpayer is only heard intermittently, and the masses, who

suffer from the rise of indirect taxes, are slow to connect these burdens with unemployment, since they are constantly told, not only by popular tub-thumpers but by the new school of economists, that public expenditure is good for trade and that an immense outlay on public works is the true and only remedy for unemployment. The old common-sense doctrines that in good times Budget surpluses should be used to reduce debt and taxes, and that in bad times Budgets should be balanced by economies, and lower wages by lower prices, until a trade depression removes itself by the natural laws of supply and demand operating in free markets—these common-sense doctrines, I say, have been out of fashion since the Great War. In many countries unbalanced Budgets, leading to an intolerable burden of debt and taxes, have ended in depreciating paper currencies, popular misery, insolvency and revolutions.

Fortunately in Great Britain there has been enough prudence in the nation and in Parliament to save us from financial insanity. Since the war there have been two major crises followed by two recoveries; and it may be useful to compare them with that which seems now to be approaching, in order that we may derive some instruction from their character and from the remedies which were applied. The first of these crises began in 1921, after the brief and feverish post-war boom; the second in 1931, after the American economic blizzard had swept over the world and driven us off the gold standard.

In the first post-war crisis the collapse of trade and employment began towards the end of 1920. By March 1921 the unemployment figure had quadrupled to 10 per cent. of the register, and in June of that year it rose to a peak of 20 per cent. The total was then about 2,300,000; after that it declined a little, and in May 1922 a definite recovery began. By 1924 the total had been reduced to about 1,000,000, and it remained a little above that figure, with some fluctuations, until the year 1929, when the average was just under 10½ per cent., comparing with a figure in the years just before the war of from a quarter to half a million, which was then regarded as about normal.

Let us now turn from employment to National Debt and expenditure. In March 1914 the National Debt stood at £651

millions. In March 1919, a few months after the end of the war, it stood at £7324 millions; and as no immediate brake was put on the financial machine, it rose by the end of that year to close upon £8000 millions, about thirteen times the pre-war figure!

As for the national expenditure, which had risen to nearly £200 millions before the war (about £4 7*s*. 4*d*. per head of the population), it had in the financial year ending March 31, 1921, risen to £1184 millions, or about £26 2*s*. 3*d*. per head of the population. Even in the following year, after demobilisation, the expenditure had only been reduced to £1160 millions. Besides war pensions, interest on the War Debt, and the cost of Defence, a great number of new spending departments had been created, many of which were felt to be superfluous.

During the artificial boom that followed the cessation of hostilities, and lasted for about eighteen months, the effect of this burden, financed by enormous additions to taxation, and by excessive issues of paper money, was partially concealed. Early in February 1920 a move for economy in the House of Commons was resisted by Mr. Lloyd George's Coalition Government and defeated by a large majority. In July, however, a number of influential business men and bankers signed a letter to *The Times* pointing out that, unless something was done to stem the tide of national extravagance, we might soon be faced with financial and economic disaster. Organisations for economy sprang up, one of which was joined by two ambitious young politicians—a Conservative, Mr. Oswald Mosley, and a Liberal, Mr. Hore-Belisha. The fashion spread, and the movement grew until at last bye-election losses and the pressure of business opinion compelled the Government to operate upon the huge bureaucracy which had entrenched itself in Whitehall under the pretended necessity of controlling everything and everybody. In May 1921 a circular was issued to the various departments, ordering them to effect reductions amounting to £113 millions, a figure subsequently raised to £175 millions. The departments could only see their way to a reduction of £75 millions, so that a retrenchment of the remaining £100 millions had to be achieved by other means.

Accordingly, on August 3, 1921, the new Chancellor of

the Exchequer, Sir Robert Horne, announced the appointment of a committee on national expenditure, popularly known as the Geddes Committee, to recommend 'forthwith' all possible reductions in the supply services, 'having regard to the present and prospective position of the Revenue.' The Committee issued three Reports between December 1921 and February 1922. They recommended specific reductions of over £86 millions and added that the £13 or £14 millions necessary to complete the total of £100 millions could be realised by reductions in naval expenditure as a result of the Washington Conference, and in military expenditure on a review of our foreign garrisons.

In the end expenditure and taxation were lowered to more moderate levels. National expenditure was reduced to £910 millions in 1922, to £818 millions in 1923 and to £794 millions in 1924. In that year the National Debt was £7770 millions, and the total charge for interest and Sinking Fund amounted to £349 millions, against £24,500,000 in 1913. Happily, the balancing of the Budget and the restoration of the Sinking Fund gradually improved the national credit, and eventually Mr. Chamberlain, by conversions of the War Debt and by abandoning the Sinking Fund, reduced the debt-charge to £224 millions in 1935. Meanwhile the income tax (standard rate) had been brought down by economies from 6*s*. to 4*s*. in the pound, indirect taxes on consumption were diminished, our overseas trade recovered most of its losses, and the volume of unemployment was reduced to what we have now come to regard as normal.

Then, after 1929, came the second post-war crisis. It was started by the collapse of a great speculative boom in the United States, and was marked by an unprecedented number of bankruptcies, public and private, in South America and on the continent of Europe. In 1930 unemployment grew rapidly in our own country. The Labour Government borrowed more and more for the support of the unemployed, and the unbalancing of the Budget soon began to cause serious alarm. In previous years, and especially at the General Election of 1929, there had been much public controversy about remedies for unemployment, and proposals for 'conquering' it in two years by a loan expenditure of £140 millions on roads and other public works had been

devised by Mr. Lloyd George. His proposals, however, di not win many seats—probably because the Labour Part was ready to spend quite as much, or more, on simila projects.

What happened after the second Labour Government tool office was put on record by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald o February 13, 1933, in a written statement which was publishe on the following day: 'During the period in office of th last Government,' he said, 'between June 1929 and Augus 1931, when this policy [of State-assisted relief works] wa being most vigorously pressed forward, the number of person registered as unemployed in Great Britain increased fror about 1,100,000 to over 2,700,000, despite the putting in han of relief works of an estimated value of nearly £192 million sterling. The largest number,' he added, 'of persons directl employed on these subsidised works was 114,000.' That wa in June 1931, at which date the number of persons registere as unemployed was more than 2,600,000. A few montl earlier—on February 11, 1931—the Conservative Oppositio moved a vote of censure on the Labour Government for i 'continuous additions to public expenditure,' which had rise in two years from £818 millions to £881 millions, whi unemployment had grown very rapidly. On behalf of tl Liberal Party, which had conveniently forgotten or rejecte Mr. Lloyd George's principles of finance, Sir Donald Maclea moved an amendment asking for the appointment of a smal independent committee on national expenditure. This w accepted by the Government and carried by an immens majority of Conservatives, Labour men and Liberals—onl twenty-three Socialists voting against it. No one could ha foreseen the consequences. It made an entirely new chapt of political history, and within a year overturned the fisc system of the country, restoring as complete a network protective and preferential tariffs as that which had bee removed by Sir Robert Peel and Mr. Gladstone between 184 and 1860. Here I may put on record the wording of S Donald Maclean's motion:

This House considers that, having regard to the effect of tl present burden of taxation in restricting industry and employmen the Government should at once appoint a small and independe committee to make recommendations to the Chancellor of tl

Exchequer for effecting forthwith all practicable and legitimate reductions in the national expenditure consistent with the efficiency of the Services.

Now that both taxation and expenditure have risen to a far higher level than seven years ago, with a deficit larger than was then anticipated and an adverse balance of trade rapidly mounting up, it is surely not irrelevant to remind supporters of the National Government, as well as of the two Oppositions in Parliament, that many of them voted in the majority of 469 which held, seven years ago, that the burden of taxation was 'restricting industry and employment,' and that all practicable and legitimate reductions of the national expenditure ought 'forthwith' to be effected. It is also worth recalling that in two speeches just before and just after the carrying of the Maclean resolution Sir John Simon, our new Chancellor of the Exchequer, declared that there was 'a rude awakening coming' unless we faced the question of economy 'in a very severe and practical spirit.' He pointed out that the national expenditure had risen from £790 millions in 1924 to £884 millions, without counting Supplementary Estimates, and endorsed the policy which would insist on 'a more thorough overhaul of Government outlay.' Is not this again overdue; is there not enough of waste and superfluity in public expenditure all over the country to justify a survey as practical and severe as those which took place in 1921 and 1931? It is also worthy of mention that one of the reasons adduced by Sir John Simon for the economies which were supported in 1931 by all his leading colleagues, including the present Prime Minister, was in line with the best traditions of Treasury finance: 'It is essential to the interests of the country that Budget equilibrium should be maintained,' and that in pursuit of this, as well as to preserve our standard of living, we should seek 'by strict economy and bold resolve to return to our former prosperity.'

Though it may take some little time before this economic medicine becomes acceptable to the Government and the House of Commons, I venture to predict, if the war clouds happily roll away, that the need for a drastic purge of our swollen Estimates and relief from an intolerable burden of taxation will soon again force itself upon the minds of our business men, and through them upon public opinion. Of

this indeed, as I shall be able to show, there is already some evidence—some signs of a rude awakening to unpleasant realities.

I need not recall at any length how as a result of Sir Donald Maclean's amendment the May Committee was appointed, how Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's Government broke up because the bulk of the Labour Party recoiled from the ' cuts,' or how he then formed a National Government for the express purpose of carrying into effect a drastic scheme of public economy and a balancing of the Budget, which two aims were accomplished by Philip Snowden without infringing the principles of free trade. What has happened since, and where are we now on the eve of the seventh Budget since Mr. Neville Chamberlain started his career as Chancellor of the Exchequer?

A glance at the *Statistical Year-book of the United Kingdom* shows us that the national expenditure was reduced from £881 millions in 1930–1 to £778 millions in 1933–4. Here we have a partial explanation of the trade recovery, such as it was, which marked the years 1934 to 1936. The nation and the Government had the courage to do what a private individual does when he meets adversity with fortitude—cuts his coat according to his cloth and practises thrift. In the case of a great nation the processes of retrenchment are complicated, and in this case the savings were not all real savings, nor was the change of fiscal policy calculated to promote and enlarge the British share in the world recovery of international trade which began in 1933. It is not, however, my present purpose to criticise the use which Mr. Chamberlain, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, made of the surpluses that accrued when his Budgets emerged from Bleak House, but merely to point out that they were achieved partly by real economies, partly by conversion of debt to lower rates of interest, partly by cheap money which reduced the charge for the unfunded debt, partly by ceasing to pay interest on the American debt, and partly by the dangerously unsound policy of suspending the Sinking Fund in a time of peace and relative prosperity.

Comparing the financial year 1930–1 with 1933–4—the year before the armaments race commenced—one finds that, owing to the causes above mentioned, the annual charge for the National Debt was reduced from £360 to £224 millions;

the cost of the Army declined, in round figures, from £40 to £37 millions, that of the Navy rose from £52 to £53 millions, and that of the Air Force declined from £17 to £16 millions. At the same time the total Civil Service expenditure rose from £307 to £338 millions; but there was in fact a decrease, because the borrowing for unemployment insurance was put an end to when Snowden balanced the Budget, and the expenditure under this head was charged to revenue. On the whole, then, it may be affirmed with confidence that the national finances had been put on a far more satisfactory footing at the commencement of the year 1934 than they were at the commencement of the year 1931, when Sir Donald MacLean moved and carried the Economy resolution which led to the appointment of the May Committee. Thus the two crises in public finance, trade, and employment of 1921 and 1931 were both overcome by applications of public economy, resulting in lower taxation and the balancing of the Budget, though in the second case it may be doubted whether the total burden of taxation was greatly reduced.

We have now to consider what has happened since; and the publication of the Estimates for the coming financial year enables us to paint a fairly accurate picture of changes which have completely revolutionised the position and prospects of British taxpayers. Lest it should be supposed that I am painting in too dark colours as a Gladstonian Liberal who would naturally criticise extravagance, I will adopt a statement in the *Daily Telegraph* of March 5: 'As compared with 1934–5, the last financial year before rearmament, expenditure chargeable against the revenue is up by £202 millions sterling.'

To this, however, must be added a £90 million deficit which is to be met by borrowing under the Defence Loans Act. Hence the total estimated expenditure will be about £292 millions more than it was four years ago. If the whole expenditure on Army, Navy, and Air Force were covered by revenue from taxation, as it was four years ago, the difference would represent an income tax of about 5*s*. in the pound. If by a wave of the wand the Chancellor of the Exchequer could announce in his coming Budget that his total expenditure would only be £90 millions more than four years ago, and that he would borrow the £90 millions, he could then, if

he liked, reduce the income tax from 5*s.* to 2*s.* in th
pound!

Returning to the statement of the *Daily Telegraph*, it ma
be noted that of this increase of £202 millions chargeab
against revenue 'only £147 millions (including Air Rai
Precautions) is accountable to rearmament, and that civ
expenditure during the same period has risen by no less tha
£55 millions,' or £45 millions if last year's margin of £1
millions for Supplementary Estimates is omitted in th
coming Budget. The conclusion of the *Daily Telegraph*
editorial is also worthy of quotation:

> The bill for rearmament is inescapable, and cheerfully to b
> borne; but if the national economy is to continue carrying
> creditably as it has done hitherto a strain which is to increase st
> further in 1939–40, the State will have to consider very serious
> whether the burden of other services has not swollen beyond i
> capacity.

Let us now consider another Conservative view, embodi
in a very useful survey, not only of national expenditure a
debt, but of local expenditure and debt. On February
Captain Harold Balfour, the member for Thanet, moved th

> This House, while recognising the great measure of econom
> recovery and social progress achieved during the last five years, a
> the exceptional expenditure entailed by the necessity for rearm
> ment, views with concern the continued growth of expenditure b
> the Central Government and by local authorities, and is of opini
> that His Majesty's Government should do everything in their pow
> to lighten the burdens imposed on all classes of taxpayers and rat
> payers.

I have already admitted that in times of prosperity peop
are apt to be indifferent to public economy, so long as the
is no serious growth of rates and taxes and so long as risi
prices are covered by rising wages and increasing profit
but, according to Captain Balfour, there has lately been
change.

> Any hon. member [he said] who moves among the taxpaye
> and ratepayers of the country will find an increasing body of we
> informed and authoritative opinion of all political views whi
> regards with gravity the present and prospective financial outlo
> for the country, and there is also an increasing number of ra

payers and taxpayers who are asking how long they must carry the present heavy burden upon their shoulders.

When circumstances go against them, he observed, the burden 'creates a load under which they buckle, having no resources left with which to meet the demands made upon them.' If these facts and feelings be admitted, the country, he thinks, has a right to look to the House of Commons for a review of the situation and, if possible, for some form of relief.

It was with the admirable and public-spirited object of providing the House and the country with such a review that Captain Balfour tried to set out in broad outline the national expenditure of to-day as compared and contrasted with pre-war standards. I cannot do better than follow his exposition. First, for the contrast with pre-war. Our annual Budget is now about five times what it was in 1913 or 1914, and the expenditure of the local authorities has trebled. The National Debt has been multiplied twelve-fold, while the debt of the local authorities, like their expenditure, has trebled. But the population which has to carry these additional burdens of debts, taxes and rates has only increased by one-tenth, and the rate of increase is diminishing. From this comparison he turned to the picture presented when we contrast the financial year 1928–9 with that which will expire on March 31, just before this article appears in print. The year 1928–9 was the last good year before the world slump; but even then our expenditure was being criticised as far too great. However that may be, the Chancellor of the Exchequer then budgeted for an expenditure of £770 millions. In 1937–8 he budgeted for an ordinary expenditure of £862 millions (an increase of £92 millions), to which he added an extraordinary expenditure of £80 millions to be furnished by borrowing. In other words, the real addition to expenditure was £172 millions.

Next comes the expenditure of the local authorities. In 1928–9 £188 millions were collected from ratepayers. The total for 1937–8 is not yet available, but Captain Balfour estimated it at about £200 millions. Hence the total national expenditure out of taxes and rates in 1928–9 was £959 millions, whereas the figure for 1937–8 (estimated) is £1,062,000,000—an increase of over £100 millions. But unfortunately, as Captain Balfour pointed out, we cannot end there, because:

(1) In 1928–9 there was a Sinking Fund provision for the reduction of debt, included in the debt charge, of £52 millions. There was a balance of £33 millions on War Debts, as our collections from the Allies exceeded by that amount our payment of War Debt to the United States. Now, of course, all War Debt payments are suspended. Captain Balfour also suggests that there ' will probably be ' this year a provision of £13 millions for the reduction of debt.

(2) This year's Budget allowed for an expenditure of £80 millions borrowed for defence.

Assuming that the whole of this £80 millions is spent, the result of Captain Balfour's calculations is that ' the grand total of national expenditure in the present financial year, 1937–8, is greater than that for 1928–9 by no less a sum than £254 millions, in spite of the savings of approximately £140 millions on debt services.'

Let me now summarise, as nearly as possible in his own language, Captain Balfour's reflections :

> In order to raise this terrific, this colossal sum, direct taxation is standing at a war-time level, and the law of diminishing yields is beginning to operate on the surtax if not also on the income tax. We are beginning to feel the lack of taxable resources between the maximum that can be extracted from the taxpayers and the sum which is being spent. ' I hesitate to think where would be the reserve of taxation suppose that this country were involved in a war—if we had to face the gigantic expenditure which we had to meet between 1914 and 1918, I hesitate to think, with direct and indirect taxation at their present level, how we should be able to finance hostilities on any vast scale for very long ' Again, if the present expenditure is continued, there is the question whether our social life can be maintained at its present level There is less agricultural land in cultivation than before the war. The visible excess of imports over exports has greatly increased. The tonnage of our merchant fleet has fallen about 15 per cent., and our foreign investments are much less valuable.

Captain Balfour envisaged three possible remedies. The first—and in my opinion the only one that should be entertained and striven for—is the achievement of economies in the great spending departments, and, in fact, in all branches of administration. The great hope, of course, lies in the efforts of Mr. Chamberlain to bring about peace in Europe, accom-

panied by a large measure of disarmament and freer trade between Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. The present race can only end, as he has himself said, in dust and ashes. Each of the four countries is beginning to resemble an armed camp, with war factories, aerodromes, barracks, and preparations for another Armageddon rising in all directions. The diversion of industry from productive to unproductive purposes is bound to restrict trade and diminish social welfare.

Though this plea for economy is powerful, Captain Balfour is a pessimist. He does not expect much relief for taxpayers, either from administrative economies—the elimination of waste and superfluity—or from the limitation of expenditure in respect of armaments even when the five-year programme is completed.

The second method of remedying the situation to which he refers is to bank heavily on belief in a great world trade revival which might accompany an international appeasement. This would increase the revenue, and might enable us to safeguard the present level and standard of our social services, which should not be further extended until we have some margin of taxable capacity.

Captain Balfour's third and last possible method of improving the financial situation would be 'some form of inflation.' That is the device which has been adopted by France and by nearly all the bankrupt and semi-bankrupt countries of the world. When you cannot pay your way, you resort to the printing press and make excessive issues of paper currency or borrow from the national bank. In France these successive depreciations of the currency are called devaluations. They are really confiscations of property and of securities. By halving the value or purchasing power of the pound sterling you halve the National Debt and bilk all who are creditors of the nation and all holders of debentures, mortgages, and fixed interest-bearing stocks. Such a policy is ruinous to national credit and to confidence. The mere fact that it is being discussed and that a form of inflation was actually advocated by a Conservative member, Mr. Boothby, who seconded Captain Balfour's resolution, is another proof of the peril towards which excessive expenditure, intolerably high taxation, and mounting deficits are leading us. If we

reject the remedy of ruthless cuts in expenditure, said Mr. Boothby, there is only one method of avoiding a first-class financial crisis—that is, inflation ; and ' there is no reason why we should not carry out reasonable inflation, because we are no longer tied to a fixed gold standard, and therefore, as Mr. Keynes has said, " we are no longer under a compulsion to do what is ruinous '."

I have said perhaps enough to indicate the real danger and the true remedy. Probably the most that can be hoped for from the House of Commons and the Treasury in the immediate future is a severe pruning of all the Estimates, a removal from them of all that is superfluous or wasteful or inefficient, and the appointment, if substantial economies are not speedily effected, of an independent committee to recommend such reductions as will at least limit the growth of debt and save the industry and commerce of the country from any further additions to the burdens of taxation.

FRANCIS W. HIRST.

MORTMAIN AND CHARITABLE USES

By Claude Eustace Shebbeare

Interesting as the law of mortmain may be to historians and philologists, we may well ask whether there is any reason why all the obstacles which at one time it placed in the way of pious benefactors should be longer preserved. In connexion with charitable uses or trusts it is almost a euphemism to speak of 'law.' The peculiarities and obstructions which are encountered by those who would create or administer trusts for charity can only be regarded as anomalies. Unlike other trusts, charitable trusts, although subject to the law as to remoteness, are not subject to the rule against perpetuities or liable to fail for uncertainty. These peculiarities, resulting from old but well-established case-law, and the statutory exemption of charities from payment of income tax, may be instances of the way in which 'the law,' as it is said, 'favours charity.' But it cannot be denied that the Legislature has otherwise imposed upon gifts for charity impediments which are singularly unlike favours.

The meaning of the word 'mortmain' is almost lost in antiquity, and the meaning amongst lawyers of the word 'charity' is so uncertain that it is apt to have a disquieting effect whenever it is mentioned. Such marked uneasiness does a lawyer sometimes exhibit in considering whether the object of a gift can be regarded as 'charitable' that he will often enter unhesitatingly upon researches for the purpose of answering that question when the nature of the gift—*e.g.*, an immediate gift of a legacy, and not a perpetual gift of income—renders the inquiry wholly immaterial. Indeed, the time of the court has sometimes been occupied in determining this issue, where it is difficult to discern from the report of the case that there was any need to consider it at all.

About seven centuries ago when religious houses held

land by a tenure known as 'frankalmoyne' they were exempt from the incidents of feudal tenure—wardship and marriage, reliefs, escheat—and all the services which individuals were required to render by knight service, serjeanty, or socage, to the Crown or intermediate lords. When the land became so vested it was unprofitable to the lord, for the religious house could not be an infant, marry, commit a felony, or die. The land was therefore said to have come to a dead hand—*mortua manus*; and this is what is meant by the word 'mortmain.' The Crown and the lords objected to what was called 'mortising' land. The land was lost to them. And so it came to be that no one could acquire land in mortmain without obtaining a licence for the purpose. In 1660, however, when the Statute of Tenures was passed, most of the incidents of tenure which were a burden on the tenant were abolished. The Crown can now claim nothing from anyone in respect of wardship, marriage or reliefs, and recently [1] escheat for want of heirs has been abolished. The original reason for placing difficulties in the way of a corporation acquiring land has for centuries disappeared. But for a long while it was considered desirable to hamper corporations in this way for a reason which was only advanced years after the time when there could be any objection to mortmain in its true sense. This secondary reason was that land in the hands of a corporation generally remained there, and was not regarded as so freely alienable as land in the hands of an individual. For the Legislature seems always to have considered it desirable that holders of land, like holders of money, should be frequently changing, although the landed gentry appear to have entertained a contrary opinion and to have given effect to it with considerable success.

Some of the hindrances to mortising land came to be applied to conveyances to trustees upon charitable trusts. An Act of 1736 is intituled 'An Act to restrain the Disposition of Lands whereby the same become unalienable,' and it recites:

Whereas Gifts or Alienations of Lands, Tenements, or Hereditaments, in *Mortmain*, are prohibited or restrained by Magna Charta, and divers other wholsome Laws, as prejudicial to and against the common Utility; nevertheless this publick Mischief has of late

[1] Administration of Estates Act, 1925, sect 45 (1) (*d*)

greatly increased by many large and improvident Alienations or Dispositions made by languishing and Dying Persons, or by other Persons, to Uses called Charitable Uses, to take place after their Death to the Disherison of their lawful Heirs.

This Act then proceeds to make gifts of land to charity void if the donor dies within twelve months, or reserves to himself benefits. A donor of property to charity was forbidden to reserve any benefit, and he is to this day forbidden to reserve to himself more than 'a peppercorn or other nominal rent,' so that although there is nothing to prevent a charity from buying or receiving a gift of leasehold property, a charity is nevertheless forbidden to take a lease of land or buildings at a ground rent or rack rent. This is one of the anomalies of charity law.

The obstacles to giving land for a charitable purpose were perpetuated in the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1888. If anyone now gives land in his lifetime to charity, the gift is void unless he survives it by twelve months. If he devises land to charity by his will, it has now to be converted into money within a year of his death. He wants the charity to have the land itself, and the law says it may not have the land but only its purchase-money, which is by no means the same thing. True, if the trustee takes the trouble and goes to the expense of obtaining permission to retain the land, he may succeed in obtaining the requisite authority in an exceptional case and on certain conditions to keep the land for a time; but apart from this he cannot get the land which was the sole purpose of the express gift, but has to be content with money, which is not at all what the testator intended him to have, and is probably what the testator would never have given.

Now, although this may be the position of trustees for charity to whom land has been thus vainly given by will, it so happens that in cases where trustees do in fact hold land upon a charitable trust, not only does the law not require a sale, but it positively forbids it. Since 1855 [2] it has been impossible for the lands of a charity which is subject to the Charitable Trusts Acts to be sold at all, unless, again, express authority be obtained—this time to alienate lands which the statute makes otherwise inalienable. It is therefore now the law that, unless authority for the contrary is applied for and

[2] Charitable Trusts Amendment Act, 1855, sect 29

obtained, land given to charity by a testator must be sold within a year of his death, but that trustees holding land in trust for charity are forbidden to sell it. The state of mind in which it is considered that these provisions, read at the same time, are calculated to further the alienability of land may be best appreciated by an alienist.

But the law which invalidates a gift of land to charity unless made more than twelve months before the donor's death, and requires land so given by will to be sold within a year of the testator's death, is, oddly enough, not now applicable where charity takes the form of education. Gifts for the advancement of education are exempt from these obstructions.[3] Whatever the imagined mischief which the Act of 1888 is designed to prevent in other charitable benefactions, no one seems to have discerned any objection whatever to risking it in regard to educational charities, and even the Act of 1888 allowed a testator to give an acre of land for a school. Land given to a hospital by will must be sold. Land given to a school by will need not be sold. Why may not hospitals hold land as much as schools ? It is obviously impossible to find any satisfactory answer to the question why this state of things should continue, or why a donor of land to charity must survive the gift by twelve months while a donor of any amount of money need not survive it by as many minutes. Moreover, land may now be appropriated by an executor in or towards satisfaction of a pecuniary legacy.[4]

From the other anomaly—that a charity may acquire leaseholds but may not take a lease at more than a nominal rent—educational charities are also free. So that we have this ludicrous position : Hospitals and schools alike may take an assignment of a lease, and as assignees become liable for the rent, but it is only schools, and not hospitals, which may be the original rent-paying tenants of a lessor

Again, a man may not give land to charity and reserve to himself a life interest in the property. But he may nevertheless do so if the charity is an educational charity. In the case of any charity which is not educational, the reservation of a life interest to the grantor of land is regarded as so vicious that the grant which purports to effect it is wholly void for

[3] Education Act, 1921, sect. 117

[4] Administration of Estates Act, 1925 sect 41

all purposes. A lawyer is not called upon to justify these absurdities. Enough for him if he discovers that they are the law.

The exemption of certain charities from the provisions of the Charitable Trusts Acts is quite as difficult to understand. The Charitable Trusts Act, 1853, contains in section 62 exemptions for charities which can bring themselves within its terms. This section alone has caused endless trouble. Case after case has been decided upon it. A member of the Bar who made a careful analysis of the decisions on this section became so reasonably convinced of its meaning that he published his conclusions. The result of his cogitations and researches is that he considers that the section has frequently been misunderstood by the courts and that many of the decisions given upon it are demonstrably wrong. The views which he expressed in *The Solicitors' Journal*, and afterwards in a small but erudite pamphlet [5] dealing with this section alone, are now, I believe, generally accepted by the Charity Commissioners.

But quite trivial details of fact—*e.g.*, the receipt or non-receipt of voluntary subscriptions—however trifling, at particular times, may determine whether a charity is exempt from or subject to the provisions of the Charitable Trusts Acts under this section. The results are often astonishing. A forlorn little charity with a small house in which its office work is carried on is unable to raise money by sale or mortgage without obtaining the requisite authority, while a large hospital may purchase lands and embark on the erection of permanent buildings, and enjoy not only the statutory exemption of charity property from income tax but be quite independent of the Charity Commissioners.

Whenever the trustees of a charity sell, the question arises whether they require the consent of the Commissioners or are under this section exempt from their jurisdiction. There is no enactment requiring them in every case to produce either the Commissioners' consent or alternatively a certificate from the Commissioners that no consent is required. The question has to be determined by the production of evidence, and the cost of obtaining evidence which is not in the vendors' possession has to be borne by the purchaser.

[5] *Mixed Charities*, by A. H Withers.

A provision in the Charitable Trusts Acts [6] which requires that mortgages of charity land, authorised by the Charity Commissioners or the Board of Education, must be repaid within thirty years from the date of the security may also cause difficulty. If an incorporated company whose objects are charitable issues debentures, may it not be that the debentures are in some cases invalid for want of authority,[7] and the consequent condition that they must be redeemed before thirty years have expired after the date of their issue?

But the statute law can only be found in a vast number of scattered enactments A learned work on the administration of charities contains a commentary on the sections of thirteen Acts, and references to countless other Acts which provide for exceptional cases.[8]

There is no Charities Act to which anyone may turn with confidence for the purpose of ascertaining the statutory law affecting charities. The Charitable Trusts Acts, which mainly regulate the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioners and the Board of Education, have gone on their way—the later Acts effecting frequent amendments of the earlier Acts. The Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1888, itself containing certain exemptions, has been followed by amending Acts, and has even been amended by a section thrust into an Act so unsuggestive of charity as the Settled Land Act, 1925.[9]

There is, however, an incredible number of Acts affecting particular charities which might well be sifted and incorporated in a codifying Act. There are many Acts affecting particular institutions—*e g.*, Bath Hospital, Greenwich Hospital, St. George's Hospital, the Middlesex Hospital, the Seamen's Hospital. There are the Queen Anne's Bounty Act, the Gifts for Churches Act, the Schools Sites Acts, the Literary and Scientific Institutions Act, the Recreation Grounds Act, the Places of Worship Sites Act, the Working Class Dwellings Act, the Technical and Industrial Institutions Act. There is an enactment which requires that, within twelve months from the donor's death, a memorial giving particulars of a gift for the poor of a town must be registered with the clerk of the peace or of the county council

[6] Charitable Trusts Amendment Act, 1855, sect 30

[7] *Ibid*, sect 29.

[8] *Administration of Charities*, by T Bourchier-Chilcott

[9] Settled Land Act, 1925, sect 29

unless the gift directs a permanent investment in Government or public stocks or funds.[10] There is no reason why this scattered legislation should not be brought together and one Act should not now contain all these finicking exceptions to the general law, or such of them as are worth preserving. But some of these Acts themselves present problems and call for amendment before they can be incorporated in a new Act.

A great many gifts have been made of sites for Church schools under the Schools Sites Acts. The gifts may be made by persons having certain estates in land, although in reference to the interests of such persons the word 'estate' is not here mentioned, and the gifts are to be for the purposes of a school and '*for no other purpose whatever*.' When, as often happens, the site ceases to be used for the purposes for which it was to be perpetually used, it is provided that it 'shall thereupon immediately revert to and become a portion of the said estate.' This is the only mention of the word 'estate' in the section. No one is quite sure what meaning ought in certain cases to be attached to the word 'estate.' A donor gives away a corner of his park for a school site, and upon the failure of the school the site may become again part of the park of which it once formed part. But the lands adjoining the site may at that time be in several hands, and no longer be the estate of the donor. A donor may have given for a site the only property which he had in Kent, and he and his descendants have become settled in Yorkshire. Where and what is his 'estate'? If the donor is dead at the time of this reverter, is the site to fall into his residuary estate, to become the subject of a corrective affidavit and become liable to estate duty? Who can now claim the benefit of this reverter? There have been decisions upon cases arising out of this provision,[11] but cases do and must arise which the decisions yet given are not enough to cover.

There have, indeed, been many Acts affecting charitable trusts, but 'How,' it may now be asked, 'are we to know whether a gift is to be regarded in law as charitable?' There has been no attempt hitherto to classify charities in any statute with a view to determining what is meant by 'charity.'

[10] 52 Geo 3, c. 102, sects 2 and 10, Local Government Act, 1888, sect 3 (15)

[11] *Attorney-General* v. *Shadwell*, [1910] 1 Ch. 92, *Dennis* v. *Malcolm*, [1934] 1 Ch 244

That paltry list of charitable objects selected as specimens of Tudor benevolence, referred to as the preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth, is to this day the only guide to what is meant by ' charity ' in any statute, and particular charities have been held to come within what has been quaintly termed ' the equity of the statute.'

The Act which had this preamble was repealed fifty years ago, but the preamble itself, with all its archaic orthography (a reminder, perhaps, that we are handling a ' genuine antique '), is set out in the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1888, as being the only statutory effort which has ever been made towards classifying charitable gifts Its old-world phrases may have some attraction for archæologists and antiquaries, but as an enumeration of charities which might be suggested to a modern philanthropist as suitable objects for his bounty it is no less than ridiculous.

The Victorian statute of 1888 sets out this Elizabethan list as a catalogue of gifts that have been ' heretofore made by well disposed persons ' in the following form :

> some for releife of aged impotent and poore people, some for maintenance of sicke and maymed souldiers and marriners, schooles of learninge, free schooles and schollers in univ̑s'ties, some for repaire of bridges portes havens causwaies churches seabankes and highewaies, some for educac̃on and p̑ferments of orphans. some for or towardes reliefe stocke or maintenance for howses of correcc̃on, some for mariages of poore maides, some for supportac̃on ayde and helpe of younge tradesmen, handicraftesmen and p̱sons decayed, and others for releife or redemption of prisoners or captives, and for aide or ease of any poore inhabitantꝭ conc'ninge paymente of fifteenes, setting out of souldiers and other taxes.

In this list of Elizabethan forms of charity there are doubtless such objects of generosity as might have appealed to Francis Beaumont or John Fletcher, but it is not likely that any lawyer taking instructions for the will of a testator who in the present day wished to give property to charity would, by way of suggesting possible benefactions, recite this preamble unless he felt sure that the testator might on other grounds presume his sanity.

It has long been recognised that gifts for the advancement of religion are charitable At a time when most of the religious houses in England had but recently been desecrated and

under the shelter of this doctrine, seem frequently to have had little hesitation in 'making a will for the testator' and to have disposed of property given to charity with a very free hand. Not only did judges shrink from expressing any principle in their decisions, but some of the *cy-près* cases seem to have been decided on no easily discernible principle at all. Funds were sometimes appropriated for a trust so unlike that designated by the founder as to be at direct variance with it. The doctrine has in recent times come to be better understood. Judges are not so ready now to order a *cy-près* application of property given to charity until they are satisfied that the nature of the gift or trust justifies it—that there is what is called 'a general intention' in favour of charity apart from the particular trust directed.[16] Difficulty necessarily arises in many cases in determining whether this 'general intention' can be found, for, as Lord Parker once said, 'Different minds may very well take different views.'[17] But a study of the cases on the subject has led me to state before now [18] what is, I believe, the most that can be said in determining this difficult question—that

> where there is merely a gift in favour of the foundation or support or benefit of a definite institution, establishment, or society, there is to be deemed no general intention in favour of charity from the fact that the purposes of such institution, establishment or society are charitable. But when the mention of such an object can be attributed to an express intention of being charitable, or an intention of furthering such charitable work as the definite object of the gift happens to undertake, there is to be deemed a general intention in favour of charity, to which the mention of a definite object of the gift is merely subsidiary.

Legislation defining the contingencies appropriate for the application of the *cy-près* doctrine would probably not be helpful, but so long as the judges recognise, as in recent times they have been disposed to do, that this peculiar doctrine has limits, they are not likely to go far wrong.

Another doctrine which is applied to charitable gifts, and might have odd results, arises in connexion with the law as to remoteness. It has been said that charitable trusts, although

[16] *In re University of London Medical Sciences Institute Fund*, [1909] 2 Ch at p. 4

[17] *In re Wilson*, [1913] 1 Ch. at p. 322.

[18] Tyssen's *Charitable Bequests*, 2nd ed , p. 195.

subject to the law as to remoteness, are not subject to the rule against perpetuities. This means that a trust for charity may be perpetual, but that it must take effect before twenty-one years have expired from the death of an ascertainable person now living. But even this statement needs qualification. A gift over of property devoted to charity in favour of an individual may fail on the ground of remoteness, but if the gift over is in favour of another charity it is held to be good.[19] It has been observed, however, by a learned writer[20] that a perpetual trust for individuals might be effected in reliance upon this principle.

> Suppose [he says] that land or a sum of money is given to College X on condition that if on the 1st January in every year the college does not pay a certain amount to those persons who shall then be the heirs of the donor, the land or fund shall go to College Y. This would seem to be a good limitation It is obvious that a man may in this way make a perpetual provision for his family.

The labour involved in administering charitable trusts became in course of time more than the Chancery courts could cope with. The Charity Commission was founded in order to relieve the court of much administrative work, and the powers of the Board of Charity Commissioners in regard to educational charities were afterwards transferred to the Board of Education. These bodies are liable to make mistakes; and when they do, their orders may be discharged by the court.[21] But on the whole they work well, and, unless it be due to the reluctance which some trustees have to producing accounts, it is difficult to understand why the trustees of charities should, as they seem often to do, regard the Commissioners with unreasoning hostility and as people to be avoided at all costs. But the law under which these bodies have to work is very far from satisfactory.

The ordinary practitioner, busy with his books, is intent on finding out what the law is. He can seldom spare the time to consider what useful purpose is served by the law continuing to be what it is—why anachronisms should be preserved, and why, in order to ascertain the law now in force,

[19] *In re Tyler*, [1891] 2 Ch 252

[20] *Gray on Perpetuities*, 3rd ed, § 603d

[21] *In re Weir Hospital*, [1910] 2 Ch 124

he should be required to have his fingers and thumbs in so many pages of the Statute-book at the same time.

Someone will surely one day take this matter in hand. The plethora of statutes affecting charities will be sifted, amended, rearranged and consolidated. The prohibitions and obstructions which thwart the philanthropist will be removed. Into the dark shadows of the past mortmain will follow frankalmoyne, which, alone, it was designed to prevent; the alienability of land will be ensured by permitting charities to buy and sell and postpone sale as freely as they like; a donor will give land to charity and know that the charity will be allowed to enjoy his gift; and, benefiting his fellow-creatures in ways which may be far different from 'the repaire of causwaies,' 'stocke for howses of correcc̃on' or 'the mariages of poore maides,' he will not fear lest death overtake him within twelve months of his gift, or have any reason to suppose that his last wishes will be frustrated when he dies!

CLAUDE EUSTACE SHEBBEARE.

MILITARY COURTS AND THE JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL

By Cecil Binney

'HE Judge-Advocate-General may be described in the /oltairian manner as neither a judge, an advocate, nor a eneral. Historically, he may be said with some truth to have een all three at different stages in the history of his office. 'owards the end of the eighteenth century he was not merely egal adviser, but secretary to the board of generals who overned the Army, and was therefore presumably engaged n work which would now be performed by a military officer f high rank. In 1793 [1] he ceased to be secretary, but he ontinued to be legal adviser,[2] and for a long time remained a 'rivy Councillor, and usually a member of Parliament and ne of the Ministry of the day. One of his principal duties eems to have been to defend in Parliament the policy of the Government. This type of advocacy came in for a good deal f criticism, and in 1888 the Select Committee on Army Estimates recommended that the post should be made non-olitical. On this recommendation being put into effect, the udge-Advocate-General became literally a judge, since for irteen years the post was held by Sir Francis Jeune (after-'ards Lord St. Helier), who was simultaneously President of e Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division. It is difficult

[1] See Clode, *The Military Forces of the Crown*, Vol II, chap xxvi The Sovereign was ommander-in-Chief, unless the office was granted away The Duke of Marlborough, Queen Anne's reign, was appointed Commander-in-Chief, and commissioned ficers by his own authority The Duke of Cambridge was appointed Commander-in-hief in 1887, but had no power under the Patent to issue commissions, and neither ord Wolseley, who succeeded the Duke of Cambridge as Commander-in-Chief in 395, nor Lord Roberts, who succeeded to the office in 1901, had power to issue ommissions. In India there is a Commander-in-Chief, but without power to comission officers, except temporarily, until the King's pleasure is taken

[2] Clode, *ibid.*, chap xxvii, which includes a memorandum on the Judge-Advocate-eneral which was probably written by Stephen Denison, Esq, when he held the fice of Deputy Judge-Advocate-General.

to imagine how this could have been expected to prove a satisfactory arrangement, if only for the reason that the President of the Probate Division usually sits as a judge all day and every day during the law terms; and the War Office (Reconstitution) Committee in 1904 recommended further changes. As a result, on Lord St. Helier's death in 1905, the Judge-Advocate-General became an administrative officer and head of his own department of the War Office. Although this arrangement has lasted over thirty years and survived the war, there is no reason to suppose that it will continue permanently. There are, indeed, many obvious objections to the present system.

The Judge-Advocate-General has, however, the good fortune to be one of the comparatively small number of officials who escape criticism by reason of the fact that there are so few competent or even vocal critics. During the war a very large section of the civilian population, including many people with a responsible position in civil life, became subject to military law, many of them as private soldiers, and a considerable number of barristers and solicitors found themselves, as temporary officers, prosecuting, defending, or sitting as members of courts-martial. Accordingly, for once, the administration of military law came in for a good deal of public notice, by no means altogether favourable. But in ordinary times courts-martial pass almost unnoticed by the general public, except in the rare event of some peculiarly notorious case. Obviously, private soldiers have no means of expressing any dissatisfaction they may feel; and a man who has been dismissed the Service and is thus no longer subject to military law, however much he may desire to air his grievance, is likely to get less sympathy and support even than the convicted civilian. Officers who are familiar with the practice of courts-martial are forbidden by military discipline to engage in public discussion, and even after their retirement it is probably the branch of their former duties in which they are least likely to show any particular interest, quite apart from any curb placed upon their tongues by the Official Secrets Acts.

It follows, therefore, that the only occasion when there is likely to be any criticism of the Judge-Advocate-General in peace-time is when some former officer with sufficient money

and influence to make himself heard causes something of a public scandal by attacking the system by which he alleges that he has been victimised. Such cases are fortunately rare: there have not been any since the final conclusion of hostilities, and it may be added that the supposed victims of injustice have not invariably been persons likely to evoke much sympathy from those who know the facts of their cases. It results that the public, and even the majority of those who have some claim to be politicians, accept the existence and duties of the Judge-Advocate-General without criticism for the simple reason that they know nothing whatever about them.

The name itself, Judge-Advocate-General, is very inapposite for an official who is not in any sense a judge. It may be objected that many offices of venerable antiquity bear names which no longer adequately describe their functions. But in this case the misnomer is not merely of importance to pedants, for it may lead the outside world to suppose that a case has been considered by a judicial tribunal when in reality it has merely passed through the hands of War Office officials with some legal knowledge.

The Judge-Advocate-General cannot be accurately described as the legal head of the War Office. Every Government office necessarily has a great deal of legal work and a certain number of lawyers in its employ, but few have a complete legal department. The War Office has, in the Judge-Advocate-General's department, a legal department dealing only with one kind of legal activity. The Judge-Advocate-General does not conduct legal proceedings on behalf of the War Office, as do, for example, the Solicitor to the Post Office, or the Ministry of Health, or the Inland Revenue, on behalf of their respective offices; for legal proceedings the War Office has recourse to the Treasury Solicitor, or, in the case of a criminal prosecution in the ordinary courts, to the Director of Public Prosecutions. Nor is he concerned with legal business regarding real property in the occupation of the War Department or military contracts, nor yet with questions of international law, which may arise in time of war. He is solely concerned with the conduct of courts-martial.

His duties in this sphere are anomalous and to some extent inconsistent. He does not now personally attend at any

court-martial, however important, but he is responsible i the appointment of the lesser judge-advocate, who is prese in the character of a legal adviser or assessor, to lay dov the law as to procedure and to sum up the evidence give There does not seem to be any reason for supposing that t persons selected for this duty are incompetent or unsuitab —indeed, the infrequently published accounts of court martial suggest the exact opposite; but there is somethir to criticise in a system by which any question of the fairne of a court-martial and the adequacy of the judge-advoca present at it comes for consideration before the office whic appointed him.

Some other of the Judge-Advocate-General's functior are of a routine nature: for example, he has to keep th proceedings of every court-martial for seven years afte promulgation, he must supply a copy to any person trie on his paying the authorised charge; and he can give cei tified copies of convictions, which are admissible as evidenc in other legal proceedings. These, of course, are duties whicl could be adequately performed by an orderly-room sergean and are analogous to the routine duties which are performe by clerks of assize and similar officials attached to the ordinar law courts.

Other duties are of a more responsible character. Foi example, in all cases of a general court-martial and in al cases of fraud or indecency tried by court-martial in home stations the charges and summary of evidence must be submitted to the Judge-Advocate-General before a trial is ordered. This is a most unsatisfactory provision for, in many, indeed in most, cases of alleged offences against the ordinary law, and all trials of officers, the responsibility for ordering the trial is thrown on the official who will eventually have to review it. It is extremely difficult to see how the Judge-Advocate-General can be expected, after a court-martial, to advise that the evidence given at it does not disclose any offence, or that the wrong charges have been preferred, if he has already considered the evidence and authorised the preferment of these charges before the proceedings began. It is much as though the Director of Public Prosecutions were appointed to be simultaneously legal adviser to the Home Secretary.

It is laid down by the King's Regulations that, where a trial by court-martial has been held to be a nullity, a retrial is not to be ordered without consulting the Judge-Advocate-General; also, that a petition against a court-martial finding or sentence has to be referred to the Judge-Advocate-General if it raises any question of law. These are not duties which frequently fall to be performed. A court-martial can only be held to be a nullity where there has been some patent defect in law resulting in the court having no jurisdiction to try the prisoner. Although this may happen more frequently in the case of courts-martial than in the ordinary courts, instances must be rare. Nor is there any likelihood of many petitions being lodged which raise questions of law. These are obviously more likely to be general appeals for clemency based on the facts of the case in question. In fact, little is heard of the Judge-Advocate-General's duties under these regulations. They may be regarded as special cases of his general, and his most important, duty of reviewing convictions and advising on their legality after they have been confirmed by the proper authority.

This is really the only branch of the Judge-Advocate-General's work which has ever been subjected to serious criticism. The Judge-Advocate-General is put forward as being a protection to the soldier against an unfair conviction, and, given the present constitution of his office, it is natural to ask whether and, if so, how far he can adequately perform this function. It may be observed that no reasonable critics have suggested that courts-martial are deliberately unfair; but there is obviously something unsatisfactory (however inevitable in the exigencies of war) in a court whose members have no legal knowledge trying criminal charges without a jury, and possessing literally powers of life and death. During the war the members of courts-martial were not even persons with long experience of military discipline, nor had they had time, like all Regular Army officers, to master the rudiments of military law. Courts-martial held in time of peace, although their members will be persons of much better education and greater legal and military knowledge, are unlikely to be free from unconscious prejudice. No doubt the district court-martial which tries non-commissioned officers and men is a satisfactory tribunal. But in the case of

an officer it must be very difficult for the members of a genera court-martial to lay aside preconceived ideas, even if they have no personal knowledge—as they frequently must have—of the accused person and of his offence.

But it was undoubtedly the war-time courts-martial generally held for the trial of such offences as insubordination, desertion and cowardice, which are not crimes in civilian eyes, that caused the considerable dissatisfaction with courts-martial which led to the appointment of the Committee constituted by the Army Council in 1919 to inquire into court-martial procedure. So far as the Judge-Advocate-General is concerned, this Committee expressed the opinion that the soldier convicted by court-martial was in a better position than the civilian criminal, since review by the Judge-Advocate-General was automatic, whereas the conviction by a civilian court could only be questioned if an appeal was lodged. This is mere special pleading: no convicted person remains in ignorance of his right to appeal or is unable to lodge an application. It may be safely said that every person who is dissatisfied with his conviction or sentence does in fact lodge an application for leave to appeal—which, even though no leave to appeal is given, is considered by a judge who reads through the shorthand transcript of the trial, and also by a court of three judges sitting in open court and announcing their decision in public. It will be seen therefore that in either case any proceedings which call for a review are adequately reviewed. It may be added that, quite apart from the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Home Office has the power to review sentences passed in the ordinary criminal courts. Everyone knows that, in the case of a death sentence, every possible fact bearing on the case is meticulously considered by the Home Secretary and his advisers. How far they give consideration to cases of lesser gravity is a matter on which it is difficult to be certain. But that the duties of the Home Secretary are by no means perfunctorily performed is shown by the fact that not infrequently persons serving sentences are released by order of the Crown on the advice of the Home Secretary. But these cases are rare compared with the number of convictions quashed and sentences reduced by the Court of Criminal Appeal. It is substantially true that the proceedings in the ordinary courts are reviewed

by a judicial tribunal, while proceedings in the military courts are reviewed by an administrative official. Obviously, the efficiency of all institutions depends on the probity and ability of the individuals who work them; but the opinion that review by a judicial tribunal is the better does not rest merely on the assumption that a High Court judge is likely to be a better man than a Judge-Advocate-General. For there is the obvious advantage to the accused that the judge is entirely independent of the Government department responsible for the prosecution, which the Judge-Advocate-General is not. Moreover, the Court of Criminal Appeal has to announce its decision in public, with the result that it is possible to be assured that precedents, both of substantive law and of procedure, are actually being followed, and that the ordinary rules are not being strained in view of the public importance or the outrageous character of some particular crime. And, above all, reviews by the Judge-Advocate-General are subject to the criticism which may be levelled at all departmental decisions, as opposed to judicial findings, that no one outside ever really knows who analyses the facts and who reaches the decision that goes out in the name of the responsible head of the department.

It does not seem seriously arguable that the existence of the Judge-Advocate-General is any substitute for some kind of court of appeal from courts-martial. The question for decision is rather whether our desire for justice is so great that we are prepared to face the expense, delay, and trouble and the resultant ill effects on military discipline which might conceivably be caused by setting up such a court.

There can be little doubt what the Duke of Wellington and his military contemporaries would have thought of any suggestion of an appeal from courts-martial. Even an occasional miscarriage of justice would have seemed unimportant to them compared with the necessity of preserving discipline in the Army. The majority of the 1919 Committee (whose names do not suggest that they would have been likely to favour revolutionary changes in favour of the prisoner) quote with approval the words of the great Duke in 1813: 'I consider all punishments to be for the sake of example, and the punishment of military men in particular is expedient only in cases where the prevalence of any crime,

or the evils resulting from it, are likely to be injurious to the public interest.' But the Committee are fair enough to give a context which to many will seem to rob his views of all relevance to modern times: 'A very common and a most alarming crime in this Army,' he wrote, 'is that of striking and otherwise resisting, sometimes even by firing at, non-commissioned officers, and even officers in the execution of their duty.' These words might well have made the Committee wonder whether the principles on which courts-martial should be conducted should be regarded as immutable; for it is quite obvious that the men who fought in the Army during the last war, or even those who enlist in the Army as a peace-time occupation, are totally different from those who won the Peninsular War. There is no reason why the modern private soldier any more than the average litigant should confound a rigid observance of legal forms with weakness or stupidity. It is instructive to remember that even Queen Victoria thought that discipline in the Army would be impossible without flogging. In fact, three of the 1919 Committee, including that vocal and sympathetic champion of the 'under-dog,' Horatio Bottomley, then M.P., produced a minority report in which they recommended the granting of a right of appeal. Their suggestion was that there should be a right of appeal in ordinary cases to a special tribunal of three officers of long service and experience at courts-martial, that there should ordinarily be no appeal from courts-martial in the field, but that in the case of death sentences there should be an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, sitting perhaps with military assessors. This last suggestion may seem a trifle inconsistent with their first suggestion, which was no doubt based on the very reasonable view that it would be well to keep lawyers out of it.

The differences in procedure which distinguish military from other trials are particularly unfair in cases in which persons subject to military law are tried by courts-martial for offences against the ordinary criminal law, a practice which all the 1919 Committee, and Lord Hugh Cecil in particular, condemned, but which has not been discontinued. Quite apart from the absence of a right of appeal, a trial by court-martial is not the same thing as a trial by judge and jury. Everyone who reads the newspapers will remember

recent cases of military officers convicted by courts-martial of sexual offences for which, if they had been civilians, they would have been tried in the ordinary courts. In some of them there is little doubt that they would have been acquitted by a jury if the same evidence had been given. If it be said that as a result of the jury system it is too easy for the guilty to escape conviction, the proper remedy is obviously to alter the procedure of the ordinary courts rather than to perpetuate a system under which a military man may be convicted of an offence of a non-military character in circumstances in which a civilian would escape punishment.

Obviously, if a court of appeal were to be established, there would still be plenty of opportunity for discussion as to the exact form it should take; but, whatever its constitution, it would substantially do away with any need for the Judge-Advocate-General to carry out a review of courts-martial, as is done at present. There does not, however, seem any probability of such a court being established, though it is difficult to say why the idea is viewed with so little favour by military men. The court suggested by the minority report would not cause much delay, nor could it be said to undermine discipline, since it would consist of senior officers sitting at the War Office. But it is more likely that reforms, if any, will be in the direction rather of leaving courts-martial to be reviewed by administrative officials, while altering somewhat their character and duties.

It may be not without interest to consider the system which appears to prevail in the Navy. In it, somewhat similar functions to those of the Army's Judge-Advocate-General are performed by the Judge-Advocate of the Fleet. Readers of the *Post Office Directory* might suppose that he was very small beer compared with the Judge-Advocate-General on land, for in that work he is for some reason printed merely in a list of K.C.'s, whereas the Judge-Advocate-General is surprisingly elevated to a position of eminence along with the law officers of the Crown. Actually, the office of Judge-Advocate of the Fleet is one of very great antiquity and considerable importance and is exactly analogous to the military office. There is, however, one very important difference between their duties, in that proceedings of naval courts-martial are only referred to the Judge-Advocate of

the Fleet if the Admiralty so direct, and not in all cases as with military courts-martial. It is perhaps for this reason that the office of Judge-Advocate of the Fleet is not a whole-time occupation, but is held by a practising barrister. The present holder of the office has, in fact, a very considerable practice in both the civil and criminal courts.

There can be no doubt that, if it can be achieved, it is highly desirable that any person holding a judicial or semi-judicial post of a specialised character should be as nearly in touch with the ordinary business of the courts as is possible, for it is beyond dispute that courts conducted by professional lawyers are more efficient than military courts can be. In the civilian world there are numerous judicial personages—recorders of boroughs, chancellors of dioceses, chairmen of quarter sessions, arbitrators and so forth—who combine presiding as judges in courts that only sit occasionally with continuing to practise as barristers in the ordinary law courts. As a result their own courts function far more satisfactorily than would be the case if they were cut off from the rest of the legal profession, and in danger of evolving a procedure of their own. There does not seem any reason why the review of courts-martial should not be carried out by a lawyer of similar standing and position, not, of course, necessarily giving his decisions in open court. It is particularly desirable that he should be a person who at least has practised (even if he is not still practising) in the courts and who is therefore familiar with the rules of procedure and evidence observed by the High Court.

It may be objected that the duties of Judge-Advocate-General are far too extensive to be carried out by any but a whole-time official, and that they include many of an administrative nature which would not be well performed by a lawyer who had not been trained in the routine of military offices. Such an objection begs the whole question—the question whether it is desirable that all the present duties of the Judge-Advocate-General should be performed by the same person. It is at least worth considering the alternative suggestion that, while all the other duties of the office might continue to be performed as at present, the vitally important one of reviewing convictions should be performed by a completely distinct individual, who should be personally responsible for

his decisions, and who should have nothing whatever to do with the initiation or conduct of the proceedings which it would be his duty to review. If the person appointed was someone of established position in the legal profession, it would go far to satisfy any complaints that there is no court of appeal from a court-martial. There would not seem to be any reason why the holder of this post should not continue to practise as a barrister, except, of course, in military courts or cases concerned with military affairs. This would have the effect of making the post one which might be accepted by really successful lawyers, instead of, like most whole-time legal posts, becoming a blind-alley occupation for those who do not aspire any higher. Naturally, the duties of the post would be the first charge on his time, and, as in the case of recorders, chancellors, etc., how much time he could actually devote to private practice would depend on the number of courts-martial coming up for review.

CECIL BINNEY.

NOTE.—The Secretary of State for War announced on March 15 that an inter-departmental Committee had been appointed under the chairmanship of Mr Roland Oliver, K.C.:

'To examine the existing system of trial by court-martial under the Army and Air Force Acts and matters incidental thereto, and in particular to consider whether it is desirable and practicable that a person convicted by court-martial should have a right of appeal to a civil judicial tribunal against his conviction, and to make recommendations.' [ED.]

LÉON GAMBETTA

By J. P. T. Bury

April 2, 1838—December 31, 1882

After the fall of the Second Empire and the horrors of war and Commune, France was once more confronted with the problem of Constitution-making. Slowly and painfully the Third Republic achieved legitimate birth. The Comte de Chambord, 'Henri V.,' had, as M. Thiers remarked, a good claim to be called the French Washington, for, by his absolute refusal to compromise with the principles of the great Revolution, he did most to ruin the chances of a Bourbon restoration in France. M. Thiers himself, a former Orleanist Minister, by the way in which he accustomed Frenchmen of all ranks to a Republican form of government, has also a good claim to the title of founder of the new régime. But it was neither of these, neither the Comte de Chambord, nor M. Thiers whom the Republic herself was to apotheosise as her foremost great man. That glory was reserved for Léon Gambetta, who was born just 100 years ago. And the Republic was right, for Gambetta possessed, far more than Thiers, the qualities of a popular democratic hero: he was a life-long Republican, not a convert of the last hour; and the Republic as it took shape after 1875, though far from the Republic of his dreams, was still farther from the Republic of Thiers, a régime in many ways marked with the impress of Gambetta's personality.

Léon Michel Gambetta died at the early age of forty-four, yet his life was passed under four different régimes, and in fourteen of those forty-four years he was a conspicuous and sometimes dominant figure in French politics. His career has its place in the main stream of French history in the post-revolutionary period, the stream which persistently, though uneasily, tends to flow ever farther towards the Left. To its

current of ideas he made no striking new contribution, but hi powerful personality, his extraordinary force as a popularise of borrowed programmes, and his acute sense of politica opportunity enabled him to play a great part in determinin the particular course in which the Republican stream was fo a time to be directed. This influence he exercised eithe indirectly or as an opposition party leader; the man whos real or supposed power was so great that his enemies fre quently referred to him as 'the Dictator' held Ministeria office only twice for periods totalling less than eight months.

Gambetta, the foremost orator of a defeated France, lik Hitler, the foremost orator of a resurgent Germany, came o ancestors who dwelt beyond the national frontiers. But tie of commerce had long linked the Ligurian Gambettas witl southern France, and eventually Joseph, Léon Gambetta' father, had set up a grocer's shop in Cahors and taken Gascon woman to wife. It is true to say, not, in the words o some wit, that Gambetta, like all great Frenchmen, was a Italian, but that, like so many great Frenchmen, he was southerner. By parentage, birthplace and breeding he wa a true son of the Midi, and such his appearance and hi accent, his gestures and the warmth of his eloquence at onc betrayed him. By parentage, too, he came of a *petit bourgeoi* family which, at least on his father's side, had Republica traditions. Under the Orleanist régime it did not posses the right to vote. When Gambetta was ten, however, th new Government of the Second Republic opened the electora flood-gates with the introduction of universal suffrage. The the Second Republic, in its turn, passed away and, thoug universal suffrage was retained in a modified form under th Second Empire, the opportunities for its free exercise wer limited by the infrequency of elections and by the system o official candidatures. There was no very marked alteration i the class of men elected or increase in the independence o the electorate. After 1870, however, Gambetta, who regarde universal suffrage as the sheet-anchor of the Republic, haile the alteration which was bound to come sooner or later, an in a famous speech announced the accession to political powe of 'a new social stratum.' It was to this new social stratur that he himself belonged, and to the end of his life, despit the social training that he received from some of the mos

accomplished hostesses of the day, he retained a certaii vulgarity typical of his class.

After the usual Lycée education in classics and humanitie: at Cahors, Gambetta, like most poor but ambitious young men in so centralised a country, went to Paris. There he studied law and sought his fortune. Paris was both the seat of government and the chief stronghold of Republican opposition; the Bar was a stepping-stone to politics as well as a legal forum; and the forceful southerner whose spate of eloquence soon won him a reputation in the Latin Quarter was naturally enough attracted by the idea of a political career. His family background, his youthful intolerance of an authoritarian régime, his contacts with Republican lawyers, and the gradual revival of a parliamentary opposition easily determined his allegiance. Thus the story of the first part of his political career is largely the story of his activities as a Republican antagonist of the Empire. He was an enthusiastic electioneer in the sexennial elections of 1863; he was an assiduous spectator in the gallery of the Legislative Body and became an expert on parliamentary procedure. In the Baudin trial of 1868 he turned the defence of a Republican journalist into a violent denunciation of the régime which re-echoed throughout the country and made his reputation as a formidable orator. The natural sequel was his election as a deputy in the following year. Before the Empire fell Gambetta had become the influential leader of an opposition group in Parliament, and when it fell he emerged as Minister of the Interior in a provisional Government which he himself had helped to form. The Ministry of the Interior was a key position and the Minister was a young man of thirty-two.

In the course of this rapid ascension to power Gambetta had distinguished himself, not merely by his eloquence, but also by his realistic outlook, his ambition to be a force, his tactical sense, and his cheerful absence of scruple. He was one of a new generation of Republicans who were in reaction against the austere doctrinaires of 1848. These young men were for the most part disciples of Comte, Freemasons and strongly anti-clerical, ready to take any oath or accept any ally in the interests of the combat against the Empire. In the elections of 1869 Gambetta did not hesitate to stand against Carnot, a Republican veteran of 1848, and to subscribe to a

programme which made the most radical demands, and was indeed to be the archetype of Radical programmes for many years to come. He made his entry into Parliament as a Radical and, once there, he proclaimed his 'irreconcilable hostility to the régime despite its further liberalisation. His vigour galvanised the Republicans, but did not heal their divisions; it made his enemies regard him as a dangerous 'Red.' But in fact he was no Socialist and little interested in social problems, and, though he insisted that for him reconciliation with the Empire was impossible, he insisted also that any change of régime must come peaceably as a result of natural disintegration. Parliamentary Empire was merely a new stage on the road from the Republic of 1848 to the Republic of the future. Republicans, he taught, must free Republicanism from its associations with violence, and by their patience and moderation establish their own fitness to govern. Were they but patient, power would fall into their hands like a ripe fruit.

Neither Gambetta, however, nor any of his colleagues suspected how soon their hour was to come or in what catastrophic circumstances their governmental capacities were to be tested. In July 1870, like a bolt from the blue, came the Hohenzollern candidature and war with Prussia, which in less than two months was to lead to the capitulation of Sedan. Thereupon there followed inevitably the collapse of the Empire he detested. The Bonapartist bridge was crossed, and he himself was a principal guide to the Republican shore, a prominent member of the new Government of National Defence. But this Government was no more than the anomalous war-time product of a Paris revolution The Republic it proclaimed, unratified by electors, could only be a provisional régime, and its policy of war to the knife identified this Republic with the cause of a resistance which had singularly little prospect of success. This régime, prematurely born of revolution, was indeed very different from the legitimate offspring of universal suffrage for which Gambetta had hoped, and all his efforts could not save the provisional Government from discredit or the Republic from jeopardy. When at length an armistice was concluded and elections to a National Assembly were held in February 1871, the majority of the new deputies was not Republican but Monarchist.

New conditions necessitated a new struggle to secure tł Republic.

But, though for a moment after the end of the war Gam betta withdrew from the political arena weary and dis appointed, his five months' Ministry had given him invaluabl experience and prestige. The weakness of his colleagues ha been his opportunity. While the majority of them wer besieged and powerless in Paris, he escaped by balloon, anc for four months was virtually dictator in the provinces. He organised the defence of the country on a scale whicł impressed foreigners and surprised the enemy, and, thougł there was much to criticise in the organisation and his new armies met disaster, the moral effect of his stimulus was of extraordinary importance. He could claim, with much justice, to have saved French honour. His belief in the possibility of prolonging the war indefinitely was mistaken and brought fresh schism to the Republican ranks; but his sincerity was never in doubt. The part he had played in the war enabled him to claim as 'an apanage' of his party 'the grand idea of national resistance' and to be the foremost champion of Alsace and Lorraine, in whose surrender he had refused to acquiesce. When France had recovered from her war weariness the memory of Gambetta's patriotism was to stand him in good stead.

The war had radically transformed the conditions of French politics both at home and abroad. At home France was torn by faction; abroad she was weak and isolated. A Monarchist majority, prevented by the monarch from restoring the Monarchy, wished to prolong a state of uncertainty. Others, like Thiers, countenanced the idea of a Conservative Republic without Republicans. The political atmosphere was extraordinarily tense. Parties were divided as never before; each hoped that time would work on its side, and it was not until 1875 that the Third Republic received a Constitution which was very different from the Radical ideal. But though the problems of French politics were altered, and though the Gambetta of the Republic was more mature than the Gambetta of the Empire, fundamentally he displayed the same characteristic ideas and methods of approach to these problems. The earlier period was the formative as it was the spectacular part of his career. Even in rhythm the later phase

resembled the earlier: a long period of opposition with increasing influence was succeeded by a short period of power and then by eclipse. The Gambetta of the first phase was the irreconcilable foe of the Bonapartes—the vehement orator, radical and anti-clerical, but at the same time a Republican who eschewed violence, an optimist free from fanaticism, an opportunist knowing the value both of co-operation and of independence, a realist both in home and in foreign affairs. Such, too, was the Gambetta of the second period. His aim was twofold: to make the Republic a Republican reality, not a Monarchist masquerade, and to restore France's prestige among the nations. To make the Republic a reality it was necessary to discredit its enemies, to create a popular enthusiasm for the Republic as he conceived it, to fight for a Republican machinery of government, and to win control of that machinery once it had been installed. Accordingly the enemy of the Bonapartes continued to denounce the Empire and a temporarily reviving Bonapartist party; the anti-clerical saw in the clergy the backbone of Monarchist resistance, and, borrowing the phrase of another—'Clericalism: there is the enemy'—made it re-echo through France; the Republican orator called for the dissolution of a Monarchist Assembly which was unlikely to create a true Republican Constitution. But at the same time he preached a gospel of Republicanism which was deliberately designed to win the support of the rural majority of the population, and it was a moderate gospel of peace and progress. He had had no part or lot in the Commune and could freely dissociate the new Republicanism from the terrorism and violent methods of a heroic age.

The theme he developed with a power that fascinated audiences throughout the land was the theme of a France regaining health and strength through the free development of democratic institutions, a France in which every citizen should be physically fit and trained as a soldier, in which every citizen should be fitted by a free compulsory lay education to play an intelligent part in the control of the State. Repeated bye-elections showed the strength of his propaganda as 'commercial traveller of the Republic.' Effectually the Radical, by his moderation, widened the basis of his Republic and lessened the divorce between town and country which

had been such a conspicuous feature of French politics. H had none of the Republican intellectual's contempt for th countryman, and he had none of the doctrinaire's obstinac in insisting upon a particular set of Republican machinery Though the Constitution voted by the Assembly in 1875 wa remote from the Constitutions of French revolutionary tradi tion and contained features which he himself had strongly opposed, Gambetta, with remarkable adroitness, hailed it as a triumph of the Republican idea. However imperfect they were, the new institutions were Republican, not Monarchist or Imperialist. So Gambetta at once gave them his blessing and posed as a champion of the new régime. The last phase of the struggle was to gain control of the new machinery so that it might be truly Republican in content as well as in form. Here, too, he was successful, and by 1880 the legislative and administrative personnel was largely Republican. After the death of Thiers in 1877, it was Gambetta who guided and dominated the evolution of Republican politics. But the dominance, even though exercised indirectly from the presidency of the Chamber, aroused the jealousy of individualist politicians and of a hostile President of the Republic, Jules Grévy. When at last in November 1881 Gambetta was called upon to guide policy directly, his '*grand Ministère*' of which so much was expected was a fiasco like the Ministry of the great Chatham in 1766. It endured only seventy-three days, and less than a year after its fall Gambetta was dead.

His other aim was the restoration of French prestige. To this he contributed by his support of Thiers' policy of national reconstruction, and later by his encouragement of colonial expansion. But, while the champion of Alsace and Lorraine hoped for a war of revenge, he was realist enough to appreciate how impossible it was for France to attempt revenge unaided. When he came more fully to understand the European situation he said of revenge: 'Let us bear it always in mind but never speak of it.' It was a formula which dismayed the most ardent patriots and led his enemies to cast fresh doubts upon his sincerity, but, when France was isolated in Europe, it was a counsel of elementary prudence. Allies were essential, and Gambetta more than once hoped for alliance with Russia, and was consistently anxious for a good understanding with England. His last great speech in the Chamber

was an eloquent plea for the maintenance of an Anglo-French Entente. Had he not been cut short in his prime, he might have lived to be himself the architect of the Triple Entente. As it was, he pointed the way, and a most important part of the building was to be constructed by one of his most devoted disciples, Delcassé.

Gambetta died at a moment when his star had paled and when he was disappointed with his Republic, but the Republic mourned him none the less. His conception and practice of politics was not always elevating. 'It seems difficult to speak of moral power about Gambetta,' said his close friend, Sir Charles Dilke. '. . . His kind of power was almost purely physical: it was a power of courage, energy, and oratory.' But, generous in character, he had many wide and generous aims. He had wished to recreate a national unity on as broad a basis as possible; he had sought to bridge the gap between town and country; he had worked to obliterate the bitter memories of the Commune; and when the Republic seemed secure he was ready to welcome new recruits and to moderate the policy of anti-clericalism. But he could go only so far, and then plans of conciliation were wrecked on the rocks of jealousy, individualism, and sectarian ire. More than once his own Radical past was an embarrassment. He himself had been the trumpeter of anti-clericalism, and the issue he had proclaimed was to be fought to a finish In another sphere, however, long after his death, the national unity of which he had been the champion was to be regained. In 1918 the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine came to justify his ideas on foreign policy and his patriotic faith. Though he had been nearly forty years in his grave, there were many still living who had worked with him and been inspired by his magnetism. They remembered him with fresh gratitude, and his Republic, which had now survived longer than any régime since the great Revolution, transferred his heart to the Panthéon, the appointed resting-place for her great men.

J. P. T. BURY.

THE CENTENARY OF LECKY, THE HISTORIAN

By W. A. Hirst

William Edward Hartpole Lecky was born in the county of Dublin on March 26, 1838. His father was descended from two well-known Irish families. Cheltenham was his school. He lost both father and mother in adolescence, and he was left with a stepmother, whom he always regarded with great affection; she lived almost as long as he did. At the age of eighteen he entered Trinity College, Dublin, where he read diligently, especially the English philosophers. After taking his degree he travelled over the Continent for a considerable time. He published one or two minor works which attracted little attention, but he resolved to adopt the career of author. Fortunately, he had ample private means.

In 1865 appeared his first great work, *The History of Rationalism*—a landmark in the history of English thought. He had grasped a fundamental fact. In the last years of the sevententh century a revolutionary change came about. The Middle Ages are considered to have ended in 1522, but religious wars and fierce persecutions continued unabated. Lecky says:

> When towards the close of the seventeenth century the decline of theological passions enabled men to discuss . . . matters in a calmer spirit, and when increased knowledge produced more comprehensive views, the historical standing point was materially altered.

In fact, the reign of Charles II. marks a new era in thought. Such different writers as Molière, Descartes, Spinoza, and Hobbes undermined many of the old dogmas and paved the way for the scepticism of Locke which dominated the eighteenth century, and by its influence on Voltaire and others helped to inspire the French and American Revolutions. Lecky had read and was influenced by Buckle's work, which

was then greatly esteemed, but his university training and candour preserved him from the besetting weakness of the historian of *Civilisation*, which was to make a large induction from a single fact, real or imaginary. And the harsh intolerance of Buckle is altogether opposed to the sweetness and light of Lecky.

The book was an immediate success and brought Lecky many friends of eminence. Dean Milman, remarking that Buckle was 'a bit of a bigot,' declared that 'Mr. Lecky has much larger views and a far more dispassionate judgment.' Gladstone and Lord Russell also became his friends, and he had the honour of being elected to the Athenæum Club.

In 1869 *The History of European Morals* appeared, a work quite equal to its predecessor, the first chapter, in particular, being admirable, and the book received warm praise from Carlyle and Tennyson. Lecky was on the side of the Intuitional school as against Utilitarianism, which then prevailed in England. He urges that the aim of the earlier English Utilitarians was 'to depress human nature to their standard, by resolving all the noblest actions into coarse and selfish elements.'

As already noticed, Utilitarianism was very widely accepted, Mill being regarded as almost infallible. It was a notable sign of independence in a young writer to oppose the general current of thought. He writes:

> My performance must clash in so many different ways with the opinions and feelings of so many different classes, and it deals with so many such difficult and sometimes debateable subjects that it will doubtless arouse a good deal of indignation in some quarters.

Lecky helped to turn the tide, and at the same time Thomas Hill Green, at Oxford, was doing effectual work in opposing materialistic philosophy.

Mill felt that a change was coming, as he notes in his Autobiography. He says:

> I have long felt that the prevailing tendency to regard all the marked distinctions of human character as innate, . . is one of the chief hindrances to the rational treatment of great social questions, and one of the greatest stumbling-blocks to human improvement. This tendency has its source in the intuitional metaphysics which characterised the reaction of the nineteenth century against

the eighteenth, and it is a tendency so agreeable to human indolence, as well as to conservative interests generally, that unless attacked at the very root, it is sure to be carried to even a greater length than is really justified by the more moderate forms of the intuitional philosophy.

Certainly Intuitionalism was not worsted in the conflict. In the last years of the nineteenth century the materialism of Mill and Herbert Spencer were in little favour at Oxford. And whatever may be the prevailing form of thought to-day—a somewhat doubtful matter—it is not Utilitarianism.

The following best years of Lecky's life were given to his greatest work, *The History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, which appeared at intervals between 1878 and 1900. There is nothing better of its kind. Gladstone remarked: 'Lecky has real insight into the motives of statesmen. Now Carlyle, so mighty as he is in flash and penetration, has no eye for motives.' Lord Acton also said: 'The character of Burke, though in my opinion very defective, seems to me the best I have read in the language.'

Lecky stated that it was his object 'to disengage from the great mass of facts those which relate to the permanent forces of the nation, or which indicate some of the more enduring features of national life.' He instances as among those forces the growth or decline of the monarchy or aristocracy, of the Church and Dissent, the manufacturing, agricultural, and commercial interests, the increasing power of Parliament and the Press, economic and social policy, and the like. J. R. Green had already popularised this style of history—the describing of social phenomena and the growth on institutions as opposed to the recording of battles, sieges, and the changes of Administrations; but Lecky was alike more copious, more careful of facts, and far more free from bias.

As the narrative proceeds, the reader will be struck by the historian's lucidity and thoughtfulness. In the very first pages Lecky refutes the contention that at the time of the death of Queen Anne the Whigs were what the Tories became in later history, seeing that the Whigs were then warlike and privileged, while Bolingbroke and his friends were peaceful, friendly to France, and more or less anti-Monarchical. The writer shows that the contrast was really superficial, due to special circumstances, such as the exile of

the Stuarts, which made the Tories hostile to the Hanoverians, and that the Whigs stood for the supremacy of Parliament as against the King. His observation of social phenomena is keen; the description of the lower orders, especially of drunkenness, is masterly. Perhaps the best chapter in the whole book is that on the rise of Methodism. No more penetrating or impartial estimates of Wesley and Whitfield have ever been made.

In speaking of Lecky one ever has to emphasise his skill in drawing character. Lord Acton rightly commended his study of Burke. Lecky says: 'No other politician or writer has impressed his principles so deeply on both of the great parties in the State and has left behind him a richer treasure of political wisdom applicable to all countries and to all times.' So Macaulay says: 'The greatest man since Milton.' Fox and the younger Pitt come in for similarly masterly treatment.

Ireland occupied a very large space in the work. Lecky was anxious to do justice to that distressful country and, in particular, to controvert the disparaging estimate of Froude but his *Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland* had not attracted sufficient notice to effect his purpose. Later a judicious separation was made, and in the cabinet edition there are two separate works—seven volumes for England and five for Ireland.

Lecky had been a Liberal, and was considered somewhat advanced, but as soon as Gladstone's Home Rule Bill was introduced he broke politically with his old friend, and eventually became a member of Parliament for Dublin University. I had the honour of a slight acquaintance with that great and amiable man. Being engaged in educational work in India I was struck by the unsatisfactory nature of most of the annotated text-books, which seemed to aim exclusively at cramming students until they expanded into B.A.'s. It occurred to me that the first chapter in *The Morals*, which I had studied with great admiration at Oxford, would make an excellent text-book for students of philosophy. Accordingly I approached the author and Longmans, the publishers, asking permission to bring out an annotated edition. The response was favourable, and Lecky took an encouraging interest in the project. He asked me to meet him in the House of Commons in the autumn of 1902.

He was very tall and slim, at least 6 feet 4 inches in height. Like Froude (whom I had also met), his manners were of the old courtly school. He said: 'My publishers will make all arrangements. You could not be in better hands. You will be better up in the details of the subject than I am; I have not given much attention to that branch of philosophy for many years.'

We went to the floor of the House. Sir Henry Fowler was speaking. 'Both parties,' said Lecky, 'listen to him with great respect.' He added: 'I am but a negligent performer of my parliamentary duties nowadays. My health will not allow me to do much. But my constituents are very lenient to me.' Nothing could have been kinder than his behaviour. Before the end of my leave he sent me more tickets for the House. After his death Mrs. Lecky wrote to him that he had been much pleased with my modest *Survey of Ethics*.

Lecky's later work in several instances made more appeal to the general reader than those weighty studies which earned him his great reputation, and these enjoyed considerable popularity, but they were of far less permanent value. However, *The Map of Life* contains a powerful study of Gladstone—'probably,' says *The Dictionary of National Biography*, 'the best estimate of Gladstone's character which has yet appeared.'

He well deserved to be among the first small group that received the Order of Merit. Thoughtfulness, impartiality, judgment, charity are the main qualities in the matter of Lecky's writings. As for manner, the style is perfectly adapted to the subject—lucid, dignified, polished and, on proper occasions, rising to eloquence. The smoothness of his periods is noticeable. It has not the brilliance of Froude's narrative, but is more circumspect and free from the occasional lapses of Froude into cruelty, or even coarseness. With Lecky the style was emphatically the man.

Of him I have, if slight, most pleasing memories. He was the finest flower of university culture and the perfection of a learned man of letters. Probably few men have passed through life in more blameless fashion, and Lecky was never disobedient to his ideal, a man deserving well of letters, of his country, and of civilised mankind.

W. A. Hirst.

MILTON'S PROSE

(As represented in the 'Compendious' *Milton*[1])

By E. H. Visiak

It is related of Thomas Burke that he used to vitalise hi: parliamentary speeches by reading the debate in Pandemoniun as reported in the second book of *Paradise Lost*. It was : capital expedient; for there is the true spirit of oratory, a: distinguished from mere rhetoric, in these counsels of th(infernal peers—especially in that of Belial, the advocate o expediency, or 'realism'; and this although we are told tha 'all was hollow,' and that he 'could make the worse appea the better reason.' He is indeed eloquently prudential, an(not merely plausible. He 'pleas'd the eare,' we are informed but there is little charming quality in his speech; there i nothing of the suave and glowing eloquence that inform Milton's *Areopagitica*—that 'Speech to the Parlament o England' in which there were, surely, expressed the ver) accents of the personality which enchanted such men as Si Henry Wootton and Manso. For instance, in reading th(following passage one feels that Milton was a courtier, no les courteous than any cavalier:

> If it be desir'd to know the immediat cause of all this free writin{ and free speaking, there cannot be assign'd a truer then your ow1 mild and free and human government, it is the liberty, Lords an(Commons, which your own valorous and happy counsels hav(purchast us, liberty which is the nurse of all great wits; this is tha which hath rarify'd and enlightn'd our spirits like the influence o heav'n; this is that which hath enfranchis'd, enlarg'd and lifted u] our apprehensions degrees above themselves. Ye cannot make u

[1] Together with all the poetry—with translations of the non-English poems th 'Compendious' *Milton*, edited by E. H. Visiak, with an Introduction by Sir Arnol Wilson (Nonesuch Press), includes three of the English prose works—i.e., the *Apolog for Smectymnuus*, *Of Education*, and the *Areopagitica*—the main body of *The Doctrine an Discipline of Divorce*, and selections from others

now lesse capable, lesse knowing, lesse eagarly pursuing of the truth, unlesse ye first make your selves, that made us so, lesse the lovers, lesse the founders of our true liberty. We can grow ignorant again, brutish, formall, and slavish, as ye found us; but you then must first become that which ye cannot be, oppressive, arbitrary, and tyrannous, as they were from whom ye have free'd us.

The *Areopagitica* is tolerably well known, and is generally pronounced to be the best of Milton's prose compositions. There is, however, another of his pamphlets which is no less a marvel of style, and is, moreover, more intensely condensed: in this, also, although in very different accents, the authentic voice of Milton can be heard.

This pamphlet, to give it its full title (usually modified into the *Apology for Smectymnuus*) is *An Apology against a Pamphlet call'd a Modest Confutation of the Animadversions upon the Remonstrant against Smectymnuus*—a complication which is best unravelled backwards. Thus:

'Smectymnuus' is the multiple pseudonym—made up with their various initials—of five Puritan divines, who had challenged an Episcopalian pamphlet by Bishop Hall.

The 'Remonstrant' is Bishop Hall, who had answered 'Smectymnuus.'

The 'Animadversions' was Milton's defence of 'Smectymnuus.'

The 'Modest Confutation' was an anonymous virulent rejoinder to the 'Animadversions.'

The temerarious Smectymnuans, no match for the Bishop, had found themselves 'at the mercy,' as Milton expresses it in his *Apology*, 'of a coy flurting stile; to be girded with frumps and curtall jibes, by one who makes sentences by the Statute, as if all above three inches long were confiscat'; and now, indeed, in the *Modest Confutation* Milton was himself confronted with the same sort of short, choppy sentences by one who 'will bestow on us a pretty modell of himselfe; and sobs me out halfe a dozen tizicall mottoes where ever he had them, hopping short in the measure of convulsion fits; in which labour the agony of his wit, having scapt narrowly, instead of well siz'd periods, he greets us with a quantity of thumring posies.'

The *Modest Confutation* was written by the son of Bishop Hall—assisted by his father. 'A Chip of the old block,' says Milton; who satirises the Bishop mainly by ridiculing his

burlesque romance *Mundus alter et idem* and his *Toothlesse Satyrs*, and his son mainly by tripping him up in his own arguments ; until he becomes 'weary of pluming and footing this Seagull, so open he lies to strokes : and never offers at another, but brings home the dorre upon himselfe.'

He had a broad field ; for, besides the controversial ground, many kinds of aspersions had been brought against his personal character ; and, with an incomparable range and variety of diction, of free expressiveness—which is often scurrilous, as when, for example, he is accused of having been 'familiar with a Laundresse'—he writes with an exuberance that produces the illusion almost of resonant utterance. For instance :

His next venome he utters against a prayer which he found in the animadversions, angry it seems to finde any prayers but in the Service Book. He dislikes it, and I therefore like it the better. *It was theatricall*, he sayes. And yet it consisted most of Scripture language : it had no *Rubrick* to be sung in an antick Coape upon the Stage of a High Altar. *It was big-mouth'd* he sayes ; no marvell ; if it were fram'd as the voice of three Kingdomes : neither was it a prayer so much as a hymne in prose frequent both in the Prophets, and in humane authors ; therefore the stile was greater then for an ordinary prayer : *It was an astounding prayer.* I thank him for that confession, so it was intended to astound and to astonish the guilty Prelats ; and this Confuter confesses that with him it wrought that effect. But in that which followes, he does not play the Soothsayer but the diabolick slanderer of prayers *It was made*, he sayes, *not so much to please God, or to benefit the weale publick* (how dares the Viper judge that) *but to intimate*, saith he, *your good abilities, to her that is your rich hopes, your Maronilla* How hard it is when a man meets with a Foole to keepe his tongue from folly That were miserable indeed to be a Courter of *Maronilla*, and withall of such a haplesse invention, as that no way should be left me to present my meaning but to make my selfe a canting Probationer of orisons. The Remonstrant when he was as young as I could

Toothlesse *Teach each hollow Grove to sound his love*
Satyrs, *Wearying eccho with one changelesse word.*

And so he well might, and all his auditors besides with his *teach each.*

Toothlesse *Whether so me list my lovely thoughts to sing,*
Satyrs, *Come dance ye nimble dryads by my side,*
Whiles I report my fortunes or my loves.

Delicious! he had that whole bevie at command whether morrice or at May pole. Whilest I, by this figure-caster must imagin'd in such distresse as to sue to *Maronilla*, and yet left impoverisht of what to say, as to turne my Liturgy into my Ladi Psalter.

Coleridge has truly observed that the best literary expres sion is one in faculty with the best speech-expression. In eithe case, the sense is embodied in the precisely appropriate form the 'word' is made 'flesh.' The form, however, involve more than mere words and idioms. The selection of th words and idioms is modified by the individual's mental con stitution or temperamental mind. This temperamental mind is an organic memory—a memory which, in the case of an author, has assimilated and transmuted literary modes Milton's memory in this sense was extraordinarily meta bolic, no less in regard to verbal forms than ideas; of which latter his 'borrowings,' or transmutations, from classical as well as English writers, are well known to have been prodigious. The diction in some of his writings is crude in some places with Latinisms. In the *Apology*, however, the elements, in general, are so transmuted that no change—at least, no disharmonious change—is apparent in the style even when he deliberately imitates another author. This occurs when he is answering the accusation that in his Cambridge years he used to see plays. The accusation, as is shown in his first Latin elegy, was well-founded; and he answers evasively:

What difficulty was there in that? when in the Colleges so many of the young Divines, and those in next aptitude to Divinity have bin seene so oft upon the Stage writhing and unboning their Clergie limmes to all the antick and dishonest gestures of Trinculo's, Buffons, and Bawds. . . . There while they acted, and overacted, among other young scholars, I was a spectator; they thought themselves gallant men, and I thought them fools, they made sport, and I laught, they mispronounc't and I mislik't, and to make up the *atticisme*, they were out, and I hist.

The 'atticisme' refers to a similar passage in Demosthenes' *De Corona*.

The style in this pamphlet is always original, and the more literary it is, the more spontaneous and vocal in the essentially lucid sense it reads. Even colloquial expressions are

modulated; for example: 'And yet he can remember oı none but *Lysimachus Nicanor*, and *that he mislikt and censur'd.* No more but of one can the Remonstrant remember? What if I put him in minde of one more?'

As in his comment on the 'Confuter's' short sentences, Milton diverts himself in criticising the Halls' English, as in:

> For what with putting his fancy to the tiptoe in this description of himselfe, and what with adventuring presently to stand upon his own legs without the crutches of his margent, which is the sluce most commonly, that feeds the drouth of his text, he comes so lazily on in a Similie, with his *arme full of weeds*, and demeanes himselfe in the dull expression so like a dough kneaded thing, that he has not spirit anough left him so farre to look to his *Syntaxis*, as to avoide nonsense.

In regard to the Bishop's verses, so hilariously derided in the 'rich widow' passage already quoted, Milton writes:

> That exception which I made against toothlesse Satirs the Confuter hopes I had from the *Satirist*, but is farre deceav'd: neither had I ever read the hobbling *distick* which he means. For this good hap I had from a carefull education to be inur'd and season'd betimes with the best and elegantest authors of the learned tongues, and thereto brought an eare that could measure a just cadence, and scan without articulating; rather nice and humorous in what was tolerable, then patient to read every drawling versifier. Whence lighting upon this title of *toothlesse Satirs*, I will not conceale ye what I thought, Readers, that sure this must be some sucking Satir, who might have done better to have us'd his corall, and made an end of breeding, ere he took upon him to weild a Satirs whip. But when I heard him talk of *scouring the rusted swords of elvish Knights*, doe not blame me, if I chang'd my thought, and concluded him some desperate Cutler But why *his scornefull muse could never abide with tragick shoos her ankles for to hide*, the pace of the verse told me that her maukin knuckles were never shapen to that royall buskin.

Milton in this pamphlet deliberately directs and controls his style, for all its apparent impetuosity, like the self-conscious artist that he supremely was; and avowedly so, since, in concluding a magnificent autobiographical digression, he writes:

> And how to break off suddenly into those jarring notes, which this Confuter hath set me, I must be wary, un-lesse I can provide

against offending the eare, as some Musicians are wont skilfully tc fall out of one key into another without breach of harmony.

One way in which this attention to technique is evident is in the delightful Ciceronian cadences which occur at the close of certain of the sections into which the book is divided; for instance:

And so I leave you and your fellow *starres*, as you terme them, of *either horizon*, meaning I suppose either *hemisphere*, unlesse you will be ridiculous in your astronomy. For the rationall horizon in heav'n is but one, and the sensible horizons in earth are innumerable; so that your allusion was as erroneous as your starres. But that you did well to prognosticat them all at lowest in the horizon, that is either seeming bigger then they are through the mist and vapour which they raise, or else sinking, and wasted to the snuffe in their westerne socket.

The style of the *Apology* is influenced by English as well as classical writers; the style of Milton's *History of Britain*, on the other hand, appears to have been compounded—and, for the most part, rather crudely compounded—from Latin elements. It is compressed, as one may describe it, *Tacitly*, yet develops admirable diction in passages where it is most compressed; condensing into a style which is reproduced in the preface to *Samson Agonistes*, and which reappears, with metrical modification, in the verses of *Paradise Lost*. I give a brief citation of this condensed style, followed by a passage in which the Latin elements are transmuted into diction of superb eloquence:

Thus representing the state of things in this Iland, *Beda* surceas'd to write. Out of whom chiefly hath bin gathered, since the *Saxons* arrival, such as hath bin deliverd, a scatterd story pickt out heer and there, with some trouble and tedious work from among his many Legends of Visions and Miracles; toward the latter end so bare of civill matters, as what can be thence collected may seem a Calendar rather then a History, tak'n up for the most part with succession of Kings, and computation of years, yet those hard to be reconcil'd with the *Saxon Annals*. Thir actions we read of, were most commonly Wars, but for what cause wag'd, or by what Councells carried on, no care was had to let us know: wherby thir strength and violence we understand, of thir wisedom, reason, or justice, little or nothing. . . .

'Tis true that in obscurest times, by shallow and unskilfull

Writers, the indistinct noise of many Battels, and devastations, of many Kingdoms over-run and lost, hath come to our Eares. For what wonder, if in all Ages, Ambition and the love of rapine hath stirr'd up greedy and violent men to bold attempts in wasting and ruining Warrs, which to posterity have left the work of Wild Beasts and Destroyers, rather then the Deeds and Monuments of men and Conquerours. But he whose just and true valour uses the necessity of Warr and Dominion, not to destroy but to prevent destruction, to bring in liberty against Tyrants, Law and Civility among barbarous Nations, knowing that when he Conquers all things else, he cannot Conquer *Time*, or *Detraction*, wisely conscious of this his want, as well as of his worth not to be forgott'n or conceal'd, honours and hath recourse to the aid of Eloquence, his freindliest and best supply; by whose immortal Record his noble deeds, which else were transitory, becoming fixt and durable against the force of Yeares and Generations, he fails not to continue through all Posterity, over *Envy*, *Death*, and *Time*, also victorious . . .

Milton, in referring in the *Apology for Smectymnuus* to a 'hymne in prose' which he had written in his *Animadversions upon the Remonstrants Defence*, asserts that it is 'most of Scripture language': and, in fact, in the sublime passages of his prose it is the Bible—or, rather, the Old Testament (for his imagination was much more Hebraic than Christian)—that inspired the language, which underwent a marvellous mental change; it is still the voice of Milton that is heard in this sublime phraseology, but it is his voice, as it were, attuned to the rhythmical strains of a magnific organ, themselves a transmutation of his own individual quality. In the 'hymne in prose' is included a reference to the epic poem which Milton aspired to compose. He alludes to the same aspiration in his *Reason of Church-Government Urg'd against Prelaty*, implying that he possesses potentially the abilities necessary for its achievement. He continues:

These abilities, wheresoever they be found, are the inspired guift of God rarely bestow'd, but yet to some (though most abuse) in every Nation: and are of power beside the office of a pulpit, to inbreed and cherish in a great people the seeds of vertu, and publick civility, to allay the perturbations of the mind, and set the affections in right tune, to celebrate in glorious and lofty Hymns the throne and equipage of Gods Almightinesse, and what he works, and what he suffers to be wrought with high providence in his Church, to sing the victorious agonies of Martyrs and Saints, the

deeds and triumphs of just and pious Nations doing valiant through faith against the enemies of Christ, to deplore the gener relapses of Kingdoms and States from justice and Gods tru worship. Lastly, whatsoever in religion is holy and sublime, i vertu amiable, or grave, whatsoever hath passion or admiration i all the changes of that which is call'd fortune from without, or th wily suttleties and refluxes of mans thoughts from within, all thes things with a solid and treatable smoothnesse to paint out an describe.

These conditions of poetic inspiration are related on thei altruistic side to Milton's views on the sources of pros eloquence, as stated in the *Apology for Smectymnuus*:

For me, Readers, although I cannot say that I am utterly untrain'd in those rules which best Rhetoricians have giv'n, or unacquainted with those examples which the prime authors of eloquence have written in any learn'd tongu, yet true eloquence I find to be none, but the serious and hearty love of truth: And that whose mind so ever is fully possest with a fervent desire to know good things, and with the dearest charity to infuse the knowledge of them into others, when such a man would speak, his words (by what I can expresse) like so many nimble and airy servitors trip about him at command, and in well order'd files, as he would wish, fall aptly into their own places.

It is the sentiment of 'dearest charity' in the aspect of compassion which inspires from beginning to end Milton's *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, and makes it, in consequence, the greatest, most moving, of all his prose writings. In the course of its ardent, eloquent arguments is produced a myth of majestical beauty:

Love, if he be not twin-born, yet hath a brother wondrous like him, call'd *Anteros*: whom while he seeks all about, his chance is to meet with many fals and faining Desires that wander singly up and down in her likenes. By them in their borrow'd garb, Love though not wholly blind, as Poets wrong him, yet having but one eye, as being born an Archer aiming, and that eye not the quickest in this dark region here below, which is not Loves proper sphere, partly out of the simplicity, and credulity which is native to him, often deceiv'd, imbraces and consorts him with these obvious and suborned striplings, as if they were his Mothers own Sons, for so he thinks them, while they suttly keepe themselves most on his blind side. But after a while, as his manner is, when soaring up into

ıigh Tower of his *Apogæum*, above the shadow of the earth, he ; out the direct rayes of his then most piercing eyesight upon impostures, and trim disguises that were us'd with him, and ærns that this is not his genuin brother, as he imagin'd, he has onger the power to hold fellowship with such a personall mate. strait his arrows loose their golden heads, and shed their purple ıers, his silk'n breades untwine, and slip their knots, and that ınall and firie vertue giv'n him by Fate, all on a sudden goes out leaves him undeifi'd and despoil'd of all his force : till finding *eros* at last, he kindles and repairs the almost faded ammunition is Deity by the reflection of a co-equal and *homogeneal* fire. Thus e author sung it to me ; and by the leave of those who would ounted the only grave ones ; this is no meer amatorious novel ugh to be wise and skilful in these matters, men heretofore of test name in vertue, have esteemed it one of the highest arks human contemplation circling upwards, can make from the ıy sea whereon she stands) but this is a deep and serious verity, ving us that Love in mariage cannot live nor subsist unlesse it ıutuall ; and where love cannot be, there can be left of wedlock ıing, but the empty husk of an outside matrimony ; as undelight- and unpleasing to God, as any other kind of hypocrisie.

Thus, in Milton the ethereal quality of compassion pro- es beauty : whether he is contemplating—without self- —a personal affliction, as in the verses on his blindness open the third book of *Paradise Lost*, or a public (and › personal) calamity, as in the Divorce myth ; but passion ndignation, on the other hand, condenses into sublimity, ən the ' vehement vein throwing out indignation, or scorn ' s he explains in the *Apology for Smectymnuus*—is con- ted into the exalted figure of ' Zeale.'

Such a transformation takes place with stupendous effect nediately after an outburst of indignation against priestly ınny and arrogance in Milton's *Of Reformation touching 'rch Discipline in England*. The passage, like the incom- able ' hymne in prose,' is too long to give in full ; I take, conclude with, a paragraph or two in mid-flight :

. stay us in this felicitie, let not the obstinacy of our halfe ədience and will-Worship bring forth that *Viper* of *Sedition*, that these Foure-score Yeares hath been breeding to eat through the 'als of our *Peace* ; but let her cast her Abortive Spawne without danger of this travailling and throbbing *Kingdome*. That we still remember in our *solemne Thanksgivings*, how for us the

Northren Ocean even to the frozen *Thule* was scatter'd with the prou Ship-wracks of the *Spanish Armado*, and the very maw of He ransack't, and made to give up her conceal'd destruction, ere sh could vent it in that horrible and damned blast.

O how much more glorious will those former Deliveranc appeare, when we shall know them not onely to have sav'd us fro greatest miseries past, but to have reserv'd us for greatest happiness to come. Hitherto thou hast but freed us, and that not fully, fro the unjust and Tyrannous Claime of thy Foes, now unite us intirel and appropriate us to thy selfe, tie us everlastingly in willing Homag to the *Prerogative* of thy eternall *Throne*.

And now wee knowe, O thou our most certain hope an defence, that thine enemies have been consulting all the Sorcerie of the *great whore*, and have joyn'd their Plots with that sad Intelli gencing Tyrant that mischiefes the World with his Mines of *Ophir* and lies thirsting to revenge his Navall ruines that have larded ou Seas; but let them all take Counsell together, and let it come to nought, let them Decree, and doe thou Cancell it, let them gathe themselves, and bee scatter'd, let them embattell themselves and bee broken, let them imbattell, and be broken, for thou art with us.

Then amidst the *Hymns*, and *Hallelujahs* of *Saints* some one may perhaps bee heard offering at high *strains* in new and lofty *Measures* to sing and celebrate thy *divine Mercies*, and *marvelous Judgements* in this Land throughout all AGES. . . .

E. H. VISIAK.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Archæological Reconnaissances in N.W. India and S.E. Iran, carried out and recorded with the support of Harvard University and the British Museum by Sir Aurel Stein: xii + 267 pages, with 22 plans and maps, 88 illustrations and 34 plates (Macmillan, 1937, £3 3s.).

Sir Aurel Stein combines the historic virtues of Ulysses and Æneas, and he has found a generous patron in Harvard University, whence he obtained six-sevenths of the funds for this his latest pilgrimage to the homelands of the common ancestors of most mankind. His goal was originally Chinese Turkestan and Inner Mongolia; frustrated by the obstruction and dilatory tactics of Nanking and of provincial Chinese officials, he turned his steps to South-Eastern Iran in the hope of extending the work which he had already done in British Baluchistan in connexion with Alexander's Indian campaign. His travels took him from the extreme south-east of Persian Makran through Baluchistan to Kerman, and south from Minab, near Bandar Abbas, to Bushire, through regions which appear, in the words of Lord Curzon, 'intrinsically abominable and vile' to those who know them only from the air, and must have appeared scarcely less so to Sir Aurel Stein. He had the advantage during the first of these journeys and on his traverse of the Salt Ranges of N.W. India of the company of Dr. C. L. Fabri, of Leiden University, to whom he pays a generous and deserved tribute.

His first two chapters shed fresh and authoritative light on Alexander's campaign and on Buddhist remains in the Punjab. The rest of the book, a royal quarto, deals with Persian Makran and the country to the west of it as far as Bushire. Full credit is given and the fullest use made of the researches of earlier workers—mainly British and German—in the same field; the pottery, coinage and other remains discovered, fully delineated, in a series of admirable plates, suffice to demonstrate, for the first time, the close relation between the civilisation of the Indus valley with Iran in pre-

historic periods. No new discoveries of importance described, but the continuity of history and the existence organised local Governments in these desolate areas, in d: that seem to us incredibly remote, is shown by a wealth carefully marshalled evidence.

Two observations suggest themselves. The first ref to Sir Aurel Stein himself. He is nearly seventy-six, which age Mrs. Trollope had written 140 volumes, the fi of which was not written till she was fifty. In a few montl time he will have lived longer than Turner, Disraeli ar Jowett, not in the easy retirement that was their later lot, b in strenuous journeys in exceedingly trying climates, oft facing, in the course of his travels, difficulties which riv those of St. Paul. Yet his pen is fresh, his memory cle: and his capacity, in the words of Jeremy Taylor, 'to dra many lines from the same centre, and most deductions fro the same facts,' remains wholly unimpaired.

T. L. Peacock's lines to Lord Broughton will be echoe by Sir Aurel Stein's many friends when, on November 2 of this year, he celebrates his seventy-sixth birthday.

Old friend, whose rhymes so kindly mix
Thoughts grave and gay with seventy-six,
I hope it may to you be given
To do the same at seventy-seven ;
Whence your still living friends may date
A new good wish for seventy-eight,
And thence again extend the line,
Until it passes seventy-nine ;

. . . . .

And the lines do not end there.

A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

Samuel Johnson once observed that knowledge was of two kinds ; 'we know a subject ourselves or we know where we can find information upon it. When we inquire into any subject, the first thing we have to do is to know what books have treated of it.'

He would have warmly welcomed the *Handbook of International Organizations* (other than those run for profit) just

published by the League of Nations.[1] Thirty pages are devoted to International Organisations, mostly to prevent war; seventy pages to societies for or against religion, or to inculcate all or some aspects of morality; seventy to the Arts and Sciences, and so on—nearly 500 pages in all. There are subject, geographical and alphabetical indices, and the work is well printed. It should take its place among standard works of reference in every public and club library. It is, however, more than a work of reference: it is a monument to the fissiparous, adscititious tendencies of thoughtful folk in many spheres. There are thirty or more international organisations against war, half a dozen against alcoholism, a dozen in the cause of Christianity and half a dozen against it, with several scores dealing with education. The need for *gleichsaltung* is apparent. The best established organisations are those which existed before the war: the most successful, except the I.L.O., are those which, though sometimes affiliated to and even subsidised by the League under Article 24, have their headquarters elsewhere. Some, which are not under the direction of the League but co-operate with it in some special field, show every sign of vigorous life. The present weakness of the League does not of necessity involve a diminution of the influence and activity of these bodies.

I can trace no reference to the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, to the Epidemic Intelligence Bureau at Singapore, and there are other apparent omissions, but they do not detract from the great value of the work to all engaged in public work.

A Meteorological Chronology to A D 1450, by C E. Britton, B Sc. (Stationery Office, 8*s*, 1937). [M O 409a. Air Ministry Meteorological Office. Geophysical Memoirs No. 70, First Number, Volume VIII. Crown Copyright Reserved. Decimal Index, 551 506 9]

This formidable quarto volume of 177 pages (paper covers) is a recent product of 'Research' under governmental auspices. It covers 4000 years from B.C. 2668 to A.D. 1450 It has been compiled with immense industry which must be regarded, for practical purposes, as lost labour.

'*Causa vera et radix fere omnium malorum in scientiis ea una est, quod vera ejus auxilia non quaeramus.*' Thus Lord Chancellor Bacon This is not the way to harness history in the service of man, and I doubt whether any scientific society would have thought it worth the money spent on it.

[1] Agents: Allen and Unwin (12*s* 6*d*, 1938)

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER

1877 1938

Founded by JAMES KNOWLES

1938 MAY No. 735. Vol. CXXIII.

LONDON: CONSTABLE & CO., LTD., ORANGE STREET, LEICESTER SQUARE, W.C.2.

Registered for Canadian Magazine Post.


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PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY *AND AFTER*



No. DCCXXXV—May 1938

THE PRESENT OUTLOOK

By Lord Ponsonby

Nobody wants a European War. But there are numbers of confusing and contradictory expedients advocated in order to prevent it. Underlying all is fear—one may almost say terror—of the destructive capacity of modern engines of war. No one now is safe, not even the high governmental authorities who hitherto have been able to direct hostilities in safety from a distance. Destruction and loss of life on a large scale are not all that is feared. Considerable as these are bound to be, judging even by the comparatively small instances in the wars now being waged between ill-equipped forces, the widespread alarm and ghastly panic which must ensue from bombardment by highly equipped air forces may produce unimaginable results undermining the whole order of our present civilisation. In fact, the nations—indeed, humanity itself—is contemplating its impending doom.

Man's ingenuity has far outrun his moral sense and, terror-stricken, he watches the development of the work of his own hands; not the so-called act of God—the earthquake, the flood or the volcanic eruption, for which he has no responsibility—but a far more devastating scourge which he has himself invented and prepared. All defences must be puny and ineffective, and preparations for still greater violence can only add more fuel to the flames. Salvation can only be found in a supreme moral endeavour to guide man's mind into another direction. This requires greater effort, more courage and more determination than appears to be conceivable, judging by the acquiescent drift towards the abyss which one and all see staring before them.

What conceivable causes are there for so calamitous an outbreak of fratricide in the world? Some say the situation reminds them of 1914, whereas it has little or no likeness to it. Fear of war has possessed the general public for some considerable time. In 1914 the storm blew up in a seemingly clear sky. But the war of 1914–18 must be closely remembered as an outstanding example of the futility of force and as a classic example of military victory leading to a vindictive peace, and consequently sowing the seeds of future suspicion, revenge, jealousy and conflict. The war to crush German militarism has produced a militarism in Germany compared with which the attitude of its Government seems now very tame. The war to make the world safe for democracy has meant the fall of many Parliaments and the emergence of powerful dictators. Yet there are many to-day who are repeating those very same cries. The democracies are to band themselves together against the dictators and Nazism and Fascism are to be crushed by force of arms. Amazing as it may at first seem that such cries should be acceptable anywhere, with the lesson in our minds of only twenty years ago, we must remember that there is a new element introduced which can make them sound plausible—the League of Nations. No finer conception has come to the mind of man than that of a representative international body to help in regulating, and when possible adjusting, inevitable international disputes. But a Covenant drafted in the hour of triumph, attached to a Treaty imposing punitive terms on the vanquished and relying on force for the preservation of the

status quo according to the parcelling out of Europe and other parts of the world by the victors, could not last long unless wisdom were shown in rapidly withdrawing restraints, adjusting differences and eliminating injustices. But no such wisdom was shown. Consequently the vanquished took the law into their own hands and, disregarding obligations which had been forced on them, hailed a dictator who could recover for them their sovereignty, their equality of status, their power and their prestige in the community of nations. Another dictator flouted the League's endeavour to stop his enterprise in imperial aggrandisement when he wanted to wipe out the Italian defeat at Adowa by the conquest of Abyssinia (copying us when we wiped out the defeat at Majuba by the conquest of South Africa). The automatic and co-operative exercise of force by the League was found to be impracticable, and the imperial expansionist, now called the aggressor, went unpunished. The League was deeply shocked. Four great Powers now stand outside, and yet its friends still insist that it should form the basis of what is loosely termed 'collective security' to line up the peace-loving democracies, with Russia at their back, to keep in order, thwart and, if need be, punish the aggressors. This general basis of faith in what remains of the League finds favour with those who genuinely fear the extension of the doctrines of Fascism. Strong anti-imperialists as they may be, they genuinely believe that by force of arms the extension of the doctrines of the totalitarian States can be checked and countered. Thus a conflict of what is popularly called 'ideology' divides opinion with the same intensity as conflicting religious beliefs did in past centuries. In the nations where free expression of opinion is allowed these ideological differences are internal as well. Here at home the fear of either Fascism or Communism is negligible. But both sides are keenly apprehensive about the growing tide of either on the Continent, where the antagonism in totalitarian States is clear-cut.

Let us consider what are regarded as danger-points and the nations spoken of as potential aggressors. The United States may be ruled out under either head. France is no potential aggressor, but is undoubtedly a danger-point. Its defective method of government produces an instability

which in times of crisis is a serious handicap. The prospect of three Fascist neighbours is alarming and internal dissensions of a violent character cannot entirely be ruled out. In the circumstances, wise counsels would recommend accommodation with neighbours whatever their form of government may be, whether it be established by revolution, by consent, or by *coup d'état*. Our commitments to France are vague and therefore dangerous. In 1914 they were secret, but quite precise. Differences of opinion internally are likely to prevent any foreign adventure unless it were to meet a direct attack—an improbable eventuality.

The Russian dictatorship, so closely resembling in its methods the Fascist dictatorships, is at present linked to France and therefore 'on our side.' The enthusiasm for Russia in our Left wing has considerably cooled owing to recent purges, which have, incidentally, shown that there must be something dangerously rotten in the Soviet structure. Nevertheless, owing to sharp differences of opinion here at home, a war against Russia would be impossible.

Italy, disappointed by the negligible spoils acquired in 1919, has been encouraged by a dictator to assert itself as a great military Power. In the eyes of many there is danger here.

Spain need not be such a danger-point as is generally supposed. The Civil War is not a new phenomenon produced by the circumstances of modern times. It is only the last of a series of revolutions which have occurred at frequent intervals in Spanish history. Modern weapons of war have made it more savage and destructive, and the rapid and detailed transmission of news has served to excite the partisans of either side in other nations. Non-intervention has failed, as it was bound to do. But undoubtedly our adherence to the principle has prevented the fire of the Spanish Civil War from spreading into a great European conflagration. If the insurgents are victorious, then Franco's task is not concluded. It begins. He has got to govern Spain, including the vast populations he has been trying to destroy. He will be kept very busy, and no menace to outside countries is likely to come from Spain.

Germany, kept for long in subjection under the Treaty of Versailles, finding appeals for justice—moderately put

forward under the republican Government—ignored by the victorious Powers in the war, has submitted to the domination of a dictator. He has torn up the Treaty of Versailles page by page. Germany has rearmed, reoccupied lost territory and asserted itself once more as a formidable military Power with further ambitions.

The question then arises how best to deal with the two dictator Powers whose projects and ambitions are making other nations nervous. On the one hand, it is proposed to fall back on the Covenant, in spite of the absence from the League of four great Powers, and to revive the idea of 'collective security,' in spite of the fact that it has been demonstrated beyond question to be utterly impracticable. It is suggested that we 'should have no truck' with the two dictatorships, but by a united alliance of the remaining members of the League a sufficient force would be created to make them hesitate, or indeed to check them, in the fulfilment of what are deemed to be their aggressive ambitions. This, of course, means dividing Europe up into two hostile and sharply divided camps, and consequent war on a far more extensive, and necessarily more devastating, scale than the war of twenty years ago.

On the other hand, it is proposed to adopt the method of conciliation, of approaching and talking with the most difficult nations, with whose form of government we have no sympathy whatever. By this means their grievances, their resentments, their complaints, and their proposals can be closely examined, and round a council table a relaxation of the tension, settlements with a view to appeasement, and equitable adjustments can be reached. In the case of Germany, for instance, the claims of colonies must be faced, not as a matter for bargaining, but as part and parcel of a general settlement. Get your peace treaty before a war, when cool minds can examine the questions in a judicial and dispassionate frame of mind. Leave it till after the fighting, and the victors are bound to impose vindictive and inequitable terms on the vanquished.

The great failure of the League of Nations has been not so much inability to impose sanctions on Japan or on Italy, nor even the breakdown of the almost grotesque Disarmament Conferences, which occupied their time in laying down

regulations as to how the next war should be waged. The League's failure has been its gross neglect for twenty years to tackle the question of the revision of treaties and its consequent attempt to defend and maintain a *status quo* which, it was obvious, the vanquished nations would not indefinitely tolerate. The periodic and automatic revision of all treaties is a function with which a real League of Nations should most certainly be entrusted in the modern rapidly changing world.

There can be no doubt that the method of conversations and bilateral agreements is the right initial approach. There is no question, however formidable, which cannot be resolved by good-will. Good-will only exists in peace-time, not after a war. But this first step must be followed by a more comprehensive conference where not only political and strategic questions are examined, but where social, economic, tariff, currency and industrial problems should be faced, affecting as they do all nations in a world more closely united than it has ever been, and where the impoverishment or ruin of one nation injures all the others. Without declaring acquiescence in all the propositions in the Van Zeeland Report, many believe that this first approach to the subject is one that should be followed up. The continuous effort to grapple with causes and origins is a far more hopeful method of procedure than each nation waiting aloof for the inexorable drift towards first economic and then military conflict.

So far I may have in my argument been able to carry a large proportion of my fellow-countrymen with me. But, as a life-long pacifist, I must venture on to more disputable ground where a minority only, though a growing minority, will support me I come to the one actual danger, by far the most formidable. The wise moves towards conciliation and conference are vitiated, and may be rendered entirely nugatory by the policy of rearmament. The nations are rearming, are piling up engines of war, are imposing on their people intolerably heavy financial burdens, are neglecting works of reconstruction, are militarising their countrymen, and in this country making a temporary and dangerously illusory reduction in unemployment. All this is poisoning the public mind with the false prospect of inevitable war. Germany rearmed because the rest of Europe refused to honour their obligation

to restrict their armaments. 'Why should Germany rearm?,' we asked; 'what has she to fear?' Immediately we, in a far safer geographical position than Germany, joined in the competitive armaments race and so encouraged other nations, great and small, to follow our lead No nation has ever increased its armaments without saying that it is only for defensive purposes. The old phrase '*Si vis pacem, para bellum*,' discredited times without number, is still repeated. It is a thousand pities that a good move diplomatically should be accompanied by what must always be regarded as a threat. There is no need to labour the point. It may take long for people to become convinced that disarmament means security, as in those circumstances there is no remote possibility of being accused of aggression. They may need more tragic examples to prove to them that armaments do not mean security. 'Winning' a war, the people are deluded into supposing, is all that is needed. In reality it means nothing, and only postpones a durable peace still further into a distant future. The bare fact is that the piling up of arms in itself becomes a cause of war. No one has expressed this more convincingly than Lord Grey of Fallodon when, looking back on the war, he wrote his reflections in 1925:

> Each Government, while resenting any suggestion that its own measures are anything more than precaution for defence, regards similar measures of another Government as preparations for attack. The moral is obvious: it is that great armaments lead inevitably to war. If there are armaments on one side there must be armaments on other sides While one nation arms, other nations cannot tempt it to aggression by remaining defenceless. . . . Each measure taken by one nation is noted and leads to counter measures by others. The increase of armaments, that is intended in each nation to produce consciousness of strength and a sense of security, does not produce these effects On the contrary it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear. Fear begets suspicion and distrust and evil imaginings of all sorts, till each Government feels it would be criminal and a betrayal of its own country not to take every precaution, while every Government regards every precaution of every other Government as evidence of hostile intent.

As relevant to the present position of international relations, the case against armament competition could not

be better put. When one hears the language used in the repeated assertions that our hectic, extravagant and accelerated rearmament is merely a precaution for defence, one cannot help agreeing with Dr. L. P. Jacks, who in his recent book *Co-operation or Coercion?* writes:

> Our armed strength wins us a certain kind of respect; but we should be respected still more, and in a higher sense, if we overcame our inveterate habit of inventing moral reasons for looking after our own interests.

To sum up: in my view there are no outstanding international differences or causes of dispute which are of such a character as to lead nations to the battlefield, or to the deadly rain of bombs from the sky, when they all know that by such means any solution becomes definitely impossible. The terrible and impending danger comes from the gigantic preparation of the most devastating engines of destruction which makes Governments feel that when they are 'ready,' with inadequate excuse, they can strike a blow. In negotiations carried on in a strained atmosphere, Governments with the war card in their hands, which they imagine to be a trump, will play it on the slightest provocation. The fully armed man may think he can dominate in the Council Chamber. So he can; but only at the expense of justice and peace in the future.

PONSONBY.

THE POISON CALLED HISTORY[1]

By H. G. Wells

My title sounds aggressive and it is meant to be aggressive. It is addressed to all who teach history to the new generation, and that means not only teachers but parents, preachers, journalists, writers of all sorts, elder brethren. I want to speak very plainly about the relationship of what is called 'History' to the human outlook. It is impossible to do so without giving offence in quite a number of directions, and I see no good at all in propitiatory gestures. The world to-day is in an evil state and it faces greater evils. Many factors no doubt contribute to this malaise of our world, but the primary source of our present troubles is the complete incompatibility between our historical traditions and the new, more exacting conditions of life created for us by invention and discovery. The adjustment of history to reality has become a matter of supreme urgency. It will not wait. This discordance means destruction and suffering and blood and enslavement, and more destruction and suffering and enslavement, until a clear conception of the jarring forces at work in our world is achieved, a controlling conception that is, *or* until the present degringolade is complete.

You are teaching history to the on-coming generations in a wrong way and in a wrong spirit. I am going to do my best to show you why I think you are teaching history in the wrong way and the wrong spirit. A drastic revision of your ideas and methods is necessary before your teaching can be effective in that cause of world peace to which almost all of you give at least lip service.

The world is being torn to pieces now by old ideas armed with new and frightful weapons. You see conceptions of

[1] Lecture delivered at the League of Nations Union International Teachers' Conference, April 24, 1938.

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national conquest, ascendency, glory, revenges and sentimental releases, old-fashioned conceptions all of them, equipped with destructive power beyond all previous times. None of these ideas are innate ideas. They have been *taught* to peoples. They have been imposed upon them. If you changed at birth all the babies of one country for those of another, they would grow up patriots of their land of education. They would fight, only they would fight the other way round. Nationalism, plainly, is the purest artificiality. It is made by the teaching of history—by parents, friends, flags, ceremonies, as well as by the persistent pressure of the schools, but mainly in the schools. I do not see how you can evade the conclusion that the festering of worn-out and discarded national history is the irritating cause of all the fear and fever in which we are living to-day.

Now the essence of what I have to say is that there are two sorts of history, an old traditional history which is out-of-date and decaying and becoming more and more poisonous, and a new sort of history which is essentially human biology and which arises naturally and necessarily out of the mighty revolution in biological thought that has happened in the past hundred years, and which has also been tremendously assisted in its development in the last forty years and more by archæological work. That is my essential thesis. That is what I am thrusting in your face now—my challenge.

There is an old history—which, for all the headlong denials of indignant teachers, is what is still being taught up and down the scale from the universities to the infant schools. And there is a new history—now most urgently needed—which is different in scope, method, possibilities and effect from the old and which is scarcely being taught at all. It is so different that people have suggested that it should be called by a new name. Just as the old anecdotal and descriptive *natural history* of our grandparents gave way to a practically new science, biology, of which the study of operating causes was the core, so it may be found necessary to speak by another name of a new history which also puts anecdote and description into subordination, which simplifies detail whenever it can and seeks operating causes. Human ecology, social biology, have been proposed. But we have not settled that term yet, and for the present there is no choice but to talk

about the old history, history proper, and, opposed to it, scientific history that must supplement it almost to the pitch of replacement, if history is to be of any real service to mankind.

There is a necessary sequence in both these cases. Natural history had to come before scientific biology. History proper had to exist before it could be subjected to the probes and acids of criticism. But the new stuff is what matters in this connexion. It furnishes the natural clue to that vast and fundamental change in human conditions which is implicit when you talk of the abolition of war. It shows plainly why war has to be abolished if humanity, as we know it, is to survive. It explains (and that clearly) why consciously directed life must now undergo a revolutionary change, or blunder on through deepening distresses and disaster. It analyses operating causes, as every honest science does, with a view to foresight. That the old history never did.

The older history in which we have all been saturated from childhood has never had any anticipatory quality. The bits and scraps of the new history which we have had to pick up for ourselves are, on the contrary, full of intimations of what is likely to happen to us in the years before us and of what has to be done if certain consequences are to be escaped or attained.

But first let me ask rather more precisely, What is this older history in which I have said we have all been saturated? What has been its function in the past? And how is it functioning now?

At the back of our minds we find a sort of assumption that history has some sort of scientific value, that it is a balanced account of what really happened in the past. I myself was brought up in that widespread delusion, and, in common with multitudes of other active-minded people, my intellectual life-history in this respect is largely one of disillusionment. For the reality is plainly different, so soon as you achieve that last phase of adult development, looking facts in the face. I am, in fact, saying practically what that very clear-headed and original American, Henry Ford, said about common history: that it is *bunk*—pretentious stuff and largely useless matter.

From the beginning history has never been scientifically impartial; it has been written with a purpose. Sometimes, but not very often, that purpose has been purely artistic—as when Gibbon, for example, painted that mighty spectacular piece *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. But usually it has been written, and almost universally it has been taught, in order to school minds in relation to some particular conception of the community in which they had to live. It sought to make them citizens, it sought to make them patriots, it sought to combine them for glory or some aggressive enterprise. It enhanced their pride in themselves. The Father of History was plainly the propagandist of a Greek attack upon Persia. Read him again and see. Most of the historical parts of that strange miscellany, the Old Testament, aim at consolidating that queer crowd of Babylonian Jews who returned to Jerusalem, by the legend of a chosen people and a special promise. It has been a very tragic tradition for the Jews, an incentive to racial egotism, a perennial exasperation of the Gentiles round about them. The more people come to translate and read each other's histories, the more likely they are to detest each other. That magnification of 'us' and 'ours' to the disadvantage and irritation of other peoples pervades nearly every history in the world.

Usually the old history begins with a falsified account of the national beginnings. Few go back into any remoter past. A certain number of histories jump into their story with the favoured nation as a growing concern, and many deal only with a definite period of time. It is rare that any attempt is made to trace changes in the proportion of various social elements or the way in which the legend of a national character is built up, and still rarer that there is any checking back of documentary sources by archæological material. Common history remains still national or regional propaganda lightened by gossip and at most paying lip service to humanitarian ideals. It is only in quite recent years that any attempt has been made to present a world history. And then the disposition of the historians has been to assemble all the partial histories in a sort of crazy patchwork rather than to discover any general pattern. The time-honoured national and imperial boundaries are not broken down; they are still

there as the main divisions of the subject. Yet there *is* a general pattern, and it is simpler than any of these jig-saw shapes which historians present to the new generation. But they have a constitutional disposition to precision in specific detail and recklessness in generalisation. They introduce the most amazing phantoms—the spirit of the East, the spirit of the West, the Greek spirit, the Hebrew spirit, the virtues of the Nordics, young nations, old nations, golden ages, the cradle of civilisation, the march of civilisation from East to West!

Their training, their tradition, expose them to these fantasies. They begin with the arbitrary unreality of patriotism, and to enlarge the scope of history is for them only to enlarge the arbitrary fantasy. No historian ever troubles to criticise a generalisation. It is in this general looseness and partisan unscrupulousness that the essential unsuitableness of the old history for our present necessities resides.

I put it to you that if we want the world to become a consistent whole, we must think of it as a whole and it must think of itself as a whole. We must cease to deal with states, nations and empires as primary things which have to be reconciled and welded together, we must deal with them as secondary things which have appeared and disappeared almost incidentally in the course of a larger and longer biological adventure. Education, I insist, which made these boundaries, can wipe them out completely. Even an intelligent critical opposition can so enfeeble them that everywhere nowadays the established order is forced to a more or less complete suppression of radical criticism. Everywhere. I would like to know how and where a frank denial of the value of the British monarchy could be launched in England—launched, that is, to reach any number of people. If we are ever to have a World Pax, these primary divisions of the matter of the old history have to be abandoned. It is a wild impossibility to dream of peoples being at the same time kept distinct and yet being welded together in some sort of disunited unity.

Now this new history of which I speak, *so far as it is still political*, must be essentially a history of enlarging communities. I do not mean by that an enforced coalescence of

communities; I mean a real enlargement of scope and intercourse. The world-story begins at the sub-human level with scattered family groups, and the main operating cause of all the subsequent developments has been the increase in the facilities of communication—the growth and elaboration of speech, gesture, writing, locomotion on land and water, roads, power-driven transport, telegraph, radio, and so on. A crescendo of facilities. Every increase in the range of communications has necessarily opened up new possibilities of co-operation, injury and enslavement. So that continually the nature of social and political history has changed. The rules of the game have changed. But the state of historical thought and knowledge in our community is still such that this secular process of enlarging association gets but the scanticst attention. Historians, even if they admit a certain amount of coalescence in the past, will not recognise it as a current possibility. Nations are their units. *International*, and not cosmopolitan, is their blessed word. Cosmopolis they will not endure. It never has been. Therefore it cannot be. All history is against it.

But all reality is for it.

Let me now put before you some of the leading topics with which the new directive history must deal, and with which the old history, with its incurable bias for particularism, for nationalist sentimentality, is too entangled to deal. They are urgent topics. I want to be quite clear about this. I do not intend that these topics I am proposing should be *added* to the present teaching of history. I am proposing that you teach history in a new way and in a new spirit. I propose that the present division of historical teaching into the chiefly political history of localities, of countries, of selected peoples, of periods, should be absolutely and completely scrapped. I propose that the teaching of Greek History, Latin History, Jewish or Bible History, English History, French History, Mediæval History, German History, our Island Story, the Empire, and so on, and so on, as separate subjects, shall be entirely abandoned. Bear in mind, please, that here I am speaking of teaching. So far as special historical study and research goes, there is excellent justification for the intensive treatment of particular persons and phases, bits of record and groups of events, and I do not see why it should

be restricted at all, in the light that a broader historical and biological education would throw upon such special studies. I do not see why that sort of thing should not be further concentrated and intensified. There is need, of course, of a great increase in research on the scientific side of past developments, but that does not detract from the meticulous pursuit of historical fact by every available means. But research is one aspect of history and teaching quite another, and I am speaking of teaching now, and particularly of teaching from the point of view of preparing the human mind for a World Pax, and with a full realisation of the horror, contempt, disgust and hatred I am evoking in many of your minds, I repeat again that if you are really in earnest about world peace you must utterly and entirely wipe out this sacred system of dividing history into 'histories' that has hitherto prevailed.

And instead—

Instead, I suggest that in teaching the history of mankind we approach the story from the biological side. We begin with the conception of small sub-human family groups scattered about the world, almost completely unaware of each other. We trace the development of speech, of gesture and drawing, and we show how these beginnings of communication and understanding led inevitably to larger communities. This is a mode of presentation far more acceptable to the childish mind than 'In 43 a Roman host from Gaul assailed *our* southern coast,' or any other of the time-honoured nationalist beginnings. We teach of wanderings, of caves and shelters, of primitive habitations, of the invention of implements. Never once do we talk of *our* tribe. I am writing this in England as an Englishman. The truth is that, so far from the southern coast of Britain being *ours* at that time, we, or rather our ancestral genes, were almost everywhere but there. *We* were in Gothland, on the Baltic coast, down the Danube, in Palestine, in Egypt—Heaven knows where. But wherever we were, our ideas, our arts, our powers and range were progressing in an orderly and intensely interesting way. The history of communication, the history of implements, and the intelligent study of the consequences of this progress and extension of human mentality is infinitely simpler and truer than any of the old history. It's healthy food, whereas your race-and-nation stuff is poisoned food.

Children like it better. It is the primary shape of history. And every step in method and material, every new device, has changed the social conditions and mentality of the peoples to whom these new things came. Everywhere old tradition has fought a long but losing battle against the adaptation of usage, law and convention to the new conditions. Political institutions have always been ultimately dependent upon material change. They are such stuff as books are made of. They change with the writing and the telling. They are shadows on the surface; they may reveal contours, they do not make them.

Consider one chapter in this more fundamental human history for which I plead—the onset of iron. Iron came into human life bringing with it all sorts of possibilities—for war, for peace. Up to the very present day the irons, the steels, direct and rule and change life as no Alexanders, no Cæsars, no Jengis Khans or Mussolinis have ever done. Because you know it is only your prejudice against new things that makes you belittle Stalin and Hitler and Mussolini *vis-à-vis* Cæsar and Napoleon. They were all resultants of deeper forces. If you choose to look at reality, you can see the things that arise out of iron, from the first iron spearhead and the first axe, to the steel rail, the battleship and the motor, tempting and obliging and compelling men to change their ways of life and their relations to one another. There were no particular iron-minded peoples. It was a matter of quite secondary importance to everyone but the gangs and individuals concerned, what collection of people first got hold of the new thing. In any hands it did the same thing. Iron is still ruling us, because we are so silly in our history-made politics that we cannot rule iron.

The other day I was reading about one incidental edict of this metallic empire, and that was Tom Harrisson's account of the destruction of the social life in the New Hebrides. Before the axe and nails came to these islands the hollowing out of a canoe was a long enterprise demanding the brotherly exertion of the whole community. It was elaborated, it was socialised. Life was full and interesting for active young men. Then came the swift hatchet and everything was changed. There was no longer the same need for mutual help, old procedure was discredited and, most dangerous thing any human

community can produce, there appeared a class of insufficiently employed young men with easy weapons to their hands. Social disorganisation followed inevitably.

The story of iron is only one section of metallurgical history. Metallurgical history is only one chapter in the story of implements and devices. Another section would be the story of the boat, the ship, the wheel, the domestication of the horse and the making of roads. These things arose here and there: the history of their beginnings is profoundly interesting to every free intelligence; and they seeped about among the growing communities. Every one of them changed human relations. Every child is eager to learn about such things. Think of the toys they like! No one dreams of giving children images of Great Men—Cæsar, Moses, Darwin, Beethoven, Buddha and so on. They would be bored. But bricks, implements and inventions are alive to them. New classes of workers appeared, old classes were superseded, symbolic beliefs lost their significance, the reality of power shifted from group to group. People got at each other in new ways.

Old prestige fought against these changes. The history the older order sustained, did all it could to deny their reality. Wherever change was happening, old history teaching was doing its best to deny it. The old history up to the present day breaks up the picture of the real operating causes in human affairs and does everything possible to conceal them The history of nations and peoples is not the essential history of mankind; its chapters are not even natural fragments of that history. It is very largely a history of the bragging and misbehaviour of the peoples who were thrust for a little time into a position of advantage because the new thing chose to strike them first. When the new education does have to take cognisance of the kingdoms and empires that have come and gone, like flashes of colour in an oily pool, it will have to deal with these childish claims with humour and sometimes with indignant humour But not with respect and incitements to respect.

I will not speak at length about certain other primary realities in the spreading, development and coalescence of human communities, of diseases, and particularly of epidemic diseases, of natural variations of climate; the history of

South-East Russia and Central Asia, for example, is not so much a history of what mankind has done there as of the things that fluctuations of rainfall have done there. From the earliest time man appears as a biological nuisance to himself as well as the rest of living things. He cuts down trees, he destroys soil, he acclimatises destructive animals. A map of the world showing the devastated regions due to mankind would amaze most people. In the past hundred years you have seen great regions of the United States turned to sandy desert, you have seen Australia swept by weeds and rabbits, you have seen a slaughter of scores of useful animal species, you have seen a monstrous destruction of natural resources, and your old history teaching does nothing to awaken the minds of the coming generation to the gravity of this process. It does not heed such things. It exaggerates heroes and leaders whenever it can, it talks loosely of racial energy and decadent peoples, and hurries on to map out new political boundaries and break up and lose the essential problem in new ' national ' stories.

But the new history is not simply a new criticism of the general material life of mankind. Do not imagine that though I began first with the material expansion and changes of human life I consider that to be anything more than the groundwork and framework of a new history. Its subtler and more important business is the study of the development of socially binding ideas through the medium of speech and writing. How did language, speech and writing arise? The new generation to whom you are teaching history has hardly a shred of an idea about that. How does a language guide and determine thought? Does the structure of a language determine a particular idiom of thought? People are beginning to realise as much, to demand books about it, but you old historians have done nothing to show how the imposition of a language or a blending of languages gives a new twist, and often a new power, to the community's mental processes. I find in that excellent new encyclopædia the French are producing so heroically, a very admirable comparative study of the Aryan, Chinese and Japanese languages as instruments of thought. A language is an implement quite as much as an implement of stone or steel: its use involves social consequences; it does things to you. It makes new

precisions and also new errors possible. There are endless things you can say in English that you cannot say in French or Russian, and no doubt *vice versâ*.

Your old history never calls attention to that. You are letting people grow up with a belief that, apart from the natural changes from Old Saxon to Old English, Middle English and so on, it would be possible for a common Londoner of, let us say, 800 A.D. to exchange ideas with a common Londoner of to-day. But in reality they would be using instruments as different in complexity and possibility as a coracle and a rather worn and misused motor launch. They would not be able to make head or tail of each other. And when a university don sits down to tell you of the political schemes of Cæsar and Alexander, he never attempts to get, much less to give, any account of the geographical or administrative knowledge of these two wastrels. I doubt if either of them had even as much political creativeness as the late Huey Long—or was even as great a man.

And not only does the old history teaching give people nothing about the powers and dangers of the metal implements men have used and are using, but it develops no sense of the comparative quality of the binding ideas that hold, and have held, communities together.

These binding ideas, these national and religious legends and mythologies in which we were all saturated in our youth, are mental growths of the most complicated sort. The laws of their development and operation have to be examined and exposed frankly and scientifically. The old history has accepted and treated these flexible and unstable systems as unalterable. In reality these mental contagious and infectious diseases are as controllable as physical contagious and infectious diseases. And their proper sanitation is imperative if any permanent world peace is ever to be attained.

My conviction of the extraordinary uselessness of the old history in our treatment of modern problems has been very much quickened in the last few years by my excitement over two particular questions. One of these is the continuing steady ill-will of large sections of the American community towards Britain and of influential sections of the British community towards America. This split does much to weaken the force of liberal opinion in the English-speaking

community. The other question is the far more moving a tragic situation of the Jew in the modern world. Both th questions concern the establishment and growth of a lege and the old history, which is itself essentially the offspring legend, has a natural aversion to the parricide involved.

I will merely glance at the paradox of the Americ situation. A century and a half ago the original thirte states of the union cast loose from the economic exploitati of the British monarchy. They did so with the support a sympathy of the City of London and large sections of t British people. It was a social quite as much as a territor conflict. But to hold the new detached colonies together, prevent their drifting back towards British tutelage, it w necessary to simplify the issue and tell a story of the u mitigated disingenuousness of all British people. Th became the master idea of the American story. That sto is sustained by a number of American writers with the passi of fanatics and the industry of paid propagandists. In t United States of America now you have a vast population the most varied origins—Scandinavian, Dutch, Germa Canadian, Irish, Italian, Moravian, Eastern European, Syri and so on and so forth, and, except for the Jews, they have lost their own ancestral legends. Only a very small eleme in this mighty human aggregate had even a single ancest on either side in the War of Independence. But they ha all taken that story on—lock, stock and barrel. You w meet American citizens still speaking with a strong Germ accent who glory in their victory at Bunker Hill and a unable to express their indignation at the unforgettal barbarity of bringing Hessian troopers into a white mar war.

I should call that sort of thing historical assimilation. is worth attentive study in America to-day. It is still mo worth studying in the present welding of various Wendis Celtic, High and Low German folk into the delusion th they are a racially pure and simple and superior Germa people. But the greatest, most astounding story masked ar hidden beneath the misrepresentations of the old history the Judæo-Christian mythology that has set the Jewish peop apart from the rest of mankind. It is only nowadays that or is able to see the reality of the process through the mist o

tactful suppressions and concessions in which it has been veiled by the old historical teaching. But now—small thanks to the old history—we do begin to realise the actual shape of the story. We see, although so far we do not trace the directive forces in the matter, how the kindred Semitic-speaking peoples, the Babylonians, the Phœnicians, the Carthaginians crumple up one after another under the attacks of Medes, Persians, Greeks and Latins, rough militant peoples who knew far less about commerce, finance and civilisation generally than the Semitic peoples they conquered. We see the nucleus of the Jewish tradition centring its story upon an alleged promise of God to return certain people to Palestine.

Everywhere in that ancient world were Semitic people, politically dispossessed, but they met one another, they had their gathering-places; many of them read and wrote, they counted, they traded, they formed a string of similar communities with similar habits, customs and ceremonies. What more natural than that a legend of a coming dramatic reinstatement should capture the Semitic imagination everywhere, should set about assimilating these subdued peoples? Suddenly, in your histories, Phœnicians, Carthaginians, Babylonians disappear; and as abruptly everywhere you find Jews. What had happened? Judaism and Christianity were manifestly born side by side in the opening years of the Roman Empire. They were attempts of the human mind, and particularly of the Semitic-speaking section of humanity, to adjust itself to its new conditions of political inferiority. It was profoundly human to fall in with this idea of being God's chosen people, unpopular and scattered but destined to an ultimate triumph.

It was very natural history, but it was bad history. It had a poisonous strain in it. It arrested the amalgamation of the Aryan and Semitic cultures. It set up a division in the spirit of mankind, so that a great multitude of brilliant, able and skilled people, constituting a majority of the trading, travelling and money-handling strata, were set apart by the circumstances of their upbringing from any chance of coalescence with the people about them. Their exclusiveness increased.

I can imagine no more dreadful position in the world to-day than to be an intelligent Jew, with a clear sense of

reality. However great his gifts, he is going to be more or less frustrated, he is going to be a marked man. It is no good his claiming to be a citizen of the world. The Gentile world will not have it. It will say, 'No. You are a Jew.' And the Jewish world will not have it. It will say, 'Remember, you are a Jew. Stick to your own people.' Never has this dilemma had such long and sharp horns as it has to-day. Maybe we are in a phase of peculiar exacerbation about this business, but it seems to me that until we have had a strenuous clearing up of history-teaching in both Christian and Jewish education, until it is possible for the Jew to cease feeling distinctively a Jew and become a cosmopolitan without shame or falsehood, this miserable and tragic discord will enfeeble the intellectual processes of mankind and spoil the lives of innumerable people.

I cite the Jewish question as a particularly bad instance of the distortion of human life by the poison called History. But all over the world where history is taught, the history that separates prevails. You are not going to do anything to turn the world from its evil courses by assembling all these poisoned histories together, sewing them together with that bit of weak, rotten string, the League of Nations, and imagining they will act as antidotes to each other.

The old history is by its very nature useless as the basis of a World Peace Ideology. It is a struggle to sustain the old worn-out story of personified Britannias, Germanias, Holy Russias and so forth, meritorious races and chosen peoples. And this League of Nations, this little bit of a paper hat on the top, not of a Colossus but of a squirming heap of discordant patriotisms, is only a last desperate attempt to carry on the old patchwork of nationalist ideas into a new world that has no wholesome use for them. They have outlived their use, they decay, they become poisonous. If the young Hercules of a new World is to live, its first feat must be to strangle the tangled coil of poisonous old histories in its cradle.

H. G. Wells.

THE CULT OF THE HYENA

By J. P. Collins

That droll philosopher Mr. Dooley gave vent to his indignation years ago about the enormities of the Chicago Press in its handling of private concerns; and after watching the infiltration of Western methods over here, it is not to be wondered that the result meets with equal reprobation. 'They used to say,' Mr. Dooley remarked in his best sententious manner, 'a man's life was a closed book. So it is, but it's an open newspaper. The newspaper does everything for us. It runs the police force and the banks, commands the milishy, conthrols the legislature, baptises the young, marries the foolish, comforts the afflicted, afflicts the comfortable, buries the dead, and roasts them afthcrwards. There are no such things as private citizens.' The serio-comic 'Sage of Archey Road' knew his newspaper from title to 'signature,' and his impeachment in the main holds good to-day, especially where our less scrupulous papers add a new horror to death. But even impeachments call for fairness, and there is a morbid quadruped of no importance or reputation which is entitled to common justice at the least.

The hyena has many unattractive attributes. He shambles in his gait; he is rank and smells to heaven, and his equipment of tooth and claw makes his name a byword for obstinacy, misplaced efficiency, and sheer persistence. He is the real Common Enemy Number One, because he makes night hideous, and his work goes round the clock. In the main his prey is carrion, particularly carrion in a condition answering to Kipling's crisp description of 'fish that has gone bad twice.' When denied this delicacy he prefers, instead of facing men and horsewhips, to prey upon women, children, and domestic servants. He specialises in calamities and cemeteries after dark, and plays the part of what used to be

called the 'resurrection man'—but with this difference, that he does his own dirty work. Also, to be sure, he does it for hunger, not for hire. After harassing the common ear with his serenades, he leaves the relics of his paw-work a desecration in the light of dawn, so that everybody is made to know what has happened in the least agreeable way.

Yet there are distinctions to be drawn, in morticulture as in everything else. Even a hyena, one imagines, would draw the line at torturing the widow and the fatherless in moments of grief and dereliction. It is this sub-bestial behaviour on the part of certain publications which arouses indignation among right-thinking people, for they are made to realise day by day that this particular evil is the inevitable product of an elaborate and evil system. Let us merge this group into a composite photograph, as it were, since in their varying degrees and activities it will be found that they arrive at much the same end, irrespective of party label or class destination. Frankly, with some of them, politics matter as little as was the case with the Hoosier editor in the 'Biglow Papers,' except at election times, and then their passion for independence too often leads them to turn upon their own party. As someone has said in the enlightened Western jargon of the day, 'Their patriotism is poppycock, their politics are punk.' There is all the less reason for hesitation in lumping them together—that in regard to the principal ingredients in their composition (advertisements, 'features,' topical illustrations, and the paramount element of 'hot' news), their staple industry, in and out of business hours, is watching and stalking each other for the purpose of plagiarism and second-hand effects, 'as if their whole vocation were endless imitation.' Thus, if one of them starts a new order of 'stunt,' it is pounced upon and adopted by the rest, and no questions asked. That is why we see the same criminal or scandalous item decorated with the same 'agency' snap-shots and 'thriller' headlines in the same column of the corresponding page in rival papers of equal date. Somehow, one had thought enterprise was centrifugal in its action, but here the process of competition is so artificial and so unconcealed that it brings these internecine enemies by convergence to a mean and paltry assimilation.

Though the currency has risen since the middle 'nineties, when these 'popular' papers were a novelty, and they now

fetch a penny retail instead of half that figure, the taint of the 'bawbee' clings to them still. Perhaps that is why some of them take turns so often in canvassing the suburbs with wholesale offers of a period of distribution free. There are people, in fact, who cannot help referring to them still as 'the ha'penny Press,' and the label is not to be shaken off in a hurry. They remind one of the jibe that a witty playwright put years ago into a forgotten comedy, *The Duke of Killiecrankie*. The quiet talk of two sensible women on the terrace of a Highland castle is disturbed by the furtive antics of a stranger with a note-book, and the guest asks her hostess if he is a retainer on the estate. 'Oh dear no,' says the Duchess, 'I fancy he'll be from one of those cheap halfpenny papers in London.' 'Pardon me,' breaks in the stranger, with huffy dignity and a Chaplinesque whisk of his bowler hat, 'we may be a ha'penny, but we're certainly not cheap.' True, the price per copy has doubled, as already noted, but here the improvement ceases, and the note-book gentleman's boomerang admission still holds true. In some cases the antithesis might be continued, for as the number of pages grows the quality dwindles, so far as the contents go. The lower they sink in the scale of taste, however, the more the circulation rises, and in this, if not cause and effect, there are mutual reactions, for both symptoms are results of the same intensive campaigning in one direction or another. In brief, the more these productions differ in their pretensions and relations, the more they are the same thing in the taint they leave upon the palate. They specialise in the unseemly, and their motto is 'No misgivings, by request.'

Vanity never was a monopoly of merit, and the self-consciousness of the periodicals in question is notorious. They advertise their circulation and importance even in hostile organs, and pay space-rates for the accommodation. If, as we are assured on editorial authority, news value consists in the 'unusual,' how is it that these products of the 'bantam' Press are so monotonously alike, and so deplorably unvaried from day to day? Like proprietary medicines, they make no secret of their recipe. They turn out every morning, in more than one edition, a broad-sheet of twenty pages or more, which in many cases is only bought for the caricature, the list of public amusements, the racing news, or the insurance

policy. The rest in its make-up looks like a higgledy-piggledy compound of a typefounder's sample-book and the ravings of a cross-word 'fan' escaped from an asylum. In this queer mixture congealed into print, one may descry the most incongruous elements thrown together anyhow, reminding one of 'Handbook' Ford's recipe for a Spanish salad, except for his stipulation that there must be careful selection and clean hands. Through a maze of scattered and congested 'display' advertisements one marks the traces of police gazettes, a tipster's 'flimsies' for the turfy crowd, the squabbles of a debating club about the arcana of sex, a sprinkle of film and other puffs, a column of social chatter that is rancid with garrulity and gush, a crude display of nudist nymphs sprawling in all directions, a slang dictionary dismembered and stripped of explanations, an inarticulate hubbub about the backwash of Parliament, Bohemia, and so-called 'society,' with sometimes a gratis insurance policy scheme that puts a premium upon disaster, and an elaborate travesty of the prophetic cackle of Zadkiel and Old Moore that is a libel even on astrology. This indigestible mixture is arabesqued into a jagged pattern of angles and 'boxes' and 'turn-overs,' like a migraine of ink and paper, or a midnight cabaret without the consecutiveness or the attempt at mirth. Every other page is devoted to the glorification of trivialities, in the spirit of the Crystal Palace idyll of years ago:

> A cherry-stone, an orange-pip, the stump of a cigar,
> When hallowed by a royal lip, how beautiful they are!

As for the turn-out, considering how the hapless reader has to track an argument or a news 'story' up and down the defiles of column and page, the wonder grows how much further this gallimaufry of overprinted smears and letterpress can go.

It is not easy to form a level estimate of the kind of reader to whom this welter of garbage appeals, or to determine how far its character and presentment are dictated by the advertising agent and his client. But there is no difficulty in perceiving the ideal objective at the back of the paper's mind, or the class of person it delights to thrust upon the public gaze. Let us take the crime page, for instance—that Blue Beard's cupboard without the reticence. The chief qualification for its attention

is to be found dead or found out, in detailed circumstances of discredit. With the feminine sex, unfortunately, the case is even worse. The high road to celebrity for any woman hereabouts is to be divorced several times over, or left stripped and murdered in a smother of anatomy and gore near the public highway, or else deserted by a faithless swain or patron of fabulous wealth in a trunk or a riot of extravagance. Indeed, it would be hard to exaggerate this remorseless pursuit of the indelicate, where the 'man in the street' is used as a fetish and a byword, and then the slander is used as a pretext for making him worse by inculcation. There may be in this outlay of ink some smack of that flattery of the reader which a shrewd advocate serves up to the average jury; but its shallowness certainly disparages its victims' intellect and taste. The late Lord Acton spoke of untidy historians who 'take their meals in the kitchen,' but here the metaphor would appear to fail by a shade of understatement. In fact, this menial atmosphere in contrast with such lofty pretensions, and the use of a superb equipment of machinery to print such garbage, reminds one of Victor Hugo's masterpiece in anti-climax where after death and dissection the brain of that prince of cynics and apostates, Talleyrand, found an inglorious outlet down the tunnels of a Paris sewer.

Obviously the 'man in the street' has his remedy, for he can turn to better fare elsewhere, or occupy himself with the cross-word puzzle for the day. On the other hand, the journalist who is trained and employed in an office of this description has no option save unemployment and the professional dole. He is a galley-slave with a vengeance, and his outlook on life betrays him. Staffs are hand-picked and tested for their unabashed ardour at the game, and are promoted for their proficiency in the disregard of self-respect and syntax. Thus these purlieus of Fleet Street have acquired possession of a class of 'sleuth' unwearied in the pursuit and manipulation of the sordid, and the investigator is only excelled by the highly paid desk expert who dresses the harvest into shape. That is why Pressmen of experience with any concern for their profession and its traditions are so anxious about the gradual disappearance of the old school of reporter—accurate, versatile, discreet—who used to be the pride and backbone of his calling. The only conclusion it

that he is utterly out of place on a class of paper which is no longer an organ so much as a sub-editor's harmonium. Time was when Fleet Street was gaily credited with a file of police to escort the procession of break-away men from one office to another, but nowadays the interchange of units from group to group is simply infusorial. Even here the desert of demerit finds a few oases in the work of men who were shaped and matured years ago among better surroundings, as, for instance, the descriptive writing of an acute observer and humanist like Mr. H. V. Morton, or the amusing *flânerie* of Mr. Hannen Swaffer. But what are these and their like among so many? Too often the mentality of their associates appears to contract as the paper's circulation grows, and one cannot help thinking that if Lady Blessington and Martin Tupper were alive to-day they would be millionaires and front-page oracles, with their pens in continual demand. The latest speciality common to this region is a column or two of egotistic paragraphs from ephemeral and callow witlings where the trickle of vapidity reminds one of Mark Twain's terse description—'a ceaseless wish-wash of prepared platitude and canned twaddle.' And speed in production is but poor excuse for the feverish atmosphere in Mr. A. P. Herbert's diatribe on 'newspapers run by men who haven't time to think.'

A certain philosophic divine concluded a debate in London the other day by declaring every country had the Press it deserved. This is the kind of superficial fallacy that saves thinking but clouds the issue. To begin with, it expressed a fatalism wholly at war with the preacher's own vocation. If it were carried to its logical conclusion, there might be no newspapers at all (which he might think a bearable state of things), and no preachers (which he would probably deplore). We can no more accept the existence of these 'larger lunacies' in the newspaper world as having been ordained by Providence than we can blame it for our freaks of weather or the deserts and dust-storms that follow on deforestation. The tame acceptance of such bilge in print would condemn the rising generation to newspaper fare that is in every way unworthy of the period, but acquires a sale in excess of its deserving, largely by an air of slickness and compression. Unhappily, any virtue of brevity it ever had is cancelled to-day because it is bulked out with blatant headlines, repetitions, exaggerations,

irrelevances and innuendoes. Circulation is forced into monster figures by having football 'pool' coupons and free insurance policies tied around the paper's neck. Its pretensions to express the ideas of the popular majority are based on a systematic choice of the shallow and the commonplace, pranked out in artificial jargon, exotic slang, and overweening emphasis. That is why we all had reason to rejoice when a certain dynastic crisis loomed above us, and there was every danger of a tidal wave of Western scandal and innuendo breaking over the kingdom. The initiative was fortunately taken over by a group of provincial papers, and the task of stating the facts firmly and temperately was rescued—thank goodness—from the rat-pit of catchpenny scandal, distortion and misinterpretation. This steadying example was endorsed next day by the best papers here in London, and the farther the discussion spread throughout the Empire, the better reason we had for rejoicing that the right course had been taken just in time.

The owner of a successful paper may be so absorbed in his own special interests and problems that he is content, according to his kind, to abide by the principle laid down in *Hudibras*, where

> Great Commanders only own
> What's prosperous by the Soldier done.

But he can no longer ignore the deep resentment aroused by so many known instances where the pest of intrusion has been carried to intolerable lengths. To take only a few of those which have been ventilated in *The Times* is to show how variously the torture-irons may be applied, but always with the same profanation of the private household, and the same immunity for the case-hardened delinquents Royal guests have been harried and departed in disgust. Now and then a misleading pretence has been advanced that the sufferers have connived or assisted at the exposure of their own views and feelings, and this is simply adding insult to injury. In other cases, where no such fraud was possible, the public has been roundly informed that the kinsfolk of the dead have been put to the question, and have replied with dignity and self-restraint that there was nothing to be said. The publication of such a mild rebuff, whether said in sarcasm or not, would

seem to be outside the scope of any self-respecting paper, but we have to allow for the lengths to which highly competitive journalism has to cater for its market. Nor must we forget the anxiety of the news-manager to satisfy his proprietor that everything has been done to 'cover the occasion'—and a great deal more, one ventures to think, than humanity would countenance at a time of private sorrow.

One of the cases which has gone round the lobbies at Westminster is that of a member who was pestered by telephone late one night for particulars concerning a purely private trouble. By way of revenge for his refusal to comply, his chauffeur and garage-keeper were tracked down in the early hours of the morning and assured that they had full authority to speak out. The information thus obtained had no interest whatever for reasonable people, and the feeling left behind was that the motive at work was retaliation for the snub administered by a man whose indignation was more than warranted. As if to show how slow any public protest is to secure improvement, a later case has come to light of a still more hurtful kind. A correspondent in *The Times* who sent in his signature tells how his wife's facial injuries from a motor accident were morbidly described in print, and no murmur of complaint was raised. But one emissary from the intrusion group badgered a servant for a photograph in her employer's absence, and then, having failed in this attempt, printed a bogus interview attributing to the patient statements that were 'not only untrue but utterly abhorrent.' In such cases, as a rule, the remedy at law—which clearly exists, according to counsel—remains unsought because it would involve increased publicity where feelings have been already outraged almost past bearing. But why not make it possible for the evidence to be heard with a minimum attendance in court, and, as in divorce cases, direct the Press to leave details alone and print the verdict? Why should the scarred limb or dimple of some film celebrity move a jury to excessive damages—where publication is, to say the least, far from being resented, and may actually assist the 'star' in her orbit of fame? And why should people who shun notoriety be coerced into the limelight, and made to shrink in double distress, at the order of some news organiser in ambush, and all for the sake of a front-page sensation? Could there be a

grimmer or more ironic comment on Matthew Arnold's lines ?—

Not till the hours of light return
All we have built do we discern.

The absence of any effectual defence for this social misdemeanour may surely be taken as tantamount to admission of guilt, especially when we consider how such gentry delight in explicit statement concerning nearly everything else. Every other day they rally to their own defence, and exhaust superlatives in airing their impeccability. Every reproach is an affront, every aspersion an 'attack.' They fall back upon a familiar term like 'the freedom of the Press,' which in their mouths amounts to smug and arrant hypocrisy. They make things worse by citing the honoured name of Milton, but forget how he states his plea for 'the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing.' He begins with the profound admission that 'it is of greatest concernment in the church and commonwealth to have a vigilant eye how books demean themselves'; and indeed, when that breaker of shackles was called upon to play the censor, he did not err on the side of lenience by any means. Faced with a position like this of to-day, he would have held, as the late Sir J. M. Barrie said of literary recklessness, that 'complete liberty is never within the competence of any subject of the realm.' If this holds true of books and pamphlets, with their limited reach, what shall we say of broad-sheets that boast of their circulation by the million? A great part of their existence appears to be spent in dodging Statute Law and defying the ordinary rules of decency. It is a monstrous fallacy to suppose that every person who pays a penny for the 'Daily Squeegee' is entitled to have the intimate grief and distress of well-known people dragged out and displayed in extra large type as a relish for his breakfast.

Let us give the ordinary citizen a fairer character-reading than to believe for a moment that he desires such hideous delectation, especially when he knows it has been gained by cold-blooded cajolery or telephonic impudence, in violation of the feelings and wishes of the victims. Common decency bids us subscribe to the axiom of Voltaire when he said, with that rapier pen of his, that the 'honour' of having one's private affairs penetrated and exposed was usually reserved for royalty—a state of things which has been more than

exemplified by various happenings of late. There is a point, in fact, where competitive publicity becomes secret persecution, and it may be that the men of law are only waiting for our legislators to decide the line of demarcation in an equitable manner. It is said there are newspaper authorities who uphold this inquisitorial system with the glib excuse that it is good for people not to be 'squeamish'; but this does not restrain their Olympian wrath, it seems, when their own names are given in connexion with some public function without the precaution of consulting their wishes. Such a term as 'squeamishness' is transparent cant, and 'freedom' a sheer misnomer when they are used in order to cover the hunt for cheap and impertinent 'copy' at the expense of people of susceptibility and refinement.

It remains a further irony of the situation that while people in private life and persons of reputation find themselves pilloried like this in seasons of distress, the wrongdoers remain unidentified under the mask of their respective papers. If some form of legal machinery is obtainable for requital and a remedy, it will be but common justice, of course, to make allowance for subordinates working under duress. The true delinquent is the news organiser or whipper-in who forces them down to a task that they seem to loathe, and must certainly despise. In any case, the framers of a suitable Bill ought not to be satisfied with the present convention which contents itself with a mere figurehead, and makes a blameless foreman printer the scapegoat for offences of which he is probably unaware till the law has been invoked. Why should professional traffickers in private grief enjoy concealment and impunity when colleagues engaged in straightforward controversy are thrust into the light? Surely these casuists behind the editorial 'We' and the proprietorial 'I am' cannot have it both ways. As Lady Bothwell exclaims in Sir Walter's story of the Canongate, 'Good God, of what can men's hearts be made, who can thus dally with the agony of others?'

To frame the equation in terms of business policy and common-sense, there must be something suicidal about folly of this kind—to give it no worse a designation—when it can be proved by case after case that influential individuals are turned into indignant opponents. They perceive at once how

serviceable and reputable books of reference are systematically raked through by night and subjected to a *scrutin de liste*. In this way members of either House of Parliament, or people in the social 'annuals' of reference, are subjected on the slightest excuse to this kind of pettifogging torture by callous practitioners who make no difference between honourable distinction and common notoriety. One or two Dominions, vexed by party faction and recrimination, have retaliated by decreeing that political articles must not be printed without the writers' names, possibly as a roundabout revenge for the practices in question. This 'kind of wild justice'—to use Bacon's term—appears stupid and ineffectual until we realise how persecution of an individual in print can be rendered ten times acuter when there are political and factional grudges to be fed as well. But it is rampant and brazen iniquity for any section of the Press to alienate the opinion of Parliament by badgering its members in their private capacity, and then falling back on the 'collective security' of a trade union highly magnified.

One eminent apologist for the delinquents is reported in a public speech to have said there was real danger of our losing the benefits of a free Press, not from the deliberate tyranny of an autocratic Government, but through the ill-considered interference of 'well-meaning meddlers.' Right intention counts for something in these contentious times, but in this matter one doubts if the compliment can be returned. In any case, there seems to be a confusion of the issue here, if not a contradiction in terms. The Press has been warned by its own accredited representatives at Westminster that it has largely lost favour there because of certain papers that glory in their unrestraint, but, when challenged in courts where the damage can be legally defined, soon exchange their habitual bluster for a cringing and abject apology The law has marked limitations, but it can also give us lessons in correction, and one doubts if the loosest rhetoric at the Bar would apply the word 'meddling' as it has been misused here. Who, after all, is the meddler—the man who seeks to restore the status of the Press, so gravely and admittedly impaired, or the salaried emissary who knocks at the door of bereavement at midnight, and, failing an answer, manipulates the nearest telephone to extract expressions of pity or impatience which he can take back to show he has carried out instructions?

Another aspect of this invasion evil remains to be considered. If London is a stronghold of such undesired publicity run riot, it is not to be expected that the provinces can remain exempt. The force of competition which is pleaded so glibly as a doctrine of necessity in the case is the very means of spreading that evil in all directions. Modern conditions and inventions have shortened the distance between the metropolis and the chief provincial centres to a minimum, so that, in a sense, Aberdeen is nearer Charing Cross to-day than Willesden was a few years ago, simply by the operation of radio and the private wire. Mutual invasion of territory and the pooling or 'syndication' of interests among London and provincial papers have carried this virus of misguided enterprise faster and further than ever, and the frequent exchange of staffmen has spread the infection to quarters where it would have been routed with scorn a few years ago. Decent-minded editors who retain something of old-world self-respect have stood out solidly against it. Theirs is the attitude of Squire Hardcastle in the play when he said these might be the modern ways, but he never saw anything so like old-fashioned impudence. Alas! ripe criticism of that sort is always in opposition, but has been crowded, you may say, into the back benches below the gangway. Provincial organs which have long enjoyed a reputation for decency and decorum have been succumbing one by one to this barefaced craze for the 'personal,' and even areas which can defy 'dumped' editions from London have given way on occasion to underhand methods of catering for news. Fortunately, there survives in many of the provinces a salutary and vigorous public opinion to which London has long been a stranger, and we cannot imagine the *Scotsman* or the *Yorkshire Post* or the *Manchester Guardian* sending out these midnight raids across the private threshold, any more than we can the two great London organs that remain to us out of the newspaper wreckage of the past few years.

The craze for lucrative publicity at the cost of other people's feelings does not extend to the ventilation of professional measures adopted for the promotion of reform, and so far the resolutions and remarks put forward by the organisations most concerned have come remarkably short of rightful expectation. Can the offenders and their indulgent

associates be surprised that indignation is still rife and ready to take a more definite form if and when further occasion arise? The best professional discussion to date upon the subject took place months ago at the annual conference of the Empire Press Union, and the resolution passed for taking steps to restore the status of the Press was not only justified by prevalent conditions, but carried with one dissentient. The only attempt at defence put the blame on the pressure of competition and the efficiency of the telephone—a plea which in its futility reminds one of Kipling's story of the burglar discovered in the safe who explained that he must have walked there in his sleep! At any rate, the discussion embodied the definite opinion and experience of editors, proprietors, and journalists of standing and experience in this country, India, and all the Dominions. Surely it called for a similar expression of approval from the only English organisation which is in a position to steer Press activities in the direction of the reform desired. Otherwise, as it very well knows, we may have to face developments which cannot redound to the reputation of the Press as the chief forum of public opinion outside of Parliament.

A word is due as to the injurious degree to which these malpractices are reacting on public opinion in India and the Empire at large. The considerations which have been expressed in this protest are a round-up of considered judgments formed by responsible and experienced journalists, many of whom have long been engaged in rendering a fair and—wherever possible—a favourable interpretation of 'Home Affairs' for the benefit and information of readers overseas. These conscientious writers can produce plenty of evidence to show how any decadence in these 'popular' forms and phases of journalism over here is being copied and exploited at a distance to the detriment of the British name. As for the effect abroad, this affords the offenders opportunity to print foreign commentary without shame, and 'head it up' as proof of Continental Anglophobia! The fact remains that Parliament, an important majority of the thinking public, and the Press at its best are at one in condemning this pestilence of anti-privacy as indefensible on any grounds of public service, inhuman by all the standards of decent feeling, and profoundly un-English, to say the least. No Pressman worth

his salt desires to see a Parliamentary committee take the matter up in the shape of authorised inquiry, or to find that the higher dignitaries of the law are being consulted as to the formulation of a remedy. On the other hand, no reasonable citizen can deny a fair compensation claim for private injury inflicted on health and peace of mind by such nefarious methods. Law has been characterised as a game where hearts are rarely trumps, but nowadays it reveals more and more of a disposition and desire to safeguard the rights of the law-abiding individual. Accordingly, if this principle of compensation can be fixed there may be consequences for which an unworthy minority of our newspapers have only themselves to blame.

* * * * *

Since the above was written there comes to hand a competent and reasoned verdict on this subject of Press intrusion which it would be presumptuous to call an endorsement, but which expresses, at any rate, the best feelings of the Press with an impartiality, an authority, and a moderation not to be gainsaid. It is a pity, however, that half a guinea is charged for this new *Report on the British Press* issued by the Political and Economic Planning movement, because it ought to be in every thinker's hands. In a careful and admirable survey of current newspaper practice and symptoms in this country, it turns a keen light upon the intrusion evil, and there is significance in the fact that, so far as one can find, *The Times* alone had the courage to print this passage as it stands :

> Perhaps the most acute cause of trouble is the intrusion into private lives and personal affairs which has led to considerable public indignation against sections of the Press. This intrusion arises largely out of attempts to fill columns not with news connected with public affairs, but with private matters which are of no public interest, however interesting they may be to the curiosity of members of the public who find in them a substitute for, or addition to, personal gossip. It is quite possible that such methods, if continued, may lead Parliament, which has already shown signs of indignation on the matter, to deal with them by legislation which might be very injurious to the freedom of the Press.

The Report suggests a professional tribunal to investigate the more glaring instances, and by a series of case decisions to establish a working code of sanctions and redress, let us

hope, in respect of legitimate and illegitimate procedure. It is possible that this ingenious compromise may divert attention from the main issue; and in any event, we may fairly conclude that the difficulties and antagonisms thus grouped inside one room would be insuperable. To begin with, it could never demand the presence of the principals concerned, or even of executants who are as scant of leisure as they are of scruple. Then again, a tribunal of this kind, if it ever reached shape, would have to work on such a level of moral courage as to constitute it a council of perfection, conceivably of persecution, and possibly of unemployment. In the meantime, the Report is a valuable contribution to the alleviation of a dangerous state of things, and the solution of a vicious problem of which the very compositors and printers are ashamed. Finally, every journalist of experience and principle must look upon it as a charter of sanity and liberty well worth practical attention and, if possible, enforcement for the honour and the rescue of a great profession.

J. P. COLLINS.

ULSTER'S PLACE WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM

By THE RIGHT HON. SIR HUGH O'NEILL, M.P.

THE recent conversations between Ministers from Southern Ireland and members of the United Kingdom Government have revived public controversy with regard to the position of Ulster, and it is common knowledge that at the outset of the discussions Mr. de Valera raised the question of the 'partition' of Ireland. To such a suggestion the British Ministers could give but one answer—that it was not within their competence to discuss it; and no British Government, of whatever political complexion, could have acted otherwise. The self-governing province of Northern Ireland is already a constitutional fact, and no alteration in its status can ever be made without the consent of its Parliament. This is the doctrine by which the various self-governing units in the British Empire have been established, and any action by the British Parliament in contravention of it would lead to the break-up of the British Commonwealth of Nations. This is a fundamental fact—obvious, patent, self-evident; and there is no way through it, round it, over it, or under it. Even Mr. de Valera must have known that on this issue he was hammering against an impregnable wall of iron.

Over a quarter of a century has passed since the pre-war parliamentary struggles over the Irish question. Those who can remember them have largely forgotten the details, and a younger generation has since grown up to whom these events are merely hearsay. It seems, therefore, an appropriate time to examine once again the events which led to the exclusion of Ulster from the Constitution of the rest of Ireland, or, in other words, to the partition of Ireland.

Partition, as it exists to-day, is based on a number of agreements and Acts of Parliament passed by the legislative

assemblies of the three Governments concerned—the Government of the United Kingdom, the Government of the Irish Free State, and the Government of Northern Ireland. It was not imposed by violence or by any unilateral action, but was the subject of an agreed constitutional settlement.

The question of separate constitutional treatment for the Unionist *bloc* in the North of Ireland first became a live issue during the passage of Mr. Asquith's Home Rule Bill, which eventually became law in 1914 as the Government of Ireland Act of that year. In the days immediately preceding the Great War the principle of partition had already been conceded, and efforts were being made to define the area and conditions of exclusion. Various suggestions had been made, such as exclusion by county option and exclusion of the six counties for a limited period, but the Ulster leaders could accept none of these devices. They were adamant in upholding the broad principle that the area to be excluded must comprise the whole of the solid loyalist population (which meant the six counties) and that it must be without any time limit. In a final effort to define the area to be excluded, a conference was summoned to meet at Buckingham Palace in the summer of 1914 under the presidency of King George V. It consisted of Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George, representing the Government; Mr. Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne, representing the Opposition; Mr. Redmond and Mr. Dillon, representing the Irish Nationalists; and Sir Edward Carson and Captain Craig, representing Ulster. The King received the delegates and opened the proceedings, after which the Speaker (Mr. Lowther) took the chair. The issue at this conference was narrowed down to the two counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh. Were they to form part of the excluded area or not? After several days of discussion it was found impossible to reach agreement, and the Buckingham Palace Conference broke up.

At this point a brief reference must be made to the position of the two counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh. They contain a small majority of Nationalists or anti-partitionists, but they adjoin and are contiguous to the other four counties where the Protestant Unionists largely predominate. The Unionists in these two border counties are passionate in the strength of their convictions, probably because they have always lived so close up against their opponents. In these circumstances

they would never have consented to be governed by a Parliament in Dublin, and to have forced them into it could only have led to bloodshed and civil war. Nor would their co-religionists in the other counties have ever agreed to exclusion without them, not only for reasons of sentiment, but also because the excluded area would then have been too small for a separate constitutional unit. Even with the six counties it is small enough.

It has so often been said or implied by Southern Irish politicians that there is a large anti-partitionist majority in Tyrone and Fermanagh that a few figures must now be given. Charges have been made that the constituencies for the local Parliament have been 'jerrymandered' in favour of the Unionists; and the fairest figures to give, therefore, are those which have reference to the two counties as a whole. These are available from the various elections for the United Kingdom Parliament which have taken place since 1920, as the two counties jointly form one double-member constituency for the House of Commons at Westminster Ignoring the election of 1924, when two Unionists were returned owing to Nationalist abstention, all the other contested general elections have been a straight fight between Unionists and Nationalists, and the results have been as follows:

> In 1922, out of a total poll of 83,876, the Nationalist majority was 6596.
>
> In 1923, out of a total poll of 81,736, the Nationalist majority was 6270.
>
> In 1931, out of a total poll of 95,751, the Nationalist majority was 5549.
>
> In 1935, out of a total poll of 97,516, the Nationalist majority was 4266.

The situation in these two counties was, as already mentioned, the cause of the breakdown of the Buckingham Palace Conference; and with the declaration of war all further efforts towards a compromise were abandoned. The Government of Ireland Bill became an Act of Parliament in September 1914, and at the same time another Act was passed suspending its operation for twelve months or the duration of the war.

Between 1914 and 1918, while the war proceeded, several further efforts at a settlement were made, including the Irish

Convention of 1917. But they all failed. During the war years a new power was making itself felt in Southern Ireland—Sinn Fein—and the influence and prestige of the parliamentary Nationalist Party became less and less effective. The rebellion of 1916 was the symptom of the change, and the demands of the new party became ever more and more extreme, with the result that at the General Election in December 1918 the Southern Irish people voted overwhelmingly for Sinn Fein, and only a handful of the old Nationalist Party remained at Westminster. It was in these circumstances that a further Home Rule Bill was introduced in the House of Commons to take the place of the Act of 1914, which was still in abeyance. It reached the Statute-book in 1920, and it finally legalised partition by creating two separate subordinate Parliaments in Northern and Southern Ireland respectively. The area controlled by the Parliament of Northern Ireland was that comprised by the six counties of Antrim, Down, Londonderry, Armagh, Tyrone and Fermanagh, including, of course, the county borough of Belfast.

The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 was, however, never accepted as a settlement by the majority in Southern Ireland, who were then carrying on a bitter campaign of violence and assassination against the forces of the British Government. This state of affairs eventually led up to the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, which was signed by members of the British Government on the one side and the accredited representatives of Southern Ireland on the other. In this Treaty partition was recognised and provided for, and the articles of the Treaty which dealt with it are of sufficient importance to merit quotation in full. They were as follows:

11 Until the expiration of one month from the passing of the Act of Parliament for the ratification of this instrument, the powers of the Parliament and the Government of the Irish Free State shall not be exercisable as respects Northern Ireland, and the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, shall, so far as they relate to Northern Ireland, remain of full force and effect, and no election shall be held for the return of members to serve in the Parliament of the Irish Free State for constituencies in Northern Ireland unless a resolution is passed by both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland in favour of the holding of such elections before the end of the said month.

12. If, before the expiration of the said month, an address is presented to His Majesty by both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland to that effect, the powers of the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State shall no longer extend to Northern Ireland, and the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920 (including those relating to the Council of Ireland), shall, so far as they relate to Northern Ireland, continue to be of full force and effect, and this instrument shall have effect subject to the necessary modifications.

Provided that if such an address is so presented, a Commission consisting of three persons, one to be appointed by the Government of the Irish Free State, one to be appointed by the Government of Northern Ireland, and one who shall be Chairman to be appointed by the British Government, shall determine in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions, the boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland, and for the purposes of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and of this instrument the boundary of Northern Ireland shall be such as may be determined by such Commission.

The Treaty, therefore, recognised the principle of partition and set up machinery for defining the excluded area. In accordance with its provisions, which became operative on December 5, 1922, an Address was presented to His Majesty on December 7 in that year by both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland praying that 'the powers of the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State shall no longer extend to Northern Ireland,' to which His Majesty replied: 'I have caused my Ministers and the Irish Free State Government to be so informed.' Partition was thus legalised and complete, the only outstanding point being the Boundary Commission constituted by the Treaty. It must be remembered that Northern Ireland was not a party to the Treaty, and the provisions in the Treaty affecting it were inserted without the knowledge or consent of its Government. It was no surprise, therefore, to find that the Government of Northern Ireland declined to appoint a member to serve on the Boundary Commission. The matter was then referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, who reported to the effect that the Commission could not be legally constituted without the Ulster representative. A further Agreement was therefore concluded between the British and

Free State Governments, which was given statutory effect by the Irish Free State (Confirmation of Agreement) Act of 1924. This Act gave to the British Government the right of appointing a third member of the Boundary Commission. They took immediate action under these powers and appointed a Commissioner on behalf of Northern Ireland. The Boundary Commission, thus legally constituted, began its deliberations, which occupied about a year, during which time it heard a large amount of evidence and visited the various border districts. Towards the end of 1925 it became known that the Commission was about to issue its Report, and it was also common knowledge that the Report would be unanimous and would merely recommend slight modifications of the existing boundary and the transference of small populations contiguous to the border. The Irish Free State had expected something much more drastic than this, and, in response to popular clamour, their Commissioner immediately resigned, with the result that the Report was never actually issued. A further conference was then held between the three Governments represented on the Commission and a further Irish Agreement was concluded on December 3, 1925. This Agreement is of great importance as showing the free acceptance of partition by the Irish Free State Government. By its provisions the three Governments, 'being united in amity' and 'resolved mutually to aid one another in a spirit of neighbourly comradeship,' reached the settlement set out in Article 1 of the Agreement as follows:

> The powers conferred by the proviso to Article 12 of the Articles of Agreement of December 6th, 1921 [*i e*, the Irish Treaty] on the Commission therein mentioned are hereby revoked, and the extent of Northern Ireland[1] for the purposes of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and of the said Articles of Agreement shall be such as was fixed by Sub-Section 2 of Section 1 of that Act [*i.e.*, the six counties].

This Agreement was confirmed by Acts of the Parliament of the United Kingdom (15 & 16 Geo. V. chap. 77) and the Parliament of the Irish Free State (Act No 40 of 1925), and in the Parliament of Northern Ireland resolutions were adopted by both Houses approving of its terms.[1] It is therefore clear, beyond any question of doubt, that partition

[1] Par' Deb. H of C, December 9, 1925, Senate, December 9, 1925

was recognised by Southern Ireland, and that the present area of Northern Ireland was approved and sanctioned by Act of the Free State Parliament. And yet Mr. de Valera still appears to contend that partition has never received the consent of Southern Ireland, and that it can be modified or abolished by unilateral action on the part of the Government of the United Kingdom!

The Northern Irish Constitution has worked satisfactorily for seventeen years. Some reference, however, must be made to complaints which have been put forward as to unfair treatment of the Roman Catholic or Nationalist minority who comprise about one-third of the population. These complaints are usually voiced in respect of three main heads—denial of fair representation through 'jerrymandering' of constituencies, the 'Special Powers' Act to deal with outbreaks of lawlessness, and adverse discrimination in employment. No case has ever yet been made out in respect of any of these charges.

To deal first with 'jerrymandering,' the minority have the full share in parliamentary representation to which their numbers entitle them. The first two general elections for the Northern House of Commons were conducted by means of 'proportional representation' as laid down in the Act of 1920, and the whole object of this system is to provide adequate representation of minorities. During the course of the second Parliament this system of voting was abolished in favour of the British system of single-member constituencies, and the redistribution of seats which followed was so arranged as to give to the minority such a number of safe seats as to ensure to them as many members as they had under proportional representation. Could anything have been fairer than that? Complaints are made that the minority in County Antrim have no chance to return a member. This is true, but only because it was found impossible to carve out a constituency which would have sufficed. That compensation was given elsewhere is evidenced by the approximation to 'proportional representation' results which has already been mentioned. It would be as impossible to provide that every Nationalist voter should be able to return a Nationalist member as it would be similarly to satisfy every Unionist voter.

The 'Special Powers' Act was passed at a time of grave

disorder when the Republicans were carrying on a campaign of arson and assassination in order to try and overthrow the Ulster Government. It gave to the authorities drastic powers of search, arrest and detention without trial—powers which enabled them to crush the rebellion and restore law and order. The Act admittedly gives powers which seriously endanger the liberty of the subject, and has not yet been repealed, but nobody who does not indulge in political crime is affected by it in the slightest degree. It is still necessary. The Republican 'army' is still in existence, and there are also lawless elements among the so-called Protestant underworld of Belfast. In the last few years several daring raids for arms have taken place, illegal drilling has been discovered, bombs have been used for political action. During the last few weeks a recruiting office in Belfast was shattered by an explosion and a monument to Irish Republicans was similarly wrecked. At the time of the King's Coronation visit to Ulster, customs-houses on the border were set on fire and attempts were made to blow up bridges. The 'Special Powers' Act is still very necessary indeed. The only criticism which can perhaps justifiably be levelled against it is that it has been made part of the permanent law. During the first few years of its enactment it was passed for one year only and renewed annually in the 'Expiring Laws Continuance Act.' In view of the drastic nature of this legislation, it might have been better to have retained it as a temporary measure only. The Government would have had no difficulty in securing its re-enactment by Parliament each year as long as it was necessary, and a periodical discussion on it could have done no harm.

The case as regards employment is largely founded on an unfortunate speech by a member of the Ulster Government in a moment of aberration. He could not have meant what he said, and it is as certain as anything can be that he does not practise it. Large numbers of Roman Catholics are employed in most of the industries of Ulster, and they suffer no adverse discrimination in the labour exchanges and other employment agencies. At the time of the inception of the Ulster Government a Parliamentary Committee was set up in connexion with the formation of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It reported in favour of minority recruitment to

the force on the basis of population—*i.e.*, one-third. The minority are consequently well represented in the police. They have also their share in the Government service. The first Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland was a Roman Catholic, and the present permanent head of the Ministry of Education is one too. The treatment of Roman Catholics by the Government has not been without criticism from the other side. An organisation called the 'Protestant League' has recently been formed to uphold the rights of Protestants as against Catholics in respect of employment and otherwise. They put up a candidate at the last election, but he was not successful. Complaints therefore do not all come from one side! The course of history has unfortunately divided the population of Ulster into a Protestant majority and a Roman Catholic minority. They have never fused, and probably never will fuse. The minority have consequently no hope of ever becoming the majority and being responsible for the government of the province. There is therefore a very special obligation on the part of the majority to ensure fair treatment to them in every respect. If ever they do not get it, the proper remedy is exposure in the provincial Parliament, where the minority have strong representation. Debates are public, and exposure would soon scotch any unfair treatment if such there were. But, unfortunately, the minority are divided and have no leader. Only a few of them attend Parliament, the others mistakenly thinking they can best serve their supporters by abstention. It is to be hoped that some day this foolish attitude will be changed.

Having shown how partition came about and the area affected by it, two further aspects of the matter must now be dealt with. Is Ulster justified in her desire to remain in the United Kingdom and outside the Southern Irish Constitution? Is there any prospect of ending partition and creating a united Ireland?

In reply to the first question, the Northern Unionist will give no uncertain answer. In his view, the attitude of Ulster in demanding separate treatment has been justified by events to an even greater degree than he could ever have thought possible. He never trusted the Southern Irish; he always said that the grant of self-government would only be used for making further demands till practically complete separa-

tion from Britain was achieved. But he could hardly have imagined that these things would have come so soon, or that the campaign for independence would have been so violent and so successful. If 'I told you so' was ever justified, it has been justified here. Ulster's fight for exclusion from 1912 to 1914 was against incorporation in what was, after all, to be merely a subordinate Constitution within the United Kingdom, for Mr. Asquith's Home Rule Bill was nothing more than that. And yet, even so, her attitude was held to be justified by at least one-half of the British people. How much more, therefore, must it be justified now? The Home Rule Bill of 1912 did not interfere with the status and powers of the Crown; under its provisions the British Army would have remained in Ireland and the historic Irish regiments would have been left intact; there would have been no question of a separate flag; the 'Soldier's Song' would presumably have been illegal as a national anthem; the oath of allegiance would have remained unaltered; there could have been no question of a separate coinage banishing the effigy of the King; there would have been no customs barrier between Great Britain and Ireland; representation in the Parliament of the United Kingdom was to be retained. And yet Ulster was prepared to fight to be excluded from this Bill, and half the British people supported her attitude.

What is the present position? The whole conception of an Ireland within the United Kingdom has been ruthlessly swept aside. Every safeguard has been abandoned. The Crown has been degraded, and all its effective powers within the Constitution have been abolished. The British Army has been withdrawn and the Southern Irish regiments disbanded. A new coinage has been established. The subject's right of appeal to the Privy Council has been abolished. There is complete divorce from the Parliament of the United Kingdom. There is a different flag, and every effort is being made to establish a different language. Almost the most absurd provision of all, two separate fiscal systems have been set up within the British Islands. Even the name of the country has been changed because it sounded too English. And Ulster is asked to unite with a Southern Ireland with such a Constitution and such ideals! The suggestion is so preposterous that it is almost comic. There is not the remotest

chance that Ulster will ever unite with Southern Ireland so long as anything like the present state of affairs exists. The commencement of the recent Irish talks came shortly before the Ulster General Election was due, and the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland anticipated the dissolution of Parliament by about two months in order to obtain from the electorate a decision on the question of partition. The answer was emphatic and decisive, and showed that the Ulster people have not changed. The result was remarkable in that an overwhelming majority in favour of partition was given to the Government, although on purely local issues it had incurred a good deal of unpopularity. Independent Unionists contested several seats owing to dissatisfaction with the Government's record, but in no case were they successful. The people believed that Ulster was in danger, and gave to official Unionist candidates larger majorities than ever; but on the partition issue it would have made no difference if every independent Unionist had got in. They would all have voted for a resolution upholding partition which would doubtless have been tabled in the Ulster House of Commons if such an event had happened.

Can unity ever be achieved? Not in a thousand years, except by successful force, against the will of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland; and their views will never alter unless there is a change of heart on the part of the Southern Irish people Of that there is so far no sign. A considerable part of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 was devoted to providing for the possibility of Irish union at some time in the future, and if the settlement contemplated by it for the whole of Ireland had been accepted by the South as it was by the North, it is conceivable that some kind of co-operation or union might eventually have resulted. That Act, as already stated, would have left the whole of Ireland within the United Kingdom. It has been much derided, presumably because it did not satisfy the South, but it was a statesmanlike measure nevertheless and contained greater possibilities of eventual co-operation than any other scheme of Irish self-government. There were two provisions in it by which, at any rate, the semblance of unity could have been maintained. One was the Council of Ireland, a body which was to consist of a President nominated by the

Lord Lieutenant and forty other members drawn in equal numbers from both Houses of the Parliaments of Northern and Southern Ireland respectively. Its actual powers were limited to legislation affecting railways, fisheries, and the Diseases of Animals Acts, and certain private Bills affecting Ireland as a whole. But it was also given power to consider any questions which might appear in any way to bear on the welfare of both Northern and Southern Ireland, and could make suggestions by means of resolutions in respect of such matters. It was further provided that the two Parliaments could by identical Acts delegate other powers to the Council if they thought fit to do so. True it is that the actual powers of this Council were not impressive, but it would at least have provided a platform on which the elected representatives of the people from both North and South could have met together and discussed matters of common interest. Ulster accepted the Act of 1920 and would undoubtedly have co-operated in the provisions relating to the Council of Ireland. But Southern Ireland spurned it, and the Council of Ireland was never constituted and has never met. Thus was ended a possible chance of fruitful co-operation.

The other unifying provision in the Act of 1920 was the High Court of Appeal for Ireland, which had power to hear appeals from the courts in both Northern and Southern Ireland, and of which the Lord Chief Justice from each was a member. This court had a somewhat happier experience than the Council of Ireland, since it actually came into operation and heard several appeals during 1921 and 1922. It ceased to have effect in December 1922 with the enactment of the provisions of the Anglo-Irish Treaty.

Ulster will never accept any union in which the reserved powers are centered in Dublin instead of in London. In other words, she will accept no union which is not within the United Kingdom. She will not recognise any allegiance but to the Crown, she will not enter any separate fiscal system, she will not give up her right to direct representation in the central Parliament of the Empire.

HUGH O'NEILL.

THE POLITICAL HORIZON IN CANADA

By J. A. Stevenson

The fortunes of Canadian political parties in the last two decades vividly illustrate the dangers of political prophecy. At the close of the late war the Liberal Party of Canada, then feebly represented beyond the borders of Quebec, seemed doomed to be a minority party for at least ten years, but have, in fact, enjoyed since 1921 a greater ascendancy than at any time since Confederation. They have a commanding majority in the House of Commons at Ottawa, they control six out of nine provincial Legislatures, and have the benevolent friendship of the Liberal-Progressive Ministry of Manitoba. Conservatism, on the other hand, has suffered grievously from the aftermath of the war.

The Liberal Party of Canada bears to-day a strong resemblance to the Democratic Party in the United States, for its membership ranges from earnest radicals to extreme reactionaries and may thus claim to be a national party representative of a complete cross-section of public sentiment. It is led by Premier Mackenzie King, not a great orator, nor a zealous crusader for reforms, nor even a bold and vigorous administrator, but an expert conciliator and skilled manipulator, who can drive a mixed team, avoid acute issues inside or outside his party and, in the true tradition of his great predecessors, Sir John Macdonald and Sir Wilfrid Laurier, discover a middle way through the perilous swamps of politics. Perhaps only a politician with these particular gifts can hope to remain long in office in Canada, so deeply is it afflicted with sectional fissures—geographical, economic and racial.

To keep together a party so heterogeneous as the present Canadian Liberal Party involves constant compromise, and he party has, in fact, maintained itself in power in Ottawa

for eleven out of the last sixteen years by its conservative attitude upon most major issues. Freedom of trade and freedom of speech and the Press should be dear to Liberals, and the present Ministry has been responsible since 1935 for a number of reductions in customs duties, largely conseqent upon trade treaties concluded with Britain, the United States, and other countries; but the present tariff is protectionist, and is no fulfilment of Liberal pledges. At the General Election of 1935 there were more Liberals elected for industrial seats in Eastern Canada than ever before; their influence has prevented the drastic inroads upon the protectionist system promised by Liberal leaders. They have justified this policy by claiming that the Conservative system of high protection had created a host of vested industrial interests, and that summary and drastic reductions would have caused a disaster; but tariff reductions have hitherto been too small and too slow to please Western Liberals, whose dissatisfaction recently found expression in a public protest against a Bill to increase the protection of the hat and furniture industries. There have been serious rumblings of discontent from the West, and Western Liberal malcontents are determined to force the Government's hand in the matter of tariffs. One of their leaders had tabled a resolution asking for the establishment of a special committee of the House of Commons to investigate the administration of the customs tariff and, in particular, the workings of the system of drawbacks, in order to discover whether the Canadian consumer, as contrasted with the producer, is getting any benefit from it. This move is a direct challenge to Mr. Dunning, the Minister of Finance, who has always maintained that the system benefits the consumer and is not a disguised subsidy to the manufacturer.

With this issue the future of Mr. Dunning is deeply involved. Starting life in Canada as an immigrant lad from England, he first came into prominence as an efficient architect of a co-operative grain-marketing system in Saskatchewan and a zealous opponent of protectionism and, when he entered Federal politics in 1925, was regarded as the most formidable exponent of Radical Western sentiment. Losing his seat in 1930, he spent the next five years in the inner circle of 'big business' in Montreal and Toronto. His old admirers fear

that he has forgotten the rock from which he was hewn an become irretrievably contaminated by his close associatio with the great business magnates of the Eastern cities. B common consent he is the most energetic member of an most capable administrator in the present Cabinet. It wa taken for granted two years ago that he would one day lea the Liberals, but his claims to the succession would no encounter fierce opposition from those very Western element which once regarded him as their chief paladin. Without the support he would find it difficult to overcome the prejudic in Quebec against the elevation of any but a native-bor Canadian to the highest office in the land. His presence i the Government assures it of the support of powerful busi ness leaders, who have complete confidence in his judgmen but, before the next general election, he and the rest of th King Cabinet will have to clarify their position about fisca policy.

Another fundamental Liberal issue, with which Mr. King' Ministry has so far dallied, concerns freedom of speech an the Press. A year ago the *Union Nationale* Ministry of Mr Duplessis, which now rules in Quebec, passed the 'Padloc Law,' which conferred upon the Attorney-General drasti powers to suppress undefined subversive activities. Under it authority the provincial police of Quebec have been raidin Left-wing newspaper establishments and the private home of journalists and labour leaders, confiscating papers an banning Left-wing meetings. Here, surely, is an issue whic would arouse sincere Liberals. Lawyers are confident tha the 'Padlock Law' is an unconstitutional measure and hol that it should be disallowed. The King Ministry, whose members have sedulously avoided any pronouncement o opinion about the Act, are now faced with the necessity o making within the near future a decision upon a forma petition against the Act. Disallowance will not please most of their own French-Canadian supporters at Ottawa, nor the Roman Catholic Church, but if Ministers allow the law to stand after disallowing the banking and other laws of the Alberta Legislature they will have to face the accusation of betraying one of the basic principles of the Liberal creed.

The province of Quebec provides the Liberal Party with

its most awkward political problem. From 1867 to 193 dominated the province; it supplied an unbroken series provincial Ministries, and only at rare Federal elections it fail to carry less than three-fourths of the sixty-five seats the Federal Parliament assigned to Quebec. In August 1 this great fortress of Canadian Liberalism was taken by *Union Nationale* Party, an alliance of Conservatives, Indep dents, and Liberal insurgents exasperated by the policies of Taschereau Ministry, whose frailties were only fully expo after its expulsion from office For eighteen months *Union Nationale* Ministry formed by Mr. Maurice Duples formerly provincial leader of the Conservative Party Quebec, has been in control, and the developments wh have already occurred have aroused great disquietude in t other parts of Canada. The 'Padlock Law' is only one o series of measures which seem to aim at the creation o Clerical-Fascist régime in Quebec.

Behind the Duplessis Ministry stands the Roman Catho hierarchy, whose leader, Cardinal Villeneuve, Archbishop Quebec and Primate of the Roman Catholic Church in Cana declared in public some time ago that democracy, as practis in North America, weakened Catholic society and that a co porate State must be established in the province of Queb Such respect has the Duplessis Ministry for Cardinal Vil neuve that it has given him, at the opening of the provinc Legislature, a precedence never before accorded to an ecc siastic. Space forbids any detailed account of its legislatu record: there has been a commendable effort to effect general rise in wage scales, which still remain deplorably lo there is disturbing evidence of a concerted attempt to re ment the working classes in labour organisations, saf controlled by the Roman Catholic Church. There have al been alarming leanings towards racial particularism ar while the idea of an independent French-Canadian State the banks of the St. Lawrence has received little pub encouragement, the underlying separatist spirit has fou open expression. The Duplessis Ministry has ordained th all its civil servants must speak French, and English-speaki merchants have discovered that if they want French-Canadi patronage they must have French-speaking employees

To such extremes has the cry 'French-Canada for t

French-Canadians' been carried in some places that the position of the English-speaking minorities has become quite uncomfortable and the gulf between the two races in Quebec is fast widening. There has also come into existence, without protest from the Duplessis Ministry, a Fascist movement whose supporters drill openly and indulge in anti-Semitic crusades. The evangelists of the new order claim that they are bent upon establishing a system of corporatism to them quite distinct from, but to others not unlike, Fascism. Leaders of Liberalism in Quebec have done little to resist these developments. The situation, however, is not without hopeful features, including the growth in the towns and cities of a pro-democratic and anti-clerical movement. For the exposition of its views there was recently founded by an ex-civil servant, Mr. J. C. Harvey, a French-Canadian descended from a Scottish soldier of Wolfe's army, a lively weekly paper, called *Le Jour*, which attacks both the Duplessis Ministry and the Catholic Church every week. The rapid growth of its circulation indicates that it has found many sympathisers. But, for the moment, the *Union Nationale* Party and clericalism are in the saddle, and the former has hitherto abstained from any intervention in the field of Federal politics beyond challenging the right of Ottawa to create a Federal system of unemployment insurance. In recent bye-elections in Quebec Mr. Duplessis refused to support independent candidates who opposed the armament policy of the King Ministry, and the latter was able to hold two seats in Quebec, one of them by a greatly reduced majority. A very different ordeal will face the Liberal contingent from Quebec in the Federal Parliament if, at the next election, candidates of the *Union Nationale* Party are nominated in every constituency. Yet the progressive elements in the Federal Liberal Party would not shed many tears over a drastic diminution of the French-Canadian influence in its councils.

Another cause for anxiety to the Liberal leaders at Ottawa is the attitude of Mr. Mitchell Hepburn, the Liberal Premier of Ontario, who has at last formally renounced all allegiance to Mr. Mackenzie King. Mr. Hepburn is a young resourceful and ambitious electioneering artist of a high order, and in a position to harass the King Ministry but, since his recent victory, his reputation has suffered from some disturbing

disclosures about the policies of his Ministry and he has probably passed the peak of his power. It is plain that a time of severe testing lies ahead of Mr. King's Ministry.

The historic Conservative Party, which has controlled the destinies of Canada for forty-four of the seventy years since Confederation, is in a parlous state. In the Federal House of Commons its strength of thirty-eight is the lowest in its long history, and its majority in the Senate is soon destined to vanish as dead Conservative senators are replaced by live Liberals. In three provincial Legislatures—those of Quebec, Saskatchewan, and Prince Edward Island—it has not a single representative, and only in three—those of Ontario, Manitoba, and New Brunswick—can it muster an effective Opposition The results of recent provincial elections and Federal bye-elections indicate that it is not regaining the confidence of the voters and, in some provinces, its organisation is in decay. A political party in Canada cannot survive without provincial allies, and the Federal Conservatives have few or none. They had at Ottawa a leader in Mr. R. B. Bennett who, by virtue of his debating power, his indefatigable energy, his long experience of politics, business and finance, and his comprehensive knowledge of Canada's basic problems, was the dominating personality in the House of Commons; but last March, at the age of sixty-eight and in ill-health, he resigned from leadership of the party.

If the Conservative Party is to survive as an effective political instrument it must make a fresh start with a new leader and with a new programme, but public discussion on these questions has revealed ill-omened divergences. One school of thought, sponsored by the *Montreal Gazette*, holds that Canadian Conservatism has fallen so low because it has abandoned Conservative principles under the guidance of unstable spirits like Mr. Bennett, and that it cannot revive until it reverts to them. They would like to see the party, under a new Right-wing leader, espouse high protectionism, the amalgamation of the two great railway systems under private ownership, the abolition of all regulatory restrictions upon business, and stern measures against extremist activities. Progressive Conservatives scorn the plan, holding that the Liberal Party has forestalled such a programme and stands so well in the confidence of 'big business' that there is no

room for a second party of the Right, and that a policy of reaction would be fatal to the Conservative Party which, in the past, was responsible for most great reforms. This view is well voiced by Mr. W. D. Herridge, an Ottawa lawyer, brother-in-law of Mr. Bennett, with four years as Canadian Minister at Washington to his credit.

He has political ambitions, but no seat in Parliament; his speeches show courage and originality and have aroused keen interest. His main thesis is that the capitalist system has failed to provide for the mass of the Canadian people a standard of general well-being such as the vast natural resources of the Dominion should make possible. He preaches a doctrine of economic nationalism:

> The Conservative Party has always been the party of action, just as Liberalism has always been the party of inaction. The policy of Conservatism has been a national policy, just as the policy of Liberalism has been an international policy. The international policy bases the welfare of this country upon the welfare of the world. The national policy bases the welfare of this country upon its own natural wealth and upon the capacity of its citizens to employ it.
>
> To-day the national policy means full employment of our natural wealth by our people for their benefit; it means therefore maximum production with profits compatible with it; not maximum profits with whatever restraint upon production is necessary to achieve them.

And:

> All the friends of progress must stand with us. We have common need to defeat reaction, to repulse the threat of alien finance, to clear the way forward. Let us then go forward together—Conservatives, the independent parties, and those Liberals who love liberty more than the party label.

The National Convention of the Conservative Party, which is now being planned, may well be the scene of a fierce battle, as the diehard elements of the party will not readily accept such a programme. The adventures in tariff negotiations upon which the King Ministry has now embarked may help Conservatives, as there is clear evidence that any sacrifice of Canada's present privileged position in the British market will evoke strong opposition.

Mr. Herridge and his allies hope to secure the friendly

co-operation of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and the Social Credit Party. The former is a sort of political holding company for agrarian and labour organisations of radical tendencies and, in the light of its programme, which is frankly collectivist, it can properly be described as Canada's Socialist Party. It is strong in the West, notably in British Columbia, where till recently it provided the official Opposition in the provincial Legislature but, except in certain industrial centres, has no serious foothold in Eastern Canada, without which it cannot profess to be a serious competitor with the two historic parties of Canada. It commands the services of a substantial body of intellectuals, but has to compete in places like Toronto with a very active Communist Party, which is strong enough to sustain a daily paper, the *Clarion*, with a circulation of over 12,000 and, in the Prairie provinces, with the Social Credit Party. In Canada, as elsewhere, the internecine feuds of the Left-wing parties are at present condemning them in Canada to political futility.

In August 1935 the Social Credit Party, under the leadership of Mr. William Aberhart, who, in his original *rôle* of a religious commentator, was a skilled broadcaster, performed a remarkable feat in obtaining within a few months of its organisation control of the provincial Legislature of Alberta by a sweeping majority; but its leaders, while they have accomplished a great curtailment of the debt obligations of the province by measures highly unpalatable to the financial interests and have acquired some following in the other Western provinces, have so far refrained from inaugurating Social Credit. Their prestige among their own followers has suffered accordingly, and the old political parties are organising a united front against them for the next provincial election.

The Social Credit leaders have lately made overtures to the leaders of the United Farmers of Alberta for an agreement between the radical forces in Alberta to avert, by an allocation of seats, the splitting of the Radical vote at the next Federal election. The adverse economic conditions, which helped to give the C.C.F. Party, at the General Election of 1921, over fifty seats in Western Canada, have now been aggravated by a series of droughts, and, if the feud between the two factions can now be healed, the old parties may again have to reckon

with a formidable radical movement in the West. The Liberals will stand to lose more than the Conservatives, who to-day only hold two seats in the three Prairie provinces and four in British Columbia. If no new issues come to the forefront in politics the next Federal General Election will probably be a confused *mêlée*, with the Liberal Party defending its position against a variety of opposing groups, with nothing in common but their dislike of its performances and policies. In such circumstances public opinion is likely to support the party which promises stability.

Other political issues are arising which may prove decisive. For some years past there has been evidence of growing strains and stresses in the structure of Confederation, and they have been made apparent by the great depression which, from 1930 onwards, almost engulfed the Western provinces, some of which were only rescued from bankruptcy by the Federal Treasury. Mr. King's Government appointed a Royal Commission to investigate the relations of the Dominion and the provinces, the workings of the financial arrangements of Confederation, and correlated problems. The Commission, whose chairman is Chief Justice Rowell, of Ontario, includes experts on politics, economics and finance, all avowed Liberals. It is now taking evidence; its report will probably not be available until the end of the year, but the statements already submitted to it have aroused much controversy and revealed how difficult it will be to patch the fabric of Confederation.

The fathers of Confederation had before their eyes the unfortunate experience of the United States, where the allocation of the residuary powers of sovereignty in the Constitution to the individual States and the consequent growth of the doctrine of ' State rights ' led to civil war. They were resolved to take a different constitutional path, and planned a Federal State which, under a strong central Government, would be gradually welded into a real unity. But, as the years passed, their intentions were nullified by the growth of provincialism and by a series of legal decisions of the Privy Council, which on various issues upheld the claims of the provinces against the Dominion and opened the door to an enlargement of provincial jurisdiction far beyond what the framers of Confederation ever contemplated.

In a well-reasoned brief submitted to the Royal Commission at Ottawa, Professor F. R. Scott, who holds the Chair of Civil Law in McGill University, thus summed up the present situation of Confederation :

After two generations of national life under the Confederation agreement it can be said that two of the original five objects have been achieved : one is alive but none too secure, while two have been frustrated. The union of Canada under the Crown of Britain remains, and the rights of minorities are accepted as a basic part of the Constitution even though the extent of these rights gives rise to frequent debate. These two objects have been successful. The preservation of parliamentary institutions has been achieved, but democracy as a way of life has deteriorated in many respects in Canada. We may repeat the reasons for this : (1) the increasing power of small minorities in control of money and the Press who are able to influence parties unduly and swing elections ; (2) the increasing maldistribution of income and property which is making the accident of birth more and more important in the life of the individual Canadian ; and (3) the disparity of bargaining power between capital and labour, due to the more rapid increase of centralised control on the side of capital than on the side of labour.

Of the remaining two purposes which the fathers of Confederation hoped to achieve, one, a strong central Government with effective residuary power, has been largely frustrated, and the other, the progressive unification of Canadian law in the common law provinces, has been totally unfulfilled.

For these unfortunate developments two eminent British judges, Lord Watson and Lord Haldane, are credited with the chief responsibility because, as dominating members of the Privy Council, they gave persistent comfort to provincial claims, and now Lord Atkin stands in the same pillory by reason of a judgment delivered in 1937 which has had the effect of making *ultra vires* a large part of Federal legislation for industrial and social reform passed by the Bennett Ministry in 1935. The position now is that the Federal Parliament lacks the legal authority to sponsor a programme of social security, including agreed measures for unemployment insurance and standards of wages and working hours, whilst the provinces, which possess the authority, lack the resources. So an *impasse* has been reached where further progress with social and industrial reform cannot be made without a drastic amendment of the Constitution.

The Commission is expected to advocate an enlargement of Federal authority in the interests of national unity, of uniformity in administration, and of social and industrial reform. Any such proposals are certain to evoke vigorous opposition. Mr. Duplessis has already announced that the Government of Quebec will surrender none of its present jurisdiction to the Federal authority. Mr. Hepburn has intimated that he proposes to range himself on the same side against Federal aggrandisement. They are devising a common plan of action, and they are understood to be laying plans for invading the arena of Federal politics with a new party which would attempt to enlist the voters of Quebec and Ontario—two provinces which contain almost two-thirds of the population of Canada—in a campaign for the maintenance of the *status quo*. For different reasons the present Social Credit Ministry of Alberta will resist any surrender of provincial jurisdiction, and the present Liberal Ministry in New Brunswick contains members who take an extreme view of provincial rights and hold Confederation to have been a misfortune for their province. So, while Canadian Labour, which wants a programme of social and industrial reform made uniform throughout the Dominion, and Left-wing elements generally, will be ranged on the side of constitutional changes which will enlarge the Federal authority, the forces of opposition will not be negligible. When the issue is joined many party ties may be broken, and new parties may emerge which will introduce a life-giving reality into Canadian politics.

J. A. STEVENSON.

AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

By DONALD COWIE

THE last six months at the antipodes have been chiefly remarkable for a general awakening of public interest in problems of local and Imperial defence. The introduction of the big Australian Defence Estimates last September (the sum involved was £11,531,000, a record for any British Dominion) was followed by a fierce controversy in the Commonwealth as to how the money should be spent. The Federal Labour Party contended vigorously that a defence policy for Australia should be based solely on local needs. Trades union orators tried to persuade the electorate not only that the future safety of the Dominion depended on the maintenance of a gigantic air force, instead of a moderate air force combined with strong naval and military defences, but also that the Imperial connexion was potentially a source of danger and embarrassment.

But fortunately the Australian people refused to listen to this blarney; and their action last October in returning the Lyons Government to power for its third successive term (another record) was a final endorsement of the new rearmament policy. Based as it is on an Imperial rather than a purely national outlook, this policy aims at the strengthening of naval and fixed coast defences, and expansion of the army and air force, in conjunction with an important departure, the intensive organisation of internal resources for the production of foodstuffs, raw materials and munitions to meet any national or Imperial emergency. It was announced recently that 'Australia proposes to work towards the ideal of becoming the supply centre for the Western Pacific area of the Empire.' Thus Great Britain can depend upon this Dominion both to stand up for herself in time of trouble, and to assist in the anxious work of keeping the Empire

supplied with the necessaries of life and death. If all other Dominions had adopted a similar policy the Em would now have the unified scheme of supply and defe that it so fatally lacks.

But Australia's example has not been lost upon neighbouring Dominion of New Zealand, and, although Savage's Government has found it somewhat difficult reconcile conflicting ideological loyalties, plans have rece been laid for increasing the effective strength of the arı forces, and for centralising defence control. It is w noting that, while Mr. W. J. Jordan was embarras Mr. Eden at Geneva, Ministers at Wellington were sa things like this :

> Until the League becomes effective the Government must the steps necessary inside its powers to defend the Dominion. this end, and with valuable assistance from Great Britain, ai defence scheme has been organised ; the proposals about operation in naval defence have been finalised , and steps been taken to reorganise the land defences, and to co-ordinate three branches of defence services to eliminate waste and to ε the most effective use of our resources if and when the need arise.

But a candid observer must add that the New Zea Defence Vote this year, £1,600,000, is the lowest of all Dominions, and that this fine country, larger than the Ur Kingdom and with the population of a London suburl undoubtedly the most vulnerable single unit in the Bı Empire. Many New Zealanders realise this themselves. Andrew Russell, G.O.C. the New Zealand Division f 1915 to 1919, stated recently that 'New Zealand's war position, in case of trouble in Europe which prevented arrival of aid from England, would be hopeless.' The ı cheerful aspect of the situation is that Labour will face country at a general election in November this year.

Six months ago one could note with some satisfac that the Australian Government and Australian public opi alike seemed to be opposed to the much-discussed Imp trade *rapprochement* with the United States. The Austr attitude at the Imperial Conference had been quite defir that the Dominion had nothing to gain, but much to

from such a move. Mr. W. T. White, Minister for Trade and Customs in the Dominion Government, speaking at Melbourne on June 8, 1937, stated categorically that 'Australia was unwilling to agree to preference cuts,' and that 'it was more fitting that America approach Australia direct.' Yet this same Mr. White is now to go with an Australian delegation to London this month (March), where revision of the Ottawa Agreements is to be seriously considered; and later he will visit Washington and negotiate for a trade agreement with the United States. Moreover, the Commonwealth Government terminated the licensing system for goods from America a month or two ago and has just been removed from Washington's 'black list' of nations ineligible for most-favoured treatment by the United States; whilst the Australian Attorney-General (Mr. R. G. Menzies) stated in the House of Representatives the other day:

> We are guilty of no want of appreciation of the Empire spirit and what it has done for us, or for the supreme value of the British market, when we say that we, as a young country on the threshold of our development, must look to the whole world for our markets. That is why we approach the American negotiations with a hopeful spirit. Should these negotiations lead on to some effective financial and commercial *rapprochement* with Germany, so that it became once more a large buyer of the natural products of other countries, the effect on Australia and the intensification of our development would be remarkable.

What has happened since last year?

From all available sources of information one can only conclude that the Australian Government has been directly influenced to change its mind, although it is not as yet clear exactly what means have been employed this time. It is unnecessary to point out that Australian opposition was the chief initial stumbling-block faced by the negotiators of the preliminary Anglo-American trade agreement. Australia did not want such an agreement, because with a population of less than 7,000,000 she buys more from the United Kingdom than does the United States with her 120,000,000 of people, while the United States already sells far more to Britain than does Australia. The Dominion's adverse balance of trade with America during the ten years 1925–35 was no less than £200,000,000.

Such bad news is slightly offset, however, by the re reports that the Lyons Government intends at last to reo the question of immigration. Expansion of manufactu industries in the Dominion and wholesale agricultural commercial recovery have rapidly absorbed surplus lab and now there is a real shortage of skilled operatives. Sc sensational revelations of Anglo-Saxon population decline alien population increase in the Dominion have stirred pul opinion. In the seven years from 1930 to 1936 Australia l on balance nearly 30,000 people of British stock throu emigration. In the financial year ended last June 12 Britons left Australia, but 3324 aliens, mostly Italians a other Southern Europeans, came in. The Government a the people have suddenly realised the seriousness of t position, and it was announced a month or two ago that comprehensive scheme for renewed immigration would initiated very soon. The new plan to encourage Britons come to Australia would deal, according to rumour, wi three phases of immigration : (1) extension of the nominat migrants scheme; (2) widening the scope of the prese methods of bringing boys from Great Britain for farm trai ing; and (3) encouraging retired British Army officers t settle in Australia. When he outlined this plan recently Mr Lyons said the British Government would be approached o the question of providing assisted passages for suitable Britis migrants nominated by friends or relatives in Australia. I can only be hoped that the two Governments will reach agree ment on this question without delay. As the Australian Prime Minister has himself pointed out : 'If the Australian birth rate drops further and is not compensated by migration, our population will begin actually to decline in twenty years or less. At the present rate of increase 1930 to 1934 it will only be 9,500,000 in 1984.'

But, again, the position of New Zealand is even more serious than that of Australia, partly because her politicians are less far-seeing. As recently as December 16, 1937, the Minister for Immigration (Mr. H. T. Armstrong) answered a Press question on migration prospects in the following terms :

New Zealand must develop its industries before attempting to provide for a larger population. We are not going to enter upon a

policy of immigration blindfolded; we want some plan so that we know what to do with the immigrants when they arrive.

Yet the Auckland branch of the New Zealand Farmers' Union had to advertise in Sydney last November for farm labourers, who, it was stated, could not be obtained locally; the New Zealand Government statistician, analysing the Dominion's birth rate in October 1937, stated that 'the rate of reproduction in 1936, if maintained, would be insufficient to maintain the population at the 1936 level'; and Viscount Bledisloe, a former Governor-General of the Dominion who should know, declared at the recent Empire Migration Conference that 'the country could absorb during the next fifty years from 10,000,000 to 20,000,000 Britons. There is no more vulnerable country than New Zealand.' One would like to ask the New Zealand Minister for Immigration: 'How would your country be situated to-day if legislators in the early years of the settlement had refused to encourage immigrants until the infant colony had "developed its industries"?'

Two notable anniversaries have recently been celebrated in Australia. The sesquicentennial of the foundation of New South Wales by Captain Arthur Phillip, R.N., and his thousand-odd convicts, seamen and marines, has at once inspired the moralist to meditate upon the strangest story in the history of colonisation, and has provided Australia and the Empire with useful and well-founded publicity. The centennial of the Union Bank of Australia, an institution that has maintained an unbroken record of dividend payments to shareholders, and that has retained the confidence of its depositors through every period of adversity, has enabled its chairman (Major-General Sir John H. Davidson) to provide a striking commentary on the growth of Australia since it was founded as a 'thieves' colony' 150 years ago:

> Last year Australia was this country's second best customer for pottery, glass, abrasives, chemicals, drugs and electrical goods, and third best for a large category, including iron and steel, cutlery, hardware, machinery, and cotton yarn and piece goods. For vehicles, paper and cardboard Australia actually ranked as Britain's largest customer.

But the two anniversaries have, for thinking people, been

capped by two anxieties. Although it is now nearly a year since the Imperial Conference approved the building of two fast, high-class liners to combat the American subsidised shipping competition in the Pacific, the orders have not yet been placed, and Lord Craigmyle, chairman of the P. and O., stated on February 3 this year that it was 'impossible to prophesy when they would be.' This, he said, was 'no fault of the Australian Government, whose actions and preparedness for further action have proved that they have the interests of British shipping at heart.' Then whose fault is it? Some antipodean rumours state that New Zealand's Prime Minister has refused to approve of any plan unless seamen, officers and stewards on the proposed ships work under New Zealand labour conditions. It seems unlikely that such an objection would really stand in the way of an agreement. Why has Whitehall been so strangely silent on the subject?

New Zealanders who had waited for years for aerial communication with the outside world were excited to learn in January that Pan-American Airways were planning to begin a fortnightly service from Auckland to San Francisco at once. But a few days later they were shocked to hear that the machine 'Samoan Clipper,' appointed to inaugurate the service, had been destroyed by fire during the second journey out, and all its fine crew had perished. Such an inauspicious beginning augured ill for the future of the service, it was admitted everywhere, and now New Zealand is once again looking to Imperial Airways. How much longer will Imperial Airways keep New Zealand waiting?

DONALD COWIE.

THE EGYPTIAN ELECTION

By Philip Graves

A bitter and turbulent general election has temporarily solved the Egyptian political crisis, the causes and development of which were described in the March number of the *Nineteenth Century and After*. Nahas Pasha's 'official' Wafdists have been routed, and so completely that they cannot convincingly invoke 'official terrorism' as the chief factor in their defeat. It goes without saying that the Ministerialists, a combination of minority parties which had long remained in rather hopeless parliamentary opposition to the Wafd, enjoyed those marks of official favour upon which the supporters of any Egyptian party Government which is conducting an election are accustomed to rely. Their allies the Saadist Wafdists, and some if not most of the numerous Independent candidates, appear to have shared largely in these advantages; and there can be no doubt that in some constituencies the local officials in charge of the polling were able to influence the results by such means as the denial to persons who had not been provided with voting-papers of their right to prove that they were entitled to vote. Still, the change-over from a Wafdist majority of 186 to 46 in the last Chamber to a miserable minority of 12 seats in the 263 already filled has been far too sweeping to be explained away by the tales of bribery and intimidation that are told by the losers in most Near Eastern elections.

Negligence and incompetence in administration, failure to fulfil their promises, the secession of their ablest members and their unnecessary and unpopular quarrel with the Palace had turned the scale against Nahas Pasha's Government and party. The fact was that since Saad Zaghlul Pasha's death the Wafdists had maintained their hold on Egyptian public opinion by defending the cause of national independence against the

British and that of constitutional government against the authoritarian tendencies of an able but unpopular King. They had made their political fortunes in and by opposition, for when they did form a Government they had either the British or the King or both to contend with. When the British Government signed the Treaty of London and King Fuad was succeeded by his young and popular son they could only meet a situation which called for a new policy of construction by attempting to fight the constitutional battle all over again, without any serious justification and at the worst moment they could have chosen.

Before describing the course and results of the election it is necessary to explain the origin of the fierce political animosity which marked the election campaign and the elections themselves. The quarrel between the Prime Minister (Mohamed Mahmud Pasha) and the Nahassite Wafdists was of long standing. He had left the Wafd after sharing in its earlier struggles and undergoing deportation in Zaghlul Pasha's company because, while remaining a convinced supporter of Egyptian independence, he considered Zaghlul Pasha's attitude towards Great Britain to be too brusque and uncompromising to offer much hope of success, and also because the domestic policy of the Wafd was too disorderly and demagogic to commend itself to a conservative landowner of an old and distinguished family who had acquired a reputation as a strong-handed and competent administrator in the days of British control. He led the Constitutional Liberals first in an uneasy alliance with the Wafdists, then in opposition to them, and in 1928, when King Fuad first broke with Nahas Pasha, he formed a Ministry and governed Egypt without Parliament, but efficiently, for over a year, to the great indignation of his opponents. During Ismail Sidky Pasha's quasi-dictatorship he sided with the Wafd rather on account of his distrust of King Fuad than from a convinced hostility to Sidky's new Constitution. This did not save him from having his windows broken by Wafdist students in the course of the demonstrations that preceded the opening of the Treaty negotiations with Great Britain, although his speech on November 7, 1935, did more than anything else to prepare the way for them. Nor did his patriotic co-operation with the Wafdists in the United Front

appease his enemies, who went so far as to send their Blueshirts to attack his town house during the disturbances that broke out last autumn, and to accuse him of having prompted the attempt of a crazy Greenshirt to shoot Nahas Pasha in November last. But Wafdist fury reached its height when Mahmud Pasha included Sidky Pasha in his Cabinet which took office on Nahas Pasha's dismissal. The Wafdists had found Sidky's little finger thicker than Mahmud Pasha's loins. He had not only broken up their meetings *vi et armis* and muzzled their Press, but had also made them look somewhat ridiculous, notably by the artful expedient of detaching the railway carriages in which Nahas Pasha and his staff and allies were travelling on their way to raise trouble for the Government at Tanta and leaving them and their occupants marooned for a long day in a torrid and unfrequented siding.

Here was one quarrel. Another was as bitter. Nokrashi and Ahmed Maher Pashas, whose differences with Nahas Pasha and his *fidus Achates*, Makram Ebeid Pasha, had led to their successive expulsion from the party, took the field at the head of a number of candidates. They called their group the Saadist Wafd, in order to make it clear to the public that they alone professed and followed the political principles established by Saad Zaghlul. They thus poured oil on the fire of Nahassite indignation which had burnt fiercely since their rebellion. They were called turncoats and reactionary traitors; they retorted in kind; and their intimate knowledge of the weaknesses of their former associates made their retorts the more telling.

The election campaign was therefore the bitterest yet waged in Egypt. Charges and counter-charges of bribery, slander, terrorism and treason filled the air. Those who knew the provinces best feared bloodshed, and their fears were justified. Happily, the danger that the unpopularity of Makram Pasha, who is a Copt, might excite outbreaks of Moslem fanaticism was conjured—in spite of the anxiety caused by certain utterances of the Rector of the Moslem University of El Azhar—by the Government. King Farouk's name was used with regrettable freedom by both Ministerialists and Opposition, but, since the crisis which preceded the change of Government had arisen from the Wafdist attack on the royal prerogative, its misuse was almost inevitable.

The Government's preparations for the fray were simpl and ingenious. The increase of population since the las census justified the enlargement of the Chamber of Deputie by 32 new seats, making a total of 264. The boundaries o the new constituencies were naturally drawn with small regar for the wishes or the interests of the Opposition candidates It was decided to hold the election in Upper Egypt or March 31 and in Cairo and Lower Egypt on April 2. The Ministerialists obviously hoped that their expected success ir Upper Egypt, where the Wafd was relatively weak, would have its effect in Cairo and the Delta, though their spokesmen professed to doubt whether the returns could be made known in time. The Government, nevertheless, published them with unusual rapidity, and with the desired effect. These and other dodges, such as the requisitioning by the authorities of all possible means of transport on election day, may not have been, strictly speaking, legal. Local officials, however, often disobeyed Mahmud Pasha's orders to hold the election fairly, and British observers had an opportunity of studying what their grandfathers would have called 'a real old-fashioned contest,' conducted with all the rigour of the game as played in Egypt.

In one particular the elections deviated from the model of Eatanswill. The Egyptian peasant, though normally a cheerful and sociable soul, has a quick temper, notably in Upper Egypt. Faction fights and manslaughters are frequent in some districts, and elections are often marked by bloodshed On this occasion there was no spectacular conflict such as happend near Zagazig during the election of 1936—which, incidentally, was conducted with complete impartiality by a neutral Government—where the rivalry of a descendant of the Mamelukes and a candidate preferred to him by the Wafdist Central organisation caused the death of ten persons and the wounding of some fifty more. But there were many affrays; at least a dozen lives were lost, and the death of Senator Saleh Lamlum Pasha and his brother at Wafdist hands in a fight in Minich Province may lead to a serious blood feud on account of his influence among the Beduin of Western Egypt.

The final results of the polling gave the Ministerialist Coalition of Constitutional Liberals, Shaabists (Sidky Pasha's

group) and Ittihad (Palace Party) 99 seats, the Saadists 84, Independents 68, and Nahassite Wafdists 12. The election in the constituency where Saleh Lamlum Pasha was killed has been postponed *sine die*. The large number of Independents can generally be ascribed to the election of persons representing strong local interests who were too indifferent or too prudent to take sides until they had been elected. Had the Wafd been more successful, some would doubtless have joined it, as so many Independents did after the election of 1925. On this occasion most of them have promised to support Mahmud Pasha. Far more important, however, is the success of the Saadist Wafdists They owed something to their title in the many rural constituencies where the name of Saad Zaghlul Pasha is still a word of power. They also gained the support of the many Wafdists who were dismayed by Nahas Pasha's campaign against the Palace. Yet the frequent abuse of official influence makes the defeat of the Wafd less impressive than it might otherwise have been. The best prophets gave the Nahassites some 50 seats, perhaps 60, in the new Chamber, and it is hard to believe that some results —Nahas Pasha's defeat by over 900 votes in his home town of Samanud, for instance—were entirely due to a sudden change in the attitude of the electorate. On the other hand, Makram Pasha's failure in the Shubra suburb of Cairo is stated on excellent authority to have been caused by the attitude of wealthy Copts of that quarter who decided to oppose their unpopular co-religionist by all means in their power lest the Coptic community might suffer from his success

The parliamentary situation thus created is extremely favourable to Mohamed Mahmud Pasha. For the first time in his political career he has a majority in the Chamber behind him. If the Saadists decide not to accept office but to play the part of benevolent critics of his Administration, he will be assured of a numerically powerful and intellectually competent Opposition. That this will be their policy may be inferred from Ahmed Maher Pasha's refusal to stand for re-election to the Presidency of the Chamber. They may be trusted to support his Government as long as he adheres to constitutional and democratic methods of administration and carries out the constructive programme to which he is pledged.

This includes the strengthening of the independence of the judicature, the National University and local representative bodies, the supply of drinking water to the villages (where water-borne parasitic diseases such as bilharzia are wide-spread), the reduction of the taxation on small holdings, the provision of more opportunities for the literate class, where 'black-coated unemployment' is increasing, and the re-organisation, re-equipment and increase of the army. If his health stands the strain he should succeed. Meanwhile, the Saadists may be expected to do their utmost to weaken Nahas Pasha's adherents by emphasising their claim to preserve the true Wafdist tradition.

So far as the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty is concerned, there is every reason to believe that Mahmud Pasha will fulfil the obligations of the Egyptian Government under that instrument as loyally as his predecessor. The Wafdists, on the other hand, have for some time been ascribing their troubles and reverses to British 'interference,' which, they aver, induced King Farouk to invite Mahmud Pasha to form a Government. This fable does not come too well from politicians who had allowed themselves to believe, and had done their best to persuade their followers, that the British Government stood behind them, and who were accused by their opponents of visiting and consulting the British Embassy with an assiduity that was not consonant with the dignity of an independent Government. At a recent meeting the Wafdist leaders, after declaring their intention to continue the struggle against reaction and its British supporters—presumably such British journalists as have called attention to eccentricities of Wafdist policy—and stating that they regarded the recent elections as null and void, went on to pass a resolution that the Anglo-Italian conversations in which Egypt took no actual part were an infringement of the rights and status of independent Egypt as guaranteed by the Treaty of 1936. King Farouk's Speech from the Throne has since shown that the Egyptian Government was fully informed and regularly consulted during these negotiations by its British ally, and the text of the Rome Agreement proves that the Egyptian Minister to Italy took part in their later stages, in which Egypt appeared as a sovereign State with an independent interest in Near Eastern affairs. The satisfaction expressed by King Farouk at

the improvement in Anglo-Italian relations is shared by all responsible opinion in Egypt; and it is hoped that it may now be possible to devote a fraction of the sums previously destined for urgent rearmament to rural betterment and hygiene.

This account of the Egyptian elections may provoke the inquiry whether their result conveys any sort of political moral. Admittedly all Egyptians are broadly agreed upon the essentials, recently enumerated by the Cairo correspondent of *The Times* as:

> . . . the jealous preservation of the national independence; the maintenance of the constitutional monarchy and of the parliamentary *régime*, the relations of Egypt with the Sudan; the upholding of public security, the national defence; the fight against illiteracy; the need of improving the conditions of hygiene . . . the general improvement in the lot of the working classes.

It might, therefore, be argued that the recent election was fought over the loaves and fishes of office or to satisfy personal rancours. This is not so. It was fought in defence of the constitutional rights of the King which were threatened by the Wafd's attack on his lawful prerogatives and by their maintenance of a private army—which has now been dissolved by decree—together with the Greenshirts and the Italian Blackshirt organisations in Egypt. It is true that the constitutional issue was not raised by the Wafdists after the national rejoicings over King Farouk's marriage had taught them a lesson, but they had none the less to pay for the wild words and foolish demonstrations of last autumn.

PHILIP GRAVES.

BRITISH-ITALIAN FRIENDSHIP RESTORED

By Commendatore Luigi Villari, M.C.

Now that British–Italian relations are once more being restored to their former friendly course, from which they need never have deviated, it may be of interest to explain to British readers Italy's attitude throughout the recent troubled times, and above all her present outlook towards future developments. The great difficulty, as an Englishman recently told the present writer, was that many of his countrymen during the conflict failed to realise that there was an Italian case at all; and that until this was admitted all 'conversations' and discussions would be waste of time. Before examining the situation of the recent and, let us hope, dead past, the following points should be borne in mind:

(1) Italy had taken part in the World War on the side of Great Britain and France and had lost 670,000 men killed in the struggle, to say nothing of the vast cost in treasure and shipping.[1]

(2) She had been promised under the terms of the Pact of London of April 1915 an extension of her colonial territories in Africa, and by the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement of April 1917 a share in the partition of Turkey, including the Smyrna area.

(3) Italy needed these possibilities of expansion far more urgently than her Allies, because her own home territory was limited, much of it sterile and all of it very poor in mineral resources, because, unlike them, she had no colonies where large numbers of her sons could settle, and because her population was increasing more rapidly than theirs.

(4) At the Peace Conference Italy was not given the promised extension of colonial territory, whereas the

[1] Half her national wealth was consumed in the struggle and two thirds of her mercantile marine was sunk.

other Allies secured large additions to their already vast colonial empires under the specious form of 'mandated areas,' and Italy's share in the partition of Turkey was handed over to Greece; incidentally, Greece proved unable to retain Smyrna, and her attempt to occupy it resulted in the rise of the new Nationalist Turkey, the first of the vanquished Powers to snap its fingers at the Peace Treaties.

(5) At the Peace Conference and after Italy had always advocated a policy of moderation towards Germany and the other vanquished Powers, not out of sentimental sympathy, but for reasons of practical common-sense, realising that a policy of vendetta was bound to provoke dangerous reactions. That policy, although it met with approval in Great Britain, was not supported with sufficient vigour to overcome France's ruthless determina- to crush Germany for good and all.

(6) As early as December 1922 Signor Mussolini himself had advocated the cancellation of reparations and inter-Allied debts, a policy which, if it had been adopted, would have saved Europe from subsequent economic disasters.

(7) Italy had from the first realised the futility of attempting to keep Germany and Austria apart, however much such a separation might be regarded as desirable in many quarters, and the advantages of accepting it with a good grace.

(8) At the first Assembly of the League of Nations, when many countries were literally starving for raw materials to reconstruct their economic life after the war, the Italian delegation proposed a measure of free trade in such commodities and the elimination of all embargoes on their export (Great Britain had then imposed a heavy duty on the export of coal, which Italy needed desperately). This proposal was bitterly attacked by the Canadian delegate, and ended by being laughed out of court.

(9) In the various Disarmament Conferences Italy's proposals for qualitative disarmament and that disarmament should be general (*i.e.*, equally applicable to the land, the sea and the air) and universal (*i.e.*, applicable to all countries) were not accepted.

Italy was not powerful enough to insist on this policy single-handed, and, although they were in harmony with Great Britain's views, British support was lukewarm, as in the case of the suggested policy towards Germany.

The disregard of points (2), (3), (4) and (8) had handicapped Italy's economic development and intensified her need for expansion. No effort was spared by the Fascist Government to improve agriculture by means of land reclamation and scientific farming methods, to develop industry by the extension of hydro-electric power, to colonise the limited fertile area of Libya to its full capacity, and to find work for the Italian people in every way. But this was not enough. Emigration was closed by the restrictive measures of the United States Government and by the reduced capacity of other erstwhile immigration countries to absorb foreign labour. Further expansion was becoming ever more urgent for the Italians of to-day and those of to-morrow.

In spite of these handicaps imposed on Italy, the tradition of British-Italian friendship was so strong that the policy towards Italy of the British Government at the Peace Conference and after was attributed by most Italians to the personal prejudices of individual statesmen rather than to the British people or Government as a whole. Even the insulting language of certain British papers and politicians towards Italy's new régime was regarded merely as the antics of the genus crank which, even in Italy, was known to flourish like a green bay-tree among the British. When the Labour Party, so closely associated with British anti-Fascism, came into power, relations continued to be friendly. Indeed, in the field of foreign affairs, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald seemed as anxious as Pope Pius II. to make the world forget his past ('forget Æneas Silvius Piccolomini,' the worldly humanist said on ascending the Papal throne, 'and only remember Pius II.'). It was, in fact, *consule* MacDonald that the cession of Jubaland to Italy was effected, the first attempt to make good in a small measure the promises of the Pact of London.

British-Italian friendship was in fact taken for granted, and it did indeed operate on many occasions, *always* for the benefit of both countries and of world peace. The two peoples appeared less subject to collective hysteria and to be

better endowed with common-sense and balance than many others, and neither was subject to sudden panic. The Four-Power Pact, which was primarily a British–Italian agreement, was the most promising international act concluded since the war.

Nevertheless, Italy's urgent need for more land and more sources of raw materials persisted, and she began to look towards Abyssinia as the one country wherein Italian expansion was possible without encroaching on the legitimate interests of any other European State. Expansion in Abyssinia might well have been effected peacefully had it not been for the suspicious hostility of the Negus, inspired, most Italians firmly believed, by certain Governments and individuals hostile to Italian interests, and by no means real friends of Abyssinia or her ruler.

I need not enter into the various incidents which led to the conflict of 1935–36. It is clear, however, that the British Government was not in any way alarmed at the prospects of action by Italy in East Africa, except in so far as it might distract her attention from the European situation and make it more difficult for her to make her weight felt in case of further complications. The terms of the Maffey Report [2] suggested that an eventual Italian occupation of Abyssinia was regarded as likely to prove beneficial rather than otherwise for the neighbouring British possessions and as unlikely to constitute a menace to British interests elsewhere. It was not until June 1935, when the results of the Peace Ballot were published, that the British Government took a definitely hostile line to Italy in regard to Abyssinia. At the same time, as Sir Charles Petrie writes,[3] 'British statesmen thought that Mussolini was bluffing, a thing that he has never done throughout his career.' Those statesmen 'having for years told their countrymen that collective security was a more than satisfactory substitution for national defence, it required greater skill than most of them possessed to eat their own words without calling attention to their diet.' Sanctions were applied in the hope of calling Mussolini's bluff, and failed.

In Italy this situation was understood in a general way,

[2] It was made in June 1935 before Mr Eden went to Rome, but was not published until the following winter—by an Italian paper.

[3] *Lords of the Inland Sea*, p. 58.

but not in all its implications. In many quarters it was firmly but erroneously believed that British opposition to Italian expansion was inspired by anxiety lest Italy should represent a menace to British interests in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea and to the safety of the British route to India. The bitterness displayed in some quarters and voiced in the Press seemed to indicate that the British public was animated by hatred of Italy. This, of course, was not the case, and a large number of prominent Britons, including many of the best-known names in English literature and journalism, were greatly distressed by the turn of events and genuinely anxious to see British–Italian friendship restored. The present writer has hundreds of letters in his possession written to him by friends and strangers in Great Britain during the conflict expressing their cordial friendship for Italy in those dark days.

The prevalent hostility was clearly inspired by hatred of Italy's system of government, in which class warfare was eliminated and replaced by national class solidarity. Fascism's unforgivable sin was that it had proved a success. If it had been Bolshevist Russia which had invaded and conquered Abyssinia, it is doubtful whether Left-wing politicians would have been disturbed. Italians perhaps failed to grasp the fact that the British interest in their affairs was not inspired by selfish considerations, but by a worthy if tiresome national trait. The imposition of Sanctions confirmed the view that British hostility to Italy was general, because though Sanctions were agreed to by fifty-two nations and applied (more or less) by most of them, it was obvious that the driving force behind them was the British Government, and particularly Mr. Anthony Eden. While the stories of a personal conflict between the latter and Signor Mussolini are known to be apocryphal, it did seem that Mr. Eden's personal feelings counted for a good deal.

What outraged Italian feelings more particularly was the fact that it should be Great Britain, their traditional friend, who proved so hostile. If France or Bolshevist Russia had taken the lead in this hostility, Italians would not have been surprised. But, in the words of the Psalmist, 'if it had been an enemy that had done me this dishonour, then I could have borne it, but it was my own familiar friend whom I trusted.' Then all the previous actions of the British Government at

the Peace Conference which had proved prejudicial to Italy were remembered and appeared to form a background for its policy over Abyssinia.

After the Abyssinian war was ended it would have been possible to restore the old understanding at once. Italy asked for nothing better. The fact that she triumphed so completely, far from rendering her truculent, had created a ' victory feeling ' which engendered a sense of satisfaction and good temper. The least sign of friendliness would have been cordially reciprocated. Had the British Government accepted the *fait accompli* and proved ready to let bygones be bygones, another and much more attractive British characteristic, Italians would have been only too delighted to meet it half way. Unfortunately, a series of events subsequent to the war served to keep up the tension and brought Italy and Great Britain into an even bitterer conflict, and, as Mr. Chamberlain stated last February, very near a disastrous conflict.

Of these events the most serious was the Spanish Civil War, which raised the question of the Mediterranean once more. The British people were alarmed by rumours, sedulously disseminated by parties interested in promoting international conflict, that Italy had sinister designs on the Balearic Islands, Spanish Morocco and other Spanish territories, that she intended to cut British communications in the Mediterranean, seize Malta and annex Egypt.

The British rearmament programme which synchronised with these rumours at first sight suggested to many Italians that its object was to enable Great Britain to avenge the failure of her own policy over Abyssinia. But well-informed Italians accept without hesitation Mr. Neville Chamberlain's strongly worded denial of any such intention. Indeed, his succession to the Premiership represented a guarantee of common-sense and real (not collective) security. Every speech which he has made produced an impression of sincerity and soundness of view, from the one delivered at Floors Castle in September 1935, which proved him to be out of sympathy with the idea of Sanctions, down to his most recent pronouncements. He at once undertook to enter into negotiations with Italy in order to arrive at a friendly settlement of the various outstanding causes of disagreement, many of them of purely journalistic origin. He had the good

fortune to be kept informed of the state of public opinion in Italy, and of the genuine desire in Italy to see the old British–Italian friendship restored, by other than exclusively official sources. The negotiations were held up for a time, but when it came to a show of strength the Prime Minister was able to secure an overwhelming majority for his policy.

Recent events in the British Parliament are, of course, internal affairs of Great Britain, on which it would not be proper for a foreign observer to comment, except where they affect international relations. Fortunately, the undesirability of interfering in other people's internal affairs is beginning to be realised, and we find Lord Ponsonby stating in the House of Lords on March 29 that 'getting on a pedestal and lecturing other people would not bring peace to Europe.'

There is, however, no doubt that the external effects of these events have been all to the good. It is felt now that there is a genuine desire on the part of those responsible for British foreign and Imperial policy to settle difficulties with Italy in a spirit of friendliness, a desire heartily reciprocated by Italy herself. Now that this spirit exists the battle may be said to be won, for the dispute was more psychological than material. Lord Halifax, in defending the policy of the British Government in the same House of Lords debate of March 29, stated that 'if we can extend the circle of our friends, as I believe we can, through our present conversations with the Italian Government, by resuming old relations, unhappily, but, as we hope, temporarily interrupted, we shall render a real service, in my judgment, to the common good.'

The divergences in themselves are indeed of comparatively minor importance. The main points of friction are: the Mediterranean and its outlets, the Red Sea, the recognition of Italy's annexation of Abyssinia, British–Italian interests in East Africa (frontiers, Lake Tana, grazing rights, etc.), Spain, the Rome–Berlin axis, and Bari.

The Mediterranean is of great importance for both countries, and it is more important for Italy, being that country's only sea; no Italian fails to realise its value as a line of communication for the British Empire. But its very geographical situation should make of it a connecting link between the two Powers rather than a cause of disagreement. It is to the interest of both that navigation through it should

always remain free, and, as Mussolini himself said in his speech at Milan in November 1936,

> we have said a thousand times . . . that we do not intend to threaten this route [the Mediterranean]. We do not propose to interrupt it, but we expect, on the other hand, that our vital rights and interests be respected also. . . . A bilateral clash is not to be thought of, much less a clash which, from being bilateral, would immediately become European Consequently, there is only one solution—a sincere, rapid and complete agreement based on the recognition of reciprocal interests.

The interests of the two Powers in the Mediterranean are complementary and not antagonistic, and both require that there should be peace, and not war, in that sea. Some distinction might perhaps be made between Italy's 'vital' interests and the 'essential' one of Great Britain, but in actual fact the difference is not a serious one. Similarly, that the Suez Canal should be kept open to the ships of all nations in peace as in war and made really international is a British and an Italian interest; and, indeed, Italy's conquest of Abyssinia has strengthened the community of interests between the two Powers in this connexion rather than weakened it.

The recognition of the *fait accompli* in Abyssinia is in itself also a matter of minor importance, especially for Italy, but when it is effected, either directly by Great Britain, as it has been by a large number of other States, or 'within the framework of the League,' it will be a gesture of friendship which cannot fail to have satisfactory results. The other Abyssinian questions are also easy of adjustment. The waters of Lake Tana only affect the fertility of Egypt and the Sudan to a very limited degree; and in any case, Italy has always undertaken not to hinder their flow in any way. The frontier questions between Abyssinia and the adjoining British possessions are matters to be dealt with by technical delimitation commissions.

Italy's new position in Abyssinia does not imply any conflict of interests with Great Britain in the Red Sea. Since 1885 Italy has had possessions on its shores, which she occupied at the request of Great Britain when Egypt was about to evacuate that stretch of coast, and to-day she has not acquired another mile of territory there. Nor need there

be any fears for British interests in Egypt or the Sudan. A glance at the map should reassure the doubtful that any idea of invading either country from Abyssinia is preposterous. Egypt, of course, could be invaded much more easily from Libya, where Italy has been in possession since 1911, and no one, before 1935–36, dreamed of any danger from that quarter. Why should Italy covet either Egypt or the Sudan? What she needs is territory where her people can expand and where she can find some of the raw materials she requires. The Sudanese climate is utterly unsuited to settlement by Europeans; and if the country does produce cotton, Italy can secure all she wants in Abyssinia, which also happens to have a temperate climate suited for white settlers, and to be largely depopulated, whereas Egypt is one of the most densely inhabited countries in the world.

The Spanish question has proved a fertile source of dissension between Great Britain and Italy. Italy only intervened in Spain long after France and Russia, to say nothing of other countries, had done so to a far greater extent. The triumph of General Franco will, I am convinced, be beneficial rather than prejudicial to British interests.

The Rome–Berlin axis aroused misgivings in many quarters in Great Britain; the close agreement between Italy and Germany, with all its implications, was simply the direct result of the policy of the British Government over the Abyssinian conflict, the imposition of Sanctions, and French policy towards Germany. If these Governments did not wish to see the 'axis' materialise they should not have driven Italy and Germany into each other's arms. From another point of view the common interest of Italy and Germany in preventing predatory Communism from extending to the rest of Europe is by no means in conflict with the interest of the British Empire, especially in India and in its other possessions.

To descend from the sublime to the ridiculous, we must say a few words on the much debated subject of the Bari wireless messages. In the first place, not one in a million of those who object to them have heard and understood them, for they were in Arabic. Secondly, the messages themselves were issued at a time of bitter conflict between the two countries, while the B.B.C. was issuing an unceasing stream

of anti-Italian messages; and in both cases the wireless was employed as an instrument of wordy warfare. Lastly (witness the valuable Chatham House Report on the subject), the conflict on the banks of the Jordan was already so bitter that no outside influences, by wireless or otherwise, could make it any worse.

The actual details of the settlement are of secondary importance. What matters is the spirit of the settlement, and that could not be better. The two Powers recognise each other's interests in the Mediterranean. Each is free to provide for the defence of its own positions without infringing on or menacing those of the other; the freedom of transit through the Suez Canal in peace and in war is reaffirmed, various areas are recognised as being within the spheres of influence of one or other of the two Powers concerned, and the position in Abyssinia itself will shortly be recognised for what it really is. The withdrawal of the volunteers from both sides in Spain had already been agreed upon; in fact the acceptance by Italy last February of the British formula on the withdrawal was the beginning of the parliamentary crisis in Britain and, in consequence, of the 'conversations' in Rome. But the march of events will probably eliminate the question altogether in the near future.

While the British Government and the large majority of the British people now understand that there is an Italian case and are willing to consider it in a friendly spirit, it is realised ever more clearly in Italy that the continued existence of the British Empire, as conceived by Disraeli and Joseph Chamberlain (in the policy of the present Prime Minister we discern the true Chamberlain touch) and voiced by Rudyard Kipling, is a vital asset for world peace and therefore a major Italian interest.

What of the future? A return to the old understanding should at least give us back those benefits which accrued to both countries before the pacifists tried to force them into war—and so very nearly succeeded. But that is not enough. Recent events should teach us something more. One point is, I think, quite clear. Italians had for many years realised the limitations of the League of Nations, and were convinced that, while it might prove a useful instrument of diplomatic procedure for many technical questions, for settling minor

political conflicts between great Powers and larger ones between small Powers, it was incapable of handling the major international problems. The present writer, in an article published in the *Quarterly Review* for April 1927, stated that

> we must avoid trying to make it [the League] do what it is as yet obviously unfitted to attempt. Above all let us liberate it from the ministrations of its too zealous and not too wise supporters, both those who picture the League as an organisation in which certain States are the Lord's elect and deserving of the worship of the faithful, while others are hopeless reprobates condemned to everlasting damnation, and also those ardent pacifists who are ready to plunge the world into war for the sake of peace.

It was pointed out in the same article that 'to make the League really capable of carrying out its proper functions it should be liberated from the fumes of *crank*-incense.' Unfortunately, the League continued to try to do things for which it was not fitted.

In both countries the necessity for a common colonial policy is beginning to be realised. Colonial possessions should no longer be regarded as bones of contention between civilised peoples, but should provide a basis for certain general principles concerning the intelligent exploitation of the natural resources of the world, the fair and humane treatment of the natives with a view to raising material and moral conditions, and the settlement of suitable white colonists on its land. Italians are perfectly willing to collaborate with other nations in this great task.

Once an understanding is established between Great Britain and Italy, it should not be regarded as a final goal, but as an opening for further expansion into a wider international sphere. Mr. Neville Chamberlain himself in a recent speech stated that he looked forward to a real understanding between Great Britain, Italy, Germany and France—*i.e.*, to a revival of Signor Mussolini's Four-Power Pact of 1932. If recent events have created a situation differing from that of 1932, it does not follow that the agreement cannot be revived, perhaps in a different form. If this result is achieved, Soviet Russia will cease to be a danger, while none of the smaller and less responsible States will be able to create disturbances. European peace will be assured.

LUIGI VILLARI.

EDUCATION AND 'THE CAT'

By D. S. MacColl

Those of us who have publicly protested against torture by flogging are asked the question, in print or privately, 'What is the alternative?' We are bound to reply, so far as our minds are clear upon a difficult problem.

I say then, first of all, that criminally insane persons and insanely sadistic assaulters of women and children should be painlessly 'eliminated,' to use current jargon, for their own peace and that of the community. To these I would add, if it lay with me to decide, all traffickers in the flesh of women, children—and men: also blackmailers, a very odious class of the cruel. Others I will refer to presently.

Next, that in considering the sort of crime which gave rise to the recent debate in the Press, a distinction should be drawn between kinds of robbery, with their several possibilities of violence.

1. There is the species of Amateur Pilferers, or that of men tempted to house-breaking by open windows or other such sudden opportunity.

2. The professional Snatcher or Burglar. He is a man, often, of remarkable native abilities, which might be turned to honest advantage in other directions. He has become a skilled adept in thieving, because he is so intelligent as to be bored by a world in which employment for brains is slack, and even a livelihood hard to come by. He is at odds with society, and out to profit as he may; but also keen on adventure and chances to prove his skill. In prison, if he is reasonably treated and not repressed and rendered more vengeful, he develops surprising mastery in games of skill, such as chess, or inventive production of gadgets; or he may show a keen interest in reading and a gift for writing, when he is not fobbed off with

religiose (not, please, 'religious') rubbish, and allowed the use of pen and paper, with sufficient light. Such men did well in the War, with its opportunities for the Artful Dodger in No Man's Land or elsewhere, and when managed by the more civilised type of Prison Governor may distinguish themselves outside of burglary when released from confinement.

Such men disdain the use of violence, when it can be avoided, regarding it as unprofessional and a sign of incompetence.

3. The Amateur Bungler, educated perhaps at a Public School, who aims at a rich return from crime, but does not know his business, and therefore premeditates violence as probable, and provides for it. Like the Casual House-breaker, he is subject to nervous fright, and when he means to stun may blunder into near-homicide or murder.

The problem, accordingly, is the proper treatment for perpetrators of outrage under the last heading. Clearly what they need, unless they are really hopeless brutes, is education.

Now, whatever may be the advantages of a Public School training in other respects, it has this drawback, that it blunts the honour of the body, through the canings on which elderly gentlemen look back with indulgent fondness when they have forgotten their original feelings, and are eager that others should undergo the smart and shame suffered by themselves and administered with gusto by an unpleasant and obsolescent type of clerical pedagogue. It was my good luck to escape such precious experiences. It is true that at my first school, a Scottish one, 'the tawse' was in use; but its application was the signal for skilful and comic evasions of impact, or a chase over benches and final dog-fight of an unedifying character. I had, luckily, no part in such displays, for I should have revolted.

At my second school, University College School, in London, there was no corporal punishment because it was not needed; the masters knew their job. There was a 'Task Book,' an 'Appearing Book,' and a 'Black Book' when there had been too many 'tasks.' The second meant an interview with the Vice-Master, from which boys came away grinning, after the pleasure of a talk with Horton, and sinned no more

or not so much. If they were incorrigible, and figured more than once in the 'Black Book,' they were expelled: a rare event. The 'Monitors' played up to so fine a lead.

This was a Day-School, and therefore exempt from the special problems of the Boarding House type, with its semi-barrack conditions. We all know that the Public Schools produce men with a high, if socially limited, 'sporting spirit,' and the virtues that may be summed up in 'playing the game'; namely, readiness to serve, to combine, to take the lead. We also know that in those schools, as in others, masters with a genius for teaching are to be found; to the advantage of exceptional pupils. But it cannot be denied that from the indifferent and depressed hotel-keepers, who take charge in greater numbers, the pupils come away arrested in mental development, and are hard put to it to grow up intellectually. The Schoolboy ripens too often into the 'Blimp.'

This phase of our national life is not likely to endure. The old landowning and professional classes, which stocked those schools, will no longer be able, under pressure of taxation and diminishing returns on investment, to afford the cost involved, and the offspring of wealthy Jewish or native hard-baked financiers will be less impressionable under the ushers' harrow, since the former, at least, will be keenly intelligent, and both strong-willed. But for the present our Public School boys have suffered, too many of them, from a faulty education, and from a moral blunting in their attitude to bodily outrage. To that extent they are to be pitied, and an educative seclusion is what they badly need, without even another 'swishing' to aggravate their insensibility. Their mind calls for correction, rather than their body, by fresh and fruitless applications *a posteriori*. If they chance to belong to the class of the hopelessly cruel, then, I submit, 'elimination' is the right treatment, and I should like to add to them fraudulent financiers, insurance wanglers, share-pushing touts, and other pests who pray upon the poor or foolish.

Schools, at the best, are institutions for the relief of parents from the worry and responsibilities of discipline, rather than for the education of those who are, in any high degree, educable. For them the waste of time and wear of mental tissue is deplorable, since the *tempo* of teaching must be slowed down to the capacity of the average, if not the

recalcitrant learner. A boy or girl of any parts could gallop through the tedious bit by bit parsing of the classics, or conning of elementary mathematics. Such pupils respond with delight to any touch which sets a light to their natural love for imagination in literature, the appeal of a foreign tongue to variety in structure and expression, with the illumination thrown by these on the character of our own; or which opens doors on the worlds of history and science. These eager impulses are checked and obscured by the dull and slow grind of class-work, and frowned upon by the philistine herd whose interest is limited to games. There is a further disadvantage in segregation of the sexes, with the perversions incident to such separation, which meet with punishment out of all proportion in the treatment of early and ignorant lapses.

All this takes a heavy toll from the play of mental originality, so common among our children, and its further growth and blossoming. A blunting, intellectual and moral, is inevitable. Economic stress may bring something of a cure, as the growing obliteration of class-distinctions proceeds, and parents become no longer fearful for their children of association with other sections of a nation which are so rapidly catching up in manners and scrupulous habits. But school-classes must be smaller and better assorted; the hands and eyes given a greater measure of the instruction at present directed to the head, so that the young may be weaned from their elders' tolerance of mean distractions and contempt for the fine arts of the senses.

I have strayed a little from my immediate subject; the tendency of an imperfect and somewhat barbarous upbringing to foster a brutal temper, and the ineffectiveness of violent corporal penalties as a cure.

On the disputed point of deterrent effect, correspondents brought up the old story of the stoppage of garotting by extensive flogging. That claim has been repeatedly confuted; what worked a charm was doubtless better street-lighting and police-patrol. In any case, the garotting had stopped before the new statute came into action, and the Home Secretary himself had no illusions about its usefulness.

The race of 'Blimps' will continue to clamour for the necessity of flogging in the discipline of 'backward races,'

and they are right. So long as semi-slavery persists in the exploitation of tropical and primitive peoples the cudgel and the 'Cat' will be called for.

I had written so far before the *Report of the Departmental Committee on Corporal Punishment*[1] appeared. It amply confirms the view expressed above of the ineffectiveness of such punishment as a corrective or a deterrent, making one curious reservation in the case of violent attacks by prisoners upon warders. That will go the way of the rest. The ugly thing is doomed, if not dead.

D. S. MACCOLL

[1] His Majesty's Stationery Office Price 2*s* 6*d* net

INGGLISH

By William Barkley

The practical Englishman would see some sense in Latin *mensa* or French *table* being regarded as a female if it were capable of producing a nest of small tables. British students of these Indo-European languages are so absorbed in mastering gender as rarely to think how well in English we get on without it. True, we have our 'he–she' difficulty. 'If the reader disagrees, will he or she turn to another page?' But what other language can more neatly say 'He took her money' or 'She took his'? Among the blessings showered on us by our ancestors let us count this—that they rid 200,000,000 English-speaking people of sex in nouns and adjectives. While little French, Italian and German boys are busy learning that a sentinel is always feminine or that a knife, fork and spoon have a different gender, each with adjectives according, little English and American children are pursuing something more practical in their education. As for the unfortunate Russian children, I am told that even their verbs are male and female.

Our ancestors, too, be thanked for abolishing cases, except for the invaluable him's and her's and me's and the neat possessive. An Englishman rightly finds a difficulty in seeing why the name of a thing should change (as in Greek, Latin or German) according as it does something or has something done to it. *Mensa*, if the table stands on the floor; *mensam*, if you hit the table with your fist. We do very well without that complication by paying attention to the order of our words, thereby, no doubt, to some extent ordering our minds.

We are well rid, too, of all but the minimum of verbal inflexions. Would-have-been is every whit as good, and if written in one word would look as precise, as *fuisset*. And

where else can you get these verbal subtleties between, say, would-have-gone and would-have-been-going, and all the other variations in this expanding suit-case of verbs conjugating on a simple and logical principle ?

In short, English, although so expressive, is simple. Its rules of grammar could be compressed into half a dozen pages. Its syntax—there is hardly any of it. One heard at school that Germans, leaving, as our forbears did, their litter of word endings behind them on the other side of the North Sea, could make a fair shape of being understood after a few days in England or the United States.

But the gods are jealous of their Englishman. In his childhood he would not suffer enough unless they could put an artificial obstruction in his way. He would learn so quickly to speak, read and write his native tongue that he would have a ten yards start of other nations in the race of competitive life. So in an evil day the wicked gods invented English spelling. It has been stated by experts (I know not on what authority) that it takes twelve months of an average child's life to learn, and then never thoroughly, the grotesque hieroglyphics which do duty on paper as the mirror of the spoken English language. For twelve months, spread over as many years, the English-speaking child struggles to become the conventional English-writing child. True, it might be worse. The Japanese child has to learn 2000 word signs, and on the average masters only one half of them when his (or her) school-days are gone. Moreover, in China it is said that the threescore years and ten are ending before a scholar attains complete mastery in the art of writing what will not much longer be of use to him. But the Italian or the German from the beginning spells pretty well as he speaks ; and if French is not phonetic, at least it follows well-ordered lines of departure from the phonetic

But the English-speaking boy and girl, when they come to write, enter a world of bafflement and bewilderment. It is a world of grown-ups' make-believe in which nothing is what it seems, where nothing moves on any coherent or intelligible plan. Impossible to over-rate the blunting effect of the spelling class upon the alert young mind. How many a bright and prattling infant does one not see stupefied after first contact with school ! A child that sighs ' I shall

never be able to spell' is in despair of ever understanding anything of the adult world, and is in danger of becoming for all its life repellent rather than receptive.

Surely when our ancestors did so well by us in simplifying our speech we can finish their labours by correctly spelling it.

Yet if one wants to be known as a crank the easiest way is to advocate simple spelling. A human being may sit the night through as a croupier at the tables of Le Touquet or Nice and be regarded as a useful member of society. Another may spend his days and wakeful nights endeavouring to forecast for clients and for himself the movements of Trans-atlantics or Home Industrials, and he may so earn, if he guesses right, the title of sound business-man. But interest himself in spelling—he's a crank. Endeavour to spread English culture by simplifying the foreigner's approach to English—he's a crank. Try to ease the burden of the child's mind, give him in his school life a twelvemonth's leisure for acquiring useful knowledge—raise, if you like, the school-leaving age by one year as measured by curriculum and without the cost of a penny—plainly the man's mad!

But is he? Those who sneer at the efforts of the simple spellers are themselves foolish. They are of a piece with the novelists who make a character spell phonetically when they wish him to appear illiterate. We are familiar with the novelist's Cockney who says: 'Laaf! he sez; I never laaft so much!' This is, of course, topsy-turvy. It is the educated character who should write, as he speaks, 'laaf' and 'sez' The Cockney, to be made a fool of, should be taught to write such grotesque nonsense as 'laugh' and 'says'.

In the excellent French film *Amphitryon* Jupiter from Olympus takes a look at the world through his telescopic crystal. He is looking for Alcmene in Thebes; but, being a bungler, he focusses on the United States. His prompter Mercury cries: 'Not there, your Majesty; that will not be discovered for 4000 years.' Jupiter to-day, if he directed crystal and ear-piece on the States, would find much to make him gurgle at the follies of mortals. He would see each county in each State, after endless eliminating trials, selecting its best spellers He would see the finalists emerging at last in the Federal spelling contest. He would note the fame, the parental pride—and the commercial prospects—of youths

and maidens depending on their ability in front of a vast and excited audience to remember on point-blank demand that 'character' is not spelled with a 'k'. These spelling bees are certainly evidence that the now-discovered country of the United States is in some things indeed young. It seems the height of irrelevance for the English-speakers to conventionalise a futile and barren style of spelling, and on top of that to make a virtue of the ability to memorise it. In truth, spelling as a test of intelligence has no place to-day except in the class-room or among adults whose minds on this subject are still infantile.

It surprises me that the go-ahead cousins across the Atlantic have done nothing to modernise their spelling. If they spelled English phonetically it would be as good for them as another Boston Tea Party. They could call their language American. To even an habitual British reader of United States magazines it is always striking to notice that Americans speak of their language as 'English'. No subtle sneer is intended here Some of the best English to-day is written in the New World, but one would imagine that Americans would refer to the language they use as 'the American language'. What a pity that the pioneers of British stock did not imitate their ancestors! If the Pilgrim Fathers had said: 'When our forbears crossed the North Sea they wisely left their litter of genders and cases behind them; now that we have made the passage of the ocean we have left our grotesque spelling behind us' Had that happened, who would grudge the title 'American' to the English language in modern dress? Who would not prefer 'American' to English?

Thirty-two years ago it looked as if this event of world importance might indeed happen. It was in the States that the most powerful forces of Government were first hitched to the campaign of simple spelling. President Roosevelt championed it—President Theodore Roosevelt, dynamic, strenuous, fist-shaking 'Teddy'. In London *The Times*, as we should now say, 'splashed' the announcement. Beside its leading articles in the issue of August 25, 1906, one reads the large headlines:

Latest News: 'Reform' of American Spelling: President Roosevelt's Support. New York, August 24. *From Our Own*

Correspondent. Mr. Roosevelt to-day issued orders to the public printer that hereafter messages from the President and other documents emanating from the White House should be printed in accordance with the recommendations of the Simplified Spelling Board. The President's correspondence moreover will be spelled in the new style. It is expected that the heads of all Government departments will follow suit.

This spelling board was set up with funds from Andrew Carnegie. It had issued its first list of 300 reformed spellings in June. In two months the President had adopted them officially. They included 'deprest', 'dipt', 'heapt', 'fantasm', 'pedagog', 'kist' and 'gazel' (gazelle). In the same despatch the correspondent added: 'The list is to be followed from time to time by additional lists until in the end spelling is purely phonetic. Mr Roosevelt will, it is stated, endorse each recommendation as it is suggested by the Board.'

From the same source I may reproduce the President's actual letter to the printers (*The Times*, September 3, 1906). He wrote:

My Dear Mr. Stillings,—Please hereafter direct that in all Government publications of executive departments the 300 words enumerated in Circular 5 [of the Simple Spelling Board] shall be spelled as therein set forth.

A way to write! 'Please hereafter direct . . .'

But in this short time the storm had broken. The remainder of the letter is a justification of his action. The President continued:

Most of the criticism on the proposed step is evidently made in entire ignorance of what the step is. There is not the slightest intention of doing anything revolutionary or initiating any far-reaching policy. . . . If [the changes] do not ultimately meet with popular approval they will be *dropt*.

Not 'dropped'; 'dropt'. He adopts in his letter one of the 300 changes. He then continues:

These changes represent nothing in the world but a very slight extension of the unconscious movement which has made agricultural implement makers and farmers write *plow* instead of *plough*; which is even now making people write programme without the 'me'—just as all people who speak English now write *fat*, *set*, *dim*, *sum*

and *fish* instead of the Elizabethan *fatte*, *sette*, *dimme*, *summe* and *fysshe*; which makes us write *public*, *almanac*, *era*, *fantasy* and *wagon* instead of the *publick*, *almanack*, *aera*, *phantasy* and *waggon* of our great-grandfathers.

It is not an attack on the language of Shakespeare and Milton because it is in some instances a going back to the forms they used; and in others merely an extension of the changes which as regards other words have taken place since their time. It is not an attempt to do anything far-reaching or sudden or violent or indeed [alas! the President was cooling] anything very great at all. It is merely an attempt to cast what slight weight can properly be cast on the side of the popular forces which are endeavouring to make our spelling a little less foolish and fantastic.

Sincerely yours,

THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

On despatching this text the New York Correspondent of *The Times* appears to have breathed more easily. He notes that Mr. Roosevelt would have been wiser to call a conference of English and American authorities to decide reasonable changes; then he thinks the President would have earned the gratitude of both countries instead of their criticism. But he is in no mood to let off the President without a sharp smack; for he adds that the moderate nature of the proposals 'is no argument for Mr Roosevelt's position in view of the *menace* of additional lists to be issued by the Simple Spelling Board.'

The italics here are mine, and were never better employed. This menace at least is one which, to my knowledge, has not again become an issue of State in thirty-two years.

The pioneer band of 300 words seems to have made a successful anabasis. One sees '*program*', '*honor*', '*plow*' and '*dropt*' in American prints. They are mere irritants. Such trifling alterations prejudice the chances of reform. No good saying the change must be made gradually. It must be done in one—completely and thoroughly—or it will never be done at all. The sole hope of success in reform is to demonstrate how much more beautiful and efficient the printed word looks when it accurately and systematically holds up the mirror to the spoken word.

Assume that we are agreed to find some new system of spelling. What system can we adopt? One condition is fundamental. It is outside the province of this article to go

too deeply into the immense history of English spelling an(the vast efforts which have been made by successiv(enthusiasts to reform it. But the most cursory glance clearl) shows that the change to simple spelling must be mad(within the existing Roman characters of the alphabet. N(new symbol would be tolerated for a moment.

The modern movement for spelling reform was initiated in the year 1844 by Sir Isaac Pitman. The founder of 'stenography' made one significant departure from the practice of preceding inventors of shorthand systems; whereas they had frequently followed the spelling, he reproduced only the pronunciation. His second edition of his shorthand system, published in 1840, was entitled *Phonography, or Writing by Sound.* Spelling at once fascinated him. For the rest of his long life he devoted more time to spelling reform than to furthering the fortunes of his shorthand. In 1844 he published his *Phonotypy*, which was a phonetic printing alphabet containing new letters invented to supply the deficiencies of the Roman characters. For forty years he laboured, and without success; for the introduction of new symbols was an insurmountable obstacle. He admitted defeat in 1883 when he agreed that spelling must get on as it can within the compass of the twenty-six letters which are familiar to us.

Pitman's early collaborator, A. J. Ellis, spent another life in devising new symbols. This pioneer in phonetics, who first made an erudite study of the sixteenth-century spelling reformers, invented and agitated what he called 'Palæotype'. These new 'phonotypies' of Pitman and Ellis were forerunners of to-day's scientific phonetic systems which are of value to the philologists, etymologists, glossologists and lexicologists of this earth. They were useless to men and women who merely wished to read and write their native language. New founts of type were needed by the printer, and his demand for an italic version of the new symbols could not be met. As for the longhand-writer, he would clamour in vain for a new symbol which would flow easily from his pen.

Ellis went down fighting gamely. His last system proposed, indeed, that there should be no new symbols, but that some of the old ones should acquire a new value on being printed upside down. Nor did this commend itself.

In our own days we have seen the reformed systems of the poet Robert Bridges founder on this same rock. Clearly, new symbols must be dismissed from our scheme of things.

Now the consonants offer no real difficulty. There is a question whether clumsy 'k' must necessarily replace convenient 'c'. But this matter can well enough be arranged among the consonants which we have. The problem is the vowels in this much-vowelled English. Until recently there seemed no solution. Then in a flash of inspiration something like a miracle was worked. Five new vowel signs were created without the use of any new symbol. And how? So simply. The letter 'e' is added to each vowel to give it on paper the sound which it has in the alphabet as we learned to recite it. Add 'e' and you have the sound of the *name* of the letters 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o' and 'u'.

Thus we have 'ae', 'ee', 'ie', 'oe' and 'ue'. We can illustrate these (as almost anything else) from our present spelling 'Gael', 'maelstrom' for 'a'; 'feet', 'beet', etc., for 'e'; the sound of 'i' is in 'deif*ie*d', 'ratif*ie*d'; 'o' is spelled 'oe' already in 'vetoed' and in 'toe'; we have 'ue' for 'u' in 'due' and 'hue'. What is proposed is that these vowels should always be spelled in this way when they have their full quantities (I daresay two of them are diphthongs) as they have in their alphabetical names. This releases the letters 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o' and 'u' to serve for the short sounds, as in 'bat', 'bet', 'bit', 'lot' and 'but'. We still have two more 'a's' to deal with, as in 'father' and 'already'. In the first the double 'a' is suggested—'faather', 'raather'; in the second 'au'—law becoming 'lau'; 'already' would become 'aulredi'. Still we have two more 'u's'—short, as in 'good'; long, as in 'food'. For these 'uu' and 'oo' respectively will do service, giving us 'guud', 'suut' (from the chimney); but, as at present, 'food', 'soon', 'moon'. The remaining diphthongs would be 'oi' and 'ou', as in 'boi', 'roial', 'toi' and 'hous' (house), 'rouz' (rouse), 'mous' (mouse). Very frequently these new vowel spellings involve only transposition: 'made' becomes 'maed'; 'site' becomes 'siet'; 'mode' becomes 'moed'; 'few' becomes 'fue'.

This vowel system, whose inventor I do not know, already has an authoritative history. Perhaps it was Professor

Zacchrisson who thought of it. Certainly he advocated it strenuously and taught his Swedish students in Upsala to read English quickly with these vowels; but he adopted practices much too slovenly for literary use. He called his system 'Anglic'. There were great trumpetings in London eight years ago when Americans and Europeans met to further 'Anglic'. But it has not gone much further, and last year Professor Zacchrisson died.

In simple spelling the written language becomes fair and honest. The unconscious satisfaction which we enjoy in writing such crisp monosyllables as 'rid', 'hid', 'red' or 'bet' becomes vivid pleasure when we can extend simplicity to 'hil', 'wel' or 'kof'. The change is stimulating; and, to the unbiassed mind at least, such a spelling as 'ofis' quickly begins to seem preferable and (if beauty is truth) more attractive than 'office'. One makes strange discoveries. The language is not nearly so sibilant as it looks. Half the 's's' are soft 'z's'—'luvz', 'moovz', 'livz'—and the 's' is soft in endless plurals such as the word 'plooralz' itself. Some words disclose more content than meets the eye. The word 'language' itself would have to become 'langgwaej'.

The prospects of simplified spelling have received a setback by the death of Sir George Hunter, the Tyneside shipbuilder, who had made this subject the hobby of a long life. His loss is the more irreplaceable, because just as Americans will always respect the vigorous Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, so in the same way no Englishman could regard entirely as a crank the man who built the *Lusitania*. Sir George was the chairman of the Simplified Spelling Society, founded in 1908. Its members and supporters are the cream of British academic life. Far too little notice has been taken of an historic decision taken by a representative committee meeting of this society on May 3, 1933. This writer was present at that meeting, when there attended such experts as Mr. Lloyd James, Professor of Phonetics at the London School of Oriental Studies and Linguistic Adviser to the British Broadcasting Corporation; scholarly Professor Sir (Edward) Denison Ross; Mr. Daniel Jones, Professor of Phonetics, University of London; Mr. W. Ripman, London University's Chief Inspector, of

immense linguistic knowledge and innumerable publications. The National Union of Teachers, the National Association of Schoolmasters, and the Incorporated Association of Assistant Masters in Secondary Schools were all represented. The company, Sir George Hunter presiding, included also four members of Parliament: Mr. Oswald Lewis (Colchester); Sir Luke Thompson, then M.P. for Sunderland; Mr. Arthur Henderson (Kingswinford); and Mr. W. G. Pearson, then M.P. for Jarrow. Unanimously this meeting adopted the vowel system set out here to be the basis of the reformed English spelling. Such a result must be regarded in this long controversy as a decision of major and even of final importance.

Why was this meeting called? It is linked to a story of departmental delays and obstinacy. It was well known to the society that the Board of Education are too ingrained in tradition to wish to experiment in spelling. But in March 1933 they asked Lord Irwin (now Lord Halifax), then President of the Board of Education, to receive a deputation. He refused. The reason which he gave was that an interview was useless unless reformers decided upon an agreed and definite scheme. They met, and reached agreement, as aforesaid, on May 3, and with high hopes the society wrote again to Lord Irwin on May 16. On May 31 Lord Irwin replied that there was no backing of popular opinion for simplified spelling. He again refused to see a deputation, prompting this writer to comment a trifle bitterly at the time: 'He saw Mr. Gandhi, but he will not see Sir George Hunter.'

Hurt and disappointed, the society engaged in a vigorous canvas for support and, with the backing of 200 members of Parliament and 800 university professors, applied once more for an interview. Lord Irwin denied them thrice. On this occasion his reason (in a published letter to Sir George Hunter, June 30, 1933) was that he could not recommend the setting up of a public inquiry such as the deputation wished to press: 'At a time of universal pre-occupation with national and international problems touching the livelihood of millions.' In short, the interview was refused on the three variant grounds of—(1) no agreement; (2) no popular backing; and (3) rearmament, Hitler and Mussolini. One wonders which of these wrong or irrelevant factors weighed most, if at all, in his decision. And it is a strange commentary

that to-day the Government have appointed Sir Robert Vansittart on a Propaganda Committee to spread abroad the knowledge of British institutions, when, in fact, the simple spelling of English, even for foreign use only, would at one stroke give an immense impetus to the dissemination of British culture through the natural medium of its distribution —its language.

The memorial to which I have referred as signed by 200 members of Parliament and 800 professors was addressed to Lord Irwin in the following terms:

> The undersigned, who are interested in education and in the question of simplifying English spelling; in view of the growing need of an international language for use in international conferences and meetings and in publications of world-wide interest, and in view of the increasing conviction in Sweden, Germany and other countries that the English language, which is already used by nearly 200,000,000 of our world's population, can best supply that need, but that its inconsistent and difficult spelling is a hindrance; respectfully submit for your consideration THE REQUEST that you will appoint a representative committee to consider whether English spelling can be and should be simplified, and, if so, what improvements should be recommended for optional or general use.

Needless here to list the supporters of this ' sma' request '. They include every name that one knows of academic distinction, headed by the new chairman of the society (Professor Gilbert Murray) and thoughtful M.P.'s of every party. Teachers' associations added their names; bishops gave the movement their blessing; a dozen authors—including H. G. Wells, Bernard Shaw, H. V. Morton—appended their best-seller autographs; fifty-five publishers, twenty-three chambers of commerce, rotary clubs, chambers of trade, lord mayors and many Dominion commissioners and agents swelled the total of the undersigned. But there was no popular backing! There was no agreement! We must rearm! The answer was in the negative, and there, until some vigorous championship arises, the matter languishes.

Sir George Hunter continued a desultory correspondence with the Board, receiving ever shorter replies, until, at the age of ninety-two, in January 1937 he died.

Since the paramount objection to the simplification of spelling lies in our innate objection to changing anything,

it is comparatively easy to demolish all the other objections. What, it is said—as Theodore Roosevelt found—lay impious hands on the texts of Shakespeare and Milton! This is an argument made in ignorance that the older poets spelled very differently from their present-day texts; and that Shakespeare cared so little for spelling that he wrote four different forms of his own name.

A more specious objection is that phonetic spelling would destroy the association of the written word, with its foreign or classic origin. I think this is a loss which we might be prepared to suffer. Because we may be in '*det*' (debt), there seems no particular reason in reminding us that the Latins spelled it with a 'b' (*debitum*). In the Great Britain *v.* America spelling bee organised by the British Broadcasting Corporation on January 20 the word daguerreotype floored two competitors from Harvard and one from Oxford. They forgot the 'e' before the 'o'. And, pray, why should they or anyone remember it? Because it is pronounced acutely in French, why should it be spelled in English where it is not pronounced at all? And is it so useful to be reminded that the man who gave his name to this invention spelled that name Daguerre? Let us stop this nonsense and spell it simply '*dagerotiep*'.

Some of our spellings perpetuate grotesque blunders of early philologists. There never was a guttural in '*delight*', which our ancestors used to spell, more correctly, '*delite*'. The mistake arose in confusion with the Teutonic '*light*'—'delight', of course, being Latin. Those Scotsmen who still pronounce their gutturals will say '*licht*', but never one of them will say anything but '*deliet*'—except for the artificial wee Scotlanders of the kailyard school, who, to the '*delight*' of this Scots writer, sometimes express themselves as '*delichtit*'.

We have recently seen a prolonged correspondence in *The Times* on the proper way of pronouncing Latin. A strange feature of this discussion is the universal assumption that Latin is spelled phonetically. There are various champions of how to pronounce 'v' or 'c' in the high Roman fashion; but never a scholar among the correspondents doubts for a moment that if the consonant was there in the word it must be pronounced somehow. How foolish these scholars would look if, in fact, the Romans did not pronounce

one-half of their written consonants, but merely set then down on paper in order to preserve the original Etruscan In fact, the notion that we should spell otherwise than we pronounce, for any reason whatsoever, is a modern delusion If to-day we happened to spell 'pig' as '*pigge*' or '*pighe*' be assured that this style would have its defenders. If to-day we still kept the 'k' in 'publick' as Pope wrote it, we should have etymologists rising up with shouts of 'vandalism' if we proposed to remove it.

Moreover, our ancestors whom we worship seem to have made many departures from this sacred idea of preserving a word's derivation in print after it is lost to the lips. There is, for example, the word '*sound*'; it is spelled precisely according to the system outlined here; but it has three meanings because it is really three different words. As a strait or strip of water it is Anglo-Saxon. As a noise it is Latin. But when it means to plumb or probe it is said to derive from another Latin word, '*subundare*' (to get below the waves); and clearly, when our scholars write the word in this sense they should spell it '*soubnd*' on the analogy of '*debt*'.

And so one could continue dismissing the stock objections. Strangely enough, there is one objection to reformed spelling which this writer, at least, has never seen expounded by opponents and to which he sees no easy answer. The problem is insinuated by the example of the word '*sound*'—one spelling for three meanings. In our conventional spelling to-day we have large numbers of monosyllables which, although pronounced the same, are spelled differently according to their different meanings: 'sight' and 'site'; 'might' and 'mite'; 'gilt' and 'guilt'; 'right' and 'rite' (and 'write'). It is true that the distinctiveness of the spellings does not follow any known principle; but the variation certainly gives the written word a degree of precision unknown to the spoken language; and, indeed, at times English-speakers have been known to spell the word if they failed to make their meaning clear. By a feat of memory and by long grounding and grinding in childhood we maintain a useful, although an artificial, clarity. What are we to do with these words?

A bold spirit might advocate the ruthless course of ordering all these words to obey the phonetic rules. In his

support he might argue that we have no right to expect the printed language to be more precise than the spoken, since what we say should come first and what we write should be the echo of what we say. In time, he might continue, we should cease to write phrases which we instinctively avoid in speech because of their ambiguity. If 'guilt' and 'gilt' were spelled alike—a clause, by the way, which conveys nothing when read aloud—the City might in time find a new expression to replace the now dubious '*gilt-edjd*'. And there would be a small contribution on the other side. We should be rid of the words spelled the same although pronounced differently—as in '*read*' itself, which we have always to read twice before we know if it is present or past.

But in a proposal to sweep so much of the lumber out of the written language it might be possible to wink at abnormalities. A close study of these monosyllables might result in the discovery of a plan on which their distinction could be maintained. This proposed new spelling, be it noted, makes no use of the devices common in other languages—the dieresis, circumflex, and accents, grave or acute. Possibly the study of these troublesome little words would result in a plan to make two groups of them—one group of plain meaning and another group of transferred or metaphorical meaning. Or a census would show that, for example, '*might*' is in much more common use than '*mite*'; and we could use the circumflex for the transferred meaning or for the less common usage. That would be a pleasant little task for schoolchildren to sharpen their memories upon, relieved, as they would be, of their present-day tortures.

Anyhow, with a little thought and a little work, we might yet succeed in removing the greatest reproach on our language and in ridding it of an impediment, not in the speech, but in the writing of it. The thing could be done and, if so, it should be done. And we should all speak the better for it

[Enihou, with a litel thaut and a litel werk, we miet yet sukseed in remuuving the graetest reproech on our langgwaej and in riding it of an impediment, not in the speech, but in the rieting of it. The thing kuud be dun and, if so it shuud be dun. And we shuud aul speek the beter for it.]

WILLIAM BARKLEY.

DR. JOHNSON'S FAVOURITE PURSUITS [1]

By Harold Williams

Nobody can pretend himself a real lover of Johnson until he has cultivated a friendliness with him well out of Boswell's company, free from the persecution of incessant questions. But Boswell is essential, and, taking Johnson and Boswell together, the task of knowing all that may reasonably be known becomes, not easier, but more exacting. Sir Walter Raleigh remarked that two shelves of books are all we need, and that the editions of Birkbeck Hill 'make the study of Johnson the easiest of pastimes.' This was said about thirty years ago, and may remind us of a like remark by Cunningham when he surveyed his edition of Walpole's *Letters* (1857–9), and declared that 'there is little prospect that any additions of moment can now be made.' Since then we have had the Toynbee edition, with hundreds of additional letters; and now the great Yale edition, on its majestic way, will include, with much else, 300 of Walpole's letters hitherto unpublished.

So also with Johnson and Boswell. Boswell's papers from Malahide Castle have been edited in eighteen imposing volumes; but, fortunately for most of us, who cannot hope to possess the books, they have recently been indexed. It was not unnatural to suppose that little more of Boswell could survive; but in 1930 Professor C. C. Abbott discovered at Fettercairn House quantities of papers and letters relating to Boswell and Johnson. There is all the work that Professor Tinker and Professor Pottle in America have been doing on Boswell. There is now Dr. Powell's revision of Birkbeck Hill's *Boswell*, with all its accumulations of research. There is Dr. Chapman's work in the past; and there is his new edition of Johnson's *Letters* to expect, although this is the very thing Johnson himself hoped to escape. 'It is now,'

[1] A paper read to the Johnson Club, March 25, 1938

he said, 'become so much the fashion to publish letters, that in order to avoid it, I put as little into mine as I can.' He would have echoed the words of the parodist:

Lives of great men all remind us,
As we o'er their pages turn,
That we, too, may leave behind us
Letters that we ought to burn.

Johnson, it is true, left little or nothing behind him which he ought to have burned. Boswell left much. Fortunately, he did not burn it.

Johnson's distinction as a writer rests upon *The Rambler* and the *Lives of the Poets*. In these two works two constant occupations of his mind are discovered. 'Philosophy and biography were his favourite pursuits,' says Boswell. The remark, though it may read a little strangely to us, is made casually as if nothing could be more obvious. We should not, however, to-day describe Johnson as a philosopher, or think of his writings as *philosophy*. But his contemporaries thus thought of him, and he accepted the *rôle* of sage-philosopher.

The word 'philosophy' is now used almost as a synonym for 'metaphysics,' which Johnson himself defined as: 'Ontology; the doctrine of the general affections of things subsisting.' But this narrowed use of the word 'philosophy,' so far, at least, as English is concerned, only began to appear in the first half of the nineteenth century, and has been established less than one hundred years. If we turn to the *Dictionary* we do not find that the identification of philosophy with metaphysics crossed Johnson's mind. Nor when he told Boswell that at Oxford 'the study of which he was most fond was Metaphysicks,' did he mean what we should now take him to mean.

In the *Dictionary* Johnson gives four definitions of the word 'philosophy,' of which the first is for him the common and ordinary use:

1. Knowledge—natural or moral.
2. Hypothesis—or system upon which natural events are explained.
3. Reasoning, argumentation.
4. The course of sciences read in the schools

And he defines a philosopher as 'A man deep in knowledge, natural or moral.'

The use of the word 'natural' three times, and of 'moral' twice, in the definitions quoted is significant. The antithesis was for Johnson of primary importance to our understanding of the true purposes of philosophy as it concerns the life of men. The distinction was constantly present to his mind; and nearly twenty-five years after the publication of the *Dictionary* he explained himself at large in one of those typical digressions which diversify his *Lives of the Poets*. The *locus classicus* is in 'Milton,' where he turns aside to condemn the educational innovations proposed by Milton and Cowley, who, in addition to the ordinary classical curriculum, were anxious to introduce the 'reading of those authors that treat of physical subjects; such as the Georgick, and astronomical treatises of the ancients.' Johnson's scorn is magnificent. Physical science is 'not the great or the frequent business of the human mind.' We may know a man half his life, scarcely aware that he is a scientist, 'but his moral and prudential character immediately appears.' He has no patience with 'literary projectors,' Milton and Cowley among them, who 'seem to think that we are placed here to watch the growth of plants, or the motions of the stars.' And he takes comfort in the reflection that 'if I have Milton against me I have Socrates on my side. It was *his* labour to turn philosophy from the study of nature to speculations upon life.' Socrates was 'of opinion that what we had to learn was, how to do good and avoid evil.' In other words, *philosophy* was for Johnson moral philosophy, or ethics.

The fruits of Johnson's philosophy are chiefly to be found in the pages of *The Rambler* and of *Rasselas*. Even so, and as a moralist, he was not a systematic thinker. He presents no theory of the origins of morality; he is no psychologist; he does not stop to examine the recesses of man's mind; the correlation of subject and object does not concern him. His commentary upon life is common-sense and practical, without embellishments or embroidery. But how well it is phrased, and how admirably struck off! The 'Dicta Philosophi' collected by Birkbeck Hill at the close of his edition of Boswell's *Life*, and more again in the *Johnsonian Miscellanies*, illustrate Johnson as the philosopher. It is not often that

he goes deep; but there are profound sayings among them. This, had we not known it, might have been suspected for Coleridge:

> The eyes of the mind are like the eyes of the body, they can see but at such a distance. But because we cannot see beyond this point, is there nothing beyond it?

That is a searching thought and admirably illustrated. Then there is the questionable truth of:

> Hope is an amusement rather than a good, and is adapted to very tranquil minds.

But not one of us will question this:

> A man is in general better pleased when he has a good dinner upon his table than when his wife talks Greek.

Practical wisdom, everyday morality, uttered in dignified, sententious, or witty phrase—and not infrequently illumined with poetry and imagination—it is thus that Johnson's philosophy is discovered. The hall-mark of literary genius, the gift of phrase, constantly distinguishes his sayings. If we are told that life is short we are unmoved, but when we are reminded that 'He who runs against time has an antagonist not subject to casualties,' which means the same thing, we are startled into a renewed consciousness of the urgency of life's business.

Johnson, if primarily a man of letters, was, like many of the greater figures in the annals of literature, also a very ordinary, natural, and lovable man among his fellows, mixing readily with those for whom books meant little or nothing. He belongs to the same class as Shakespeare, Fielding, and Sir Walter Scott. He had trudged the streets of London in poverty, slept where he could, known hunger; and when he rose to better circumstances he was still at home with porters, tavern-keepers, women of the street, and he could bandy words with Thames watermen. On his Scottish tour not only university professors, but local magnates, gillies, and the people of the isles, found him easy to get on with, if a little odd and incomprehensible. His nature was generous. Whatever his hardships and disappointments, he never, as

Boswell tells us, complained on his own account, and 'he hated to hear others complain of general injustice.' His bodily activity, even in advanced years, was remarkable. He ran a race with Baretti in the rain, and beat him. On another occasion he outran a young lady on the lawn, kicking off his slippers and leaving her far behind. He used to hunt with the hounds when his association with the Thrales at Streatham gave him the opportunity of a mount; and Mrs. Piozzi tells us that 'though he would follow the hounds fifty miles on end sometimes, he would never own himself either tired or amused.' Much more might be said to amplify what may seem a wholly irrelevant digression, which has, however, a purpose in illustrating Johnson as both in body and mind a very normal character. He had no consciousness that life is illusory and a dream, a state of mind which Schopenhauer declares to be the first requisite of the philosopher.

The circle of Johnson's immediate friends and admirers held the most eminent names in English letters, art, politics, and the contemporary stage—Goldsmith, Reynolds, Burke, and Garrick. And it is curious, reflecting upon this, that while the sage omniscience of Johnson is appealed to at all turns, nobody within that circle seems to have been conscious of the importance to the history of thought of the contemporary school of English empirical philosophy, which, beginning with John Locke in the previous century, developed through the idealism of Berkeley to the critical inquiries of Hume. Berkeley's *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* was published in the year of Johnson's birth; the first and second books of Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* appeared in 1739, when Johnson, two years after his arrival in London, was writing for the *Gentleman's Magazine*. Hume's *Treatise*, although it 'fell dead-born from the press,' marked the beginning of a new era in philosophy, and led to the speculations of Kant. While Johnson was making his name with *The Vanity of Human Wishes*, writing *The Rambler*, and compiling his *Dictionary*, successive volumes of Hume's moral and philosophic essays were appearing, notably *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* in 1751. When every allowance has been made for the fact that in any generation original developments in philosophic thought command slight general understanding or interest, it is remarkable how

little Locke, Berkeley, and Hume are reflected in Boswell's *Life*, or in Johnson without Boswell; and, so far as they are noticed, to say that they are imperfectly appreciated is a euphemism. In Boswell's *Life* Locke is virtually not mentioned. In the *Lives of the Poets* Locke is singled out for the doubtful honour of being an admirer of Blackmore; Pope, we are told, had read his *Essay concerning Human Understanding*; and Watts had improved upon his *Conduct of the Understanding*. This is small measure indeed, especially as there can be no doubt that Johnson had read Locke, for he even quotes in illustration from him in the *Dictionary*.

The fundamental principles of Berkeley's philosophy are those of the *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, but he is more consistent than Locke, and the conclusions at which he arrives bear a very different appearance. He introduced a new conception of the universe, which has engaged philosophical thought ever since. But his attempt to popularise his conception of matter in *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* (1713) was fated to misunderstanding. His doctrine that external nature is the mode in which the infinite mind impresses ideas upon finite minds, that its phenomena express thought related to our own, has commonly been accepted to mean that matter does not exist. The ordinary man, whose senses told him that matter certainly exists, only laughed; and he still regards Berkeley's theory as an absurd paradox with which he need not trouble himself. We may forgive Boswell for failing to understand what it was all about. He refers to Berkeley's theory of knowledge as 'ingenious sophistry,' as 'reverie,' and as 'ingenious philosophy.' But, although he held that Berkeley ought to be disproved, he had the wit to see that he could not easily be dismissed. He once observed to Johnson that 'though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it.' Johnson had no such qualms. 'I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, "I refute it thus".' What a picture! Johnson nursing his injured toe and the philosophy of Cloyne in fragments! On another occasion when a gentleman who had been maintaining Berkeley's philosophy was about to leave the room Johnson checked him with: 'Pray, Sir, don't leave us; for we may perhaps forget

to think of you, and then you will cease to exist.' But, if he did not accept his philosophy, Johnson recognised Berkeley's intellectual standing, asserting him to be 'a profound scholar, as well as a man of fine imagination.'

Hume was in a different category. For one thing he was a strict contemporary. His life covered about the same span as Johnson's; and references to him are more frequent than is the case with Locke and Berkeley. He is, however, chiefly alluded to as a critic of revealed religion, as an infidel, as a denier of miracles, as an historian, and as the writer of a questionable Frenchified style. Any suspicion of his importance as an original thinker is barely to be traced. Jack Wilkes might almost be forgiven, and he was certainly good company; but Johnson, we are told, refused to shake hands with Hume. Apart from his work as an historian Hume is scarcely at all referred to save for his chief offence—his assertion that it is more probable witnesses 'should either deceive or be deceived' than that miracles should happen. This reflected upon the Christian revelation, and put Hume outside the pale. Johnson himself, as we should expect of him, was sceptical of the marvellous. He would brush tales of wonder contemptuously aside. When it was pointed out that this attitude was scarcely to be distinguished from Hume's argument against miracles, he made no attempt to evade the charge. 'Why, Sir, Hume, taking the proposition simply, is right.' Common-sense, however, again came to the rescue. He refused to go as far as Hume and endanger beliefs upon which his life was founded. There might be something beyond the farthest point of vision. Everything which Hume had advanced, he declared, had passed through his mind long before.

> Always remember this, that after a system is well settled upon positive evidence, a few partial objections ought not to shake it. The human mind is so limited, that it cannot take in all the points of a subject, so that there may be objections raised against any thing. There are objections against a *plenum*, and objections against a *vacuum*; yet one of them must certainly be true.

It must have been a satisfaction to Johnson that Dr. Adams, Master of Pembroke College, Oxford, where his own undergraduate days had been spent, where also in later life

he was received with honour, had written a refutation of Hume. He was the

> . . . candid Adams, by whom David fell,
> Who ancient miracles sustained so well.

His was one of the best reputed of the ' Answers by Reverends and Right Reverends ' which Hume refers to lightheartedly as coming out ' two or three in a year.'

But Hume's sceptical criticism of orthodox theology is not his title to fame, although it bulked so largely in the eyes of contemporaries. Were we to rely upon Boswell, or upon anything we find in Johnson, to gain a conception of Hume's major achievement, the material for building our structure *is not there*. We should certainly gather that Berkeley was a philosophical thinker with great and brilliant gifts, if fanciful in his conclusions ; but that Hume was a philosopher in the line of descent from Locke we should never suspect. In looking through so large a chronicle as Boswell's *Life* we of a later generation unconsciously read into the narrative and characters much that is not there—that is, until from time to time we recollect ourselves. Hume, as we think of him, is not the Hume known to Johnson and Boswell. He appears in the *Life* as an infidel writer against revealed religion whose personal character was not beyond suspicion, as an historian who echoed Voltaire and was ' a Tory by chance,' and as a Scotsman who showed a quite unreasonable dislike of the English.

So far the *Life*. But Hume had for Boswell a fascination which he refrained from parading openly. When he was first introduced to him in 1758 Boswell, writing to Temple, could scarcely restrain himself. Hume was an ' extraordinary man ' and ' a very proper person for a young man to cultivate an acquaintance with.' Fifteen years later he ' was not clear that it was right . . . to keep company with him ' ; but he had serious thoughts of publishing some memoirs of Hume. The most ' entertaining and interesting ' part of these memoirs was to be his account of the interview he had with the philosopher about six weeks before his death. This was found among the Malahide papers. The fact is that Boswell saw more of Hume, and had a greater liking for him, than he cared to admit. He was both horrified and fascinated by his

dangerous infidelity. But of the philosopher he never had a realisation.

Johnson cultivated the second of his two 'favourite pursuits,' biography, from early days. Between 1738 and 1754 he wrote a number of lives for the *Gentleman's Magazine*. In 1744 he published, in separate form, his famous *Life of Savage*. 'For delicacy and power,' writes Sir Walter Raleigh, 'it is one of the few great Lives in English.' Thirty-five years later it was included in the *Lives of the Poets* with little alteration. The early 'Life of Roscommon,' contributed to the *Gentleman's Magazine*, was also, though enlarged and revised, included in the *Lives of the Poets*.

In the first paragraph of the *Life* Boswell apologises for his presumption in attempting to write the *Life* 'of him who excelled all mankind in writing the lives of others.' Boswell knew that he had written a good biography. He did not know that by universal consent he would come to be regarded as a greater biographer than Johnson had ever proved himself. But, as he admits in the first few pages of the *Life*, he had learned from Johnson some of the more important secrets of the art of biography.

Despite Johnson's fondness for the reading and writing of biography, and the theories about it which he had evolved, the full opportunity for putting his principles into practice did not come till that March day, 1777, when three London booksellers, representing the trade, waited upon him, and invited him to supply a series of Lives to accompany 'an elegant and accurate edition' of the English poets. Ten years before, when Johnson had his famous interview with the King, 'His Majesty expressed a desire to have the literary biography of this country ably executed, and proposed to Dr. Johnson to undertake it. Johnson signified his readiness to comply with His Majesty's wishes.' The time had now come. And besides, had not Johnson himself said that 'he did not think that the life of any literary man in England had been well written'? It is unnecessary here to dispute this sweeping assertion. Even Johnson would, on second thoughts, have admitted exceptions. Isaac Walton's *Lives* was one of his favourite books; and he thought the Life of Donne 'the most perfect of them.'

Johnson's conception of the art of biography is linked

with his conception of the nature and scope of history. And here again, as so often, the *Dictionary* illustrates the way in which he introduced his leading ideas into definitions of words. A biographer, according to the *Dictionary*, is 'A writer of lives; a relator not of the history of nations, but of the actions of particular persons.' The biographer and the historian are particularly distinguished. Macaulay's castigation of Johnson for the 'wild and ignorant presumption' with which he talked of the past and of remote countries, and the 'fierce and boisterous contempt of ignorance' which he displayed towards history, may be a spangle of glittering exaggeration, but there is some reason for the outburst. Mrs. Piozzi tells us that 'no kind of conversation pleased him less than when the subject was historical fact or general polity.' He hated allusions to the Punic war or any stereotyped references to ancient history. The historian, he asserted, had little need of great ability, and only as much imagination 'as is used in the lower kinds of poetry,' for all the facts were ready to his hand. 'There is but a shallow stream of thought in history,' he declared. Even Gibbon's presence in the room did not restrain Johnson from remarking upon one occasion on 'how very little history there is; I mean real authentick history. . . . All the colouring, all the philosophy, of history is conjecture.' When, in 1759, Robertson published his *History of Scotland during the Reigns of Queen Mary and King James VI*, England was taken by storm. Horace Walpole, who was not given to praise, could not conceive how a man whose dialect he could scarcely understand had written 'what the world now allows to be the best modern history.' But Johnson was not carried away. It was the sociable Robertson who drew from him the famous remark: 'I am for knowledge and claret.' He loved the man so well that he preferred not to talk of his book. He regarded his history as romance 'Robertson paints; but the misfortune is, you are sure he does not know the people whom he paints; so you cannot suppose a likeness. Characters should never be given by an historian unless he knew the people whom he describes, or copies from those who knew them.' Johnson was here comparing Robertson unfavourably with Lord Hailes, whose *Annals of Scotland* could be accepted as a reliable reference work giving the dry

particulars. On an earlier occasion we find Johnson asserting the same position, that we may know the truth of historical facts, but that we cannot ascertain motives. Characters in historical narrative cannot be trusted 'unless when they are drawn by those who knew the persons; as those, for instance, by Sallust and by Lord Clarendon.' Had Johnson lived in our own day he would have supported those who assert history to be an exact science, and not an art. He suspected any departure from the dry statement of ascertainable fact. History was not for him, as it was for Carlyle, the story of great men. Nor was the historian entitled to select his facts, or to write to the guidance of any theory.

In *The Rambler*, No. 122 (May 18, 1751), Johnson wonders whether the deficiency of this country in writers of historical genius is due to the fact that an Englishman finds it difficult to 'stop at that mediocrity of style, or confine his mind to that even tenour of imagination, which narrative requires.' The only exception he can discover in an otherwise melancholy retrospect of our national achievement is the *Generall Historie of the Turkes* (1604), by that 'great historian,' Richard Knolles (1550(?)–1610). Ralegh and Clarendon came short of the ideal. Robertson, as he declared elsewhere, was a verbose romancer. Hume, the last of our Tory historians, who ought, on that ground, to have appealed to Johnson, was only a 'Tory by chance.' It is not clear, furthermore, how far Johnson had any first-hand knowledge of Hume's *History*. The successive volumes were published between 1754 and 1761, and in 1773 he admitted that he had not read them. The first volume of *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* appeared in 1776, rather late in Johnson's life to expect a ready appreciation, especially as Gibbon's infidelity made him suspect.

Johnson loved biography more than any other literary form; and Boswell claimed for him that he had 'a peculiar art of drawing characters, which is as rare as good portrait painting.' The *Lives of the Poets* is, as could only be expected, an uneven work; but it justifies Boswell's claim. Some of the minor lives are perfunctory, and there are times when Johnson wearied of the task; but the remarkable pains he took with the greater part of the work, and always with the major lives, is abundantly manifest. In most instances he

laboured under the same limitations as the historian of the past; and this he fully recognised. If he denied historians the right to portray the characters of men and women whom they had never met, he was equally stern with biographers. He thought poorly of Goldsmith's *Life of Parnell*, 'for nobody can write the life of a man, but those who have eat and drunk and lived in social intercourse with him.' He was equally emphatic talking to Thomas Warton. Only those 'who live with a man can write his life with any genuine exactness and discrimination.' The thought runs through one of the best of all the *Ramblers*, No. 60, on 'The dignity and usefulness of biography,' and is summed up in the assertion that 'more knowledge may be gained of a man's real character, by a short conversation with one of his servants, than from a formal and studied narrative, begun with his pedigree, and ended with his funeral.' In *The Idler*, No. 84, on 'Biography how best performed,' he goes further and asserts that autobiography is the best kind of biography, for the man who writes his own life 'has at least the first qualification of an historian, the knowledge of the truth.' And if it be objected that partiality and self-love are likely to vitiate the narrative, that danger is no great matter, for we have all been so often betrayed by self-esteem, we shall be 'on the watch against its artifices.'

It is, furthermore, of singular interest to note that in these two essays, the one from *The Rambler*, and the other from *The Idler*, separated from each other by nine years, Johnson returned to the distinction between the functions and uses of history and of biography. History he regarded as of lesser value than biography, for it has fewer lessons which the reader can take home to his heart. Few of us are called to take part in great events. We can read with equanimity the stories of shattered empires, exiled monarchies, and the revolutions of state. 'Those relations which never descend below the consultation of senates, the motions of armies, and the schemes of conspirators' leave unmoved the ordinary man, who will never engage in the conduct of national affairs. The reading of history, therefore, is of little value, 'for example, of life and instruction of manners,' to use the Prayer Book phrase. And the moral purpose of literature was always predominant with Johnson. Men can,

on the other hand, conform their minds to the stories of particular lives, adapt the incidents to their own, and gain instruction for 'every diversity of condition.'

Johnson's insistence upon the need for knowing a man, or of obtaining firsthand information from those who had known him, as the foundation of good biography, is based on his recognition that a man's true character is revealed, not in vulgar parade or brilliant achievement, but in domestic privacy and in the commonplace daily round. He gives some admirable illustrations in the sixtieth *Rambler*. Sallust is commended for telling us of Catiline that '*his walk was now quick, and again slow*, as an indication of a mind revolving something with violent commotion.' The great enterprises of De Witt tell us less of the man than our knowledge that he was '*careful of his health, and negligent of his life*.' On the other hand, and rather inconsistently, Tickell is called to account for descending to the insignificant in telling us that Addison's pulse was irregular. This, surely, *is* significant, for it confirms general inference that Addison was of low physical vitality.

A man's failings and limitations are as important to our knowledge of his character as his virtues, and should not, Johnson held, be excluded, if the author professes to write a Life and not a Panegyric. He cited the example of the sacred writers, and followed his own precept in writing the *Lives of the Poets*. Fortunately also for us, Boswell followed the example set him, declining to represent Johnson as 'entirely perfect,' and resisting the entreaty of Hannah More that he would 'mitigate some of his asperities.'

It has always been admitted that one of the merits of the *Lives of the Poets* is the anecdotes and reminiscences which Johnson included. Whenever he could, in accordance with his own tenet, he tried to get into touch with contemporaries and acquaintances of those whose lives he was writing. When he was young he projected a 'Life of Dryden,' and applied to Owen MacSwinney and Cibber, the only two persons then alive who had seen Dryden. From them, however, he could learn nothing save that Dryden used to sit as an arbiter at Will's coffee-house, in a chair by the fire in winter and on the balcony in summer. He also sent Samuel Derrick, who himself published Dryden's *Miscellaneous Works* in 1760, to

Dryden's relations, but got nothing of value. Further, Johnson quotes his own father's testimony to the large sales of *Absalom and Achitophel.* Cradock lent him a copy of Euripides with manuscript notes in Milton's hand, but Johnson found in them 'nothing remarkable.' He paid a special visit to Lord Marchmont to hear his anecdotes of Pope. A conversation which he once heard 'between the Earl of Orrery and old Mr. Lewis' suggested a doubt of the authenticity of Swift's *Four Last Years of the Queen*; and to Lord Orrery he owed the story of Swift's irritation with a servant waiting at the Earl's table. Dr. Madden informed him that Swift was certainly married to Stella in 1716. 'The late Mr. Clark of Lincoln's Inn' told him an amusing story about Edmund Smith.

These are but a few, selected at random, from many examples of Johnson's endeavour to put one of his own precepts into practice. He was at pains to get into touch with any who had been personally acquainted with poets whose lives he was writing. Furthermore, he drew on the stores of his memory for anecdotal illustrations to life and character. As he recognised that in everyday life we learn to know our friends and acquaintances, not by their larger reputation but by their unguarded behaviour, so he introduced into his *Lives* whatever he could learn of domestic incident and private circumstance. And, generous as the *Lives* are, with that generosity which was part of his large nature, Johnson did not refrain from mention of frailty and shortcoming, in the belief that only thus could just biography be written. At the back of his mind, further, was always the thought that while lessons of history were largely lost upon ordinary men, they could take to themselves the moral contained in the narrative of other men's lives, however simple and uneventful. The test of good biographical perception was the consciousness of significance in small things. A Mr. Fowke once remarked to him upon his excellence in the writing of biography. 'Sir,' Johnson replied, 'I believe that is true. The dogs don't know how to write trifles with dignity.'

HAROLD WILLIAMS.

THE THINGS THAT ARE NOT CÆSAR'S[1]

By Douglas Jerrold

Can any good thing come out of Manchester? Mr. F. A. Voigt's *Unto Cæsar* provides a tragically belated but consoling answer. Its publication is an event of importance because it is the first sign within half a lifetime that Liberalism, in the true and honourable sense of the term, may find its soul again. Mr. Voigt has not found the search for his own soul easy, and the result is that his book is difficult to read. This is more than a pity, because it is a book which every student of public affairs has the duty to read. The root of the matter is there, albeit obscured by special pleading about matters fundamentally irrelevant to its all-important central thesis.

The supreme evil of the modern world, Mr. Voigt tells us, is the growth, not of secularism, but of secular religions—the attempt of man to found the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth. This effort is the latest grand heresy, and it is foredoomed by the nature of man to failure. Marxism, National Socialism, the Geneva Sanctions system, are all different applications of this fundamental heresy. Because the desire to assert the dictatorship of a class, a race, or a system corresponds to no requirement of all men's being, their policies need to be enforced by terroristic methods. Their only sanction is force, and it is the Nemesis of force that it raises up force against it. It thus breeds terrorism to the point where the classless Utopia involves the extermination of whole classes, the race State the subordination of the end (the race) to the means (the State), and the pursuit of universal peace involves universal war.

> A national ideal is the most dangerous of all, for it presupposes a spiritual homogeneity which can never be achieved save by force

[1] *Unto Cæsar*, by F. A. Voigt (Constable, 10s. net)

and, when achieved, can never be maintained except by the despotism of secular religion.

Mr. Voigt addresses that warning in his last pages, not to Herr Hitler, but to this country. Mr. Voigt points his warning by reference to the fate of another great sea power also pledged to the cause of liberty. 'The Athenians abandoned their own heritage and denied their own greatest glory' when they attempted to set themselves up as 'the ultimate arbiters of truth and of right and wrong. . . . England is in danger. Her spiritual life is threatened by the Hubris of secular religion. Her material existence is menaced by the greatest military Power in the world. Unless she is strong' she will be conquered.

I forbear to quote the end of that sentence as Mr. Voigt wrote it, for it reflects the curious and persistent psychological twist which mars so much of his book. The Athenians' betrayal of their ideal is summarised for us by Thucydides in the famous dialogue with the men of Melos, whom the Athenians proceeded to exterminate. The Nemesis came with the defeat of Athens by the Spartan coalition in the Peloponnesian wars. Mr. Voigt should have ended his sentence by saying 'Unless she is strong, the men of the Third Realm will be to her as the Spartans were to the Athenians.' What he has actually written is that unless England is strong 'the men of the Third Realm will be to her as the Athenians were to the men of Melos.'

This is not only intolerably confusing—I can claim some professional skill as a reader, yet it was necessary for me to read the last three pages of Mr. Voigt's book three times before I could be sure what he meant—but it is symptomatic. Mr. Voigt's rediscovered soul is throwing a cold, hard light on our own madness, but his Manchester soul is trying, below the levels of his conscious purpose, to make Herr Hitler the object of his eloquent invective.

And eloquent it certainly is. How true his account of how, under the influence of the revulsion against war in England and France,

> men of letters, attracted by the facility with which utopian dreams of international peace can be popularised, took to politics or to political writing, under the illusion that such dreams are the substance of politics . .

Pacifism . . . became a political and literary fashion. It was exploited for vote-catching, first by the 'left' and then by the right. . . .

Peace was no longer a precious heritage, hard won and hard to preserve, even within its greatest stronghold, the British Commonwealth. It became a messianic abstraction to be imposed upon the entire world by every known form of coercion from economic and financial boycott to actual warfare.

Monstrous proposals, like the proposal to create an international air force that would emerge—from some Alpine stronghold, presumably—and bomb the cities of the alleged aggressor, found a considerable following in the post-war years. Such inhuman phantasmagoria had an affinity with the secular religions of the European continent. Indeed, English militant pacifism had something in common with the Marxian dreams of a universal realm of peace, justice and well-being. As we have seen, the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth is inseparable from its own opposite. It can only come about by violence. It contains a contradiction that was irremedially established by the Fall.

The threat of universal war as a means of establishing universal peace is a peculiarly English conception that has crystallised in the doctrine of 'sanctions.' This doctrine is analogous to the doctrine of the proletarian dictatorship which would establish social peace by making class-war permanent and universal. 'Sanctions' are the counterpart of the revolutionary terror.

And who has written of sanctions themselves in more realistic terms?

It is urged in defence of 'sanctions' that they are unwarlike. Before there is any resort to arms, a general boycott (as prescribed by Article 16 of the Covenant) is attempted. There is economic and financial pressure and a rupture of commercial and political relations (a method applied, though incompletely, in the abortive attempt to avert the Italian conquest of Abyssinia).

The armed forces of the enemy are to be spared as long as possible, while trade (including the trade of the 'sanctionist' Powers with their victim) is to be ruined and the civilian population is to endure shortage, perhaps even hunger. The soldiers shall not be exposed to any danger until the old men, the women, and children have suffered.

A Power resisting the pressure of 'sanctions' can keep its armed forces intact, or use them to suppress rebellion amongst a population made desperate by hunger. A despotism will always be better able than a free country to resist 'sanctions.'

To erect the 'punishment of the aggressor' into a general system would be to concentrate immense power into a few hands and establish an abominable and universal tyranny.

There is true Liberalism as our fathers understood it. It was never a popular doctrine. It is desperately unpopular to-day when the delusive dream of a man-made Utopia, operating under the twin banners of 'planning' at home and a 'peace system' abroad, so dominates the minds of all classes and parties in the democratic States that the Government as well as the opposition still feel bound to give lip service to both as noble ideals.

Mr. Voigt writes as well of the one ideal as of the other:

> 'Planning' has not given Russia stability, order, or well-being above so-called 'capitalist countries,' none of which have been so shaken by economic crises as Russia has. . . . There is not a greater free-trade area in the world, and no other Power has such natural resources. And yet the Russian people were flung from one violent crisis into another. The famine of 1931 was the most frightful European calamity since the Great War (except the great famine of 1921). And it was brought about not by natural causes, but by Marxian politics and economics—and it afflicted one of the richest regions of Russia, the Ukraine, destroying millions of people by starvation . . .
>
> 'Planning' in Russia has caused immense misery and has always been made to work with the help of executions, jailings, and the other coercive measures (including that atrocious form of 'speeding-up' known as Stakhanovism) such as no workmen in western Europe or the United States would tolerate.

History will record as the deepest tragedy of post-war England that we have had to wait till 1938—twenty long and bitter years which have brought us to the very edge of war, under conditions less favourable to our chances than at any other time in our history—for this truth to be said by a Liberal. The whole political balance and sanity of this country depends on the vitality not of the Liberal Party, which is just a label attached to a racket, but of Liberalism. Democracy can only survive if democrats are prepared to tolerate the things they dislike, and peace can only survive if democratic countries are prepared to do the same. This may seem a hard saying, but it is not as hard as Mr. Voigt's, who

writes that 'No government in the world has the right to declare war for a principle.' That is apposite and, as applied to contemporary States, profound, but it is not universally true. I prefer Mr. Voigt's acid remark that 'it is certainly an outrage to provoke aggression, but aggression has to be resisted whether provoked or not.' In that last sentence is written what is most needed to be said of the contemporary tragedy. We have created a situation to which there is no honourable solution. Mr. Voigt, I suspect, would say that there is no place for gentlemen in the world which is Cæsar's, that we must therefore be pained, but not surprised, at the absence of honourable solutions to its problems. It is at that point that an emphatic reservation is necessary.

The Liberal position as restated by Mr. Voigt is in many vital respects acceptable. It is a necessary starting-point of any frank discussion of the modern world that it has forgotten the Fall of Man, that man was made to know and serve God, and that God's kingdom is not of this world. Organisation creates nothing. It can only organise what is already there. You cannot, by taking thought, add to your stature one cubit. On the other hand, man is not only fallen but redeemed. Man, with the help of God's grace, can save not only his own soul but the souls of all the world. We cannot create the Kingdom of God on Earth. We cannot end the historical process, because our life is a becoming. If we *could* put an end to history, our life would become as that of the beasts. It is no coincidence that those who believe that history is a finite process do, in hard fact, behave like beasts. We are not, however, justified in concluding, as Mr. Voigt wishes us to conclude, that all exercise of force is equally vile except force used to preserve a balance of forces. That is a good working rule for professional politicians, who are not usually metaphysicians and never moral philosophers. It is not, however, in the absolute sense, true.

It is the old Adam in Mr. Voigt which tempts him to devote the first half of his book to an impossible attempt to equate revolutionary Communism with National Socialism, and to dismiss the whole *corpus* of twentieth-century anti-revolutionary thought, by implication, when he describes National Socialism as 'the more advanced form of Fascism.' National Socialism has only one thing in common with

Fascism—that it is one of the several possible forms of a necessary revolt against the decadent and corrupt perversion of political democracy into a tyranny of the clerks. But Fascism, unlike National Socialism, sets up against political democracy a new and coherent political system, a non-political State, based on an economic democracy. Communism is the logical conclusion of the unrestricted democratic political State. It is the same State as our own, but developed to the point when all the power and all the responsibility is concentrated in the hands of the political classes. Fascism is an ingenious (and, arguably, an unworkable) device for reducing the political classes to impotence by giving political representation and power to function instead of to opinion and making the Government the expression of economic function instead of the expression of political will. National Socialism is not even an attempted compromise between these two utterly contradictory systems. It is merely a dictatorship, in the true sense of that term : a concentration of power in the hands of one man for a particular purpose. It is not a system. It is a despairing substitute for a system. What use is likely to be made of this concentration of power we do not know, but it is significant that Mr. Voigt does not even discuss this problem. Yet there is interesting evidence on the point. We are seeing in contemporary Germany the first attempt in history at the deliberate creation of a classless aristocracy trained for the express task of government. It is intended to select and train a non-hereditary, non-privileged *corps d'élite* of rulers, chosen for their physique, character and intelligence The type aimed at is, curiously enough—and the parallel was surely worth noting—that admired by Cecil Rhodes and designed by him to be the rulers of our own democratic Empire.

Yet there was more excuse for ignoring this audacious experiment, the fruits of which will not be seen for another generation, than for ignoring the corporate State, which is already working (albeit in its very early 'Lancastrian,' or, at best, 'Tudor,' stage) in Italy and in Portugal. Mr. Voigt, however, has conquered his prejudices and remembered his Liberal faith only with an effort and for conscience' sake. When our own fate is at stake, he feels compelled ('*O ! si sic omnes !*') to face the realities. When he is commenting on

foreign nations, all non-parliamentary peoples come under his lash.

We must be forgiven for remembering that '*Qui s'excuse, s'accuse.*'

If the parallel between Communism and National Socialism were really so exact, would it have been necessary for an accomplished writer with a trained intelligence to spend 150 pages demonstrating it? The 'parallel'—let us be blunt—is ridiculous. All men in the seizure and safeguarding of power do things which those not called on to act in a crisis condemn as atrocious. Mr. Voigt contrasts Hitler unfavourably with Cromwell; but history will draw a comparison between Cromwell in Ireland and Hitler in Austria which will not be in favour of the English dictator. It is surely unjust to compare the Russian revolution, the greatest political slaughter in the whole of recorded time, with the German revolution, the most peaceful in the long, rough story of Europe, not even excepting our only revolution of 1688. The pseudo-scientific cult of class or race as the ultimate good is a perversion of civilisation and a prostitution of moral energy in the service of anti-Christ. For his recognition of this fact we owe a debt to Mr. Voigt, the Liberal who has found his soul. For the confusion which he creates first between National Socialism and Fascism, and then between both and revolutionary Communism, we must challenge Mr. Voigt, spokesman of the Liberal Party which, in losing its soul, has prejudiced the whole future of European Christian civilisation.

We must learn, if we are to preserve our sanity, let alone our civilisation, to put first things first. The Communist revolution is evil not only because the Communist ideal is evil—men were not created to be inmates of an institution—but because it is, by its declared policy, a minority movement, which attains power by the ruthless exercise of force against the majority and secures it by mass murder and systematic terrorism. It sets out as its first step on attaining power to destroy the Christian religion—not to persecute it, not to impoverish it, but to destroy it. The Communist revolution, alike in theory and in practice, denies all the three liberties—political liberty, economic liberty, and religious liberty. No other régime in history, no other 'ideal' of the professors, denies all these liberties.

It is doing no service to our much harassed generation to create confusion (however noble the indignation that inspires the effort) between revolutionary Communism and those other systems of government which are challenging its claim to dominion over men's hearts. Mr. Voigt may be deeply sincere in his belief that although Communism is vile, it was not dangerous either in Germany or in Spain, and he is not only sincere but profoundly right in seeing beneath the pride and glitter and immense constructive ability of National Socialism a falsehood which if it be not eradicated will be fatal to the hopes of Herr Hitler and his followers. The pride of national fellowship can never be an end satisfying in itself; it must, because it can never meet the deepest needs of man's being, always strive for some purpose external to itself, and that striving must spell danger and, ultimately, disaster to our common civilisation. All this is true, and must be faced. It is not, however, nearly sufficient to cry '*delenda est Carthago*,' and it is no help at all towards purging the mind of cant and prejudice, to try to construct a philosophy of National Socialism which runs parallel to Communism and is in its essence undistinguishable from it.

There are echoes in Mr. Voigt's analysis of *Mein Kampf* of old and ridiculous obsessions which are best reflected in the popular mistranslation of *Deutschland uber Alles*. The claim of the new Reich, as of its predecessor, is not to assert the supremacy of Germany over other countries, but over the hearts of Germans. Assimilating Herr Hitler's racialism to Marx's classism, Mr. Voigt implies (or at least will be understood by nine readers out of ten to imply) that, while Marxism aims at the dictatorship of a class within a State, National Socialism aims at the dictatorship of a race within a continent. This is profoundly untrue: it is indeed the exact opposite of the truth. The essential idea of Herr Hitler's racialism is that the German race, educated, drilled and organised for collective action in all the tasks of civilisation, is to provide the sole object of the creative activities of its component citizens. This is something very different, not in degree but in kind, from Marxism. It is not an idea incompatible with the pursuit of different ideals by other States. It is quite true that Herr Hitler declared in *Mein Kampf* that the destruction of the power of France was essential to the self-realisation of the

German people, but it is clear that this does not refer to the destruction of the power of the French State over Frenchmen, but to the destruction of the Versailles system, which ringed with bayonets a crushed and disarmed Germany separated from her minorities by the guaranteed frontiers of the succession States. Moreover, if what Herr Hitler wrote in 1924 is so vitally important, it is only just to attach corresponding weight to what the same speaker has declared repeatedly in regard to France in the new situation. Germany's quarrel with France, Herr Hitler has declared over and over again, is now closed. And with good reason, because the desire to dominate and rule an alien race is not only foreign to but actually incompatible with the philosophy of racialism. The evil of that philosophy is, not that it denies the claims of the races living outside its borders, but that it gives a pseudo-moral as well as a pseudo-scientific sanction to the persecution of racial minorities within its borders, and that is sets the State above the Church. It is essential, however, to remember that neither justice to the Jews nor the submission of the nation to God is incompatible with the social and political structure of the Third Reich. The English, above all peoples, have the duty to realise this, because there is nothing that National Socialism has done to the Jews which English Parliamentarianism did not do to the Catholics. It burnt, and it tortured, and, right up to the nineteenth century, it persecuted; it denied civil rights, including even the right to own property. These things may be forgotten in London, but, as Mr. Voigt will realise, they are not forgotten in Lancashire or in Ireland. Yet Parliamentarianism has not only survived these iniquities but has achieved, in England at least, a complete reconciliation with its enemies, without any sacrifice of its essential principles.

There is, indeed, no excuse for ignorance on this point, because we have before our eyes in Portugal and in Nationalist Spain examples of authoritarian régimes which are not passively but actively Christian, and which are certainly not anti-Semitic. Nor is Mr. Voigt innocent of very serious exaggeration when he writes that 'In Russia, the dominion of the Hammer and Sickle does not extend to the altar. In Germany the Swastika is being erected above the altar.' We are faced here with the old Adam at his worst, as when Mr

Voigt declares that there is nothing to choose between the conduct of both sides in Spain. In Russia and in Red Spain tens of thousands of bishops, priests and monks have been murdered. The churches have been systematically desecrated and turned to secular purposes. There are no practising Christians in the Government of either of these States, and no public propagation of the Faith is allowed. Children are being brought up in deliberate and enforced ignorance of the Christian doctrine and adults are not free to worship. Blasphemy is not merely tolerated but encouraged. Not one of these things is true of the Third Reich. Such persecution of the Churches as exists is exclusively political. All persecution is evil; but the difference between the two kinds of persecution is so vast that it is surely hardly permissible in a book written to enlighten the ignorant to use the same word for two such different things. Even in the matter of religious education, the Hitler youth are free to go to church on Sundays, and do go without let or hindrance. The absence of religious instruction in the curriculum is deplorable, but it is equally absent as far as Catholics are concerned in our own State schools.

Mr. Voigt also omits all reference to another fundamental difference between National Socialism and Communism. The right of ownership is a natural right, not a political arrangement. All property is held in trust under God for the common good. That is common ground among all moralists, and exploitation is as bad in Christian as in Marxian morals. But the difference between a State built up on the right to own, and therefore on the mutual responsibility of the State to the individual and of the individual to the State, and a State built up on the denial of the right of ownership is fundamental. In the one system, however aggressively political it be, the individual has the last word against the State. In the other, however tolerant it be (and history as yet affords no example of a tolerant Communist State), the individual is, in the last analysis, a slave.

An understanding of these things is fundamental to our peace. We cannot build up that understanding between the peoples of Western Europe, which, as Mr. Voigt wisely says, is the absolute condition of peace, unless we recognise not only the dangerous similarities between the philosophy of

Marxism and the theoretic claims of Racialism but alsc more fundamental differences. Still more necessary is i understand that the political theory underlying the Corpo State is just as different from German National Socialism a is from English Parliamentarianism. There are five theo of government in Europe to-day—those of the Russian, i Central European, the Mediterranean and North-Weste peoples as to-day practised, and that of the doctrinai professors who seek to submerge all these systems in a wor Government of clerks and bury the aspirations of all unde a dead weight of paper.

This doctrinaires' theory involves the dictatorship of th upper-middle class. National Socialism is the dictatorship of the lower-middle class, and Communism the dictatorship of the proletariat. Mr. Voigt has done a service in making this clear and in drawing attention to the dangers involved in each of these heresies. With his practical conclusion, that we must husband our strength and enter into no ideological alliances, all who read and understand his book must necessarily agree. There is, however, one further requirement of the situation which is ill-served by this otherwise excellent work. We must clear our minds of prejudice regarding the constructive achievements of non-parliamentary Governments which are taking place along the shores of the Mediterranean and, to a much more limited extent, even in Germany. Until we have done that, there can be no real 'understanding,' and therefore nothing better than an armed truce.

DOUGLAS JERROLD.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 *&* 12 *Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.*

NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

1877 1938

Founded by JAMES KNOWLES.

1938 **JUNE** No. 736. Vol. CXXIII.

LONDON : CONSTABLE & CO., LTD., ORANGE STREET, LEICESTER SQUARE, W.C 2.

Registered for Canadian Magazine Post.

Price Three Shillings. *Annual Subscription (Home and Abroad)* 36/– *post free*

U.S.A. and Canada, 75 *cents.* „ „ *U.S A. and Canada* $8 75

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

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NINETEENTH
CENTURY
AND AFTER

No. DCCXXXVI—June 1938

THE CHOICE BEFORE US

By The Rt. Hon. Viscount Samuel, G.C.B., G.B.E.

In these anxious, perilous times people in this country, and in many countries, are asking themselves constantly how, if at all, can the peace of Europe be preserved In presence of the thrusts of Germany and Italy, backed by their formidable and growing military power, what policy ought we on our part to adopt? In Great Britain and throughout the British Commonwealth, in all the countries of Western, Northern and Eastern Europe, the discussion goes on incessantly; in Parliaments, in the Press, in conversation, the vast debate proceeds. As it develops the fact emerges more and more clearly that, broadly speaking, two alternative policies are open, both seeking the same aim—the safeguarding of peace, yet quite distinct in spirit and in method. And we have to choose between them.

One school look upon the sovereignty of law among

States as the supreme issue. They regard the open breaches of treaties by Germany and Italy, and by Japan as well; the withdrawal of those three Powers from the League of Nations; their promptness to resort to force to gain their aims—they regard all this as destructive of the very foundations of civilisation. They know that in Germany, which is the leader, the movement rests upon a specific philosophy, long matured and deliberately adopted—a philosophy which rejects the ethics common to Christianity and all the great religions; which pushes aside the ideas of justice and kindness and universal good-will, and puts in the forefront ideas of nationalism and race, ruthlessness and power. The world watches the consequence in armaments piled up with feverish speed and without limit. The conclusion is drawn that a general war is probable, and very likely inevitable. Therefore the chief duty of peace-loving, law-abiding nations is for themselves to arm as fully and as quickly as they can in order to meet the imminent danger, and to draw close together for their mutual protection. While not refusing to consider any grievances, political or economic, that may be advanced and that may prove to be well-founded, they are influenced at the same time by the belief that concessions would fail to satisfy the constantly growing appetite of the dictators, and would merely add to their prestige, to their influence over the smaller States, and to their strategic strength. To win them as friends is hopeless; to make them, by our own act, more powerful as enemies would be the height of folly. Consequently, it is urged, the right course is to enlist as many States as possible under the banner of the League of Nations and respect for law; to make it clear to potential aggressors that acts of force will be resisted by a combination possessing greater force, further fortified by moral right; and in this way to safeguard the peace of the world. That is one policy.

The policy of the other school is founded on the recognition that some of the main provisions of the Peace Treaties were wrong; that, looking back over the post-war years, it is quite obvious that grave mistakes were made in handling the European situation, in particular by France, but with the acquiescence of Britain and of the League of Nations; and that we are in danger of making similar blunders now. Let law, they say, be maintained by all means; but law is not

always the same thing as justice; where it differs it is the law that should be changed and not justice denied. Without subscribing in any particular to the Nazi or Fascist creeds, this school emphasise the principle that States must be accepted internationally for what they are; that internal régimes should not decide international relations; that to try to keep Germany poor in order that she should not be strong would only succeed in making her more united, more bitter and more hostile; and that the policy of making the League a military alliance against aggression would, in fact, merely be to divide Europe into opposing blocs, and, so far from precluding war, would be the best way to make it certain. It is admitted that conciliatory methods also may fail; that militarism is so powerful in Germany that any event at any time may be held to justify, in the name of German security or German honour, mobilisation and war. So it is common ground that the democracies must arm themselves powerfully. But if the catastrophe should come in spite of a sincere effort for conciliation, at least their peoples will be able to face it with a clear conscience, with the assurance that they, for their part, had done their best to retrieve past blunders and to set Europe on a better road.

That is the other policy. The two are incompatible with one another and cannot be combined. It is futile and dangerous to waver doubtfully between them. We have to choose.

Here in Great Britain the influences that make for the first of these policies are very strong. The great majority in the nation, who believe that freedom and justice are good things, are revolted by outstanding features in the Nazi régime. The forcible suppression of every form of criticism or dissent; the arbitrary arrests and the imprisonments without trial or sentence—in particular the repeated imprisonments of Dr. Niemoller and other champions of religious liberty; the oppression also of the Catholics; the cold, persistent persecution of the Jews, the insults and contumely directed against them, the confiscation, direct or indirect, of a great part of their property, the loss of livelihood and opportunity for many men among them eminent throughout

the world for intellectual distinction and service to humanity—all these things cause an indignant feeling of revulsion. Accompanying this is the immense and menacing increase in the German air force, which compels a corresponding effort here. The British people, now obliged to spend on their defences at the rate of £1,000,000 a day; with the standard rate of income tax at 5*s.* 6*d.* in the pound, other taxation heavily increased and the National Debt steadily mounting; with the whole population being drilled in such measures as are possible to save themselves from being blown up, burnt and gassed from the air—the British people have little cause to cry 'Heil Hitler!'

The plea that the immense armament is nothing more than a defence against a Communist invasion that threatens Central and Western Europe is not believed; it is held to be merely a pretext. The demand for the return of the German colonies, which is becoming more and more insistent and may soon develop into a threat, is in some quarters resented. It is held to be detrimental to the interests of the native population; not to be justifiable on grounds of economic necessity, and still less justifiable in view of the origins and the results of the war. Had Germany been the victor, it is said, she would certainly have imposed terms even more severe than those she received; the Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest Treaties, which she dictated, are the proofs of it. Furthermore, it is impossible to arrive at understandings with people who openly declare it to be their creed that to do whatever is expedient in the interest of their State is itself the highest morality. All their undertakings, therefore, are unreliable from the beginning. The question of Austria gives an example. In May 1935 Herr Hitler, addressing the Reichstag, said:

> Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an *Anschluss*.[1]

In March 1938 the German army marched into Vienna and Austria was absorbed into the German Reich. A few weeks later Herr Hitler, speaking to a great meeting in Salzburg, took pride in the fact that 'his long-existing ambition to bring about the *Anschluss* had been realised.'[2]

[1] *The Times*, May 22, 1935 [2] *Ibid.*, April 7, 1938.

Many people think it established that if Great Britain had definitely declared, in 1914 or earlier, that she would stand by France and Russia should Germany or her allies provoke a European War, there would have been no war. The situation, it is said, is substantially the same to-day; the mistake made then should not be repeated; and it is only fair to Germany and to the world that we should say clearly and at once just where we stand. This is why it is urged that, in presence of the union of Berlin, Vienna and Rome, a combination should be formed by all the other European States; that round the 'axis' of potential aggression there should be constructed an equator of peace.

Considerations such as these have great weight. It is not surprising that they move large bodies of opinion. The leaders of the Labour Party, many Liberals, most of the active supporters of the League of Nations and the principle of Collective Security, have been led by them to support, wholly or mainly, the first of the two policies. Mr. Winston Churchill is engaged in a platform campaign to persuade the nation definitely to adopt it. In France, I believe, this tendency is even more general than here. The memories of the war, still fresh and poignant; the sacrifice of so many of the best youth of France, the devastation of whole provinces, the aftermath of economic strain, the present financial and political difficulties, due largely to a burden of defence almost past bearing—all this is attributed directly to an overbearing spirit of aggression ingrained in the German mentality. No wonder that the French people have been, and still are, reluctant to make concessions of any kind. When Justice is invoked it is answered that concessions made to Germany in the name of justice would only strengthen the will and increase the power of the Nazi régime to commit fresh injustices on others at home and abroad.

Arguments such as these have enlisted for the first policy a powerful backing. Nevertheless, I believe that that policy is wrong and that the other is right, and I would summarise the reasons that influence those who hold this view.

To act on the assumption that a war is inevitable is always wrong. No war is inevitable. More than once in the course

of the nineteenth century a war between Great Britain and France, the 'hereditary enemies,' was held by many people in both countries to be inevitable. Nevertheless, it proved not to be so. To-day a war between Britain and France is *regarded, not as inevitable, but as unthinkable. History gives many similar cases. The right course now is not to line up the nations for a conflict that is thought bound to come, but to take steps to obviate conflict.*

I do not believe it to be true that, if the different course that is suggested had been taken by the British Government in July 1914 or earlier, there would have been no war. I was a member of the Cabinet in those years and my judgment may be biassed; but it seems to me clear that the German Government was fully aware of the course that Britain might take in such an eventuality as did in fact arise, and in particular could not have doubted that we should fulfil our definite guarantee to Belgium if her territory was invaded. To have gone further, and to have ranked ourselves formally with France and Russia beforehand, would have involved us in responsibility for all the acts of our allies, and would almost certainly have stimulated Slav intransigence in the Balkans. Moreover, it would have evoked violent controversies at home; the predecessors of the politicians of the Left who now make the complaint would have been the first to denounce the Government of the day for entangling the nation in Continental quarrels and committing the country to war in support of Russian imperialism.

So again now. The Prime Minister made it sufficiently clear, in his recent declaration in Parliament on the situation in Czechoslovakia, that any act of aggression, there or elsewhere, might have consequences that would draw in nations not directly affected; in other words, that Germany could not count on our neutrality if she provoked a European War. The British public acquiesced in that statement; no representative voice was raised against it. But if the Prime Minister had gone further, if he had given the definite guarantee of support urged by the Labour Party, from that time forth we should have been in effect responsible for the internal policy of Czechoslovakia. Everyone knows that the political situation there is most delicate. Concessions are asked from the Czechs by the Sudeten Germans, and by other racial

minorities, which, even though reasonable, are very hard to grant. Secured by an effective guarantee from Britain, as well as from France and Russia, the temptation to yield as little as possible would be almost irresistible. It is the same with the countries of the Little Entente. Who will assert that the frontiers drawn by the Peace Treaties were in every respect right? Yet any revision must needs be unpalatable to those who are called upon to make sacrifices. It has been asked, is Britain to be 'bound for all time to all the War Treaties unless the beneficiaries under those Treaties are willing to release us? These beneficiaries are unlikely to compromise so long as they can count upon our armed help to preserve their advantages.'

Mr. Churchill's campaign declares itself to be in support of the League of Nations. But it may be questioned whether the course that he advocates is really in the interest of the League. So long as Germany and Italy are not members, it is clearly impossible that the League can provide the machinery for handling questions in which Germany and Italy are among the principal parties concerned. It is useless to close our eyes to the fact that to organise the remaining members of the League into a Council for dealing with matters that closely affect those two Powers, but without their co-operation and concurrence, is not to establish the Collective principle. On the contrary, it would establish precisely that division of Europe into two separate blocs, which is most strongly to be deprecated. The fact that one of the blocs would consist of members of the League and the other of non-members would not make the situation better; it would make it far worse. For it would preclude the possibility that some day an opportunity might arise for restoring the membership and the influence of the League. Nor is there the slightest probability that the smaller nations of Europe would be ready to-day to lend themselves to such a policy, particularly after the unhappy experience of Sanctions against Italy. On the contrary, any pressure upon them to do so might result in yet further secessions.

There is another reason—and it is conclusive—why a British Government cannot engage in a policy of blocs, guarantees and commitments, leading to a Europe divided between the totalitarian and the democratic Powers. It could

not command the support of the general body of the nation. Nor could it command the support of public opinion in the Dominions. The Imperial Conference, held in London last year, unanimously declared their view 'that nothing would be more damaging to the hopes of international appeasement than the division, real or apparent, of the world into opposing groups.' Of all the blunders that a British Government could commit the very worst would be to give undertakings which could not be honoured, and to arouse expectations that might afterwards be disappointed because, when the crux came, neither this nation nor the Commonwealth was willing to take sides in the particular conflict that had arisen.

We survey the course of events since the close of the war. There is no one in any country who cannot see now, with easy wisdom, how many and how grave have been the mistakes committed by the Allied Powers. The excessive reparations exacted by the Treaty of Versailles is admitted universally to have been a mistake; out of it came the French occupation of the Ruhr—also seen to have been a blunder—and after that came the collapse of German currency and the ruin of millions of Germans. To forbid Germany to station her own troops in an integral part of her own territory was a further mistake—a prohibition obviously impossible to maintain. To disarm Germany by treaty may have been right, but only if her neighbours fulfilled the promise they gave that the disarmament would not be one-sided and would be followed voluntarily by themselves. The Treaty was a legal obligation and took immediate effect; the promise, although in writing, was not in legal form and no date was expressed for its fulfilment. Fifteen years went by; the promise was not kept; and, after years of discussion in the Disarmament Conference, there was no sign that it was going to be kept.

Austria offers another glaring instance of mistake. The Peace Treaties constituted Austria as an almost impossible economic unit; but when she tried to save herself from ruin by a Customs Union with Germany, the Allies vetoed it. Review again the question of colonies. Germany owned colonies, the fruits of long years of effort and sacrifice: no doubt their administration at times was faulty; but the faults had mostly been remedied, and the colonial adminis-

tration of other nations also had not been immune from criticism. The Treaty of Versailles swept away all the German colonies at a stroke, leaving her the only Great Power in Europe without colonial possessions. Can we doubt now that that was also a mistake ?

Nor was this all. Throughout the whole of that period the impression gradually gained ground that, in international affairs, unless there was violence, or the threat of violence, nothing happened. There were exceptions—the belated ending of reparations and the plebiscite in the Saar were the most conspicuous ; but they were few, and mostly in affairs of secondary importance. The League of Nations made the same error as Great Britain had made in Ireland, in Egypt and in India. When force was imminent or actual, action was taken ; when not, there were assurances of good-will, promises of consideration, sometimes the appointment of a Committee, but nothing more. 'Peaceful Change' was accepted as the formula ; but the accent was always on the peace and seldom on the change. When Germany was disarmed and acquiescent we said 'There is little there that needs attention.' If now that Germany is formidable and truculent we are to say 'She does not deserve attention ; to give attention in deference to threats is a weak surrender to the spirit of violence,' what escape will there be from the dilemma we should ourselves have created ?

Extend the survey over British foreign relations generally and it will yield little more satisfaction. In the last ten years seven different Foreign Secretaries have been entrusted with the conduct of affairs [3] ; but if the declared aims of British policy are compared with the achievement, can any of them claim a record of success ?

When the great depression was at its worst the British Government declared, with others, that to lessen the barriers to international trade was essential : with that object a World Economic Conference was invited to meet in London ; it met, with the British Prime Minister as its president ; it deliberated ; and it dispersed, with a record of barren,

[3] Sir Austen Chamberlain, Mr Arthur Henderson, Lord Reading, Sir John Simon, Sir Samuel Hoare, Mr Anthony Eden, and Lord Halifax.

unredeemed failure. In the Far East the dispute broke out between Japan and China; the League of Nations sent a Commission to adjudicate, a British statesman being its chairman; the Commission presented a unanimous Report; but Japan did not pay the slightest attention, and then and since has pursued her proclaimed policy of aggression, without the slightest regard to the League in general or to Great Britain in particular. A Disarmament Conference, comprising delegates from all the nations of the world, League members or not, met at Geneva; it chose the then British Foreign Secretary as its president: from time to time the British representatives made spasmodic efforts to offer the Conference a lead; after three years of futile discussions it ended without results of any kind.

Britain declared again and again that Collective Security was the keystone of her policy; above all things she was loyal to the League and would never act alone; yet when the League was at the crisis of its history, and fifty of its members had united to impose penalties, often at great sacrifice to themselves, against Italy as an aggressor, suddenly, without any consultation with anyone, the British and French Foreign Ministers framed the Hoare–Laval agreement, and the League action collapsed at once. Again 'the integrity and independence of Austria' was officially affirmed and reaffirmed to be 'an object of British policy'; but Austrian independence was suppressed by Germany overnight, without the slightest compunction and with hardly a protest. Another matter of great importance, our unpaid debt to the United States, has been left in an altogether unsatisfactory position.

There are three items to be found on the credit side of the account: the ending of the bickerings with Soviet Russia—which need never have occurred; the improvement in our relations with Turkey, at the cost of surrendering the Dardanelles provisions in the Treaty of Lausanne, which were clearly impossible of enforcement; and the satisfactory and welcome settlement of the prolonged dispute with Egypt.

The recent Agreement with Italy is not, I submit, to be classed among the successes. It was perfectly plain throughout our troubles with Italy that Signor Mussolini had two objects in view—first, to invade Abyssinia, to conquer the country without effective interference from others, and to

obtain international recognition for the conquest; secondly, to ensure the establishment of a Fascist régime in Spain, which could be relied upon in future eventualities, certainly as a diplomatic, and perhaps as a military ally. Until those two objects were achieved, he was prepared to make himself as disagreeable as possible in as many ways as he could to anyone who might try to stand in the way, especially Great Britain. After Abyssinia had been occupied Signor Mussolini sent a great force to Spain, and almost simultaneously he joined the Committee, set up in London, at the invitation of our Government, to promote non-intervention in the Spanish conflict.

The doings of that Committee can hardly fail to stand out in history as among the most remarkable proceedings of our time. It was said of a certain Emperor of Austria that, not being able to avoid taking part in a Conference which he wished to be futile, 'he sent to the Conference his skilled procrastinators.' Such has been the Italian delegation at the London Committee. Signor Grandi, indeed, frankly gave it as his opinion at the outset that 'Italy would not withdraw any of her volunteers from Spain until the war had been decided by the defeat of the Spanish Reds.'[4] For nearly a year and a half she has been obviously playing with the Western Powers. The proceedings of the Committee, which have been a continual cause of irritation in London and of dismay in Madrid, have no doubt been a constant source of amused complacency in Rome.

'Italy rings like metal; England is a muffled drum'[5]; thus it has been in this affair. Apart from all questions of British sympathies with the cause of Spanish democracy and progress—and it must be admitted that those sympathies have been affected by the fragmentation and the internecine quarrels of the Spanish parties of the Left and Centre, and by the atrocities of which some of their members, like some of Franco's supporters, have at times been guilty—apart from that, it must have been obvious that a Fascist militarist Spain must add to the future perils of France, and therefore indirectly be a danger to British security. General Franco, in the course of a formal statement of the system which his

[4] *The Times*, March 24, 1937
[5] G Lowes Dickinson, *A Modern Symposium*

régime would establish in the event of victory, stated, 'A military view of life shall shape Spanish existence.'[6] If France in future has to look to the defences, not only of the Rhine frontier, and not only of the Alps, but also of the line of the Pyrenees, her lot will be hard indeed.

Under the Italian Agreement we have to swallow the bitter pill of recognising the fruits of aggression in Abyssinia, against which, only a short while ago, we were the leaders in rallying the nations of the world. At the same time we acquiesce in the dilatory tactics by which Signor Mussolini is able to retain his army in Spain until he considers it has served its purpose, and will be ready in any case to withdraw it. In return we receive nothing more than the discontinuance of the disagreeable measures which he had taken in order to attain the two objectives, which seem now to have been secured. This we are asked to applaud as a triumph of British diplomacy. Mr. Chamberlain even claims it as a great achievement that the recognition of the Abyssinian Empire is not to take effect until the Italian troops are withdrawn from Spain, which is likely only to be when Franco shall have won the war. It is as though he had said, 'We are prepared here and now to give our moral sanction to your attaining one of your objects, but you must clearly understand that we refuse to give our legal sanction until you have also attained the other'!

More than ever is it plain in these days that, in international relations, the economic factor is of fundamental importance. Sir Samuel Hoare, when Foreign Secretary, made a declaration at Geneva in September 1935 on the subject of the supply of raw materials to what are called 'The Have-not Powers.' He announced that the British Government would be ready to take up that problem and to bear their share in attempting to deal with it fairly and effectively. At the time the declaration caused a world-wide sensation. Now at last, it was thought, one of the Great Powers is putting life into the policy of Peaceful Change. A Committee of Inquiry was duly appointed; an expert Report was duly presented; and nothing whatever has been duly done.

[6] *The Times*, April 24, 1937

At a later date the British and French Governments took a joint initiative by inviting Monsieur Van Zeeland, then Prime Minister of Belgium, to examine into the whole complicated economic situation. He accepted the task, made a painstaking inquiry, and presented, months ago, a Report full of far-reaching suggestions. So far nothing has happened.

Germany raises the question of colonies. A few voices are heard here in sympathy with her claims; but often with the proviso that there are excellent reasons, affecting each in turn of the British colonial or mandated territories, which, so far as the British Empire is concerned, prohibit us, much as we regret it, from meeting her wishes. Others argue conclusively that the colonies and their trade are so essential to us that it is out of the question even to consider making any concession, whether territorial or economic; but that her former possessions were so useless to Germany that it is hard to understand why she should trouble to raise the matter at all.

It may be well to remember that tropical Africa was divided among the nations of Europe during the nineteenth century without any war between them, but the peace was only maintained by means of prolonged and patient negotiations, of compromises and sacrifices. If sacrifices are called for now, the British Commonwealth, possessing one-fourth of the land area of the globe, can hardly expect to be exempt from contributing to them.

Perhaps if in recent years our Governments had had a less rigid regard for minor and immediate British interests, and a greater regard for major and ultimate British interests—which are also world interests—we might have helped more than we have done to promote the tranquillity of Europe and the peace of mankind.

No one would be so rash as to prophesy that, if the democratic nations choose the second of the alternatives that are open, the aim in view will in fact be achieved. The future actions of Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini cannot be foreseen—perhaps not even by themselves; defensive arma-

ments are essential as a precaution; the Staff conferences with France are clearly necessary. But neither would it be safe to prophesy that the attempt is sure to fail.

History shows many cases of surprising changes in national outlook and action as a result of changes in conditions. If the present period of tension can only be got through in safety, there might well come about, in a calmer atmosphere, some general European settlement, in which a friendly arrangement in the colonial and economic sphere would be an important element. Such a settlement would immediately bring so great a stimulus to industry and commerce that a new prosperity would spread over the countries of Europe. With lessened burdens and expanding revenues the whole outlook would be changed.

Nor can it be believed that a nation so intelligent as the German, not long ago in the foremost rank of world civilisation, will submit indefinitely to the lowered standards which the philosophy now dominant has imposed upon it in many spheres of thought and action. We read that 'the Nazi Party in Upper Austria has presented to Herr Hitler a prehistoric stone club as a symbol of the absorption of Austria by the Reich.' Germans will demand some day a better emblem. And some day they may recall their Goethe's words: 'National hatred is something peculiar. You will always find it strongest and most violent where there is the lowest degree of culture.'

For many reasons, political and personal, it would have been for me far easier to write in a different strain on the main question that is under discussion. But those of us who hold the Liberal creed must take it to be the essence of the matter that justice should be done not only to countries of our own way of thinking; to be Liberal only towards Liberal States is not Liberalism at all. Convinced also that the restoration of the authority of the League of Nations is vital to the well-being of the world, how can we accept a policy of mutually antagonistic blocs, of attempting to safeguard peace by making the League an engine of war? For the League to recognise the facts of the present situation, and to prepare

the way for the reconstitution of its membership, appears quite clearly to be the only policy that is practicable and right.

In the end these are the considerations that should decide our choice.

SAMUEL.

BRITISH DIPLOMACY 1898–1914

By Sir John Marriott

It is not England's generals and admirals who have won its wars, but its statesmen Over and over again in the course of its history England has entered upon a war unprepared—but only unprepared in a military sense Diplomatically all the mines have been laid and all the ambushes prepared Any State that makes war on England must therefore realise not only that it is fighting against a rich nation that will stop short of no sacrifice in the hour of need, but also that behind the advancing British armies are the cleverest diplomatists in the world.

'The cleverest diplomatists in the world.'! Would any Englishman have advanced that particular claim on behalf of his fellow-countrymen? I doubt it. We are still, maybe, under the spell of Sir Henry Wotton's famous jest, now more than three centuries old: 'Legatus est vir bonus peregre missus ad mentiendum reipublicae causa.' Dr. Johnson did not admit the word 'diplomacy' into his Dictionary. The *New Oxford Dictionary* defines it as 'The management of international relations by negotiation.' But it illustrates the 'common usage' by the following quotation from Grattan's *Beaten Paths* (1862): 'I can find no better signification for the word which typifies the pursuit than double dealing . . . it is expressive of concealment if not of duplicity.' Perhaps that is why, in our self-righteousness, we are wont to associate the art of diplomacy less with the Teutonic than with the Latin peoples, with such masters of the craft as a Mazarin and a Talleyrand, a Cavour and a Cambon. It is in fact a German who attributes to us pre-eminence in the craft of diplomacy. Herr Kurt von Stutterheim is no stranger to this country; he has been, for many years, the London correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, and has lately published a singularly penetrating study of England and Englishmen.[1]

[1] *Those English* (Sidgwick and Jackson, 1937)

Is Herr von Stutterheim's estimate deserved? Are Englishmen truly the 'cleverest diplomatists in the world'? We now have materials for answering that question such as we have never possessed before. In thirteen bulky volumes Dr. Gooch and Dr. Temperley have published the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*.[2] The study is, of course, an intensive one. The work covers only sixteen years (1898–1914). For that period, however, it does reveal in most instructive detail the motives that inspired British diplomacy, and it does enable us to estimate the measure of success achieved thereby.

How do our diplomatists, at home and abroad, emerge from this searching ordeal? Does this documentary revelation confirm or reverse the verdict of the acute German critic? To attempt an answer to that question is the purpose of this article.

To pass abruptly to the contents of these volumes without a word of acknowledgment to the erudite and industrious editors would betray gross insensibility. Messrs. Gooch and Temperley have performed a great public service not merely with courage but with conspicuous discretion and skill. They undertook their heavy and responsible task, and have carried it through, only on the condition that they should have a free hand in the selection of documents and on the clear understanding that they would not acquiesce in the omission of any essential material. To these conditions they have, throughout the twelve years during which the work has been in progress, inflexibly adhered.[3] Acknowledgments are

[2] H.M. Stationery Office, 1926–38. London.

[3] Only once, it would appear, has their adherence to their principles brought them into conflict with a Secretary of State. On November 21, 1932, Lord Grey of Fallodon, in the course of a letter to *The Times*, wrote: '... it seems to me very undesirable to publish the minutes and memoranda of permanent officials in Government Departments. They are not authoritative documents. The writers of them have no responsibility for ultimate decisions and policy. If they are to be published the prospect of their publication will hamper the freedom of permanent officials in expressing their views to the Ministers who are at the head of their Departments. This would not be in the public interest.' To this letter the editors replied with a reaffirmation of the policy they had adopted and meant to pursue.

On this question I am in two minds. As an *historian* I am grateful to the editors for all their indiscretions (if indiscretions they be). As a *politician* I am afraid I must agree that Lord Grey was entirely right. Besides, as a rule, the minutes of the officials are of little importance except as expressions of their personal opinions, which we have, generally speaking, no right to know.

also due to the late Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, who i summer of 1924 decided on publication, and to Sir A Chamberlain, his immediate successor at the Foreign C who confirmed that decision. The outcome of the init of the Ministers and of the industry of the editors is a colle of documents which, as regards this country, is unique. French diplomacy in the eighteenth century we posses invaluable and extensive series of Instructions to F Ambassadors. Since the Great War one country after an has opened to historians the archives containing its c matic records for the period anterior to the war. Russ it in order to discredit the diplomacy of the Tsarist ré Germany has published, in fifty-two volumes, *Die C Politik der Europaischen Kabinettes*.[4] Even if its primary pu was to expose what Germans describe as the 'War Guilt the publication is one of incomparable value, for whi historians will to all time remain under a heavy debt.[5] German collection, like the French, covers the whole p between the Franco-German War of 1870–1 and the outl of the Great War in 1914. The British editors have st only at the year 1898.

In the Preface to their concluding volume the editors an elaborate apology for the selection of that year as *terminus a quo*. But of the various reasons they advance one seems to me at all convincing. It was, they tell u Government who, on financial grounds, fixed the ch logical limits of the survey. I should be the last pers question the validity of that plea; and if the editors thrown the whole responsibility on the Treasury I could have regretfully acquiesced, though I should still have that space might have been saved, and the limits pr tionately extended, by the omission of a good many docur which seem to be of secondary importance. The edito not, however, content with the plea of economy. They to justify their *terminus a quo* on the merits. They con for example, that before 1897 'England had had no active and continuous connexion with the Continent. that so? Of Captain Dugdale's careful selection no less

[4] Berlin, 1922–27.

[5] Selections from the great German work have been translated into Eng Captain E. T. S. Dugdale, and are published in four volumes by Methuen & Co.

half (two whole volumes) contains documents dated 1871–98, and a glance at the contents of those volumes would seem to contradict the editorial statement. Still more explicitly is it contradicted by such careful commentators as Professor Erich Brandenburg, whose *From Bismarck to the World War* [6] is perhaps, in this connexion, the most important monograph published in Germany since the war.

It is true that the British editors to some extent turn the edge of criticism by forsaking their formal starting-point and publishing a few (very important) documents of earlier dates. Among these special importance attaches to those which refer to Belgian neutrality. Thus in vol. viii. we have Sir E. Hertslet's admirable memorandum (dated April 8, 1872) on the circumstances which in August 1870 led to the conclusion of Conventions with France and Germany for the maintenance of the independence and neutrality of Belgium. Hertslet's memorandum contains, *inter alia*, a summary of the projected Secret Treaty between France and Germany, communicated, it has always been supposed, by Bismarck himself to *The Times*, and published by that journal on July 25, 1870—less than a week after France had declared war on Prussia. The revelation in *The Times*, genuine or fabricated, had the intended effect: it aroused English suspicions against France and inclined English opinion, in the earlier days of the war, to favour Prussia. Among other documents on Belgian neutrality will be found the opinion given by the Law Officers of the Crown to Lord Granville in August 1870 on the legal aspect of the guarantee of 1839, as well as a long correspondence on the military aspect of the Belgian question (including extracts from the minutes of the Committee of Imperial Defence of August 23, 1911, and of April 25, 1912). But much the most illuminating documents are a memorandum by Sir Cecil Hurst dated February 16, 1912, and two by Sir Eyre Crowe dated respectively November 15, 1908, and March 10, 1912. In the second Sir Eyre Crowe discusses the attitude to be adopted by Great Britain towards Belgium in the highly probable event of Germany violating Belgian neutrality. The first is an answer to the pertinent questions put to his most trusted adviser by Sir Edward Grey: 'How far would England's liability under the Treaty guaranteeing the

[6] English translation, Oxford University Press (London Humphrey Milford, 1927)

neutrality of Belgium be affected if (i.) Belgium acquiesced in a violation of her neutrality; (ii.) if the other guaranteeing Powers or some of them acquiesced?' In reply Sir Eyre Crowe says, bluntly and truly: 'The neutrality of Belgium was guaranteed, not merely because it was a Belgian interest, but because it was an interest of the guaranteeing Powers'; and he concludes that 'Great Britain is liable for the maintenance of Belgian neutrality whenever either Belgium or any of the guaranteeing Powers are in need of, and demand, assistance in opposing its violation.' Technically, then, Great Britain would have been legally bound to impose neutrality on Belgium, on the demand either of France or of Prussia, even if Belgium had herself acquiesced in its violation. The editors also call attention to the conversations in 1885 between Prince Bismarck and Sir Philip Currie in reference to Belgium as well as to the correspondence, in 1887, between Lord Salisbury and Lord Vivian, the British Minister at Brussels. Lord Salisbury's attitude they find 'very obscure. On the evidence adduced, it is not easy to dissent from their verdict.

They also publish, in considerable detail (vol. viii, chap. lxv.), correspondence and memoranda relating to Mediterranean problems, with which Lord Salisbury had to deal in 1887. On that matter students would, however, do well to consult the Ford lectures delivered at Oxford by Professor Pribram, of Vienna, in 1929. Incidentally Pribram suggests that (presumably in 1895) '[Lord] Salisbury thought for a time of entering into a permanent partnership with the Triple Alliance, and with Germany in particular.'

The above-mentioned documents represent a welcome departure from the principle of selection adopted by the editors. Nevertheless, I adhere to the opinion, frequently expressed in reviews of the earlier volumes, that the British collection, like the French and the German, ought to have started in 1871. Had it done so Messrs. Gooch and Temperley could hardly have had the temerity to say that 'as regards the essential obligations—Portugal, Belgium and the Mediterranean Agreements—they have published in fact all that really matters between 1871 and 1897.' 'Apart from that,' they add, 'during this period the connexion of England and the Continent was slight and obscure.' Obscure it may

have been; slight it was not. Apart from the French and German documents such biographies as Lord Newton's *Lord Lyons* and the recently published account [7] of Lord Odo Russell's long service (1871–84) at the Berlin Embassy suggest a very different conclusion. Only by going back to 1878, if not to 1871, is it possible to reveal the *fons et origo* of the Great War. Bismarck's relations with Austria and Russia supply the clue to it. At the Congress of Berlin he was virtually compelled to choose between his two partners in the *Dreikaiserbund.* He chose Austria; and his choice determined the direction of German diplomacy down to August 1914. 'Next to making a tolerable settlement for the Porte, our great object was to break up and permanently prevent the alliance of the three empires, and I maintain that there never was a diplomatic result more completely maintained.' So said Lord Beaconsfield in 1880. Beaconsfield's claim has recently been repudiated by two writers of distinction.[8] But it is justified. Bismarck did, it is true, renew the *Dreikaiserbund* temporarily, and, even after the conclusion of the Triple Alliance with Austria and Italy (1882), he did 'reinsure' himself with Russia. Nevertheless, the sequence of events is unmistakably clear and vindicates Lord Beaconsfield's claim. Berlin leant more and more heavily on Vienna or Budapest; by 1914, exclusively. Bismarck foresaw and deeply lamented the *rapprochement* between Russia and France. The clumsy diplomacy of the Wilhelmstrasse left Germany, as Professor von Brandenburg makes clear, without a friend in Europe except Austria-Hungary. Belgium doubtless supplied the immediate occasion of the Great War, so far as England was concerned. But the cause must be distinguished from the occasion. The cause of the war is to be found not in Western Europe but in the Near East; not in the anxiety of France to recover her lost provinces, but in Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans. To Austria's *Drang nach Osten* Bismarck had given a powerful impulse in 1866, but in 1876 Lord Odo Russell reported to Lord Derby that the German Chancellor was prepared to join England in resisting a further advance in that direction. Without England's help he pro-

[7] W. Taffs, *Ambassador to Bismarck* (F. Muller, 1938).

[8] B. H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans* (p. 560) (Oxford, 1937); R. W. Seton-Watson, *Britain in Europe* (p. 549) (Cambridge, 1937).

fessed himself unable to do it. England's help was not forthcoming. Consequently in 1878 the Hapsburgs were permitted to 'occupy' Bosnia and the Herzegovina. In 1908 they annexed them.

In that annexation King Edward VII. discerned the first irrevocable step on the path to the war he had striven so strenuously to avert. The German Emperor lamented Count Aerenthal's precipitancy as deeply as did King Edward, but he could not desert his only friend. The 'Knight in Shining Armour' could not permit Russia to go to the assistance of the Balkan Slavs. Nor could he allow France to ignore German interests in North-West Africa. In March 1905 the Kaiser had visited Tangier and announced his determination 'to uphold the interests of the Fatherland in an *independent* country.' On June 12, 1905, France yielded to the veiled threat of Germany, and dismissed her Minister Delcassé. But at Algeciras (1906) the 'nakedness of the Triple Alliance had, with Italy's defection, been exposed to public gaze, and above all the Anglo-French Entente had assumed an entirely new character. From that moment it became essential for Germany to recover her prestige by some diplomatic victory elsewhere.' So says Mr. Harold Nicolson, and with complete accuracy.

The coup of Agadir (1911) represented Germany's attempt to impose a diplomatic humiliation upon France, and to drive a wedge into the *Triple Entente*. In both objects Germany conspicuously failed. She brought Europe to the verge of war; but France refused to surrender her paramount position in Morocco, and England, by the mouth of Mr. Lloyd George, ranged herself solidly and ostentatiously behind France. War was, temporarily, averted. But the Turco-Italian War over Tripoli broke out in 1911, and was hardly ended before the Balkans blazed up. Sir Edward Grey worked hard to localise the Balkan wars, and his efforts were successful. But the day before peace was concluded at Bucharest (August 10, 1913), Austria-Hungary communicated to Italy and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and claimed the assistance of her allies in a 'defensive war.' Italy refused to recognise the proposed attack of Austria-Hungary upon Serbia as a *casus fœderis*. Germany also laid a restraining hand upon her ally. The attack was conse-

quently postponed—but only for eleven months. On June 28, 1914, the heir to the Hapsburg Crown was, with his consort, assassinated by Serbs in the Bosnian capital. The tragedy of Serajevo, not yet explained, provided a pretext, perhaps a reason, for war upon Serbia. On July 28 Austria declared war.

Once more Sir Edward Grey spared no effort to localise the conflict. But this time there was no averting Armageddon.

The part played by British diplomacy in the events thus rapidly sketched is illustrated, with a profusion of detail, in the thirteen volumes of British Documents. But it is not too easy for the student to follow them. Messrs. Gooch and Temperley have preferred the German to the French method of arrangement, and have treated their unwieldy materials not chronologically but under topics. The choice was a difficult one: there is much to be said for and against either method. The editors contend that the 'topical method is essential for displaying the workings of British policy.' That may be so for the officials in Downing Street, or for members of the Cabinet; but I am by no means certain that it is helpful to the student. The less so if, as in these volumes, a particular topic is not treated continuously from start to finish.

Take for example Anglo-German relations. The growing tension between the two countries during the half-decade 1907–12 may be followed in vol. vi., which takes us down to the Haldane Mission of 1912. But if we want to refer to the Algeciras Conference (which falls within the period) we must go back to vol. iii. If the object of our quest is the Agadir Crisis (equally within the period) we must wait for vol. vii.

Again, suppose the student wishes to investigate British diplomacy in relation to the problem of the Far East. He must go to vol. i., chap. i, then to chaps. ix., xvi. and xviii. in vol. ii., and finally must consult some appendices to vol. x. The method employed seems, then, in this and many other cases to be neither continuously topical, nor strictly chronological. The answer will doubtless be that the selected topic for vol. i. is, not the Far East, but the ending of British isolation. True: but that merely illustrates the difficulty inherent in the method adopted. Accordingly, while admitting the extreme difficulty of decision, I incline to think that the French method is the least inconvenient. Their *Documents*

Diplomatiques are arranged in strict chronological order, but help is provided for the student by the addition of a classified list of topics, and an easy method of reference to them.

I revert, however, to vol. iii. in order to call attention to two remarkable memoranda, dated January and February 1907, on the present state of British relations with France and Germany. One is from the pen of Sir Eyre Crowe, the other (in reply to it) from that of Lord Sanderson. Not often, I imagine, do the permanent officials provide their political chiefs with an elaborate review of the general principles which underlie the day-to-day processes of British diplomacy. But that is what Sir Eyre Crowe did in his essay printed as an appendix to vol. iii. (pp. 397–420). Crowe set out to apply a general law to a particular case—that of Anglo-German relations.

> The general character of England's foreign policy is [he wrote] determined by the immutable conditions of her geographical situation on the ocean flank of Europe as an island State with vast overseas colonies and dependencies, whose existence and survival as an independent community are inseparably bound up with the possession of preponderant sea-power.

But preponderant sea-power is apt, he argued, to inspire universal jealousy and fear, and to provoke attack from a combination of Powers. The danger involved in that position can

> in practice only be averted—and history shows it has been so averted—on condition that the national policy of the insular and naval State is so directed as to harmonise with the general desires and ideals common to all mankind, and more particularly that it is closely identified with the primary and vital interests of a majority, or as many as possible, of the other nations.

Thus Sir Eyre Crowe is led to insist that it is the special function of England to protect the independence of the smaller and weaker nations, and to do this by

> throwing her weight now in this scale and now in that, but ever on the side opposed to the political dictatorship of the strongest single State or group at a given time.

A detailed and deeply interesting and purely objective analysis of the development of German policy leads him to the con-

clusion that, while the relations between England and Germany are critical, a war between them may still be avoided, though only if Germany

> meets on England's part with unvarying courtesy and consideration in all matters of common concern, but also with a prompt and firm refusal to enter into any one-sided bargains or arrangements, and the most unbending determination to uphold British rights and interests in every part of the globe.

Sir Edward Grey commended the careful study of this 'interesting and suggestive' review to his principal Cabinet colleagues. Lord Sanderson's reply to Sir Eyre Crowe is printed with Crowe's marginal comments thereon by the editors. If I call special attention to Crowe's masterly memorandum it is not only because of its intrinsic importance, but because there is an amazingly precise correspondence between its basic argument and that of a highly qualified and influential German publicist. Professor Wilhelm Dibelius, whose work betrays no special affection for England, wrote in 1922 as follows:

> Britain is the solitary Great Power which has never injured the vital interest of another European people by annexation: and it is a fact of immeasurable moral effect in a period dominated by the principle of nationality (p. 103).

And again:

> England is the single country in the world that, looking after its own interest with meticulous care, has at the same time something to give to others, the single country where patriotism does not represent a threat or challenge to the rest of the world: the single country that invariably summons the most progressive, idealistic and efficient forces in other nations to co-operate with it. . . . Britain is the solitary Great Power with a national programme which, while egotistic through and through, at the same time promises to the world as a whole something which the world passionately desires—order, progress and eternal peace (pp. 108–9).[9]

Coming from a German, writing immediately after the war, this is a remarkable tribute. I have often quoted the words before: I quote them again, not only because I believe the tribute to be just, but because they explain the success of

[9] *England* (English translation) (Jonathan Cape, 1930)

British diplomacy through the ages, and not least during the last half-century.

British diplomacy has earned the reputation of inconstancy and mutability. On the short view the reputation is deserved. On the long view it is not. Great Britain has indeed 'thrown her weight now in this scale, now in that.' But she has done so in pursuit of a policy constantly and consistently pursued—the maintenance of the European equilibrium and the defence of the weaker nations. Her own position, until lately comparatively invulnerable, and her command of the sea, have equipped her for the *rôle* of '*la puissance médiatrice.*' That *rôle* she has played not only to her own profit but, as Dibelius admits, to the advantage of the whole world.

The editors of the great work under review draw no such conclusions. It was not their business to draw any conclusions. But by their skilled, impartial and exhaustive research they have enabled students to draw conclusions for themselves. My own conclusions accord with those of the two German publicists with whose words this review begins and ends. The more closely the conduct of English foreign policy is studied, the more irresistibly will the conclusion emerge that, on the long view, it has succeeded because it has been honest, because, despite superficial mutability, it has been in principle consistent, and, above all, because it has served the permanent interests of mankind.

J. A. R. Marriott.

THE SHIPPING CRISIS

Decline in Tons and Men

By Sir Archibald Hurd

Since this is an island without natural supplies of oil fuel or considerable quantities of raw materials for the making of munitions, the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force would be immobilised in time of war unless tankers and merchant ships of sufficient carrying capacity to meet their needs were available ; while the civil population, of 45,500,000 people, would speedily be brought to a state of starvation in idleness unless ships made good from day to day the deficiencies in the home production of food, amounting to 60 per cent., and brought to our shores the raw materials needed by the factories and workshops. The history of mankind holds no record of any nation so sea-dependent as this country has become. We shall perhaps never fully appreciate the blessings we derive from the use of the sea until we have lost them.

Goods of small bulk and high value, as well as first-class mail matter, may increasingly be carried by air, and passenger traffic by aeroplane, or possibly airship, may continue to grow ; but no development of aviation can, to the limit of vision, affect the geographical fact that we are completely surrounded by water ; our inward and outward trade, of an aggregate weight of 130,277,000 tons in 1937, must be conducted by sea.

For these and other reasons it is a matter for surprise and anxiety that the Government's plans for strengthening our defences have taken no account of the decline of shipping—in numbers, in gross tonnage and in trained seamen—or of the contraction of the facilities for building and repairing ships.

During the Great War the Allies had eventually at their disposal practically all the world's merchant vessels, except

those of Germany and Austria, and yet it was the lack of ships, in spite of the co-operation of the shipyards in the United States in making good the losses sustained at sea, which, in the last analysis, nearly brought them to defeat. There is no assurance that in a future struggle this country would have any maritime Power as its ally, except France, whose seagoing tonnage is inconsiderable. Yet in the past twenty years a decrease has occurred of 3,500,000 tons gross in British vessels, ranging from 100 tons gross upwards. Or, to put the matter another way, the merchant navy has suffered a loss of 2000 units. Nor is that all. There are to-day far fewer trained seamen than there were. A reduction of, roughly, 59,000 men occurred between 1911 and 1936.[1] When ocean-borne trade was fairly brisk last summer, there was a shortage of practically all classes, and especially engineering personnel. In all the elements of commercial sea-power we are weaker in relation to our needs, and also in relation to other countries, than at any period in our history. The position is becoming more serious with every month that passes, which means that stage by stage the foundations on which the mobility of the Fighting Services rests, as well as the well-being of the civil population, are being undermined

While British tonnage has decreased, tonnage under foreign flags has increased. The serious change in the balance of commercial sea-power which has occurred since 1914 is best exposed if only passenger and cargo ships of 3000 tons gross and over be considered, thus excluding most short-sea traders and coastal vessels as well as tankers which can carry only oil. (*Vide* table, p. 3.)

One adjustment is desirable in order to obtain a correct representation of the shipping available for employment in the ocean trades. The coastal and intercoastal services of the United States and Japan employed only about 150 vessels (500,000 tons) in 1914, but now 536 ships (2,655,000 tons) operate in these trades. These cannot be regarded as available for ocean carriage. When they have been deducted, we get a correct picture of the present position as compared with that of 1914. In the first place, this country is weaker by approximately 1000 fewer seagoing ships and by 2,000,000 tons gross; in the second place, foreign countries are stronger by

[1] Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence at Southampton, February 17, 1938

1100 ships and 8,000,000 tons; and, in the third place, the eleven principal maritime Powers have at their disposal only 100 more ships, but, owing to the increase in the size of individual ships, the tonnage is greater by 6,000,000 tons. On the other hand, while the tonnage registered in the United Kingdom has declined, that registered in overseas parts of the Empire has increased to about the same extent, but increased mainly in other than seagoing tonnage.

TONNAGE OF 3000 TONS AND OVER—1914–38

Country	1914		1938		Increase or Decrease
	No	Tons gross	No	Tons gross	Tons gross
Austria	170	747,000	—	—	— 747,000
Denmark	34	158,000	76	411,000	+ 253,000
France	219	1,182,000	282	1,892,000	+ 710,000
Germany	581	3,367,000	398	2,728,000	— 639,000
Greece	67	241,000	346	1,566,000	+ 1,325,000
Holland	148	787,000	243	1,683,000	+ 896,000
Italy	177	803,000	359	2,321,000	+ 1,518,000
Japan	174	811,000	581	3,185,000	+ 2,374,000
Norway	151	629,000	301	1,471,000	+ 842,000
Sweden	53	212,000	102	551,000	+ 339,000
United States [1]	188	986,000	742	4,357,000	+ 3,371,000
Foreign	1962	9,923,000	3430	20,165,000	+ 10,242,000
United Kingdom	2813	13,920,000	1766	11,835,000	— 2,085,000
Total	4775	23,843,000	5196	32,000,000	+ 8,157,000

In face of the change in the balance of carrying power, the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence—and merchant shipping constitutes, as has been stated, this country's first and possibly its last line of defence—has declared that 'there is no shortage of ships,' and that 'ton for ton and ship for ship we are substantially in as good a position to get cargo space as we were in 1914' That declaration is based on the figures of *Empire* tonnage, and not of *British* tonnage. Sir Thomas Inskip has also laid emphasis on the increase in speed and carrying capacity of the ships now available, and

[1] Excluding 113 ships (723,000 tons) owned by the United States Maritime Commission, which are laid up and will probably never be reconditioned for service.

supplemented these considerations by the following statement:

One must bear in mind certain facts, which are not always appreciated, as to the way in which we supplied other countries with tonnage in the last war; and when it is realised that there has been a vast increase in the tonnage of other countries besides Great Britain, it will be seen that we shall be able to call upon this pool of foreign tonnage to some extent, just as we did in the last war, and it may be that we shall not have to provide 23 per cent. of the requirements of other nations out of British tonnage.[3]

What are the facts? The Government's statistician has assumed that Dominion ships could be used in carrying food and raw materials for the people of the British Isles, whereas not a score of such vessels are of suitable size and design for the purpose. Moreover, the respective Dominion Governments would certainly retain all such ships in their own waters. Then, again, emphasis is laid on the increase in the size and speed of the ships on the register of the United Kingdom which has occurred since 1914. In a future war, an enemy would not sink so many tons of shipping, but so many ships, and the smaller the number of units the greater the proportionate loss, or, in other words, the fewer the ships the greater the percentage reduction of carrying power caused by enemy action. What is the value of the increased speed? In time of war, ships will steam at night without lights and must go slow, the speed of the slowest ship being that of the whole convoy; ships which are not in convoy will be directed to longer routes. Moreover, owing to this country's greater dependence on Empire supplies, the voyages would be far longer than they were in the Great War. The comment of so experienced a ship-owner as the President of the Chamber of Shipping (Mr. W. A. Souter) on the Minister's complacency is that 'it is quite true that the quality and safety of our tonnage to-day compared with the pre-war standard are greatly improved, but those improvements will be minimised in the disorder inescapable from warlike operations.'

As to the tonnage which was lent to Allies in the Great War, what assurance is there that demands might not again be made on our resources by Allies in a future war? We had

[3] *Hansard*, March 7, 1938.

to place many ships at the disposal of France and Russia and the United States, as well as Italy, in the Great War, and there is no saying that in another struggle we might not have again to aid countries associated with us. It has been also implied that we could charter—in other words, borrow—ships from neutrals. In the Great War, when we had so much more shipping than to-day, we were driven by our dire necessity to coerce neutrals to lend us tonnage, and we were able to do so mainly because they needed British coal, whereas to-day most of their ships use oil fuel. Is it proposed in a future emergency to borrow battleships, cruisers and auxiliary naval craft or divisions of troops or aeroplanes as a matter of deliberate policy in order to make good deficiencies in either of these types of armament? If not, why should we rely on borrowing neutral tonnage for the carriage of essential supplies, without which we could not fight or live?

The experience of British shipping during the Great War explains the change which has occurred in the balance of commercial sea-power, and is a reminder of the heavy price which was paid for such aid as was obtained from neutrals. At an early stage in the struggle the belief gained ground that ship-owners were making a lot of money and that their profits should be restricted. So British shipping was controlled, many ships being withdrawn from the outer trade routes for use in European waters. But though shipping was afterwards used to the utmost advantage by the Ministry of Shipping under Lord Maclay, supported by leading ship-owners, the supply proved inadequate; neutral ships had to be chartered at high rates of freight. British maritime supremacy was, for the time at least, sacrificed to the Allied cause.

Other nations came to the conclusion that this was their opportunity of improving their position at sea. In order to hasten the expansion of their shipping, they decided to pay subsidies, enabling new ships to be built and afterwards operated on the trade routes. At length the subventions paid by the United States, France, Italy, Japan and other countries reached a sum of no less than £30,000,000 a year, and to this extent British shipping, unsubsidised, was handicapped in its struggle to regain its pre-war pre-eminence.

Another cause of the change in the balance of commercial

sea-power was the vindictive treatment of British shipping by the Government in contrast to its attitude to neutral shipping. The President of the Chamber of Shipping recently gave it as his considered opinion that 'perhaps the main reason for the decline of our tonnage lies in the relative impoverishment of the industry in this country both during and since the war, which so weakened it financially that it was barely able to survive the recent depression.' For the losses which they suffered at sea, British ship-owners were paid, under the Government War Risks Insurance Scheme, £134,000,000 less than the amount which they had to spend in replacing the ships which had been sunk. On this insurance transaction the Treasury, having received high premiums from the industry itself, made a profit of nearly £16,000,000. The industry was also subjected to Excess Profits Duty even after the struggle was over—down, in fact, to 1920—though its profits had been restricted to what were known as Blue-book rates. As charterers of British tonnage, the Government reaped the benefit of the difference between Blue-book rates at 13*s.* 6*d.* and the rates paid to neutrals, which, even after the establishment of inter-Allied control, were as much as 48*s.* The financial reserves accumulated by owners in other countries out of their uncontrolled profits were so large that they were able to increase their tonnage—at the expense of the British shipping industry.

British shipping was manacled and bled white. It emerged from the struggle desperately short of ships; the fleets of tramp-owners had been decimated by the enemy, and the liner companies had lost many of their finest ships and found themselves confronted with new and, in most cases, subsidised competition on the routes which they had had to abandon, in whole or in part, during the war. In succeeding years the proportion of trade in and out of British ports carried in British ships has steadily declined from 67·7 per cent. in 1921 to 55·8 per cent. in 1937 in the case of imports, while in the carriage of general exports the percentage has fallen from 67 per cent. in 1921 to 59 per cent. last year. On the great ocean trade routes, British shipping has had to contend against every phase of nationalistic policy practised by foreign nations, and conspicuously by Soviet Russia.

Russia, in the exercise of the monopoly she claims and is

at present permitted to exercise, prevents, as the Chamber of Shipping has recorded, Great Britain from employing her own ships to carry her own imports and exports from and to Russia, and Russia now carries the whole of the exports of Great Britain to Russia and over half of Great Britain's imports from Russia. Though Russia's payments to British shipping rose from £948,000 in 1936 to an estimated figure of £1,500,000 in 1937, this was due to the short-lived improvement in trade and freights. British tonnage which used to be responsible for practically the whole of the liner trade from the United Kingdom to Russia continues to be excluded from employment, and tramp carryings represent only a trifling proportion of such tonnage engaged in the Soviet trade.

Even in the Empire trades, the British position is threatened more and more; Japan has captured from 60 to 90 per cent. of certain important inter-Empire trades and is still making headway, and one British service in the Pacific Ocean has had to be withdrawn owing to heavily subsidised American competition, and Lord Craigmyle has warned the Government that the existence of two others is threatened.

> It is a very serious thing to contemplate the possibility of vital links of our Empire being in the hands of foreign nations. Such nations are clearly determined to continue their policy of heavy subsidisation regardless of cost in an endeavour to make themselves self-sufficient on the seas and to capture the goodwill of vital trade routes.[4]

When the tramp section of British shipping—now only of half the volume that it was in 1914—was on the point of collapse, it is true that Parliament, at the urgent demand of the President of the Board of Trade, voted, under exacting conditions, in three successive years (1935-37), a total sum of £6,000,000, of which, owing to the reaction of the shipowners to the Government's challenge to co-operate to check cut-throat competition, only £4,000,000 was, in fact, paid. This meagre assistance contrasts with the sums paid between 1913 and 1936 by the Treasury by way of grants to other and obviously less vital industries—£18,000,000 to beet

[4] President of the Chamber of Shipping, March 31, 1938

sugar, £10,000,000 to cattle, £5,000,000 to milk, in addition to the many million pounds for wheat derived from the levy on flour, and apart from the advantage manufacturers have gained from the tariff. Civil aviation is in future to be subsidised to the extent of £3,000,000 each year. Shipping is one of the few industries which is receiving no assistance of any kind from the Government, while it has to submit to onerous regulations.

Lastly, if it be the fact, as most ship-owners have held, that Free Trade contributed to the prosperity of British shipping, it is also the fact that the new fiscal policy of this country, with its tariff, its quotas, and its higher general taxation arising from subsidies, has proved a serious handicap on the recovery of shipping, however necessary it may have been to abandon Free Trade on broader grounds. The success of the Government's tariff policy, in association with Imperial Preference, has been conspicuous; but ship-owners who live by carrying foreign as well as British goods have had to pay a heavy price for it, and in no trade more heavily than in the transport of meat from South America, for which they had been encouraged in the past to build most expensive refrigerated tonnage.

It is a sad anomaly that the very efforts which are being made to strengthen the defences of this country should be rendering it difficult to restore what is, in the last analysis, its first line of defence. Though, as compared with 1914, we are short of 2000 ships—1000 of them of 3000 tons, or over, capable of carrying food and raw materials—there is such an excess of foreign tonnage on all the trade routes that open-market freights no longer yield a profit to British tramp-owners, with heavier operating costs than at any time in the past, reflecting this country's high standard of living; while Conference rates, which apply only to liners, though they have in most cases been raised, are, for the most part, too low to provide for adequate depreciation charges on the ageing ships and a reasonable dividend to shareholders.

On the other hand, owing largely to the effect of the rearmament movement, the cost of new tonnage has risen in the past two years by about 50 per cent.; there has been a great increase in the price of most raw materials, and better wages have been conceded to the workers in shipyards and

engine shops as well as to those engaged in the ancillary industries.

A gap has thus developed between the amount which unsubsidised British ship-owners, faced with keen foreign competition, for the most part subsidised, on every trade route, can afford to pay and the amount which ship-builders, with higher charges to meet, can afford to accept. Only about 60 per cent. of the berths are now in use, and with practically every launch that takes place another berth remains unfilled and unemployment is once more increasing. Replacement tonnage cannot be constructed because the excess of foreign tonnage has once more depressed freights below the level at which such new ships could make ends meet. Even if the ships were built, it is doubtful if they could be manned. Nor is that all. The ship-building and ship-repairing industries, which are essential to a maritime country, are again confronted with a grave crisis, the continuance of which must lead to a further restriction of their output capacity, now one-third less than it was twenty years ago, and a reduction in the number of skilled craftsmen who have so many other and more attractive means of employment open to them.[6]

All the plans for strengthening the Crown's forces by sea, land and air will be in vain unless we possess, in any emergency, sea-carrying capacity sufficient for our needs under war conditions. One of the first objectives of an enemy or enemies will be to destroy merchant ships by gun, mine or torpedo, and the first reaction of neutral maritime nations may be to keep out of the struggle, lest defeat should overwhelm us and the victors should retaliate on them for giving us assistance. In the Great War, the only maritime country of importance—Germany—which was opposed to us was effectively blockaded by the Grand Fleet When once her few raiding cruisers had been rounded up and destroyed, the only losses of shipping which were suffered were due to action by mine and submarine, and especially submarine. In

[6] Before the war Great Britain's supremacy was even greater in building than in the size of her mercantile marine In 1913 British yards launched about 2,000,000 tons gross and the rest of the yards of the world about 1,000,000 In 191[illegible] her total was still over 1,500,000 After that, however, the claim on men and material for the Army and munitions had the most serious effects In 1915 the total fell to 660 000 tons and in 1916 to 630,000 tons.—*Allied Shipping Control* (Salter).

these favourable strategical and tactical conditions, 7,750,000 tons gross of British shipping were sunk with the sacrifice of 14,287 lives, while the loss under all flags was 12,543,392 tons gross.

The Allied cause was brought near to defeat, not by the failure of the naval, military or aerial forces, but by the want of merchant tonnage, though the inhabitants of the British Isles were rationed with increasing severity from 1915 onwards. Food supplies became the vital issue; we won by a narrow margin. Germany was defeated, in the last analysis, by hunger; denied the use of the seas, she was forced to capitulate.

This is the background against which this country's plans for defence should be made. To an island country, the security of its trade routes and the adequacy of its shipping for all its needs (civil as well as military)—for all the armed forces as well as the road services and the factories are now dependent on oil fuel supplies from overseas—are at least as vital to success as the strength and efficiency of the armed forces themselves, and, indeed, are essential to their mobility.

In the event of war, the Government would no doubt at once exercise full control of all British tonnage, receiving the assistance of the most experienced ship managers and their staffs. In view of the experience which has been gained, the control would probably be more effective from the opening phase of the war; the menace of each submarine might be less serious owing to the development of defensive measures, but there would be many more submarines [6]; by resort to convoy or the diversion of ships outside the danger areas, the losses from mine and torpedo might be smaller. On the other hand, it might not be possible to blockade the enemy or enemies as effectively as in the years 1914–18, and the losses from raiding cruisers might be much greater. Nor is the menace of enemy aircraft at the focal points of traffic to be ignored. A large volume of tonnage would undoubtedly be sunk: how much, would depend on the extent to which the enemy gained access to the trade routes.

In these circumstances, it is matter for surprise, and even alarm, that the first line of defence has been ignored in the

[6] Soviet Russia is reported to have 151 of these craft, Italy has 81, and France 78.—*Brassey's Naval Annual*, 1938

successive White Papers. That the Naval Staff at the Admiralty is alive to the dangers is certain, for arrangements have been made, with the co-operation of the Board of Trade, for the defensive armament of certain merchant ships and centres have been opened for the training of merchant officers in the use of the weapons which will be at their disposal. Ship-owners and their staffs have co-operated wholeheartedly in carrying out these measures. But no consideration has been given to the decline of shipping in tons, in numbers and in personnel.

In the King's Speech when Parliament assembled in 1936, it was stated that the Government was 'deciding what measures are required to secure the maintenance of a mercantile marine adequate for the needs of the country.' That statement encouraged the hope that effective action was about to be taken to check the continued shrinkage of British commercial sea-power. But nothing has, in fact, been done.

Apart from the essential services which British shipping renders to an island people, it has in the past been its greatest export industry—greater than cotton, coal, iron or steel—in the form of freights earned overseas [7] and has provided employment, ashore and afloat, for about 1,000,000 trained workers, besides maintaining that sea instinct which is a vital characteristic of an overcrowded island country, the centre of a world-wide Empire whose only highways are the seas and oceans of the world. Neither we, nor, in fact, our partners in the Empire, can live without ships, and that condition involves the maintenance of efficient and well-manned ship-building and ship-repairing establishments. In all these respects this country is becoming weaker, and to that extent less assured of safety in spite of the rearmament movement.

Ship-owners, not excluding Viscount Runciman of Doxford, fresh from the Board of Trade, have made no secret of their growing anxiety. It has been suggested that, as in the case of other less essential industries, the Government should investigate the causes of the decline of British shipping and how they can be mitigated. The President of the Chamber of Shipping has claimed that the condition of

[7] In 1920, according to the Board of Trade, the invisible exports of the shipping industry amounted to £134,000,000

shipping is 'a matter of national concern.' He has paid tribute to the Admiralty and the Board of Trade for their constructive and sympathetic co-operation with ship-owners in devising measures for the economical use in war of the vessels which are on the register—3,500,000 tons less than twenty years ago in volume and 2000 fewer in number. But there are other vital problems of defence awaiting solution, and upon these the industry as a whole has not been consulted. Amongst these are the diversion of traffic to west coast ports in time of war, and the steps to be taken to ensure that this will be carried out with a maximum of efficiency; the effect of the decline in the number of ships, and particularly of tramp ships, and their carrying capacity in time of war; and the possibility of a further decline. To the consideration of these problems the industry could make a useful contribution if the Government sought it. And, furthermore, steps should be taken to ensure that the ship-building industry, with the dice heavily loaded against it, does not languish for want of orders, since, as the background of a strong Royal Navy and a healthy merchant navy, there must be well-equipped establishments for building and repairing ships.

In relation to the maritime industries of a country completely surrounded by water, which is the pivot of a maritime Empire, one course is dictated by every consideration, political, military and commercial. The nation should be assured that the Government realises that its motto must be—safety first.

ARCHIBALD HURD.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S GERMAN PROBLEM

By David Stephens

Since Austria disappeared from the map of Europe, public attention has been divided between Czechoslovakia and Spain. Though war is being waged in one country and not in the other, Central Europe, no less than the Western Mediterranean, is the scene of an active struggle between rival groups of European Powers. Czechoslovakia is to-day the *point névralgique* of the European balance of power. There the French alliance system stands ranged against the centrifugal force of an expansive Greater Germany ; there Teuton meets Slav and democracy is at grips with dictatorship ; there, also, the right of small nations to exist is matched against the natural urge of great nations to expand and dominate. Much more is at stake here than was the case in Austria.

The disappearance of Czechoslovakia, or her secession from the French to the German orbit, would produce a far more radical shift in the balance of power than did the disappearance of Austria. It would mean a much greater access of power to Germany, not merely because Czechoslovakia is a larger country than Austria and produces more armaments in the year than the United Kingdom, but, above all, because strategically it is the key to South-eastern Europe. Bismarck once observed—and he was speaking, of course, in terms of great nations, not of small ones—'Whoever is master of Bohemia is master of Europe.' That observation still holds good, especially from the point of view of Germany The changes that have taken place on the map of Europe since Bismarck's day have reinforced his judgment. In Central Europe a unified Empire has been replaced by a complex of small incoherent units that have yet to show any ability or even desire to co-operate amongst themselves. Divided by national animosities and impoverished by economic

nationalism and the competition in armaments, the Danubian area is less able than of old to withstand external interference. The Habsburg Monarchy was at least some guarantee that Danubian affairs would be directed from Vienna, not from Berlin, Paris or St. Petersburg. It also brought solid economic advantages. The tangle of States that has succeeded it is a promising field for *Machtpolitik*. In such conditions the mastery of strategic points like Bohemia becomes all the more important.

So long as Czechoslovakia remains linked to France and Russia, there is a limit to the control that Germany can exercise over Danubian affairs. The Germans, for their part, have never concealed their dislike of Czechoslovakia's foreign relationships. To them Czechoslovakia represents a great hostile Slav salient 800 miles in length, biting deep into the very heart of their country. From the Czechoslovak frontier to Berlin is only 108 miles, to Munich 100 miles, while many of the industrial centres of Saxony and Silesia are almost within bowshot. A determined enemy in Bohemia could do in a few hours immense damage to German industry. But if the Czechs entered the German orbit, that danger would be removed and the last obstacle to the German hegemony of Eastern Europe would have disappeared. But what would then have become of Czech independence? The Czechs regard their alliance with France and their Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R. as indispensable to their survival as an independent people. As President Benesh has pointed out, there is no middle course between independence based on friendship with France (which the Germans regard with hostility) and membership of a German Mitteleuropa. As a possible compromise between these bare alternatives it is sometimes suggested that Czechoslovakia should be neutralised like Switzerland. But the parallel is misleading. There is little or no similarity between the external situation of the two countries. Switzerland can and must be neutral because she is poised between three great neighbours, no one of which can afford to see either of the others in command of the Swiss passes. Czechoslovakia has but one great neighbour. If she becomes neutral, how can she avoid becoming a satellite, if not a vassal of that great power?

Such is the general context of Czechoslovakia's place in

European power-politics. This international background must be kept constantly in mind in any discussion of Czechoslovak affairs, internal or external, for internal and external problems are inextricably interwoven, with the result that Czechoslovakia's domestic affairs have become a barometer of international politics.

The German problem is an example of this overlapping. Here are three separate questions all ravelled up together :—The internal problem of relations between Czechs and Sudeten Germans inside Czechoslovakia, the external problem of relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany, and the universal question of the power-struggle in Europe—the balance of Rome–Berlin against Paris–Prague–Moscow—or, as it appears in Central Europe, Germany *v.* the rest, since Italy is now virtually shut out of Central Europe. Czechoslovakia's particular German problem has ceased to be purely domestic and has become part of the general German problem in Europe.

Let us, however, leave Germany and the European power-struggle out of account for the moment and concentrate on the narrow issue of the German problem in Czechoslovakia. For eight centuries Czechs and Germans have lived together in the Bohemian basin, and for most of that time have competed together for control of it. The history of the lands of the Bohemian crown is the history of the struggle between these two nationalities. But they have not always quarrelled. In the Middle Ages, when German colonists first found their way over the Sudeten mountains, the two peoples worked together to their mutual advantage. The Germans were the town-builders, the architects and craftsmen and organisers of trade and town life. There is hardly a town in Bohemia that was not founded by Germans. Their great contributions to the cultural and commercial life of the country have always been generously acknowledged by the Czechs.

In the course of the fourteenth century the Czechs began to feel that the Germans were becoming too powerful. One of the lessons of the history of Bohemia seems to be that the Czechs are always ready to co-operate with Germans so long as German influence does not threaten to become dominant. But any suggestion of a threat to Czech independence has always produced a vigorous and immediate reaction This

explains the violent revulsion against Germans and Germanism that took place at the end of the fourteenth century under the leadership and inspiration of the Czech preacher Jan Hus. It also largely explains why the Czechs cannot bring themselves to become close friends with Nazi Germany to-day. The Hussite movement began as a campaign against the temporal power and corruption of the Catholic Church ; but it soon acquired a 'nationalist' character and became a general revolt of the Czech people against foreign domination, incorporate in the Papacy and the German world. The tide of German immigration into Bohemia was stopped ; the control of Prague University passed from Germans to Czechs (1409), and Germans were dismissed from key positions in the public life and administration of Bohemia. Many of those that remained were assimilated. For the next two centuries the Czechs were masters in their own house.

Relations between Germans and Czechs have since that day never quite shaken off something of their Hussite temper. Much as the Czechs owe to the Germans, they have always been on their guard against the danger of domination ; not by Germany, for Germany counts for little in Czech history, but by the German element in Bohemia, secured by the rule of the House of Habsburg. Bohemia did legally become a Habsburg land in 1526 but *de facto* the Czechs held their own until the Thirty Years' War. Then came the deluge. The real turning-point was the Battle of the White Mountain (1620), which effectively stifled Czech aspirations for two centuries. The Czechs had had two hundred years of mastery. Now it was the turn of the Germans. That battle was not so much a victory of German over Czech as of Catholic over Protestant, and of the sovereign Habsburg power over the rights of the estates. But the result was vastly to strengthen the German element at the expense of the Czech and ultimately to reduce the Czechs to a nation of servants and doorkeepers.

The Czech nation did not wake from its long slumber until nearly the middle of the nineteenth century. There were signs under Metternich of a renaissance of Czech learning and literature, inspired and fostered by the German Romantics, like Herder, and his fellow-professors from the German Universities. But the first practical signs of a

political national consciousness came in 1848, when the Czechs refused to send representatives to the German Parliament at Frankfurt and organised instead a Pan-Slav congress in Prague (at which, ironically enough, the delegates, being naturally ignorant of one another's language, were obliged to fall back on German to make themselves understood). For the first time since the Thirty Years' War the Czechs appeared as a people with corporate national feeling and leaders capable of expressing it. From 1848 onwards they began pressing for a reorganisation of the Habsburg Monarchy on a federal basis. The national struggle in its modern form had begun.

Too many English people, who have only recently become aware of an urgent national problem in Czechoslovakia, are apt to start their researches at 1918 and leave out of account the pre-war national struggle in Bohemia. That is a profound mistake. The post-war situation, and, above all, the psychological relations of Sudeten Germans and Czechs, can only be understood against the pre-war background. No one can understand why, in the fifteen years that elapsed between the end of the war and the coming of Hitler, the Czechs never succeeded in getting on terms with the Sudeten Germans and never really accepted them as equal partners in the State, unless they have studied the struggle that went on between the two nations in Bohemia from 1848 to 1918. The post-war struggle was not something new but a continuation of the same struggle with the *rôles* reversed, a new act in a play of which several acts had already been performed The pre-war act leads straight up to the scene which most of Europe is now watching with anxiety.

The struggle of the Czechs for national self-expression took various forms. First came the struggle for reform of the Monarchy. The Czechs always accepted the monarchy in principle (' If Austria had not existed of old,' wrote Palacky, the Czech historian, in 1848, ' it would have been necessary in the interest of Europe and of humanity to create it '); but they accepted it only on condition that it provided a measure of autonomy for the subject nationalities. Hence began in the 1860's an agitation for the *Bohmische Staatsrecht*—which meant not merely autonomy for the Czechs, but Home Rule within the framework of the Monarchy for the lands of

the Bohemian crown, based on Prague as the centre of administration. This was the mast to which the Czech colours were nailed all the second half of the nineteenth century; if realised, it would have made the Czechs masters of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. It would, in fact, have given them inside the Monarchy rather more than half of what they eventually obtained in 1918 on a basis of complete independence.

The Germans for their part began by refusing to consider concessions of any sort; then in the 1880's, as a counter to the *Bohmische Staatsrecht*, they proposed *Zweiteilung* (division of the administration into separate national sections—each nation to run its own affairs). The Czechs in return insisted on language-rights before they would discuss anything else, demanding that all officials in Bohemia should be bilingual, which meant, in practice, should be Czechs, since the Germans showed little talent or inclination for the Czech language. So the struggle went on till the war, both sides afraid to be moderate for fear of losing the support of their own nationalists; the Czechs obstructing and making the fulfilment of certain minimum demands the price of co-operation, and the Germans digging themselves in and fighting every inch of ground to the last. But all the time the Czechs were gaining upon them. The spread of education soon created a Czech official class; and every extension of the franchise brought the Czechs into the control of new positions. So, when their chance came at the end of the war, they were fully prepared to take it. They seized it with both hands, and with the memory of many generations of bitter struggle fresh in their minds. No preparation for the creation of an independent Czechoslovakia could have been more unfortunate than this national struggle which was waged in Bohemia before the war. The seeds of intolerance and chauvinism which were sown then are still bearing fruit to-day.

By the end of the war the Habsburg Monarchy had already collapsed (it was not, as is often suggested, broken up by an evil-intentioned and ignorant Peace Conference), and an independent government set up in Prague. The only question left to the Peace Conference to decide was where the frontiers of this new State were to be drawn. In the memoranda which they submitted, the Czechs claimed the historic

frontiers of Bohemia. All history showed, they urged, and economic and strategic considerations demanded, that the historic lands of the Bohemian crown should remain a single unit. The Sudeten Germans would have nothing to fear in the new State because the Government intended

> to organise its state by taking as the bases of the rights of the nationalities the principles applied by the Swiss Republic, that is to say, the government designs to make of the Czechoslovak Republic a sort of Switzerland, while paying regard, of course, to the special conditions in Bohemia.[1]

This, like the better-known quotation of Memoire III., 'le régime serait semblable à celui de la Suisse,' which is often cast in the teeth of the Czechs by German propaganda, was not a promise to introduce the Swiss cantonal system, which would be wholly unsuited to Czechoslovakia, but a statement of intention. It merely indicated how in 1919 the Czechs proposed to treat the national minorities that would be included in Czechoslovakia, if they got the frontiers which they desired. In fact they did get their way, and that against the wishes of the Sudeten Germans.

While the Peace Conference sat and deliberated their fate, the Sudeten Germans were organising separatist movements in many parts of Bohemia and Moravia, in the hope of remaining in a German-Austria which they thought would become part of a federal Germany. How that hope could have been realised is not clear, seeing that even the Habsburgs at the height of their power had never succeeded in dividing Bohemia into its German and Czech portions. Even supposing the peace-makers could have separated predominantly German from predominantly Czech districts (no simple task), that would not have divided the country into one German and one Czech part, but would have left a Czech State, strategically indefensible and economically weakened, surrounded by a series of disconnected German satellites about the size of English counties. But the fact remains that the Sudeten Germans did not want to be included in a Slav State, and their wishes were not in any visible way consulted.

It was clear from the first that the main problem of the new State would be the German problem, but it was thought

[1] Note of May 20, 1919.

that in a world ' made safe for democracy ' there would be no more national problems in the old sense. Masaryk had few misgivings either about Germany or about the Sudeten Germans. Germany, he thought, would no longer be imperialist : ' she has become a Republic, she is racially more homogeneous and she is consequently able to pursue pacific, democratic aims.' Inside Czechoslovakia real democracy would satisfy every national aspiration. National differences would sink into the background. Masaryk could not have foreseen how helpless are the forms of democracy against the disruptive force of nationalism ; perhaps he overrated the power of his people to put real democracy into practice, and forgot that the rule of the majority can be as oppressive for the minority as any dictatorship. Yet he was not blind to the dangers. In a striking passage in the final chapter of *The Making of a State* he has pointed out that under the Monarchy the Czech faith in democracy had necessarily found expression in the negation of Habsburg absolutism. Now that they had their own State, they must rise to a more positive conception of democracy, which meant above all the equal participation of all citizens in the affairs of the State. The prospects of an early realisation of these ideals were not bright.

The Czechs and Slovaks, by whose joint efforts the new State had been brought into being, and who had therefore some right to the title of ' *Staatsvolk* ' (sovereign people), made up between them barely two-thirds of the whole population. The remaining third consisted chiefly of dissident minorities, like the Germans, who did not wish to be included in Czechoslovakia at all and refused to recognise the State. How were these all to become equal partners ? The Czechs and Slovaks felt it was their State, for which they had risked life and limb in the full knowledge of what the future held for them, if the Allies, for whom they were fighting, were beaten. They accordingly set about organising it with energy and enthusiasm. The Germans, on the other hand, who had lost everything by the war and had been degraded from the position of a privileged ruling people to that of an unprivileged minority, were naturally disinclined to co-operate. That may have been inevitable but it was certainly most unfortunate, as it lost the Germans extra ground at the start which they have never since made up. In a few

years the State service, down to the last ganger on the State Railways, was predominantly Czech. To-day one of the chief complaints of the Sudeten Germans is that they have not their due proportion of officials in the State service. There is no denying that disparity, but it is not wholly the fault of the Czechs. The attitude of the Germans themselves in the early years of the Republic is at least partly responsible.

For seven years the Germans remained aloof. Then in 1926, just as in Europe as a whole, Germany was beginning to come to terms with her late enemies, so in Czechoslovakia Sudeten Germans began to come to terms with Czechs. Two German parties abandoned their attitude of non-co-operation and entered the Government, each receiving one Minister. It was the beginning of the period of 'activism,' which came to an end with the resignation of the three German Ministers in March 1938.

Unfortunately little progress was made towards the goal of equality between Germans and Czechs before the economic crisis arrived in 1929. The effects of the world depression were severe all over Czechoslovakia, but in the German districts of North Bohemia, which before the war had been the workshop of the Habsburg Empire and since the war had been forced by the contraction of the home market to seek markets abroad, they were catastrophic. North Bohemia quickly became an industrial graveyard. Unemployment figures rose far more rapidly in the German than in the Czech areas, since the latter were either predominantly agricultural or else equipped with modern industries better able to ride out the storm. The unequal incidence of the effects of the depression greatly upset the Sudeten Germans, who passionately believed that more might have been done to help them in their hour of need, that the Czechs were deliberately taking advantage of their distress to turn the screw against them, to capture or ruin their industry and generally to further the Czech national cause at the expense of a defenceless minority. A particular grievance was the tempting of German children into Czech schools by the promise of material advantages such as better food and better clothing. Perhaps there was some truth in these grievances, but, given the break-up of the Habsburg Monarchy and the fatal growth of economic nationalism, tariff walls and autarky, nothing

could have saved the industrial districts of North Bohemia when the depression came. There may have been discrimination too, but even granting that the Czechs would have been wise to do less for themselves and more for the Germans, the root of the trouble was far beyond the control of the Czechs.

The effects of the depression were still operating with full severity in Czechoslovakia when Hitler seized power in Germany. In both countries they were the best preparation for an outburst of nationalism. The Nazis in Germany could blame everything on a selfish and malicious outer world, while the Sudeten Germans could blame the Czechs for all their troubles, each with some show of justification. They both had a fair quarrel with the Peace Settlement and both longed to undo the results of the war. So the appearance of a leader in Germany who was pledged to tear up the Treaty of Versailles and who put new hope into the hearts of all Germans with his doctrine of the essential unity of the German race stirred the Sudeten Germans. They also were ripe for nationalism.

The elections which were held in May 1935 in Czechoslovakia were remarkable for the appearance of a new German party that appealed, not to some particular section, or class or profession, but to all sorts and conditions of Sudeten Germans. The success of this new party, led by Konrad Henlein, which won the support of two-thirds of all German voters, showed that many of the Sudeten Germans were losing patience. Never before had any German party united so large a proportion of the German population. Here was quite a new factor in Czechoslovak politics—the beginnings of a national front, born of economic distress and political dissatisfaction. As far as home affairs went, Henlein's party differed little in its demands from the 'activist' parties which were members of the Government. It professed loyalty to the State but demanded in return real '*Gleichberechtigung*' (equality of status) between Czechs and Germans, a share in the administration and life of the State, proportionate to their numbers, a fairer distribution of Government contracts, more public works and subsidies to relieve distress in the stricken areas and, finally, a greater measure of autonomy in cultural matters, particularly education. There was nothing remarkable or even specially original in this programme. It was no more than a

summary of what all Sudeten Germans had been demanding for years. The real differences between the Henlein party and the 'activists' lay in (1) the totalitarian claim of the former to be the only true representative of German interests in Czechoslovakia, (2) a fundamental divergence of opinion over foreign policy.

Meanwhile fronts had begun to be formed in Europe. In March 1935 Hitler repudiated Part V. of the Treaty of Versailles and reintroduced conscription in Germany. Within two months, before even the Czechoslovak elections were held, France and Czechoslovakia had countered by concluding Pacts of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S R.—a reinsurance of which the Germans were quick to show their disapproval. It looked for all the world like a revival of the pre-war alignment. This time the weak link in the chain of French alliances was Czechoslovakia, which contained a large dissatisfied German element. Here, ready to hand, was just the handle which the German Government required. From May 1935 Berlin began to take an active interest in the affairs and welfare of the Sudeten Germans.

From that moment the Sudeten Germans became a counter in the game of power politics and a part of the general German problem of Europe. The Czechs, like the Western Powers in the larger field, had missed their chance of solving their German problem. The two problems were now intimately connected. As the gap between Germany and Western Europe widened, so the domestic rift between Czechs and Sudeten Germans became deeper. Once pressure from without had begun, the Czechs could not make substantial concessions to the Sudeten Germans without weakening their external position *vis-à-vis* Germany. How could they take a Nazi-minded German population into partnership? It was beside the point to argue that it would have been less Nazi-minded if appropriate concessions had been made earlier. That might equally well have been said of the Western Powers and Germany. If the Czechs now took Henlein into their Cabinet, they said, they would never be able to hold a Cabinet meeting. So arose a vicious circle of mutual distrust; the Czechs saying, 'No concessions, until we have proof of your loyalty'; the Germans answering, 'How can we be loyal to a State that does not give us a square deal?'

Such an atmosphere was anything but propitious for the solution of a problem, towards which no legal prescriptions were of much value, if good will were absent. For the last three years the two sides have been drawing apart from one another, not least in their respective ideas of what constituted a 'square deal.' The demands of the Henlein party were at first studiously moderate. They demanded little more than the full application of the provisions of the Peace Treaty. Henlein himself was at pains to explain that he had no connexion with Germany and seemed really to believe in the possibility of a programme of moderate and conciliatory nationalism. But the tide has always been too strong for him. As the external situation of Czechoslovakia deteriorated, his demands increased, until finally (April 24, 1938) they have reached the pitch of demanding an autonomous Nazi régime inside Czechoslovakia—accompanied, of course, by the inevitable demand for a reorientation of foreign policy. This would mean the end of Czechoslovakia as an independent State. But what are the alternatives? Can no middle course be devised that would preserve the historic unity of the lands of the Bohemian Crown and enable Sudeten Germans and Czechs to go on living together in the country that they have shared for the last thousand years?

At present there is a great gulf fixed between the maximum that the Czechs are prepared to concede and the minimum that would satisfy the Sudeten Germans. The burden of the German grievance is that they are a minority in a Czechoslovak national State, not an equal partner in a State of several nationalities, which would each and all manage their own affairs and be on an equal footing with one another. So much on their own account. But as disciples of National-Socialism (as publicly declared by Henlein for the first time on April 24) they also demand from the Czechs that they should give up thinking of themselves as 'a bulwark against the so-called German *Drang nach Osten*' and revise their foreign policy 'which had led them into the ranks of the enemies of the German people.' This seems rather like asking a sluice-gate to give up thinking of itself as a barrier and imagine that it would not be carried away by the stream, if it loosed itself from the side-pillars that supported it.

It is the combination of the demand for autonomy with

the demand for reorientation of foreign policy that makes it so difficult for the Czechs to take the Sudeten Germans into partnership. The first would entail both a sacrifice of sovereignty and a radical transformation of the internal structure of the State; neither of which would be unreasonable concessions for the Czechs to make, were it not for the continuous pressure from without, of which the second demand is an expression. The Czechs have repeatedly emphasised their readiness to go to any lengths to meet the legitimate grievances of the Sudeten Germans, provided the independence of their State was not at stake. But in face of simultaneous pressure both from within and without their margin of possible concession is sadly reduced.

Yet not all practical remedies have been exhausted. In February 1937 the Czech Government concluded with the German activist parties an agreement, which was designed gradually to secure 'proportionality' for the Germans in all departments of public life. The results of this agreement were meagre, much to the satisfaction of Henlein's party, which had from the first denounced the agreement as a whitewash and a sham. So meagre, indeed, were the results, that when Austria fell, the activist parties made haste to confess their failure and resign from the Government as an insurance against future eventualities. But much might still be done along the lines of the February agreement. Its failure and the incorporation of Austria in the Reich have nominally united all Sudeten Germans under the leadership of Henlein. But amid all the exaltation and enthusiasm there remains a large body of moderate opinion which might still be won, not for a Czechoslovak national State, but for a multi-national Czechoslovakia in which the Germans would be real partners. The fundamental weakness of Czech policy in the past lies in the failure to win the rank and file of the Sudeten Germans for the Czechoslovak idea. To-day they cannot choose but hear the voice of Greater Germany.

The month of May was one of great activity in the capitals of Europe. Herr Hitler journeyed to Rome, where he reviewed not only the armed might of Italy but also presumably the future of Central Europe with Signor Mussolini. Herr Henlein appeared more unobtrusively in London, in order, apparently, to confer with those who were least in sympathy with the aims and views that he had expressed at Carlsbad.

Whatever the real purpose of this mysterious visit, whether exploratory or explanatory, it did at least show how important, perhaps even how decisive, the attitude of Great Britain may be for the course of events in Central Europe. Meanwhile the Czechoslovak Government, pressed by the Governments of Great Britain and France to go to the utmost limit of concession compatible with the independence of Czechoslovakia, were engaged in drawing up a Nationalities Statute.

A great measure of devolution is clearly necessary if Czechoslovakia is to survive. What form is that process to take? Herr Henlein has demanded the strict definition of the Sudeten areas and complete political autonomy for the Germans within those areas. He holds that the only way of securing equality of rights for the Sudeten Germans is to create an autonomous German State within the boundaries of Czechoslovakia. But a hard and fast line between Germans and Czechs is just as difficult to draw as it is between any other two nationalities in Eastern Europe. Definite ethnographical frontiers nowhere exist in that great belt of mixed population, and any attempt to apply the ethnic principle universally leads to absurdity, if not disaster. It is open to question, too, whether national problems are better approached by erecting barriers and emphasising differences between peoples than by helping those differences to disappear. The quarrel between English and Scots in our own country was solved not by the erection of a frontier, but by an Act of Union. To-day nobody dreams of remarking that the Archbishop of Canterbury is a Scotsman. But this desirable result takes time to achieve and presupposes both a much better psychological atmosphere than exists to-day in Central Europe and a settled conviction in the mind of each people that the one has no desire to expand at the expense of the other.

A solution of the Sudeten German problem would be far easier, were it not for the complications of the international situation. Much more is at stake than the rights of three and a half million Germans. The future of Czechoslovakia will be decided, not by what is done in Prague, but by what is done in London, Paris and, above all, Berlin. The question is not so much 'Can the Czechs do enough to satisfy the Sudeten Germans?' as 'Does Berlin want a satisfied German minority in Czechoslovakia?'

David Stephens.

AUBERON HERBERT

By S. Hutchinson Harris

As 1937 appeared at the head of *The Times* for the last time an article published in it on this eve of the coming year reviewed 'The Tale of '38: A Catalogue of Fame,' from the death of Hadrian in 138 to the coronation of Queen Victoria a century ago. In this catalogue of the famous born in 1838, including among the writers and politicians John Morley (to become Viscount Morley) and James Bryce (to become Viscount Bryce), appeared the name 'Auberon Herbert, apostle of "Voluntaryism".' May the babies of a later '38 yet inquire, 'What was this "Voluntaryism?".'

Born ten days before the coronation of Queen Victoria, Auberon Herbert was certainly not a fixed star in the Victorian galaxy; he was rather a comet travelling across the political firmament in his own age, and a portent for our own.

Having left Eton early, and taken a second in Classical Moderations at Oxford in 1857, when England was passing through the trough of the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny, Auberon Herbert joined the 7th Hussars, and saw service in India in 1860. After his return to England he sold out and went back to Oxford. His keenness for political discussion led him to form the Chatham and Canning Clubs there, and he was President of the Oxford Union in 1862. Having taken his B.C.L. degree in that year, he went on to take that of D.C.L. in 1865. Elected a Fellow of his own college, he remained in Oxford for some years as a lecturer in history and jurisprudence. But already in 1865 he was contesting, though unsuccessfully, a seat in the Isle of Wight as a Conservative candidate, following the party of his father, the third Earl of Carnarvon, and the family tradition.

The invasion of Slesvig by Prussia in 1864 drew Auberon Herbert to the seat of the war in Denmark. The letters he

wrote home from Sönderberg (published the same year as *The Danes in Camp*) display his quick sympathies with the Danish soldiers and people, and his early recognition of the character of that inexorable Prussian war machine, a character which was to be again remarked in our own day by war correspondents in a more highly developed form on the destruction of Guernica in the recent campaign against the Basques.

> I only see in what has happened [he wrote] how completely military conditions and necessities override every other thing ; how fragile is human bravery and endurance ; and how easily you may overtax the finest fighting material in flesh and blood, up to the very point of its breaking down and becoming worthless. At the first commencement of the month of April there was an army in Alsen composed of peasants, ploughmen, and fishermen ; men awkward and slow in appearance, but men who were inspired with a devotion to their country, and with a high courage which quietly despised danger in a manner such as I have not seen elsewhere.

After describing the wearing bombardment—'a cannonade was opened against them, exceeding at times, I believe, in violence the bombardment of Sebastopol'—he continued, 'this—without the defence of science, without the resource of war, without the meanest shelter, at the last without even a commander, and always without hope—this was the fiery affliction through which that army passed.' Although only an observer, and that for a short time, Herbert was made a Knight of the Order of the Dannsbrog on account of the conspicuous bravery he displayed in giving aid to the wounded, services commemorated later in a poem by the Danish poet Valdemar Rordam. He was to be decorated for his bravery again later in helping in the rescue of the crew of an Austrian vessel off Westward Ho !

Nor did Herbert fail to observe the incipient indications of the coming conceptions of warfare which were to be associated with the names of Bernhardi and Giulio Douhet. He wrote of the very bitter feeling engendered by the forced labour imposed by the invaders (students of a theological college as well as peasants having been compelled to work in the trenches under the fire of their compatriots), and by the shelling of the open town of Sönderberg without warning.

Two days later he was discussing warfare as an instrument of German policy, and 'the thousands of wild professors and students who dream of carving German unity out of the destruction of Denmark, of founding a military empire on the victories to be gained over one and a half millions of people, and of harbours to be won and fleets to be built on conquered territory.' Then it was the new long-range needle-fire rifle and the new Krupp artillery that was to be tested in action, as later it was to be the fast heavy bomber and the incendiary bomb.

In 1866 Auberon Herbert would have been drawn to the seat of the war against Austria had she not succumbed so soon. He succeeded in visiting the United States during the Civil War. And he was present at the battle of Sedan, and outside Paris during the siege. Among the first to enter on her fall, he was almost shot for a spy. Unintimidated, he remained there during the Commune. He had therefore had an ample schooling in power politics, whether those of the Right or the Left, when he entered the arena where the system of counting heads instead of breaking them prevailed.

In 1866 Herbert became private secretary to Sir Stafford Northcote when he was President of the Board of Trade. After a brief experience of that field, it was in the Liberal interest that he elected to contest a seat in Berkshire at the General Election of 1868. Again he was defeated, but a seat falling vacant at Nottingham shortly after, with the powerful backing of A. J. Mundella there he entered the House of Commons in 1870. Still he continued to travel rapidly towards the Radical Left, having much sympathy with the efforts then being made by Joseph Arch and others to organise the ill-paid agricultural labourers in a union. And in the friction of the parliamentary atmosphere the comet soon generated a fiery trail.

On March 19, 1872, Sir Charles Dilke moved for certain returns relating to the Civil List. Viscount Bury sought to stifle the subject by appealing to the Speaker to declare his aim, in view of a declaration in favour of Republicanism reported to have been made by him outside the House earlier, to be irreconcilable with the oath of allegiance to the Queen taken by members of Parliament. On the Speaker declining to regard it as part of his duty to say what was or was not

consistent with the oath, Sir Charles Dilke, on rising, was received, says *Hansard*, 'with much confusion.' He had no difficulty in justifying the discussion of the Civil List from the precedents of earlier days, and he was listened to patiently throughout his long speech. As soon as he sat down, Gladstone at once rose to reply. Having traversed Sir Charles Dilke's ground, he concluded by suggesting that the motion should be negatived without further discussion. Notwithstanding this august intimation, the Hon. Auberon Herbert stood by his engagement to second the motion, and he strove to address the House in spite of the roars of 'Divide' and, says *Hansard*, 'other marks of determination to prevent discussion'; it would be vain, the report continues, 'to attempt to record a speech of which no one sentence could be completed or heard.' Herbert held his ground:

> The hon. member having uttered a few words, his voice was drowned in shouts of disapprobation; upon which the hon gentleman paused, and, when the storm had somewhat abated, resumed his unfinished sentence—to be again overpowered.

When the Speaker had obtained a brief lull, he managed to express his regret that Sir Charles Dilke, in delivering his speech at Newcastle, to which the Prime Minister had referred, had not guarded his language with greater care, and thereby avoided suspicion that he was making any personal reflection on Her Majesty; he knew that his hon. friend had no such intention, and when those persons who raised this supposition reflected how the whole theory and practice of the Constitution separated the sovereign from all responsibility, they must perceive there was no real ground for such an imputation. On his continuing, the Opposition, 'with the exception of a few of the more elderly who usually occupy the front benches,' left the House, followed immediately after by many of the back-benchers on the Government side.

Herbert proceeded to dissociate himself from any attack on the Queen, saying that he deeply regretted that it should be supposed that, in seconding the motion, he for a moment believed that Her Majesty had not, throughout the whole period of her reign, acted in the manner which had so justly endeared her to all her subjects. But when he added that he would state with distinctness and frankness that he made no

secret of his opinion that the republican form of government was a better and more reasonable form of government than the monarchical one, the storm was renewed and raged more fiercely. Several attempts were made unsuccessfully to count out the House; then Lord George Hamilton (who had failed to get the Speaker to rule Herbert out of order before he began his speech) spied strangers. After the House had divided on a motion for adjournment, and the proceedings were resumed in a calmer atmosphere, Mr. Liddell said that when history looked back on the proceedings of that evening it would probably all be regarded as a 'Comedy of Errors': first, when Sir Charles Dilke spoke at Newcastle; secondly, on his following up that speech by the motion in the House; thirdly, when the seconder had attempted to brave the House; and in the fourth place, when the noble lord had called the attention to the presence of strangers in the House, thus lending an unnecessary aid to any among the public who might have republican inclinations. He hoped the errors would soon be forgotten, and the country would estimate them at their real value and significance.

The hopes of Mr. Liddell were not disappointed. But after sixty-five years the proceedings may be recalled here to recover the parliamentary atmosphere of the time, and yet more as an illustration of the indomitable character of the subject of this sketch. Then, ten years before Parnell had perfected the parliamentary weapon of obstruction, and Gladstone had been driven to the amendment of the Rules of Procedure and the introduction of the hated *clôture*, the House had its own way of seeking to enforce its will. A stand for freedom of speech within it was still necessary on occasion even at the height of that Liberal age. The lesson inculcated by Mr. Bernard Shaw in *The Apple Cart* had not been so fully learned. And among the philosophical Radicals, who had seen the effects of the policy of Metternich, Republicanism was more rife than it is in the England of to-day. Finally, in the stand which Herbert made we remark that courteous care in distinguishing between the person and the principle for which he was to remain famous.

When the dissolution came in 1874, Herbert, in spite of his zest for the parliamentary battle, did not seek re-election. What had happened? He was not the man to

take umbrage at the hardest knocks delivered in political warfare.

In the Herbert Spencer Lecture delivered at Oxford many years later, Auberon Herbert described why, in words which furnish an excellent example of his simple and direct eloquence. He then said :

I have often laughed and said that, as far as I myself was concerned, Mr. Spencer spoilt my political life. I went into the House of Commons, as a young man, believing that we might do much for the people by a bolder and more unsparing use of the powers that belonged to the great law-making machine; and great, as it then seemed to me, were those still unexhausted resources of united national action on behalf of the common welfare. It was at that moment that I had the privilege of meeting Mr. Spencer, and the talk which we had—a talk that will always remain very memorable to me—set me busily to work to study his writings. As I read and thought over what he taught, a new window was opened in my mind. I lost my faith in the great machine ; I saw that thinking and acting for others had always hindered, not helped, the real progress ; that all forms of compulsion deadened the living forces in a nation ; that every evil violently stamped out still persisted, almost always in a worse form, when driven out of sight, and festered under the surface. I no longer believed that the handful of us—however well-intentioned we might be—spending our nights in the House could manufacture the life of a nation, could endow it out of hand with happiness, wisdom and prosperity, and clothe it in all the virtues.

Like Cincinnatus, and many another, before and since, Herbert turned to the plough, to the development of the farm which he then purchased, and he found balm in communion with the wild nature he loved. But, again like Cincinnatus, he could not resist the temptation to return to the fray. Imperialism rapidly increased during the tenure of office of Disraeli's Government, and by 1878 he was taking a leading part in organising a demonstration in Hyde Park against the Jingoism which was becoming rampant, with the danger of a war with Russia overhanging the country.

When Gladstone had returned to office, in the troubled early years of the 1880's, Herbert continued his searching of heart under the suaver form of the thin disguise of an imaginary symposium of cross-bench members of Parliament,

and the wisdom of a woman to lend sweetness to their discussions. This, after running as a serial in the *Fortnightly Review*, was published in book form in 1884, under the significant title *A Politician in Trouble about his Soul*. The method enabled the writer to give free rein to his disillusionment, his sincerity, his acumen, and his wit. This work still provides an entertaining conversation-piece picture to remind us of the political and social atmosphere of the Mayfair of that day, which has now disappeared for ever. In the final chapter (bearing the heading 'In Sight of the Haven' on its original appearance in the *Fortnightly Review*) the author introduced a new character for the purpose of discussing Spencer's philosophy, and his own deductions from it.

This leaven still continued to work. The threatening clouds continued to gather. And the call reached the happy wilderness where Herbert had been able to pursue his tastes for, among other things, the study of natural history, and the history of early man recorded in the stone implements which he collected. In a series of articles contributed to the *Newcastle Weekly Chronicle* (republished in pamphlet form in 1885 as *The Right and Wrong of Compulsion by the State*) Herbert showed how far he had travelled on the road of the desert prophet's advocacy of peace and good-will among men in industrial and foreign politics.

The surcharged political atmosphere had affected Herbert Spencer also. In November 1883 he wrote to E. L. Youmans in America that for some time past he had been getting more and more exasperated at the way things were drifting towards Communism with increasing velocity, and that, though he feared little was to be done, he was prompted to make a vehement protest. This took the form of four articles in the *Contemporary Review* in 1884, reprinted as *The Man versus The State*. Reluctant as he had been to turn from the Synthetic Philosophy on which he was at work, and fearing that his ill-health might prevent his reaching its most important and crowning part, Justice and Beneficence in *The Principles of Ethics*, Spencer felt on the completion of the articles that the effort had been worth while; he wrote in a letter to Youmans that in them he had reached what seemed to him a sufficiently completed view of the politico-ethical doctrine that he had been gradually developing for more than forty

years, and he thought this might eventually form a new departure in politics, and might serve later to give a positive creed for an advanced party of true Liberalism in politics. Spencer himself was under no illusion regarding the immediate possibilities. He had no doubt that the absolute political ethics he adumbrated were far beyond attainment in the world as it was at that time.

In 1889 Auberon Herbert wrote to a correspondent: 'If I have done no other good in my life, I have done one useful deed, which is to help into circulation Man *v.* The State.' By then he himself was considering the publication of a Liberty paper to advocate this politico-ethical doctrine as an immediate positive creed. As is not uncommon, the zeal of the disciple outran the wisdom of the master. Spencer, while sympathising with Herbert's aim in advocating Individualism, expressed his fear that the paper would result in loss, and have to be abandoned after a very short life, and that the advocacy of voluntary taxation would gravely prejudice it. Three weeks after the publication of the first number he was again writing to Herbert:

> I am myself almost hopeless of any good to be done. The drift of things is so overwhelming in the other direction, and the stream will, I believe, continue to increase in volume and velocity, simply because political power is now in the hands of those whose *apparent* interest is to get as much as possible done by public agency, and whose desires will be inevitably pandered to by all who seek public functions.

But that was the current Herbert was bent on stemming, and he struggled against it in *The Free Life*, the weekly publication he established and edited, for eleven years.

The first number appeared May 24, 1890. The editor made his bow to the public under the apposite title to the introductory article: 'One Fight More—The Best and the Last,' and stated:

> We have come into existence to preach a great but simple truth, on which, as we hold, all real improvement of the human race depends. That truth is—as Mr. Herbert Spencer, above all other teachers, has taught—that a man's consent as regards his own actions is the only basis on which social relations can be happily

and permanently founded; and that the struggle for power over each other, in which all classes are recklessly engaged, is a mere madness from which they have to be recalled. The gospel we preach is that force, when not carefully and exactly confined to the one purpose for which it may be used without positive wrong, force to repel force—the force of self-defence—whenever it exists as an organised system, under which some men compel other men to accept their view of what is right or convenient, under which some men are the regulators and some the regulated, is a mere survival of barbarism, a mere perpetuation of slavery under new names, against which the reason and moral sense of the civilised world have to be called into rebellion.

The writer continued that, in succession to the Kings and their Governments, the grim image of a perfect force-system had been born in the minds of men, and had been greeted with enthusiasm by millions who found in it their new hope. The force of Kings and of Churches had been broken, the force that pretended to be of the people and to speak in their name remained to be overcome. With apocalyptic fervour he wrote of the choice that each has to make between power over the things of this world, prompted by the false Tempter that stands at his side, and the moral law; he warned his readers of the tribulation before the world—the human race had still to undergo the great final temptation, the great master-delusion, as it had lived through earlier ones. Until virtue has passed through the fire of temptation, he concluded, it is not worth the having; until the love of liberty has grown strong and pure enough to reject the gifts of State Socialism, it cannot be the guide and the mistress of men.

The advocacy of voluntary taxation soon involved Herbert in a polemic with Mr. J. H. Levy, the editor of the *Personal Rights Journal* (a title to be altered later to the *Individualist*), which Mr. Levy published in 1912 under the title *Taxation and Anarchism*. Nor was this the only side from which the charge of anarchy came, although Herbert constantly reiterated that anarchy, in the commonly accepted association of the term, seemed to him, even in its more peaceful and reasonable forms, quite apart from the 'detestable bomb,' merely one more creed of force. Jubilant on the passing of W. E. Forster's Education Bill in 1870, T. H Huxley had

chosen the occasion to trail the tail of his coat by associating the name of Spencer with what he called 'astynomocracy' in an article entitled 'Administrative Nihilism,' published in the *Fortnightly Review* (November 1871). Little as he liked it, knowing the combative nature of both, and fearing that this form of public controversy might lead to estrangement between the two friends (as, indeed, it did later), Spencer felt compelled to reply in an article entitled 'Specialized Administration,' in which he pointed out that, so far from Nihilism, it was one of the main contentions of his theory that the unnecessary multiplication of the functions of government impaired the efficient performance of those essential functions on which he insisted. In 1890 Huxley returned to the subject of government in a series of articles which appeared in *The Nineteenth Century*. As in 1871 Nihilism was the opprobrious term, so in 1890 it was Anarchy, and in the final article, entitled 'Anarchy or Regimentation,' Huxley now cited 'the "party of Individual Liberty," of which Mr. Auberon Herbert is the spokesman,' and argued that it 'must be classified as Anarchist,' quoting isolated passages in substantiation from *The Right and Wrong of Compulsion by the State*. The task which he had set before himself in his articles, Huxley concluded, was simply a destructive criticism of *a priori* political philosophy, whether regimental or individualistic, and he pleaded modesty for not offering a constructive foundation in its place. Auberon Herbert at the time was engaged in launching *The Free Life*, and, so far from quailing before Huxley's minatory warning that he was 'unable to discern any logical boundary between Mr. Herbert's position and that of Bakounine,' he continued to expound his creed, and he proceeded to describe his paper as the Organ of Voluntary Taxation and of the Voluntary State. Nor was he content to stop at writing; he sought ceaselessly to make converts through his personal efforts. And once a year he kept open house for any who liked to undertake the pilgrimage to his home, and eventually visitors would arrive to the number of some thousands, including his friends the gipsies, who cleared up the remains of the tea.

His own generation may ask, Was it, indeed, of the son and not the father, that Maurice Baring wrote in 'In Memoriam, A. H.' ?—

O liberal heart fast-rooted to the soil,
O lover of ancient freedom and proud toil,
Friend of the gipsies and all wandering song,
The forest's nursling and the favoured child
Of woodlands wild—
O brother to the birds and all things free,
Captain of liberty !

[Auberon Herbert, Captain Lord Lucas, R.F.C.; killed November 3, 1916.]

'Instead of thy fathers shall be thy children, whom thou mayest make princes in all the earth.' As Auberon (Bron) Herbert, Lord Lucas (who inherited the title in 1905 on the death of his uncle, Earl Cowper) had rowed in the Oxford Eight, had received a bullet wound, which cost him the loss of a leg, when acting as war correspondent for *The Times* in the South African War, and had become Under-Secretary of State for War in Asquith's Government in 1908. In 1904 he had visited Canada to judge the question of Imperial Preference there for himself, and he had published, with his companion, Edwin Montagu, his conclusions at the time in *Canada and the Empire*; in 1911 he went to the Colonial Office. By the time the war broke out he was President of the Board of Agriculture, but on the formation of the Coalition Government in 1915 he joined the Royal Flying Corps, and he lost his life when flying over the German lines. Would it not be of him, when passing through the distempers of childhood's recapitulation, that the father wrote with his own appreciative humour the lines published in 1894 among the occasional verses collected in his *Windfall and Waterdrift*:

Summary Justice.
He clenched his hand, he stamped his foot,—
Bright flushed the little cheek :—
'If I were King, I'd do this thing—
Cut heads off every week.

Oh ! in my realm bad men no more
Should live by land or sea ;
And in all hearts—I'd made a law,—
No wicked thought should be ! '

Captain of liberty, even that of woodlands wild, Auberon Herbert was himself championing their cause when Bron

Herbert was living the life of young Siegfried in them and learning to interpret the whispered messages of Nature. In 1872, on the second reading of the Wild Fowl Protection Bill, he moved an amendment to the effect that it was desirable to provide for the protection of all wild birds during the breeding season. He said he did so in no hostility to the Bill, although he had no very great enthusiasm for it, smelling as it did, in his opinion, too much of the larder. He then went on to point out the damage done by the insects and worms on which birds prey. His speech was replete with facts in natural history in support of his purpose, and in confirmation of the destruction of wild birds then taking place. He concluded with an appeal for compassion for those creatures which were so entirely in our power, the craft of man having increased in a much greater proportion than their resources of defence. It would be a good thing for us, and have a good effect on the national character, he pleaded, if we were willing to give up just one little bit of the power we possessed over the life and freedom of this part of surrounding creation. Although Herbert consented to withdraw his amendment on the intimation that if carried it would imperil the passage of the Bill, he was able to achieve part of his purpose in committee.

As well as a good rider, fond of sailing, and an enthusiastic Alpine climber, Herbert was a keen sportsman in his youth, though he later gave up shooting owing to his distaste for taking wild life. The same compassion was felt for the woodlands wild, and he took an active interest in the preservation of the New Forest. In an article on 'Woodlands' in *The Nineteenth Century*, Sir Herbert Maxwell had referred to Auberon Herbert's 'passionate advocacy' of picturesque ruin there, quoting from the evidence of the Deputy-Surveyor given before the Select Committee on Forestry in 1877. Here Herbert was on his own native heath, while, as he suavely suggested in his reply ('The Last Bit of Natural Woodland,' *The Nineteenth Century*, September 1891), Sir Herbert Maxwell had plunged a little rashly into a big controversy, and one of which he would appear to have had comparatively little first-hand knowledge. In this article Herbert displayed once more his love of wild things, and his recognition of the capacity of Nature to provide for herself under her own balance, in a

manner to recall the veneration awakened in Darwin by his study of the marvels of the creation.

> The truth is, [wrote Herbert] there is no rubbish: all is beautiful; all is part of a whole; all has its meaning and story; and the things which Sir Herbert Maxwell would probably sweep away are the very things which make the old woods of the New Forest different from the thousands of pleasure-grounds which are to be found anywhere and everywhere.

Ten years later came the intimation that *The Free Life* would pass into a state of 'suspended animation,' the hope being expressed that it might be resumed later in a somewhat different form. At the same time Auberon Herbert contributed two articles to *The Nineteenth Century* entitled 'Assuming the Foundations,' in which he discussed in a more philosophical vein the foundations of belief, whether religious or political. They ended, as ever, with the examination of the assumption underlying the system of democratic government, and the condemnation of the immorality of the compulsions prevailing in its name.

> I shall not point here, as I might do, [he wrote] to the state of Europe, staggering on the edge of the precipice, as the best practical proof of what results when you take from the individual the control of himself and his own affairs; we must not confuse together practical effects—whether we consider them good or evil—and the philosophical basis on which all opinions, that are worthy of the name and have not been picked up anywhere in the street, must finally rest.

Asking how men came to assume the right of the three men over the two men, he concluded that the answer must be that men's natures were still saturated by the survival of the authoritarianism of religion in temporal matters.

Auberon Herbert was spared a knowledge of the staggering descent over the first precipice. After the next one under the governments formed on the assumption of the unlimited rights of the super-State, perhaps more people than in Huxley's day will realise the value of an *a priori* philosophy of first principles of morality in the sanctions of government. If so, they will lend a readier ear to Auberon Herbert's appeal on behalf of the voluntary State, that 'it does not believe in the treatment of men and women, their faculties, and their

property, as State material, which may be employed for any purpose at the pleasure of the majority which has climbed into power.'

In the few remaining years, many months were spent in travel. In his Herbert Spencer Lecture, on 'Mr. Spencer and the Great Machine,' delivered at Oxford in 1906, Auberon Herbert repeated his criticisms of caucus politics, and restated his undying faith in the beliefs and aims to which he had clung. The British Constitution Association had been formed a few months earlier 'to maintain the fundamental principles of the British Constitution, personal liberty and personal responsibility, and to limit the functions of governing bodies accordingly,' and they now invited him to lecture to them. He prepared 'A Plea for Voluntaryism' for the purpose. His death intervened (November 4, 1906) before the delivery of the lecture; it was read at a meeting of the Association a few weeks later. Determination had not faltered; it had been his intention to circulate these lectures inviting signatures signifying agreement with their general spirit, even if judgment on special points was reserved. They were subsequently published under the title of *The Voluntaryist Creed.* Unfortunately the volume is now out of print, and space will not admit of further quotation here. A considerable part of *A Plea for Voluntaryism* will be found reproduced in the *Nineteenth Century and After* for November 1935.

Reviewing this book on its publication in 1908, Auberon Herbert's old friend Arthur Hughes (a son of '*Tom Brown's School Days* Hughes,' and himself a contributor to *The Free Life* from its first number, and after its cessation taking part in founding and editing *L'Individualiste Européen* in Paris) wrote that Herbert was nearer to Mill than to Spencer, and nearer to Emerson and Shelley than to either; and he paid a tribute to the practical common-sense that ran through the pages beside 'the predominant note of the preacher' and 'the prophet's passion.'

A further name should be added. To appreciate the force underlying Auberon Herbert's insistent theme, somewhat obscured as it was by the visionary extension he gave it, one should be familiar with Frédéric Bastiat's searching analysis of *spoliation légale* in his *Sophismes Economiques.* And this is not in repute with the Established teachers of political

economy. Political and economic planning has made much headway since Herbert wrote, and in the spate of tariffs, preferences, quotas, subsidies, currency and foreign exchange manipulation on the one side, and the instalments of empirical Socialism veiled as Social Reform, Social Security, *corporazioni di categoria*, and other euphemisms, on the other, with their corollaries, political pressure groups, whether of capital or labour, general strikes, and direct action in domestic relations, and the increase of armaments, regimentation in martial training, and power politics for foreign relations, the voices of such prophets in the desert as Herbert have little chance of being heard. And still the old motives that Herbert deplored prevail, as M. André Tardieu, with his wide experience of governments, has recently reminded us in *Le souverain captif*.

When the whirlwind of the wind that has been sown has been reaped, and the mad descent over the next steep place has been precipitated, may not the tale of a later '38 attribute to Auberon Herbert something of the perceptive foresight of the prophet, as well as the prophet's unflinching fervour in the enunciation of his precept?

S. HUTCHINSON HARRIS.

THE VERDICT OF THE PAST ON THE PRESENT

By F. S. Marvin

Here is a quotation from a recent book on the crisis or catastrophe of civilisation—by a scholar of some repute who should write, one would think, not as a furious partisan or without some historical backing for his judgments. He says:

> To me it seems that civilisation is not on the brink of collapse but that it has already some years ago collapsed; much as it might be said that the Roman world had collapsed by A.D. 400 even if it did not vanish for another century. . . . I wonder exactly how long it will take us to awake to the fact that before our very eyes the world we lived in in our youth, has passed away and with it the main props of civilisation. . I wonder what can be salved from the wreck. At all costs let us avoid the easy optimism of, 'it will all come right in the end,' for the end is now so very imminent.

One quotes this not as unique but as an example, from a better-informed writer, of wild talk poured out in abundance at the present day, mostly by men who have had no previous knowledge of the 'main props.' When one examines—as in this case—the grounds for the writer's terrifying judgment, one finds that, often enough, he puts his finger on a weak spot, that his sympathies, where parties are divided, are mostly on the right side and that, in looking towards the future, he points out real dangers which all sane men, and especially statesmen in responsibly governed countries, are striving to avert. But there is no balance in his diagnosis, and he sees no good in the things which he generally dislikes, nor hope for the redress of the evils.

To say this is to put the case mildly against his view. Because there is a palpable fear of war, and because in certain countries things have been done and liberty of thought and

action are restricted in harmful ways, are we therefore to shut our eyes to the vast mass of ameliorative work which has been accomplished in all countries in recent years, including those whose actions in other respects are to be condemned? To ask such a question is to answer it; and anyone who hesitates as to the answer, only convicts himself of inability to see more than one thing in a panoramic picture, and of judging the whole, which he ignores, by the part on which he fixes his gaze. For an individual this is a painful and unbalancing procedure; when it infects the public mind, the effect is still more dangerous and tends to aggravate the very evils which it deplores.

To redress the balance, at least in our own minds, we need to go back to those fundamental or 'main props of civilisation' to which our dismal prophet refers. It is no doubt true, as he maintains, that the very essence of civilisation is co-operation, and it is also true that in recent years many new and vexatious barriers to co-operation between nations have come into existence. Side by side with the League of Nations, which is an institution designed to promote that necessary co-operation, we have the spectacle of several strong nations, ostentatiously abstaining from the proffered co-operation and sometimes flouting its decisions. It is a deplorable fact and not likely to be overlooked by the easiest of optimists, but it hardly justifies a scientific student of contemporary sociology in writing off the League as non-existent. It still embraces a large majority of the nations of the world and carries out a multitude of useful common activities among them. In the political sphere of its work, which is only one, though the most notorious, of those spheres, it is reported already to have resolved more than thirty differences between States. They need not necessarily have led to wars, but they were obstacles to co-operation which, as we have seen, is the essence of civilisation. But clearly this co-operation is not, and can never be, mainly the co-operation between nations. Desirable as that is, it could not, at its widest and fullest, touch more than a fraction of the co-operative activities by which we live and grow as civilised beings. The great mass of these must be looked for in the smaller areas—the nation itself, the district, the town, the village, the club.

Now there is no more striking fact in the social and

political development of post-war years than the prodigious growth of this co-operative social work in all countries in the world. We in England are justly proud of what we are doing in this way, but most of the things which we do can be matched elsewhere, and it is easy enough to point to many things done in other countries which we have not yet attempted. Education, health, social welfare, amusement and sport—all tell the same tale. There is such a whirl and bustle of such activities that many good people, not averse to civilisation in the abstract, will be found sighing for older times when they might enjoy the harvest of a quiet eye. But the solid fact which emerges, and is decisive for any fair-minded student of social conditions, is that, as a result of this world-wide effort, the physical condition of the majority of mankind has improved beyond the dreams of those who knew the 'main props' of civilisation in earlier days. The capacity for life and enjoyment of the 2000 million human inhabitants of this planet has been so much enhanced, mainly by the advance of socialised medicine, that the supporters of the 'main props' in those days would be amazed. Some things no doubt they would dislike as much as social reformers of to-day—the football pool, the long suburban journeys to work, the dreary wastes of monotonous little houses. But if the possession of life and the prospect of longer and healthier life are to be regarded as goods, there can be no doubt that civilisation has now provided these in larger measure and to larger numbers than in any previous epoch in history.

But it will be said, what if all this is to be swept away by another world war wider and more destructive than the last? Even in a smaller war area, our new and more terrible means of destruction could do far more damage in a shorter time than the primitive aeroplanes and gases of the Great War. The question is of course a grave and most insistent one, but it is limited and quite different from that with which we began. It is not now whether civilisation is doomed or has already disappeared, but whether mankind, having secured by science unexampled means of destroying life, is likely to perpetrate the supreme folly of suicide. It is really a study in probabilities, the actuarial chances of insanity. The mere fact that men have found out new and more extensive means of destroying life is not in itself a symptom of decadence or of

the doom of civilisation. It seems to follow inevitably from the growing refinement of our methods and the discovery of fresh substances and qualities of things. As we make our razor sharper, it is fitter both for shaving or for severing the jugular vein.

As soon as we see this, science as science is completely exonerated from responsibility for our dangers. It is well to know as much of the capacities of nature as our mind can penetrate, and the responsibility then rests with the will and self-restraint of men to walk warily and use their knowledge for the highest good of all. But it must be thought to border on insanity to pile up deadly weapons, as men are doing now, regardless of the possibility of their explosion, accidentally it might be or almost spontaneously, to the widespread destruction of all who use them.

One seems confined in a hideous circle in this matter. It would be pure madness to remain unarmed yourself if others are prepared to wipe you out and have not the common-sense or the good-will to talk over their difficulties and appeal to a mutual understanding to solve them. And yet by duplicating the arms on the other side of the frontier one creates fresh dangers and produces the certainty of far wider destruction if war should break out. Perhaps the only safeguard is that the great majority, both of the Governments and the peoples of the world, are now aware of the danger and determined to avoid a major war if possible. Those who visit Herr Hitler report sentiments from him fully in accord with this, though unfortunately an ethos has been created, and is still fostered both in Germany and Italy, which contradicts such sound views and would penalise them if openly expressed. In Japan one can hardly say that public expressions of policy go as far as Germany is now prepared to go; we know, indeed, far less about what they really think. The Japanese indeed have one great national virtue and one great historic deficiency which both operate in a recklessly warlike direction when the word goes out from headquarters that they are to fight. The virtue is the universal readiness to sacrifice one's life to a higher call, especially of the State as embodied in the Emperor. The deficiency is that Japan has had no experience of a larger human unity such as influences us, often unconsciously, in our conflicts in the West. Italy was once the

centre not only of a Roman Empire but of a Church which embraced in spiritual bonds a larger area than the Empire. And Germany, though not incorporated by temporal Rome, was for many centuries the home of the temporal chief of the mediæval Church. These things leave permanent lines behind them. We are conscious of them in dealing with Germans or Italians as we are not in dealing either with Russians or nations of the further East.

History has many other lessons besides this and, happily, though often debatable, they are never entirely speculative like prophecies of the future. It is quite impossible to say with certainty whether there will be another Great War or not, or, if it occurred, what would be the results. But looking at the past there is an array of warlike and peaceful facts which, though never exactly comparable to the present, have often analogy of real import and always illustrate some truth of human nature. The same prophets, whose vaticinations of evil were quoted above, are always telling us that present conditions in the world are entirely different from what they have been at any earlier period. The power of man for good or evil is now so vast, they say, that we can have no guidance from the happenings of the past. Man might, in their opinion, annihilate himself or civilisation completely, or he might, if he would, create a new heaven upon earth, peaceful, equalitarian and peopled with a race of demigods. But actually an ecstasy of either kind is not borne out by a sober reading of history; and where else can we turn for light on the future?

No doubt we are right to insist that history never repeats itself, right also in the belief that with every action, either of an individual or of a community, something quite new comes into the world. And yet we are bound to look to the past and argue from it, because it is from the past, constantly reshaped, that the present and the future are being born. The soundness of our judgment will depend upon how far our knowledge is complete and whether we allow for all the possible operating factors. Clearly we cannot know them all and certain prophecy is therefore impossible. But we may strive to avoid an obviously partial judgment, and most of the judgments that have ever been current about the future are thus obviously incomplete and biassed. There are examples

on both sides—the wildly optimistic, the hopelessly gloomy. When Virgil 2000 years ago sang of the golden age which had returned to earth—'*Redeunt Saturnia regna*'—he was obsessed by the marvellous successes and the brilliant character of Augustus. He completely lost sight of the vast masses of uncivilised barbarians who surrounded the empire and the extreme unlikelihood of finding a series of Augustuses to carry on the good work which had been begun. So, on the other hand, the pessimistic prophets of the present day who see in general rearmament and in the formation of new and opposing alliances a repetition of 1914, completely overlook the general changes which have taken place in the world and the emergence of new factors which will certainly change the issue whatever it may turn out to be. There were then no Succession States; there was no League of Nations; there was not then the passionate world-wide determination to avoid war. The world had not then the terrifying experience of over four years of intensifying mechanical warfare to sober it. The United States had not at that time ever taken part in a European war. One might extend the list of differences almost indefinitely. But—be it noted—one does not refer to these differences to draw the conclusion that another world war is impossible. No such thing is impossible. It is not impossible that our planet might in a short time be extinguished by a dark wandering star which has escaped the vigilance of the astronomers. One is only arguing against drawing illicit conclusions about the future from very incomplete and biassed readings of the past and present. And surely, if there is to be a bias at all, it should, in the interests of human happiness and sanity, be a bias in favour of hope. We know the streets and highways of to-day are dangerous and that thousands lose their lives every year. If everyone applied the fatal precedent to himself, our lives would become a state of shivering anxiety, if indeed we moved at all.

Yet we must argue from the past to the future; and we cannot know either past or present with sufficient thoroughness to draw a certain conclusion. The impasse seems complete. Is there no way by which any guidance may be obtained by a study of history? It may perhaps be possible to suggest one or two lines of fruitful thought, and there is also one remarkable feature in the thought of many great

historians which has not been sufficiently noticed and seems to have some moral for the case before us.

Before we turn to this last and most suggestive point, one may give a few general comments which may seem vague and commonplace enough. But there is great virtue in a neglected commonplace. Granting all that can be said about the infinite complexity of human events and the impossibility of an exact repetition in history, there yet seem to be two sorts of conclusion that may be drawn from the past as to the future; and one or two examples of each may shed some light on the whole question. Take first the simple and limited case where the reactions of human sympathy and confidence are at stake. These are permanent factors in our nature, closely allied to bodily pain or satisfaction. If some one strikes us a severe blow we stagger; if another gives us a present or encouraging words our sympathy and gratitude are evoked. This must be as true in public dealings as in private. Thus Napoleon III. was a dictator as Hitler and Mussolini now are, and, though we cannot argue in detail from the career of one to either of the others, there are certain simple outstanding facts which must be true of all of them. Thus, as dictators, each has suppressed democratic assemblies and committed acts of violence which inevitably arouse strong opposition and animosity among those who suffer from them, quite apart from the abstract questions of political liberty and the like. One can also say, quite definitely and with confidence, that should any other dictator commit extravagant and disastrous follies, as Napoleon did in Mexico and in dealing with Bismarck, he would sacrifice the attachment of his people and sooner or later fall from power. On the other hand, it is certain that if a strong man like Pilsudski or Mustapha Kemal is able to rally his people after defeat and secure them in the possession of lands or freedom or other goods which without him they would have lost, he will by such action earn their gratitude and support. He will gain power and use it for a time, as Marius and Julius Cæsar did at the end of the Roman Republic, though what the ultimate issue may be depends on so many and such complicated factors that further reasoning by analogy is impossible.

This type of historical analogy, sound as far as it goes, sheds but a limited light on problems of the present or the

future. We mentioned above another sort of reasoning from the past. Of what kind is this and how far does it help us? It is as wide and general as the former is simple and of limited scope. We will only apply it to the case from which we started, the supposed threat to civilisation at the present time, or, as the gentleman already quoted tells us, the sad theory that 'civilisation has already some years ago collapsed.' Surely in such a crisis we are at liberty, nay called upon urgently, to look to the past to see if it contains examples at all parallel to the dangers and divisions of to-day. Again one must repeat that there can be no argument in detail. The argument is of a general kind and involves a quite wholesome element of faith. But should not the patient, even if he be 2000 million men, be encouraged to have faith in himself just as the individual is exhorted by his general practitioner? What verdict then does history pass on the power of mankind in weathering crises? The mere fact that we are here, 2000 million of us, is in itself a fairly substantial answer. But it may be said that after all we are a very poor lot, much worse than would now be inhabiting this planet were it not for the madness of wars and the devastations by barbarians, diseases, vices and all the ills which have afflicted the race and might have been avoided. And it will certainly also be said that, though there may be 2000 million now, there will be far fewer, and those much worse off, if we do not avert the present crisis, and if another greater world war were to break out. One may assent, with qualifications, to both these propositions. Our belief in the survival value of mankind does not involve a belief that the course of history is the best that could have been imagined nor that the world we have is the best conceivable. No one follows Leibnitz so far, at least in judging that part of the world's history which has already elapsed. Nor will any sane man deny the abstract possibility of another world war worse than the last, and the appalling devastation which it would undoubtedly inflict. These things are not in question; but we are entitled, looking at the past, to draw certain inferences as to the recuperative powers of human beings, as to the marvellous continuity of the most vital elements in human life and thought, as to the growth of solidity in civilisation, especially in recent times, and the strengthening of the co-operative forces in society which would ward off a

threatened outbreak and fortify resistance to it if it did occur.

History offers many examples of the ravaging of civilisation, far more extensive relatively to the existing population and the civilised area of the world than the ravaging effected by the Great War. Man survived them, and in many cases, so far as we can judge, produced a better state of things after the devastation than before. This was certainly the case in the Greek world and the Near East by the time of Alexander, compared with the same area 1000 years before. In their barbarian stage Greek hordes had swept away the civilisation of Crete; Cnossos had disappeared and Egypt was in decay. Over that area, and far beyond it, the Greek spirit and the conquering genius of Alexander had spread a new order of which the multitude of beautiful cities, the countless works of art, the keen spirit of inquiry and the love of beauty and learning are still the admiration of the world. Troy was destroyed, but Homer was born, with all that he means for the permanent enrichment of mankind. The next 'crisis of civilisation,' still more discussed and more often compared with our own times, is the transformation of the Roman Empire by the gradual invasion and settlement of the Teutonic and other tribes in the fourth and fifth centuries B.C. No doubt much was lost and we may well sympathise with Sidonius, whose letters from the south of France, towards the end of the fifth century, give us a vivid picture of the dying out of the luxuries and splendour of imperial Rome. But while we regret these ruined palaces and vanished elegance, we should not forget the basis of slavery on which they rested and the atmosphere of corruption and selfish indolence which had long prevailed and was to give way to a more bracing, if ruder, air from the north. It may seem a heresy, but is it not a tenable view that there was more human aspiration, more kindliness between man and man, more widely diffused well-being in the thirteenth century than in Gibbon's Golden Age of the Antonines? At least one may boldly compare the scores of Gothic cathedrals which cover the West with any of the religious or public structures of imperial Rome.

That man survives his crises is therefore the most outstanding general moral which we may draw from history; at

most, if not all, of these times of crisis, conflict and destruction, some specially valuable new thing, a tonic dose, is being administered to the human organism. Homer was a case in point, following on the warlike raids and settlements of the early Greeks. The spread of Christianity is the revivifying element in the agony of Rome. One might go into later times, but our vision here is still uncertain and clouded by the dust of furious controversy. But it seems, at least to the present writer, that another new element will be found now in the application of the prodigious powers of science to the forward movement of the race as a whole. One thing stands out clearly and is a curious comment on the mingled fortunes and constant restoration of human hopes. All the great historians whose names come first into one's mind have been moved to write by some special crisis in human affairs which had just been threatening some cause which they held most vital. Herodotus writes just after the Persian flood had seemed likely to overwhelm the new thought and liberties of Greece. The danger was averted and humanity was saved, though the historian is unaware of the immensity of the issues involved. Thucydides describes the fatal breach between Athens and Sparta and sees Athens go down without realising that greater powers than Athens were then growing in the north and the west which would spread the work and spirit of Athens to the ends of the earth. Gibbon describes the downfall of his ideal age on the eve of an upheaval which was to put all men, at first in the West and ultimately throughout the world, on a level never dreamt of by the majority of the Roman Empire.

It may well be that when the present day is historically reviewed it will be found to contain a similar secret and that under its prevailing gloom there is being born a new life still more vigorous than the past.

F. S. MARVIN.

ELIHU YALE, THE AMERICAN NABOB OF QUEEN SQUARE

By Hiram Bingham

On Saturday, July 8, 1721, the *Weekly Journal or British Gazetteer*, among its '*freshest Advices Foreign and Domestick*,' announced that 'Elihu Yale, Esq; commonly call'd Governor Yale, a Gentleman eminently known for his extensive Charity, lies at the point of Death, at his house in Queen's Square near Ormond-Street.' On the following Tuesday the *Post-Boy* announced his death. On Saturday, the 15th, *Applebee's Original Weekly Journal* reported that 'the following Persons of Note have died this week, viz. 1. The Lady Dowager Pierpont, . . . 2. The Countess of Northampton, . . . 3. The Lady Molesworth, Spouse to the Right Honourable the Lord Molesworth. 4. Elihu Yale, Esq; an East-India Merchant of very great Fortunes, formerly Governor of Fort St. George in the East Indies.' A few days later the *Daily Post* announced that 'the Corpse of Elihu Yale, Esq; was carry'd out of Town in order to be interr'd at Wrexham in Wales.'

In days when newspapers were small, and when notices of illness, death and burial were confined to members of the nobility and others of great distinction, it is worthy of note that four newspapers within a period of ten days should have given space to such news regarding an American who had come to London as a little boy and gone to Madras as a poorly paid clerk. To be sure, these facts were not mentioned in the Press notices, nor was anything said about his daughters, one of whom had married the brother of the Duke of Devonshire, while her sister had married Lord Guilford's cousin, the son of Sir Dudley North. Still less did the papers chronicle the fact that by a gift of 300 books and three bales of Indian textiles to a small college in Connecticut he had secured immortality!

In December the *Daily Courant* began printing advertisements of auction sales of his extraordinary collections of paintings, curiosities, watches, snuff-boxes, jewels, rings, medals, Oriental cabinets, and books. He seems to have had some 5000 paintings besides hundreds of *objets d'art*. The auction sales, held usually in series, six at a time, at intervals of a month or more, lasted for over two years.

After some thirty-odd sales had disposed of what he had collected in town, an auction of household goods and 'a large collection of pictures' was held in October 1723 at the manor-house of Latimers in Bucks. which he had leased from his son-in-law, Sir James Cavendish. Mr. Cock, the celebrated auctioneer, offered to attend 'All Gentlemen that have Horses or other Convenience of Carriage' at the Castle tavern, near St. Giles' Church, and escort them to Latimers, which he temptingly—but incorrectly—declared was 'about ten miles from London.' Finally, on February 20, 1724, Governor Yale's four town houses, besides coach-houses and stables, were offered for sale by the same auctioneer. And the Nabob of Queen Square had begun to be forgotten. In due course, however, the number of pilgrims to his tomb in Wrexham, with its striking poetical epitaph, has steadily increased, and recent discoveries of the catalogues of five of the seven series of auction sales have thrown into bolder relief the activities of this remarkable man.

The Yales came from North Wales, where some of the other branches of the family still live. The first David Yale was a Doctor of Civil Law, an owner of attractive farm lands near Wrexham, and vicar-general of Bishop Lloyd of Chester. Their children fell in love. Thomas Yale married Ann Lloyd. Like many another Welshman, Thomas went to London to make his fortune. The family became parishioners of the celebrated John Davenport at St. Stephen's in Coleman Street, not far from the centre of the City's rapidly growing mercantile activity. There were three children—Thomas, Ann, and David. Then father Thomas died, and his widow married the rich and influential Theophilus Eaton, who had made a fortune in the Baltic trade and who was now looking towards the New World.

Three hundred years ago, in June 1637, the Eatons and the young Yales landed in Boston, Massachusetts, with a

considerable part of the Coleman Street congregation, looking for a new commercial centre. They found it at the mouth of the Quinnipiac River in Long Island Sound, where they settled in March 1638. They called their colony New Haven. Eaton was its Governor, and ruled it with a rod of iron. Only church members could vote or hold office. He had the say as to who were to be admitted to church membership. Step-son David was not admitted. So David left Connecticut, never to return, and went to Boston, glad to escape from that rigorous old Puritan Theophilus who presently had Ann Lloyd, the bishop's daughter, his wife, publicly tried for lying, convicted and excommunicated! That unhappy woman must have longed to join son David in his new house on Pemberton Hill. Here his wife Ursula bore him several children. Little did they think what the future had in store when Elihu was born, April 5, 1649.

David Yale was too good an episcopalian and too independent a Welshman to be able to endure for long the theocracy of Massachusetts Bay. Although he had bought a very comfortable house, according to the standards of those days, a house that was later to be occupied by Governor John Endicott, he soon decided to sell it and go back to London, where his father had been established. Accordingly Elihu, at the age of three, became one of the first emigrants to go from New England to Old England. For a time the family lived in Steelyard Court, on Tower Hill, where merchants rented quarters from the Baltic traders of the Hanseatic League.

Of Elihu's education little is known except that for a time he was a pupil of crotchety William Dugard, the twice-dismissed master of Merchant Taylors' School, who opened a private school in Coleman Street a couple of years before his death. Elihu was twelve years old at the time, about the average age of the 200 boys in the school. Whether the school was continued by his assistants after Dugard's death we do not know. That Elihu was in London, in the parish of Cripplegate, at the time of the Great Plague seems likely, for his father was one of those who, fearing death, made a will at that time, although he got over his illness and lived on for a quarter of a century.

Young Elihu may have received some business training

in his father's counting-house. At any rate, after the Great Fire of 1666, he does not appear to have attended school or college. And in his twenty-first year he was accepted by the powerful East India Company as a clerk, or 'writer.' For a year he was on duty serving an apprenticeship in its picturesque offices in Leadenhall Street. It must have amused him to pass daily under the striking façade, with its gigantic representation of the high stern of a great caravel, decorated with an elaborate mural painting of the three ships under full sail taken from the Company's coat of arms. This was surmounted by a vivid effigy of a merchant prince in the costume of the early Stuarts, flanked by two fierce leviathans resembling dolphins but undoubtedly intended to represent the armorial sea lions. From this ornate India House in the latter part of 1671 he was ordered to Madras, where he arrived the following June.

At Fort St. George, as the Directors of the East India Company called their factory, Elihu Yale was destined to live for twenty-seven years. In the beginning his salary, like that of the other junior clerks, or 'writers,' was £10 a year. To be sure, he had a room in the Fort House, a wood-and-adobe structure already sadly in need of repair; and he ate at the common mess with the other writers and factors. They were supposed to go to prayers every morning. The chaplain, the Rev. Patrick Warner, however, complained to the Directors that the young men were not regular in attendance. Worse than that, he says that 'some of the writers' are 'so sinful in their drunkenness that some of them play at cards and dice for wine that they may drink, and afterwards throwing the dice which shall pay all, and sometimes who shall drink all, by which some are forced to drink until they be worse than beasts.'

Among the soldiers in the fort matters were even worse. Among them 'horrid swearing and profanation, wilful and abominable drunkenness and uncleanness' . . . 'reigned and raged.' It was a pretty tough spot for a young and ambitious clerk. Probably Elihu was not one of the 'few of them' that were 'guilty' of excessive drinking, for he was one of the two writers who were chosen by the Governor of Madras to go to the Bay of Bengal as secretaries to Major Puckle, a London merchant whom the Directors sent out to inspect

their factories four years after Elihu's arrival. Major Puckle died while he was on his tour of inspection. But his secretaries survived; and on their way back to Madras they attended an auction of the effects of two Englishmen who had also succumbed to the local fevers, and spent some of their hard-earned cash.

Judging by the inventory of the sale, the taste of his co-writer Vincent Sayon was practical. He bought 'old shirts,' 'slipers,' and 'five paire of Breches.' Elihu, on the other hand, seems to have had a little more personal vanity, and, possibly, to have been more fond of the ladies. His purchases included 'six neckcloths,' a 'Scarfe,' a pair of silk stockings, a pair of lace cuffs, six small handkerchiefs, and a bone fan and piece of ribbon. Apparently he was not careless of his dress.

After five years Elihu and his friend Sayon were both promoted to the grade of 'factor,' and their salary was doubled. Elihu became 'warehousekeeper.' Under the rules promulgated by the Company in February 1674, he was permitted to engage in trade on his own account, provided it did not interfere with the chief business of the Company and take up precious space in homeward-bound ships. They could not trade in pepper or calico, two items of the greatest importance in the Company's business, and they could not trade in camphor or silk or rice or sugar-candy. But they were allowed to ship home 'Pearls, Diamonds, Rubies, Saphires, . . . Oyle of Mace, Cloves, Cinnamon and Nutmegs, Persia Carpets, Damasks of Persia, India, and Bengall, Gold and Silver Stuffs, Tortois Shells, Ophium, Cornelion Rings,' and a few other articles of high value and small size. These could be bought cheaply in India and sold at a great advance in London.

The diamond trade was particularly profitable. A discussion of the diamond mines near Madras and instructions as to how to handle precious stones and estimate their value had recently been printed in London in the English version of *The Six Voyages of John Baptista Tavernier*, a copy of which was later available in India. One of the diamond merchants in Fort St. George was a Portuguese Jew, Jaques de Paiva, who was highly thought of in London. His wife attracted Elihu. They may have given the young

factor some hints as to how to make money in precious stones.

But this kind of trade required capital, and that was soon forthcoming, due to a fortunate marriage. Joseph Hinmers, who ranked second in the Council of Fort St. George and was once acting Governor, had been in the East Indian trade for many years, and had accumulated quite a little property. His mother-in-law in England had several times sent him choice tobacco and hampers of wine. He subscribed liberally when Governor Master undertook to have a suitable church built in the fort. Before it was finished he died, as so many of his fellow-countrymen did in those early days in Madras.

Six months after Hinmers' death St. Mary's Church was completed and dedicated. A week later the first entry was made in the church register. It reads as follows: '1680, Nov. 4, Elihu Yale and Catherine Hinmers, relict of Joseph Hinmers. Given by the Rt. Worshipful Strensham Masters, Esq., Governor. Henry Oxenden and John Willcox, bridemen. Catherine Barker & Tryphena Ord, bridemaids.' Elihu was thirty-one; Catherine was thirty—a fine couple.

An elaborate tomb, still standing, erected to the memory of Joseph Hinmers, offers mute testimony to the fact that Elihu was now better able to secure a much needed supply of capital.

Our young Bostonian, barely thirty years old, had been promoted, meanwhile, by order of the Directors, to being one of the Justices of the Choultry, as the local court was called. He was entitled to be a member of the Council, but he did not take his seat until the arrival of a new Governor, 'the Worshipful' William Gyfford, who came in July 1681 to replace vigorous Streynsham Master.

Immediately Elihu Yale, now Mintmaster and ranking fifth in the Council, becomes a person of real importance in Fort St. George. His faithful services had made a good impression at home. He was destined for more interesting tasks in India. A new factory was desired for a favourable spot twenty-five miles down the coast. To Elihu, Governor Gyfford entrusted the mission. Its significance was emphasised by the ceremonies which accompanied his departure and return. When he left, the Governor and the Council went out of the fort with him as far as 'Mr. Bridger's Garden,'

where a supper was provided for a dozen of the principal residents. He was given two white assistants and a respectable retinue, and 2000 gold pagodas, worth about £900. His mission was successful. He returned a month later with the desired 'cowle' granting permission to set up a station at Gingee, in the country of the Maharattas. He had 'preserved the Honourable Company's honour and their money too'! Upon his arrival he was greeted with military honours. On account of the cowle from the Rajah of Gingee a salute of twenty-one guns was fired. And, in acknowledgment of 'his good services and the success he had in the management of the business he went about,' eleven guns were fired for 'Mr. Elihu Yale'! This was recognition indeed. And it was not yet a decade since he had landed on the hot sands of Madras, an unknown clerk at £10 a year.

His advancement and his prospects must have been talked about even in Wales. The owner of the beautiful estate known as Erddig Hall, near Wrexham, a neighbour of Elihu's father David, sent him 'four Rundletts of Sandpatch Ale.' The letter of thanks, which is still preserved at Erddig, throws a pleasant light on his habits of thought as well as his power of expression. He modestly expresses surprise at the generosity of the gift. He praises the character of the ale which had twice passed through the Torrid Zone without losing 'the least Tincture of its Native Complection.' In an effort to express his appreciation properly, he follows the fashion of the times in becoming rather stilted in his choice of language: 'certainly you have out-arted the Virtuoso's Notion of Transfution; this being the only practicall Hypothesis to create and renew our English bloods.' But he realises that 'fair words and praises are no price Currant for Ale,' and so sends his friend a jar filled with 'our best Mango Atchar' (chutney) and to the lady of Erddig a 'Japan Skreen.' Elihu had a good sense of obligation and a happy way of expressing himself.

In July 1682, just ten years after his arrival, he was again promoted, becoming fourth in the Council and given the title of 'Customer,' or officer in charge of customs duties on imports and exports. Six months later, thanks to the dislike of imperious Sir Josiah Child, Governor of the Company in London, for the tone of some of the communications which

had come from India, and his belief that a high ranking member of the Council was partly responsible, another vacancy occurred, and again Elihu was promoted. As third-in-command he was put in charge of movable property, and particularly of the chests of gold as they arrived from England. He was extremely regular in his attendance upon the semi-weekly meetings of the Council. There was a good deal of illness. Governor Gyfford was frequently reported as indisposed. In July 1684 John Bigrig, the popular second-in-command, died, 'to the great trouble of all that knew him,' as the official record has it. Elihu Yale took his place.

The Company wanted Governor Gyfford to go on a tour of inspection to the factories in the Bay of Bengal. He left Madras in August, putting Elihu in charge of the fort and of the Company's affairs on the Coromandel coast. For five months 'the Chief,' as the acting-Governor was called, performed his duties satisfactorily—so much so, in fact, that the Directors decided to remove the somewhat sickly Mr. Gyfford and make Elihu Yale, at the age of thirty-eight, President of Madras and Governor of Fort St. George.

News of these changes came quite unexpectedly. The minutes of the Council, the 'Consultation Book,' give a rather graphic picture of the events of the day and lead one to take a favourable view of the character of the new Governor. 'The Councill being mett the box of Letters [from London] was opened and perused and Mr. Yale, being much concerned for, & very unwilling to displace President Gyfford, supposing the orders only proceeded from the Rt. Honble. Compas. Beleife of his absence, desired the Councill to take itt into their consideration, & if possible to excuse his taking his place, till President Gyfford's departure, which he intended by the next Ship.' Evidently our young man was modest and not eager for power.

The Council, however, after studying the documents, came to the conclusion that Gyfford's commission was revoked and that Yale could not be excused from immediately assuming his responsibilities, 'which was also President Gyfford's opinion, who willingly & readily consented thereto & . . . gave the Chair to Mr. Yale, as also the charge of the Fort, which being recd with many curteous assurances of continued respects, & the usuall salutes of Guns, Mr. Yale

and the Councill waited upon President Gyfford out of the Fort, where they took a kind leave.' It is a pleasant picture and in striking contrast to Council meetings which were to follow in the course of the next five years.

A new face appeared at the Council table that day for the first time, one William Fraser, a factor who had come out some two years previously. He was a born trouble-maker, cantankerous and ambitious. Capable of inspiring respect on first acquaintance, he won the confidence of his superiors and then made them sorry they had ever seen him. Before long he began to undermine the influence of the new Governor and to poison the minds of the Council against him.

By this time Catherine Elford (Hinmers) had borne four children to Elihu Yale. There were three daughters—Catherine, Anne, named for one grandmother, and Ursula, named for the other. A son David, named for Elihu's father, must have been a great joy; but only for a short time, for the little boy died soon after his father became Governor. This was too much for the Governor's lady. So she did what so many Anglo-Indians have done in the centuries of British occupation—she took her little brood to be educated in England. She also took some diamonds and other jewels with her, which the Directors graciously permitted her to bring in free of duty. Unfortunately she had to leave the forty-year-old Governor in India, and did not see him again for ten years.

She was a fine woman—came of good English stock, not an adventuress or a half-breed, as some of his enemies later reported. She did well by her children, saw that they got a good education and were acceptable as wives for the scions of some of the most distinguished families in England in the days of Queen Anne. As long as she was with Elihu in India, he was respected, modest, faithful and trusted. After she left, he seemed to change. It may have been due in part to the loss of his only son. It may have been due to his lofty position as Governor. It may have been due to the hot tropics and his never having had a vacation in a colder climate for twenty years. Whatever the reason, he did change. He was no longer the gracious friend, protesting that the gift of ale was too good for him and a marvellous substitute

for a blood transfusion. He was no longer the modest official, hesitant about accepting the new honours that had been thrust upon him and urging Governor Gyfford to continue as Governor as long as he remained in Madras. He was domineering, opinionated, aggressive, and unable to hold the confidence or the respect of the other members of the Council. Undoubtedly William Fraser had something to do with it. But if the Governor had been the Elihu Yale of his early married life, or of his accession to the supreme power as he was before his son died and his wife went back to England, it is not likely that he would have forced measures through against the opposition of practically all the members of his Council. Something changed him.

He was Governor of Fort St. George for five years. During his administration a municipal government was set up in Madras. The Directors of the Company expected more to be done in the way of local taxes. Thanks to the orderly conditions of life under the ægis of British rule, thousands of natives had come to live in what was known as 'Blacktown.' The Great Mogul Aurungzeb was engaged in extending his conquests in India. He was much annoyed at the attitude shown by the Company under the aggressive policy of Sir Josiah Child in Bengal. To Governor Yale it seemed the part of wisdom to put the fort in proper condition for withstanding an attack. In a manner surprising in a civilian not trained in military arts, he issued orders for the more efficient training of the troops and the mustering of possible auxiliary forces. A census of the able-bodied was ordered. The Council was afraid of some of his measures. It was feared that if the Portuguese merchants, largely Jews, were mustered they might decide to leave the town and go back to their own settlements, which would have a bad effect on trade and also on the attitude of the natives.

The Governor understood the importance of making a display of force to impress any disaffected elements. On New Year's Day, 1690, a review was held, the garrison soldiers giving the city 'Trainbands' lessons in the 'methods of the military exercise.' The Christian inhabitants and the soldiers marched out of the fort to an open field in the country, 'where they did form and order them in a battalion.' After which a 'handsome dinner' was provided for all.

Governor Yale decided to do the best he could to fortify Blacktown by throwing up earthworks. This was the occasion for a violent disagreement with the Council. Under the leadership of William Fraser, the members had already begun to enter on the 'Consultation Book' their private opinion of the Governor's wishes regarding shipments of inferior grades of cloth to England. In such matters he yielded to the Council's majority. But when it came to plans for defending Madras he decided to act on his own responsibility. Since this involved the expenditure of Company funds, his enemies on the Council were able to make the Directors believe that the Governor was wasting money on foolish projects.

In September 1690 four of the five members signed a memorial to the Directors charging Governor Yale with 'unjust, irregular, arbitrary and unwarrantable proceedings' They alleged he was 'false to his trust.' This sounds very serious. But when one finds in the 'Diary and Consultation Book' that these four, including Fraser, signed a protest against the Governor's having acted without consulting them when the French fleet appeared off the fort in August, their actions reflect more credit on him than on themselves.

Yale's official entry in the book, apparently written during the engagement, is in part as follows:

> The french fleet of Seaven Saile appearing about 8 this morning the Garrison was allarm'd, the Gates shutt and orders given for all Persons to repair to their Severall Posts, the Gunners to gett the Gunns &c in readyness and all possible preparation made to offend the Enimy and defend the place, Capt. Heath ordered aboard his Ship with 60 Soldiers, besides officers, and reformadoes and notice and assistance given to all the other Shipps to prepare for an engagement. . . . God grant us Success.

Although the French were driven off with small loss, to the English, of men or ships, partly due to the prompt action of the Governor, the disaffected members of the Council were led by Fraser to enter their complaints in the official record. There had been no summoning of the Council or getting their advice. This was resented. Fraser even complained of the way the soldiers were distributed. It is significant that this entry (and others of a similar nature) was dated more

than a month after the battle, and a few days after they had sent off their letter of protest to the Directors. It was evidence of 'arbitrary' and 'irregular' although hardly of 'unwarrantable' proceedings. When it came to acting quickly in an emergency, Governor Yale did not stand on ceremony and was willing to assume responsibility. It must have angered him extremely to find entries of this kind placed on the official record. No wonder he became even more arbitrary and uncompromising in his dealings.

There were charges and counter-charges. Ugly rumours flew thick and fast. Two members of the Council died of fever. He was accused of poisoning them. It was said he put his groom to death for taking a favourite horse out without orders. There is no evidence of it. It was reported that in his 'garden house' he kept two mistresses. This seems to have been at least partly true, since one of them, Hieronima, the widow of the Portuguese Jew diamond merchant Jaques de Paiva, bore him a son, Charles, who with his mother was buried in Capetown twenty years later.

In 1692 orders came relieving Yale of his command and commissioning another New Englander, Nathaniel Higginson, as Governor in his place. Sir John Goldsborough was sent out to investigate the charges. There were prolonged hearings. Yale appealed to the Privy Council through his brother in London for a redress of grievances This led to an investigation of the juridical powers of the East India Company. Finally, the former Governor, after seven years of residence as a private trader in Madras, was permitted to go home in state on one of the largest and best ships, as befitted his rank and wealth. He had accumulated a large fortune, the equivalent to-day of about £1,000,000. He had become an associate in the diamond trade of none other than the famous Thomas Pitt, grandfather of the Earl of Chatham, and at that time Governor of Madras. As a real 'Nabob' he lived in considerable state, rarely went out without being accompanied by a lackey, and took pleasure, at first, in being well dressed. As time went on he became a 'bubble,' an 'easy mark' for painters and dealers in all sorts of art objects and 'curiosities.' He was not interested in politics, although both sons-in-law were at times members of Parliament. Besides a large house in Queen Square, he had two in South-

ampton Row and another in Brunswick Row. He also had a seat in the country, Plas Grono, near Wrexham, a modest but comfortable house built about this time.

He seems to have been really fond of North Wales. He was High Sheriff of Denbighshire in 1704. He made acceptable presents to the Wrexham Church, whose beautiful tower was one of the 'seven wonders' of Wales. He took such an interest in the services, and he had such influence with the vestry, that he received permission to build a gallery for himself and his family across the arch of the chancel, just back of the pulpit and in the place where a rood-screen may have been. On the south wall of the chancel, where he could enjoy seeing the names of his father, mother, brothers, and aunt as he sat in his gallery facing the congregation, he placed a richly carved memorial tablet bearing the arms of his family. When he got too old and feeble to enjoy climbing up the steep stairs to the gallery he got the vestry to move it away to the west end of the nave. One wonders whether in any other church in Britain such a gallery was permitted. Its very existence was a tribute to the originality as well as to the power and influence of 'Governor' Yale, as he was called. He was accustomed to having his own way.

In 1711 he attracted the attention of Jeremy Dummer, a brilliant graduate of Harvard and Utrecht whose efforts to impress the Boston Harvard alumni with his learning had not been successful, and who was practising law in London and acting as the agent for friends in Connecticut. Learning that the Nabob was looking about for some means of perpetuating his name, had sent to America for one of his cousins to adopt as his heir, and had contemplated making a gift to Oxford, Dummer talked to him about a new college which had been started in the land where his father and grandmother once lived. Dummer persuaded him to give some forty books to the new institution. He also stirred up the folks at home to see what they could do.

Early in 1718 Dummer's friend, the famous Cotton Mather, a Boston divine who had been a Harvard Overseer at an early age and a member of the corporation, but who had twice been disappointed in his ambition to be the president of that pioneer seat of learning, wrote Elihu Yale a letter suggesting that well-placed gifts might secure for the

Governor both spiritual and material rewards. If bestowed on the little college in Connecticut they might obtain for him such a 'commemoration and perpetuation' of his name 'as would indeed be much better than an Egyptian pyramid.' This was tempting bait.

Furthermore, just at this time, the young cousin who had come over from America four years before to be his heir seems to have offended Elihu by demonstrating a strong affinity for the religious views of Dissenters. He was permitted to abandon his studies at Cambridge and hasten back to North Haven, Connecticut, where, at the age of eighteen, he was promptly made a deacon of the extremely dissentient church there. Had young David Yale not been such an ardent Nonconformist, cousin Elihu might not have been so willing to listen to the suggestions of disgruntled Harvard alumni. He did demur at helping an 'academy of Dissenters,' but was persuaded by Dummer that 'there's no better way to make men sensible of' the orthodoxy of the Church of England 'than by giving them good learning.'

So the 'commencement' exercises of the struggling college in New Haven in September 1718 were made thrilling by the announcement that there had arrived from London some 300 books for the library, a portrait of the King by a celebrated artist, the King's arms, and two trunks of valuable textiles, the whole valued at £800, together with an indication that this was only the beginning of generous attentions from their new patron, Elihu Yale. The name of the college was promptly changed. The unauthorised promises of Cotton Mather and Jeremy Dummer were made good. The 'commencement' programme, already printed, was destroyed and a new one prepared, bearing for the first time the official designation: YALE COLLEGE. The patron was reported to be well pleased at the news, and to make renewed promises of assistance.

Unfortunately, misfortune and illness now beset the ageing Nabob. He made but one more gift to the college. He started the preparation of a will in which it was a beneficiary, but failed to sign it. He was now seventy years old—an aged man for those days. An agent of the Treasury, a friend on whose bond he had gone for £40,000, absconded. Although the accounts were found to be only £13,000 short,

the Government collected the entire amount of the bond—an act of injustice upheld by the courts and the House of Lords.

A fire destroyed a valuable part of his collections, although enough was left to form the basis for more than thirty auction sales, as has been mentioned. He still had about 2000 books, largely theological works—many in Latin. Of his thousands of paintings, a few were by such masters as Rembrandt, Breughel, Teniers, Wouwerman, Van Dyck, Salvator Rosa, Sir Godfrey Kneller, and Sir Peter Lely. Dozens of his watches bore well-known signatures. He had pearls, diamonds, emeralds and rubies in fantastic amounts. He seems to have been unable to resist buying whatever offered in the way of objects of beauty or interest.

Of his friends we know little, except that he was a crony of 'the ingenious' Sir Charles Ludovic Cotterell, Master of the Ceremonies in the reign of Queen Anne, and that he once made a loan to Sir Richard Steele, who, as usual, found difficulty in paying it.

His death, as we have seen, was a matter of public interest. His epitaph, written possibly by him or his son-in-law Dudley North, or someone familiar with Shirley's popular song, 'The Glories of our Blood and State,' gives this striking epitome of his colourful life:

> Born in *America*, in *Europe* bred,
> In *Afric* travell'd, and in *Asia* wed,
> Where long he liv'd, and thriv'd; at *London* dead.
> Much good, some ill, he did; so hope all's even,
> And that his soul, through mercy's gone to heaven
> You that survive, and read, take care
> For this most certain exit to prepare:
> For only the actions of the just
> Smell sweet and blossom in the dust.

HIRAM BINGHAM.

THE TURN IN SPAIN

By Robert Sencourt

After Franco had captured Oviedo and Gijón, his resources gave him an overwhelming advantage. He had then become the possessor of practically every mine in Spain, not only the coal and iron mines of Asturias and tin and iron mines near Bilbao, but he had also in the North the Rio Tinto, Tharsis, and Peñaroya Mines; all these provided him with essential materials for munitions. He had also captured in his last advance a number of munition factories, which could make full use of his copper and pyrites. In his enemy's territories there were no mines but those at Almaden for quicksilver, and those at Utrillas for coal. They were therefore entirely dependent on foreign supplies for their support, and these had come in considerable amounts. Mr. Eden, speaking on December 8, 1937, in the House of Commons, said he could not assure the House that they were less than any that had been sent to Franco. There is much to show that they were considerably more. Some came in ships, belonging to the firm of Billmeier, flying the British flag; more came in across the French frontier at Puigcerdà and Port Bou But generous as these supplies were, they could not cope with the enormous resources gradually accumulating from Franco's own mines and factories; and it cannot be doubted that he was enabled to make the most of these by receiving technical assistance from sympathetic foreigners. Foremost among these were the great English mines of Rio Tinto, working as a private company. It provided Franco, on credit, with goods essential to the conduct of the war, and valued by the company at £2,225,000.

Apart from the enormous resources thus accumulating from month to month, Franco had also shortened his front by 200 miles and released trained troops to the number of

perhaps 100,000. He had also recruited supporters in the territories he had conquered. He had yet another advantage. The campaign in the North had given him excellent training in his special strategy and the exploitation of terrain. Franco concentrated on his maps. He looked for every path, every ravine, every height by which he could convey forces to take the enemy's positions in the rear and cut off their supplies. It was by this strategy that he had captured Mount Udala, that he had advanced through the mountainous region of Biscay to take Bilbao, and that after some weeks of further preparation he had advanced through the region of Montaña to take Santander. In each case topography played the same part; finding himself checked in his direct advance by a strongly fortified line, he drove far afield until he found a neglected spot, and on this he concentrated his men for a peculiar strategy founded on the final advances of Foch in October 1918.

The last display of this method had been the most striking of all. When he turned towards Gijón he found himself at Ribadesella in front of an apparently impregnable position Across the wide reaches of a little river, the defenders had fortified themselves in fissures in solid rock. For a time it seemed as though Franco's advance was stayed. But in the meantime, through deep mountain valleys, and often under cover of mist and rain, his troops were advancing to all the tracks which led through the Picos de Europa. Pass after pass fell to his attacks with machine-guns and light artillery drawn up to points of vantage. He thus drove down to Covadonga and Cangas de Onis, and finally took Ribadesella from behind. The Anarchist leaders then fled from Gijón, the miners in the region of Oviedo surrendered, and by the end of October the whole region was in his hands, and he was accumulating the resources we have mentioned, not only in captured munition factories at Guernica, Trubia, Reinosa and Aviles, but in the whole region round Bilbao, as well as in the South.

It had, however, taken him the whole summer to complete this operation, and his victory was hardly achieved before the Moors were immobilised by the Fast of Ramadan, which compelled them to abandon their food and drink between sunrise and sunset. Apart from this the broken bridges led to much congestion at the weaker points, and it was many

weeks before he was able to transport his troops into Aragon. When they did arrive the bitter winter weather was against them, and Franco had again weeks of work in preparing his examination of the line of 1000 miles from which he must now select the most suitable opportunities for his peculiar strategy. The salient of Teruel gave him one enormous advantage; for it enabled him to move troops either towards Sigüenza or Saragossa by road and train, while his enemy must employ a much longer and more difficult road—and no train. Much of that road was already encumbered by the transport which brought to the half million in Madrid their sparse supplies of food.

It was obvious that Franco's strategy must be based on the advantage given him by the Teruel salient. South of Madrid he could not easily mass troops; he would have a difficult terrain, and little advantage in it when captured, unless at the mines of Almaden. North of Saragossa, on the other hand, the country was so mountainous and the weather so icy that nothing could be attempted in the winter months. Franco concentrated on cutting off Madrid's food supplies, and was exploring and concentrating in the country south of Sigüenza, where the rashness of the Italians had received a memorable check in the preceding March. Their *échelon* had been too thin, their advance too rapid, and weather had been against them. Franco hoped to achieve by his deliberate Spanish methods what dash and enterprise had too lightly hazarded. It was while these plans were developing that he was caught napping by the brilliant advance of his enemy at Teruel.

The opposing generals had made him their model. Collecting in the snowy valleys of Aragon, they rushed at Teruel from either side before any plans for defence could be made by the shivering outposts, who came in from the chill wind and the snow to their fires; the attack was well prepared and bravely executed, and, though the defence was valorous, at last on January 6 the nerves of Rey, the commander, broke, and, in spite of altercation with officers of more stubborn character, Rey surrendered. The capture of Teruel was followed by some ugly massacres by the incoming forces, and as many as seventy priests lost their lives. But this tragedy was a minor episode in the grim carnage to the west of Teruel.

Although the weather was bitter, and the soldiers were dressed as for a Polar expedition, great forces were flung up from Franco's reserves near Calatayud. Their assault was stubbornly resisted. For five weeks the struggle continued, and then in brighter weather Franco was once again able to employ his typical strategy. His principal embarrassment had been that his transport had been shelled from the Siera Palomera on his left flank. His men had been exploring its recesses; ascending by secluded tracks and again cutting their communications, they once more took the enemy's position in the rear. The capture of this large area exposed the enemy's whole position, and a return of sun gave Franco's airmen their chance. Teruel was recaptured on February 20, 1938.

That was the end of the long stalemate on the 1000 miles of battle line. The Republican forces had fought with the utmost gallantry, but for an objective that had become worth nothing, and from which, after appalling losses, they were ousted after two months of racking battle. For those grim weeks of fighting in the snow had been a far more tragic experience than when, almost without a shot, the front lines had surveyed one another, often very good-naturedly, in the preceding months. Apart from the biting weather, the machinery of war had shown itself in all its terror. Casualties estimated at 40,000 conveyed a ghastly memory of amputated limbs, of entrails ripped out and palpitating in the snow, of shrieks, writhings and torments, of men operated on without anæsthetics, of bombs and bullets hailing from the air, of victims dropping down in the snow to freeze to death. And all for what? The hopelessness of the Republican cause was becoming tragically obvious, and already the most seasoned and valiant men were *hors de combat.*

Franco meanwhile had changed his plans. The attack towards Guadalajara was abandoned, and the new drive came down the Ebro Valley towards Caspe and Alcañiz. For a while the River Ebro seemed to provide a rampart, but General Yagüe, who had always shown enterprise in his advance on Madrid, now managed to effect a crossing, while further advances were made at Huesca and Portal Rubio. Before March had ended, Franco's troops had entered Catalonia, and in many cases were given a triumphal welcome in the villages. For some days they were held up in front of

Lérida, a picturesque little provincial capital, where a line of houses along the River Segre gives shelter normally to the population of 22,000 people. Placed at the mouth of several great valleys into the Pyrenees, and of several roads leading across the coast ranges into Aragon, it had been famous since Cæsar captured it in B.C. 49. This little town is dominated by the high towers of its ancient cathedral in the *castello*, or fort, where a brave effort at defence was made, and where some of Franco's forces were ambushed. This was captured on April 4, and then for some days Franco's advance was stayed while, in his determination, as always, to spare his men as much as he could, he explored the long coastal range stretching from the Pyrenees to beyond Castellón de la Plana; but by Good Friday his forces on a front of 15 miles were on the sea. Nationalist Spain was cut in two.

The rapidity of the advance was first ascribed by the Republicans to enormous accession of foreign aeroplanes. This fact cannot be proved, nor is it of vital importance. An attentive study of Franco's generalship and his resources show that at the most such aeroplanes, if they existed, could only accelerate a result which, in the long run, was inevitable. The surprise was that it had not come before, and the delay is another proof of Franco's thoroughness of preparation. It depended not only on generalship and munitions, but also on economic resources which were also overwhelming The large supplies of munitions which came from France into Catalonia invited air attacks; but they were not enough to stem Franco's attack.

Though Catalonia was one of the most prosperous areas of Spain, it depended on its manufactures which were sold to the rest of Spain. Without that trade it would be ruined. The Catalan question, therefore, is rather complicated: thrifty and industrious, the people earned more than elsewhere—unless, perhaps, in Biscay; but their earnings depended on their exports, and the rest of Spain, which provided a market, was anxious that the Catalans should not enjoy both the profits and the exemptions. Apart from this, the question of the language had been revived, and, in a country less Irish than Spain, an accommodation might easily have been made. It is hardly worth the while of the Catalans to refuse to speak Castilian if the result is that they

lose their markets, their business dwindles, their property is confiscated, and their balances disappear. Of all parts of Spain affected by the war, Catalonia has suffered most.

The sharp eye of M. Tharaud had noticed already in 1936 that the people then had been stampeded by 'ne'er-do-weels' from Murcia and Alicante, who had brought fresh venom into the Anarchist minorities in the province. In Catalonia the idea of Fascism had in past centuries taken form in the Somaten, a body of citizens who combined to guarantee order when the Government's police were ineffective. It is a monument to the native shrewdness and order of the province, of which we have lately received a fascinating and scholarly account in the *Catalonia Infelix* of Professor Allison Peers.

This region has been particularly unfortunate in the war, and so to a large extent has the whole eastern area. Around Valencia on the one side are the orange-groves which give the air at this season such an exquisite perfume, and to the south those fertile fields which, still dependent on a Moorish system of irrigation, are normally the vegetable gardens of Castile. But they have suffered from the lack of transport as well as of exchange. It is true that the great olive-yards of La Mancha are also in this territory, but the solemn wheat lands of Castile, the sausages of Estremadura, and the dairy produce of Montaña and Galicia all came under the control of Franco early in the war. In this territory life has for the most part been normal, disorder extremely rare ; supplies have always been plentiful and cheap for the inhabitants. It is hard for the starving people in Madrid, where a boiled cat is a luxury, to hear over the wireless that at Avila (only two hours away by normal trains) an excellent meal of four courses can still be had for two and a half pesetas.

But these generous supplies of meal and wheat—ample enough to share with all Spain—are not the only economic asset of Franco's territory. England has paid him millions of pounds for sherry, malaga, seville oranges, and tomatoes. Few Englishmen realise how many hundreds of thousands of pounds they pay for the fruit and vegetables of the Canary Islands, for their marmalade from Andalusia, or that their sherry bill has given Franco some £2,500,000. In normal years Spain's balance of trade with England is some £7,000,000

in Spain's favour. By careful management that balance in 1937 was still £7,000,000, and almost all of this went to Franco's Spain. Few Englishmen have realised how dependent on England's support Franco has been. They know that he has received aeroplanes from Germany and from Italy: they believed that these were a present given to insure Spanish help in a coming war, and might involve the Balearic Islands. They did not know that they have been paid for by exports from Spanish mines—exports essential to the munitions of Germany and Italy; nor that these exports of munitions have also been made to England at the normal rate.

The plain fact is that the friendship of Franco's territory is worth having for England as well as Germany and Italy. Franco was able to replace from other sources the supplies of copper and pyrites he refused to export to her (for they were liable to be sent back as munitions to his enemies). But England's plans for defence would be embarrassed without the support of his mines, and who among us is prepared to forego his sherry, his marmalade and his tomatoes?

If we value those, he is equally conscious of the financial support he owes to us, and, indeed, the relation of the two organisms is far closer than our democrats have dreamed. And yet they should have realised that Franco's aeroplanes, whatever their source, would be useless without petrol. Could that petrol come from Italy or from Germany? It is a very generous supply, and it came from somewhere.

The economic facts are paralleled by political ideals. Freedom is prized above all price by those who speak the English language. They vibrate to Byron's mighty lines:

> Yet, freedom, yet, thy banner torn but flying,
> Streams like a thunder cloud against the wind.

They resent in any country any menace to the growth and glory of liberty. But they seldom ask how much of it exists for a man who walks in danger of his life, or fails to get his daily bread. When those are lacking, a parliamentary system may be more an incubus than a privilege.

That is the situation which Franco came to remedy. It was to find freedom through social reform: it was to help and strengthen the people by insisting on general responsibilities, on guaranteed sustenance, on warmth and comfort.

No hearth without a fire and no home without bread! There Franco sees the beginning of freedom for Spain.

'We have energetically taken up the cause of social reform as a consecrated task.' That was the keynote of his first great official pronouncement at Burgos eighteen months ago. Political liberty, he said shrewdly, was a farce unless there was economic liberty. Local privileges, local communities, were inherent in the history of Spain. His belief is that the 'democracy' his country had known had been a mere mechanism of electoral regulations and votes given at the instigation of the *cacique*; it was a conventional formula, and not the valid expression of the people's will. But they did want justice, comfort, moral and economic order, an upper class conscious of responsibility, a division of wealth enough to keep any family from starving or shivering. What our acute observer, Richard Ford, wrote of Spain 100 years ago—that the fanciful theories of foreigners, and the failure and misery of constitutional crudities, have 'seared the fertile valleys of Spain with blighting desolation'—has been particularly obvious in our lifetime. It is to replace the fancy by the fact that Franco labours. He is more English, therefore, than we have dreamed. The words he uses are Service, Hierarchy, and Brotherhood; we should say Hard Work, Tact, and Playing the Game. But the Spaniard's ritual of life is more obvious and, for the masses, more courtly than ours. Borrow noticed, as he went about Spain selling his Bibles, that, in spite of an inherent cruelty and ferocity in their history, the people had the most gracious consideration for men of every class; and a very real sense of the dignity of human nature in itself. The question is, how can one make it practical? Already in the time of Primo de Rivera, Ramiro de Maeztu, who was massacred early in the war, had been arguing that accuracy of thought, precision and punctuality have a spiritual value, because they show how a man knows how to value and use his time so as to train his character for eternity. In that sense Spain has still much to learn and Franco much to teach; but every one of such lessons brings him closer to the value we English set on our own freedom. Physical welfare and social justice compared with a vote and resultant anarchy are as the bean of freedom compared to its withered pod.

In this country there has been as much misunderstanding of what life actually means in relation to government on the opposing sides of Spain as there has been ignorance of their military and economic resources—and exchanges. In both directions, ideals and business, or politics and trade, Franco is linked with England as Azaña has never been.

In actual pronouncements this has been made clear. Franco's relations with our Embassy at Hendaye were always conciliatory and courteous; Azaña's speech on the anniversary of the war's commencement was anything but cordial to either England or the Non-intervention Committee.

Another point on which we are apt to lack correct information is the relation of other countries to the Spanish trouble. That struggle did not commence suddenly. The disorders which occasioned Franco's rising were not the work of unaided Spanish Anarchists. Russia had for years been concentrating on Spain. These efforts were redoubled after the elections in 1936. Early in April, as the correspondent of *The Times* in Riga has noted more than once, the Moscow organisations of the Comminiern and the Profintern issued reports with reference to the situation in Spain and plans for the future, and strengthened their offices in Paris. A group of expert revolutionaries, with Bela Kun at their head, arrived on March 4 at Barcelona. Before that time, there was no evidence of German or Italian intervention; but soon afterwards German war material began also to arrive, and it was known to all the embassies that a crash was imminent. It is often supposed in this country that the 'Axis' had the most sinister plans aimed at France and England through Spain. No evidence for such sinister intentions has yet been brought forward—though it is widely known that Mussolini was making every effort to make Eden's situation untenable. As Mussolini had already shown after the failure of the Migration Conference in 1924, he was a man of obstinate and Machiavellian resource if foiled in what he considered just demands. None but vague and unlikely hypotheses, however, can be suggested as the terms on which Franco accepted foreign help—whether it was the English aeroplane which brought him from Teneriffe to Tetuan, or the Italian aeroplane which brought him some weeks later from Tetuan to Seville. Leaving the wild conjectures which have been current, we

may accept a much simpler explanation of German and Italian intervention: a Bolshevist Spain would immensely have strengthened the resources of the Moscow agencies in France, where, even before the Spanish War broke out, one saw the Communist agitation to be menacing, especially in and around Marseilles. If Spain, and then France, were to become Bolshevist, Mussolini would find that the Straits of Gibraltar, through which pass four-fifths of his sea-borne trade, were a gateway likely to close against him. Furthermore, in our days the power of offensive extends through the upper air to a distance of 300 miles beyond the coasts. With the Balearic Islands and Spanish Morocco as air bases, as well as the coast of Spain, the whole Western Mediterranean would pass into the hand of that hostile force to quell which Mussolini first rose to power.

But if this situation was a warning to Mussolini, it was hardly less obvious to Hitler. Hitler also rose to power to quell Communism by taking many of its social objects and making war on its organisations. Population makes it a menace even if confined to Russia alone: in 1933 the figure was given at 163,000,000, of which four-fifths were agricultural. It is an indisputable fact that agricultural populations show increase at a much more rapid rate than industrial populations; and it is believed that the Russian population is increasing at the rate of from 1,500,000, or even 2,000,000, a year. If this force were increased on the other side of Germany by the highly developed organism of France, Hitler's position would be a very nasty one indeed. Apart from this, there was a German colony of 30,000 in Barcelona. Hitler had reasons as urgent as those of Mussolini for defending himself in Spain. Both were also interested, as we have seen, in the products of the Spanish mines. There is strong reason to think that the interests of both Germany and Italy in Spain were kindred to our own interests there. Italy would not be in agreement now, had her aims been sinister.

Common-sense as such contentions are, they still sound novel. The reason is that the Spanish War has been fought out in ideologies, and the dislike of 'Fascism' in this country is so great that, when once the idea of it is suggested, facts are apt to slip into the background. Spain had become the

battleground of the opposing forces of Left and Right. The interest which our Labour Party and the *Front Populaire* feel in the Republican cause in Spain is as natural as that of Hitler and Mussolini in the other side. Were the Left to have won, a strong push towards the Left would have been given to the political situation in Western Europe. Now, however, that Republican Spain is cut in two, it is plain to all that Franco is winning: even on the Left it is generally felt that military support for the Republicans would be as cruel as it is useless. All parties in France and England should waste no more time in making arrangements accordingly.

One of the first arrangements needful is that sketched in this article—to explain Franco's Spain to England; but not less necessary is it for Franco's friends to come forward with plans of wisdom and moderation. He is hardly likely to listen to his enemies; but his friends have a claim on his attention. The friends of National Spain have now a striking opportunity; and, apart from their influence on their Spanish friends, might they not unite with others in this country in turning their organization and resources to founding in this country a centre for exploring Spain's rich genius and language? The spiritual gifts she offers us are not less generous and noble than her wines, not less vast, untrodden and picturesque than her *sierras*, not less unique and romantic than her ever-changing peoples.

Diplomatic recognition of Franco would, according to our precedents, naturally come when he has obtained possession of the whole organism of government. That cannot be long delayed. Already by the middle of April he was already in possession of four-fifths of the total territories belonging to Spain, and the summer weather will shine on prepared advances.

Events in Europe have cleared up the situation so far as to enable us to look with clear gaze at the prospect of Spain at peace with herself and with other nations Her friendship with Italy need no longer disturb us any more than it did in the happy days of King Alfonso. Mr. Eden's resignation came too late to save the independence of Austria; but that very fact has had its compensations. It warned the Italian people so dramatically of the danger of being on bad terms with England, that Mussolini was very glad to come to terms.

Our strategic preoccupation with Spain, therefore, is no longer dependent upon what Italy is doing there: the friendship of those who have a special interest in the Mediterranean is cemented by the common concern which they must all feel henceforward in the future of Trieste. Rivalries in the Mediterranean are neither normal nor even feasible. It is imperative both for the trade on which people live and for reasons of high strategy that we should be on good terms with France, with Italy, and with Spain; and all these with one another. No interests clash. The difficulties that have arisen were all made by a country as remote as Russia, aided by parties and factions to whom hatred of capitalism is a mania, and who for the most part hate also the continuity of civilisation and therefore the authority and religion which guard and enlarge on freedom. Against these factions, as fierce as they are misguided, Franco has brought to bear the forces of sanity; they have now prevailed. It is the truth which makes us free. The forces of sanity are the forces of freedom.

What is freedom? It is the full development of our energies in the peace of an organised and harmonious society with ideals as welcome to the Liberal as they are to the Conservative. Remembering that it is with the most careful consideration for the masses of the people that Franco has already engaged in the reform of Spain, let us therefore prepare for normal relations with his Government. We owe it to the sacred cause of freedom. We owe it to the Spanish people in their sufferings. We owe it to the cause of peace. And we owe it to those of our own people who cannot earn their daily bread but by their honourable exchanges with Spain, and by normal traffic through the Mediterranean.

ROBERT SENCOURT.

A PARAGRAPH IN A PAPER

By Sir John Squire

In August 1923 an old Cambridge friend and I, tired of work, decided to go to Monte Carlo, bathe, sun-bathe and play a slow system. In those days nobody went to the Riviera at that time of year; and our friends tried to frighten us by saying that all the best hotels would be shut, that nobody would be there except day-trippers, and that we should be fried by the sun. We went, nevertheless, and enjoyed ourselves. A paragraph in a paper has recalled it all to me.

It was the second morning of my stay in Monte Carlo. I had had a very good two hours at the roulette-table. The system moved extraordinarily fast; nothing went wrong; there were nice short runs; I simply scooped in the counters and all my pockets were stuffed with them. Suddenly I was touched on the arm by somebody on the left. . . .

I was not, at this stage, surprised. The evening before I had had ten minutes of trente-et-quarante which moved so quickly that I could hardly keep up with my pencilled accounts. I won heavily, but gave up exhausted. Throughout the brief session a plump, well-preserved woman in lilac sitting next to and over me had poked her face across my reluctant one and whispered, 'You vinning,' 'You losting,' and, 'Ah! you vill play goot!' As I rose she pinched me in the biceps, followed me to the bar, and made me celebrate with a bottle of champagne the good luck she said she had brought me; which was a little hard, as I didn't know her from Adam, or perhaps Eve. She had little French, and her principal language, which may have been Yiddish or Roumanian, was to me 'double Dutch.' However, I bowed and parted. . . .

Anyhow, this wasn't like that. I turned there was a dear little old woman, refined and gentle-looking, although

faintly bearded and slightly bleary, dressed in shabby black with a grey scarf round her neck. 'Would you mind,' she said timidly with the faintest touch of Cockney in her voice, 'if I followed your play?'

This was rather embarrassing, of course. I'd rather she had done it without asking, as I might have crashed at any moment. Still, I naturally said: 'Delighted, but, of course, I hope I shan't let you down.'

'You're in luck to-day,' she replied with a charming smile, as she settled in the next seat to me.

Happily, the luck lasted. She played very low, but she won what was obviously to her a great deal, if not the wealth of the Indies, and occasionally her gratitude bubbled out excitedly.

After a while she said she was going to stop. It is always a good thing to do occasionally: to go to the little bar and have a drink, to go outside and look at the red blossoms of the oleanders with the Mediterranean behind: that green cloth and wheel tire the eyes, and even the crooning of the stiff-faced croupiers gets a bit wearisome, rather like being in a church of somebody else's religion listening to a monotonous ritual. So I said: 'I shall take a rest, too. Would you care for a drink?' She said, looking up at me (for she was very tiny), that she seldom took anything, but that an occasion like this should be celebrated: so we made our way to the small bar. There sat the lilac woman (whom I suspected to be really scarlet) drinking champagne again and making eyes at a ghastly fat man with no hair and four necks, afterwards described to me by the barman (an Italian) as '*Un roi, ou un pacha, ou quelquechose.*' Luckily, she made no attempt at recognition.

Much to my surprise, my frail old lady asked for a whisky and a cigarette; she didn't look as if she had ever heard of either. She didn't quite wear a bonnet, though, conjuring up her face, I can see her in one. She certainly had a black satin dress, a grey misty scarf, a gold locket on a thin chain, silver hair, a crinkled grandmotherly face, and innocent blue eyes—all like a Victorian dowager gone a little dowdy and dusty but with traces of former grace. After we had had our drink, wanting to get out of sight of that appalling couple, I suggested a seat outside in the shade of a tree.

'Don't you want to go back to the tables?' she asked.

'Not in the least,' I protested; 'I'd much rather sit outside with you. It's very quiet and pleasant, and there's a breeze to-day.'

A champagne cork popped; she rose suddenly.

'Very well, then,' she said. 'Let us go outside and talk.'

Thereafter we met in the mornings, played a little, and then went outside to the seat above that lovely harbour and sea. She did not arrive till after opening hours, as she had to come by train from somewhere along the coast. Gradually her story came out. She was a widow living in rooms on a small annuity. She had very little margin, but roulette was her one amusement, and whenever she could (as a rule once or twice a week) she came over to Monte Carlo with a few francs in her reticule and, I think, lost them. Then one day I suggested she might come over next day and dine, as I knew my companion was dining out. She agreed, and the whole story came out. . . .

It was evening, but still warm, the lights twinkling against the fading sky, the moon just risen, the air heavy with scent. I had given her dinner and we were sitting alone over coffee in my hotel garden. We had dressed. She was in an ash-blue frock, looking twenty years younger; her eyes had a soft light in them, and her cheeks the echo of the roses of youth. I was aware for the first time of her strong and perfect though very small figure. We had been talking about the past, and travel, she seeming to have known long ago every town in Europe from Lille to Kiev. After the coffee came there was a moment's silence; she looked past me to the ship-lights in the harbour and the Old Town on its rock, and said: 'But I don't suppose you would know who I used to be, even if I were to tell you?'

She turned and smiled at me rather sadly. 'Do tell me!' I said. She took a photograph out of her bag, and passed it over. It was old, had been taken in Norwood, and represented a handsome girl in tights

I looked inquiringly.

'It's me,' she answered—'the 'Uman Cannon-ball. I was Zazel.'

The name seemed instantaneously familiar; then I won-

dered if I were not making a confusion with Voltaire's Zadig. Then the truth came to me with a shock as though I had suddenly found myself living with remote celebrities like Grimaldi, Taglioni, the Infant Roscius, the Calculating Boy, or the Learned Pig—though this last comparison is hardly kind to one who must have been a pretty girl. Zazel! Why, she had been famous before I was born! Still alive, and having coffee with me! 'Good Lord!' I exclaimed, 'you don't say so!'

But she did say so, and so it was. In 1882 she was the talk of Great Britain, if not of Europe, as elderly people still remember, and when I was small I was always seeing or hearing references to her. She was the young artiste who was shot daily out of a cannon at the Royal Aquarium, curving resplendent into the air in tinselled tights to fall into a net, a puff of smoke following her some minutes after.

'And then,' she said, 'they stopped me. A lot of those interfering men in Parliament started a committee about it and they passed a law forbidding me to do it. Oh, I was wretched!'

'Were you very fond of doing it?' I asked.

'I loved it. They'd just no right to take away me living if I loved it. I was ambitious. I wanted to be great You see, it was me Art!'

I confess I had heard of many arts, but the art of being shot out of a cannon was not one of them. However, I knew what she meant; she had had her technique of bravery and control and was proud of it and her elegance. And I shared her hatred of those who stopped her charming performance, which gave such pleasure to multitudes and to herself, merely because somebody might occasionally be killed at it—probably the very same merciless, mercenary Puritans who fought tooth and nail against attempts, at the expense of their precious pockets, to reduce the ghastly and wanton mortality in mines and merchant vessels. But they're still at their old games, in other directions.

Well, her career as a cannon-ball was ended, and shortly afterwards she married a Mr. Starr, an Englishman from Ashford, who was European manager of Barnum and Baileys, and brought the show to England. 'Me and me dear husband lived together without grousing for forty years.'

'He oughtn't to have been in the show business reely,' she said; 'his people were gentlefolk in Kent, but had lost their money. Here [showing me a signet-ring] is his crest. We travelled a lot, and were very happy, but he is dead now, and I came down here.'

I pictured those wanderings in a world of dwarfs, giants, bearded women, dog-faced men, performing seals, boxing kangaroos, ringmasters, equestriennes, jugglers, acrobats and lion-tamers, and thought of the contrast with this scented starry garden above the gentle wash of the sea. 'I suppose,' I said, 'you have many mementoes of the old days?'

'I haven't much,' she replied, 'but I've got one picture I'm fond of. It's me at seventeen. Did you ever hear of a painter called Mr. Watts?'

Shade of George Frederick Watts, O.M., R.A.! She wouldn't have been surprised if I had answered 'No'! Shades of the National Portrait Gallery, of the Tate, of Compton; of all those bearded Victorian portraits, of all those allegorical infants, monsters, and bowed repentant backs, of Love, Life and Death, Life, Death and Hope, Death, Hope and Faith, Life embracing Faith, Death embracing Hope; of the projected frescoes for the Hall of Euston Station, of acres of canvases spread with fading paint! 'Why, yes,' I assured her. 'He was a very famous man indeed. Everybody knows about Mr. Watts.'

'Well,' she went on, relieved. 'He painted my portrait when I was doing that act at the Aquarium. He came behind one day and said he wanted to paint me. I said would he do it there? And he said No, I had to come to his studio. I said I'd ask mother and asked him what I should wear. He said I should wear what I had on; and of course that made me feel awkward, as the dress I performed in was cut low and it seemed different. I couldn't bear a man looking so close at my flesh, especially because when I put my head back sometimes things didn't stay where they ought to be. Oh!' she went on, inconsequently, 'I did look like a boy; they used to bet on it.' So I asked mother, and she said: "You can go if Maggie goes with you." Maggie was my elder sister, you see.'

So off the two girls went, to Little Holland House in Melbury Road and that vast studio; and Mr. Watts, in his

prime, painted the circus-girl in tights when he could spare time from Love, Mammon, Matthew Arnold and Cardinal Manning, and I daresay it was one of his liveliest works. Anyhow, he had given it to Zazel, and she had taken it about with her as she travelled and aged, and here it was in cheap Riviera lodgings. 'I wish,' she sighed, interrupting our shared musings over the past, 'I knew what to do with it after I've gone.'

'Haven't you anybody to leave it to?'

'Nobody at all.'

'Why not leave it to the National Gallery?'

'I did try to suggest that to my solicitor when I was last in London, but he said "Pooh! They wouldn't want a picture of *you*!"'

'They'd jump at it!' I exclaimed indignantly. 'I don't suppose your wretched solicitor knows anything about it at all. Let me see it some time next week.'

I never saw her again. Our departure was sudden and unexpected, my friend's mother being taken ill, and I hadn't her address. Year after year in all these fifteen I have meant to go back and look for her and her treasure, but the winds and waves have carried me elsewhere, and I have done no more than pass through Monte Carlo in the train—in the dark.

And now I see in the paper a small paragraph saying that 'a few days ago, in the late seventies,' she has died; and now I never can see her again.

J. C. SQUIRE.

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER

XIX- -XX

A MONTHLY REVIEW

FOUNDED BY JAMES KNOWLES

VOL. CXXIII

JANUARY—JUNE 1938

LONDON
CONSTABLE & COMPANY LIMITED 10 & 12 ORANGE STREET
LEICESTER SQUARE W C. 2

CONTENTS OF VOL. CXXIII

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY THE WHITEFRIARS PRESS LTD, LONDON AND TONBRIDGE

NEW IRISH MELODY

A Wedding March

By D. S. MacColl

I. Belfast

O you glum Presbyterian of the North,
  Wrapped in your Ulster since King William's reign ;
Dour-faced, protesting still for all you're worth,
  (And that grows less with long and sore migraine)
Loyal yet Rebel, frightened by the Pope,
  And other bugbears of a heart unsure ;
Filling your aching belly with a dope,
  When a sane man would set about a cure ;
Still standing out for cutting up the Child,
  Instead of breeding better with a Bride ;
(King Solomon called for a sword and smiled,
  When the True Mother cried, No, don't divide !)
Treasuring all the rancours of the Dead ;
  The hectoring Lawyer, Galloper M.P. ;
Bottomless Carson bile and birkenHead
  And Ancient Lights, from Fingal to O'Shea.
Fingal waded the Ocean to his Cave,
  Leaving his Giant's Causeway to the daws :
O'Shea's fair Lady stole more than she gave
  To the other Leader, and Home-wrecked his cause.
When will you tire, you and your despot dense,
  (The CRAIG that frowns on AVON'S swanny grace,)
Of arming the Seven Counties against Sense,
  And saving an unprepossessing face ?
Stale now, the bloody legend of the Boyne ;
  Revived in the street-riot and the fair ;
The tide flows ; spite of breakwater and groyne ;
  And fainter thrums the *Londonderry Air*.

Drop all your water-winter-proofing gear;
  Look Southward now, and come into the Sun;
Rout out a wedding-garment, and appear
  Suitor, and Master of the House, in one.[1]

II. Dublin

And you, O scolding Woman of the South,
  Pedant of quarrels from a bygone Hell;
Mumbling an obsolete tongue with twisted mouth,
  That not yourself can either speak or spell;
Turning religion to a poisonous weed;
  Repressing every freedom of the mind;
Expelling your own noble fighting breed,
  To nurse the Gombeen and the Gunman kind;
As fickle with your lovers as the Sea;
  So jealous that your eyes must wear the green;
But dreaming still of times past or to be,
  With Erin as a delicate holy Queen.
Believe your Poets; damn your politics;
  Spies on the mind, ambushes of the soul;
The mutilations lit by blazing ricks,
  The rifts remembered; the forgotten whole.
Delete the Raiders and the Regicide;
  Put off the sad Virago and the Shrew;
Practise a hymeneal for the Bride;
  Woo the reluctant Swain in raiment new:
You have a long, a frosty field to hoe;
Kathleen gone courting a Petruchio.

III. England

We drove your sons to fester in The States,
  As Tammany and Grafter-lords acclaimed;
Twisting the Lion's tail at awkward dates,
  For lack of lesser cattle to be maimed;
Your maids to serve; taxed by the priest for cells,
  Where the dark Rosaleen must pine, unsexed,
And megalomaniac minster-piles, whose bells
  Will deave this world with terror of the next.

[1] De Valera's invitation.

Our record's bad : we starved your cottar-strain ;
Watching them dwindle on potato-blight,
While landlords sucked them dry with rack-rent drain,
To spend the profits safely out of sight ;
Refused to let you manage your affairs ;
Travestied you as comic Paddy types ;
Welcomed your Biddies gladly below-stairs,
Your men in the police, or with the pipes
And drums, to fight our battles far away . . .
All that you well remember and you hate ;
Not having the convenient English way
Of turning round and cleaning up the slate.
It was an ugly history, your lot,
Which we so comfortably have forgot.

IV. 'Eire'

Granted : but now your sons upon the dole
Congest our Glasgows and our Liverpools,
In alien slums that dispossess the soul
Of natives standing by with idle tools.
Your population dwindles with your trade ;
Your best are exiles : scholars, poets, wits,
Artists and sages ; all are renegade ;
Even Joyce, who breaks our English tongue to bits ;
Foreigners now, or wise or addlepates,
Expatriate, the eager, daft and gay ;
Fleet Street's half Irish, and in spite of Yeats
Your dramatists and actors fade away.

There is a sort of grudging, growling Peace ,
But you, the least of dis-united States,
Are proud to chip the Crown, and sheer the fleece
Of the evicted. Their great halls are burned,
Or ruinous : the Woodland songsters cease ;
The 'Lake' is derelict, to which returned
The ashes of the second Moore you shed.
While Convents sprout, the Countryside is dead.

It's possible to build a Nation still ;
No drear miscarriage of blind retrospects :

At least you have the longing and the will
  To breed the Island heirs of Saints and Sects :
Wistfully you look Northward to the home
  Of fabled Princes, where Fate's final scorn,
Harmed tragic Casement, paddling in the foam
  Of treacherous seas, upon his hope forlorn :
But what you see is Voters on the swing,
  Amid a blustering of Corner Boys ;
Ingenious bits of gerrymandering,
  To hold the Orange in an equipoise :
Discord, the Hag, calls stragglers to their tents,
Forbidding banns to sundered elements.

V. Ireland

Only a marriage can resolve the feud
  For such a passionate-intimate pair of foes ;
End the distracted, parted nation-hood,
  And bring to birth the legendary Rose.
Get on with it ; brush past the Chaperons ;
  Charter Parson and Priest and buy the ring ;
Be reasonably kind and fond for once ;
  And God, perhaps, will save you—with the King.

VI. Great Britain

As for the wedding-gifts from us : the main,
  Friendship, Prosperity, Defence from fear.
And add this more : I whisper in your ear,
  About one grievance : it's a long hughLane
That counts no turning : make a match of it ;
  We all must do the utmost that we can ;
And for my little part, to mend *our* split,
  So far as lies with me, I lift the ban.

Coda

When Finn McCoul escaped out of Belfast,
  He raised in Staffa strange hexagonals ;
Then left those magic stalagmites, and passed
  To Appin, where he fathered the MacColls.

The slogan of that tribe, 'Ourselves Alone',
  Is yours; is bad, now better times may come.
We sang, bound for a wedding of our own,
  Sinn Fein, Sinn Fein, Clan Colla, at Glasdrum.
All the gate-crashers crashed, and the Argyll
  Himself sat by, astonied, for a while;
A braver motto, surely, is '*For Others*',
  And Black-and-Tan no tartan-wear for brothers.

D. S. MacColl

January 1938

RECOGNITION OF GALLANTRY IN CIVIL LIFE

By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P.

One day in March I found myself with half an hour between appointments in London E.C. 4. I spent it in 'Postmen's Park,' as the old churchyard of St. Botolph's, in Aldersgate, close to the General Post Office, is called, studying what is certainly the simplest, and perhaps the most moving and spontaneous, of privately executed memorials of individual heroism. As G. F. Watts, artist and sculptor, who conceived the idea and executed it at his own cost, wrote at the time, it is 'a covered walk, not splendid as the deeds, but unaffected as the impulse.' Upon an old wall, beneath a pent-roof, are fifty-three small memorial plaques of glazed Doulton ware tiles, harmonious in colour, dignified in design, recording the deeds of Londoners who died in attempting to save others. Carved into the beam supporting the roof are the words:

In Commemoration of Heroic Self-Sacrifice.

In the centre is a small wooden figure; below it this inscription:

In Memoriam
George Fredric Watts
who desiring to honour heroic self-sacrifice
placed these records here

The plaques read thus:

SARAH SMITH. Pantomime artiste at Prince's Theatre. Died of terrible injuries received when attempting in her inflammable dress to extinguish the flames which had enveloped her companion, January 24, 1863.

WILLIAM DRAKE. Lost his life in averting a serious accident to a lady in Hyde Park, April 2, 1869, whose horses were unmanageable through the breaking of the carriage pole.

JOSPEH ANDREW FORD, aged 30. Metropolitan Fire Brigade. Saved six persons from fire in Gray's Inn Road; but in his last heroic act he was scorched to death, October 7, 1871.

ELLEN DONOVAN, of Lincoln Court, Great Wild Street. Rushed into a burning house to save a neighbour's children and perished in the flames, July 28, 1873.

WILLIAM DONALD, of Bayswater, aged 19. Railway clerk. Was drowned in the Lea trying to save a lad from a dangerous entanglement of weed, July 16, 1876.

FREDERICK ALFRED CROFT. Inspector, aged 31. Saved a lunatic woman from suicide at Woolwich Arsenal Station, but was himself run over by the train, January 11, 1878.

HARRY SISLEY, of Kilburn, aged 10. Drowned in attempting to save his brother after he himself had just been rescued, May 24, 1878.

WILLIAM GOODRUM. Signalman, aged 60. Lost his life at Kingsland Road Bridge in saving a workman from death under the approaching train from Kew, February 28, 1880.

HERBERT MACONOGHU. Schoolboy from Wimbledon, aged 13: his parents absent in India. Lost his life in vainly trying to rescue his two schoolfellows, who were drowned at Glover's Pool, Croyde, North Devon, August 28, 1882.

AMELIA KENNEDY, aged 19 Died in trying to save her sister from their burning house in Edward's Lane, Stoke Newington, October 18, 1871.

EDMUND EMERY, of 272 King's Road, Chelsea. Passenger. Leapt from a Thames steamboat to rescue a child and was drowned, July 31, 1874.

GEORGE LEE. Fireman. At a fire in Clerkenwell, carried an unconscious girl to the escape, falling six times, and died of his injuries, July 26, 1876.

RICHARD FERRIS. Labourer Was drowned in attempting to save a poor girl who had thrown herself into the canal at Globe Bridge, Peckham, May 20, 1878.

JAMES HEWERS. On September 24, 1878, was killed by a train at Richmond in the endeavour to save another man.

GEORGE BLENCOWE, aged 16. When a friend bathing in the Lea cried for help, went to his rescue and was drowned, September 6, 1880.

ERNEST BENNING. Compositor, aged 22. Upset from a boat one dark night off Pimlico Pier, grasped an oar with one hand, supporting a woman with the other, but sank as she was rescued, August 25, 1883.

SAMUEL RABBETH. Medical officer of the Royal Free Hospital, who tried to save a child suffering from diphtheria at the cost of his own life, October 26, 1884.

G. GARNISH. A young clergyman, who lost his life in endeavouring to rescue a stranger from drowning at Putney, January 7, 1885.

THOMAS SIMPSON. Died of exhaustion after saving many lives from the breaking ice at Highgate Ponds, January 25, 1885.

ALICE AYRES. Daughter of a bricklayer's labourer, who by intrepid conduct saved three children from a burning house in Union Street, Borough, at the cost of her own young life, April 24, 1885.

JOSEPH WILLIAM ONSLOW. Lighterman, who was drowned at Wapping on May 5, 1885, in trying to save a boy's life.

WILLIAM FISHER, aged 9, Lost his life on Rodney Road, Walworth, while trying to save his little brother from being run over, July 12, 1886.

DAVID SELVES, aged 12. Off Woolwich supported his drowning playfellow, and sank with him clasped in his arms, September 12, 1886

GEORGE FREDERICK SIMONDS, of Islington. Rushed into a burning house to save an aged widow, and died of his injuries, December 1, 1886.

SAMUEL LOWDELL. Bargeman. Drowned when rescuing a boy at Blackfriars, February 25, 1887. He had saved two other lives.

ELIZABETH BOXALL, aged 17, of Bethnal Green, who died of injuries received in trying to save a child from a runaway horse, June 20, 1888.

HERBERT PETER CAZALY. Stationer's clerk, who was drowned at Kew in endeavouring to save a man from drowning, April 21, 1889.

HENRY JAMES BRISTOW, aged 8 At Walthamstow, on December 30, 1890, saved his little sister's life by tearing off her flaming clothes, but caught fire himself and died of burns and shock.

ROBERT WRIGHT. Police constable of Croydon. Entered a burning house to save a woman knowing that there was petroleum stored in the cellar. An explosion took place. He was killed, April 30, 1893.

WILLIAM FREER LUCAS, M.R.C.S., LL.D. At Middlesex Hospital, risked poison for himself rather than lessen any chance of saving a child's life, and died October 8, 1893.

JOHN CLINTON, aged 10, who was drowned near London Bridge in trying to save a companion younger than himself, July 16, 1894.

FREDERICK MILLS, *A. RUTTER*, *ROBERT DURRANT*, and *F. D. JONES*, who lost their lives in bravely striving to save a comrade at the Sewage Pumping Works, East Ham, July 1, 1895.

WALTER PEART, driver, and *HARRY DEAN*, fireman, of the Windsor express On July 18, 1898, whilst being scalded and burnt, sacrificed their lives in saving the train.

THOMAS GRIFFIN. Fitter's labourer. April 12, 1899, in a boiler explosion at a Battersea sugar refinery, was fatally scalded in returning to search for his mate.

MRS YARMAN, wife of George Yarman, labourer. At Bermondsey, refusing to be deterred from making three attempts to climb a burning staircase to save her aged mother, died of the effects, March 26, 1900.

GODFREY MAULE NICHOLSON, manager of a Stratford distillery, *GEORGE ELLIOTT*, and *ROBERT UNDERHILL*, workmen Successively went down a well to rescue comrades, and were poisoned by gas, July 12, 1901.

EDWARD BLAKE. Drowned while skating at the Welsh Harp Waters, Hendon, in the attempt to rescue two unknown girls, February 5, 1895.

EDWARD MORRIS, aged 10. Bathing in the Grand Junction Canal, sacrificed his life to help his sinking companion, August 2, 1897.

MARY ROGERS. Stewardess of the *Stella*. March 30, 1899, self-sacrificed by giving up her lifebelt and voluntarily going down with the sinking ship.

GEORGE STEPHEN FUNNELL. Police constable. December 22, 1899, in a fire at the Elephant and Castle, Wick Road, Hackney Wick, after rescuing two lives, went back into the flames, saving a barmaid at the risk of his own life

ALEXANDER STEWART BROWN, of Brockley, Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons Though suffering from severe spinal injury the result of a recent accident, died from his brave efforts to rescue a drowning man and to restore his life, October 9, 1900.

JOHN CRANMER, Cambridge, aged 23. A clerk in the London County Council, who was drowned near Ostend whilst saving the life of a stranger and a foreigner, August 8, 1901.

SOLOMAN GALAMAN, aged 11. Died of injuries, September 6, 1901, after saving his little brother from being run over in Commercial Street: 'Mother, I saved him, but I could not save myself.'

ELIZABETH COGHLAM, aged 26, of Church Path, Stoke Newington. Died saving her family and house by carrying blazing paraffin to the yard, January 1, 1902.

ARTHUR STRANGE, carman, of London, and *MARK TOMLINSON*. On a desperate venture to save two girls from a quicksand in Lincolnshire, were themselves engulfed, August 25, 1902

DANIEL PEMBERTON, aged 61. Foreman, L.S.W.R. Surprised by a train when gauging the line, hurled his mate out of the track, saving his life at the cost of his own, January 17, 1903.

EDWARD GEORGE BROWN GREENOFF Police constable, Metropolitan Police Many lives were saved by his devotion to duty at the terrible explosion at Silvertown, January 19, 1917.

JAMES BANNISTER, of Bow, aged 30. Rushed over when an opposite shop caught fire, and was suffocated in the attempt to save life, October 13, 1901.

ARTHUR REGELOUS, carman ('Little Peter'), aged 25, who with *ALICE MAUD DENMAN*, aged 27, died in trying to save her children from a burning house in Bethnal Green, April 20, 1902.

JOHN SLADE. Private, 4th Batt. Royal Fusiliers, of Stepney When his house caught fire, saved one man, and, dashing upstairs to rouse others, lost his life, December 26, 1902.

HAROLD FRANK RICKETTS. Police constable, Metropolitan Police Drowned at Teignmouth whilst trying to rescue a boy bathing and seen to be in difficulty, September 11, 1916.

ALFRED SMITH. Police constable, who was killed in an air raid while saving the lives of women and girls, June 13, 1917

PERCY EDWIN COOK. Police constable, Metropolitan Police. Voluntarily descended high-tension chamber at Kensington to rescue two workmen overcome by poisonous gas, October 7, 1927.

Watts' biographer records[1] that the genesis of this inspiring memorial was the following letter to *The Times*[2]:

'Among other ways of commemorating this 50th year of Her Majesty's reign, it would surely be of national interest to

[1] *George Frederic Watts, Annals of an Artist's Life*, by M. S. Watts, vol. ii., pp. 102-4 (Macmillans, 1912).

[2] September 5, 1887.

collect a complete record of the stories of heroism in every-day life.

'The character of a nation as a people of great deeds is one, it appears to me, that should never be lost sight of. It must surely be a matter of regret when names worthy to be remembered and stories stimulating and instructive are allowed to be forgotten.

'The roll would be a long one, but I would cite as an example the name of Alice Ayres, the maid of all work at an oilmonger's in Gravel-lane, in April, 1885, who lost her life in saving those of her master's children.

'The facts, in case your readers have forgotten them, were shortly these:—Roused by the cries of "Fire" and the heat of the fiercely advancing flames the girl is seen at the window of an upper story, and the crowd, holding up some clothes to break her fall, entreat her to jump down at once for her life. Instead she goes back, and reappears dragging a feather bed after her, which, with great difficulty, she pushes through the window. . . . The bed caught and stretched, the girl is again at the window, a child of three in her arms, which with great care and skill she throws safely upon the mattress. Twice again with still older children she repeats the heroic feat. When her turn comes to jump, suffocated or too exhausted by her efforts, she cannot save herself. She jumps, but too feebly, falls upon the pavement, and is carried insensible to St. Thomas's Hospital, where she dies.

'It is not too much to say that the history of Her Majesty's reign would gain a lustre were the nation to erect a monument, say, here in London, to record the names of these likely to be forgotten heroes. I cannot but believe a general response would be made to such a suggestion, and intelligent consideration and artistic power might combine to make London richer by a work that is beautiful, and our nation richer by a record that is infinitely honourable.

'The material prosperity of a nation is not an abiding possession; the deeds of its people are.'

Elsewhere he wrote, on the same subject:

'The facts it is proposed to record cannot be subject to opinion, as all art must be. No art can stand on a level with the sublime sacrifices, the memory of which it is the desire to rescue from forgetfulness. Art, which should be worthy of and demand recognition for its own sake, must not be presumptuously put forward in

competition. A record of the event, date, and name is all I ever thought of or proposed. I have none of the means necessary for the carrying out of any great object. All I can attempt will amount to no more than something of the nature of a simple cutting of the first sod.'

Nothing was done, though many people were interested[3] and approved of the idea. Finally, in 1899 Watts did it himself at his own cost with the approval of the parish council, to whom, in a letter dated March 3, 1904, Mrs. Watts wrote:

'The idea in Mr. Watts' mind was to create a permanent record of deeds for which no V.C. would be received and of which there would be no history except buried in the volumes of past newspapers, deeds solely prompted by generous impulse and of which the nation should be proud.'

In a further letter of July 11, 1904, Mrs. Watts stated that the memorial in St. Botolph's should be for London only, as it was Mr. Watts' hope that similar records might be placed in other towns throughout the country.

Of the fifty-three tablets Watts himself put up thirteen, and, after his death in 1904, his wife continued with the erection of further tablets at her own expense. The remainder have been put up from time to time by public subscription.

The memorial to G. F. Watts was unveiled by Sir William Richmond, R.A., on December 13, 1905. The present upkeep of the memorial and tablets is in the hands of the parish and churchwardens of St. Botolph's, Aldersgate, Mrs. Watts having been obliged to relinquish the care and maintenance of them more than ten years ago.

Lord Chancellor Bacon observed truly that 'there is no passion in the mind of man so weak but it mates and masters the fear of death.' Carlyle was on higher ground when he wrote in *Heroes and Hero-Worship*: 'Valour is still value. The first duty of man is still that of subduing fear; . . . true valour, different enough from ferocity, is the basis of all.' The consecration of valour, he adds, was sufficient religion for Norsemen, and no bad thing, for it was worship of the highest in man known to them. Courage is one of the few virtues which no cynic has sought to denigrate: it is a neces-

[3] Mr Passmore Edwards was inclined to give the necessary funds, but Watts was unaware of this till later.

sary virtue in war; it is not less valuable in peace. 'The people,' said Emerson in his essay on *Courage*, 'give it first rank; they forgive everything to it.'

In ancient Greece the word 'hero' was applied not only to warriors of extraordinary strength and courage, but to all who were distinguished from their fellows by superior moral, physical or intellectual qualities. In the *Iliad*, in *Beowulf*, in the Scandinavian sagas, we see courage first recognising and admiring itself as such, and holding, as it were, a mirror to itself. The first mention of cowardice in literature is the Dolon incident in the 6th book of the *Iliad*, where it appears as a sporadic abnormality scarcely conceivable to the average man, one of the symptoms of the dawn of civilisation, and the first faint glimmerings of introspection. Almost as old, perhaps, is the reference in the 78th Psalm to the children of Ephraim who 'being harnessed and carrying bows turned themselves back in the day of battle.' In treating of courage Plato tends to connect or even identify it with knowledge: it is the main topic of *Laches*, where Nicias distinguishes it from the fearlessness of ignorance. Here, as later in the *Laws*, physical courage and valour are regarded as military virtues but of the lower sort: of courage in civil life little or nothing is said. Men of valour should be rewarded, as in the *Iliad* (viii., 162), with 'seats of precedence and meats and full cups' and, if young, with kisses and with every encouragement to marry and have children, that there may be more like him (*Republic*, v., 468). Yet he would award prizes for the victors in the battle of the good life as well as in war (*Laws*, viii., 829, and xii., 943).

Are we of this century wise to ignore the spiritual value to the society in which we live of organised and public recogninition of civil gallantry such as we accord, from time to time, though with niggardly hand, to military heroes? Dr. Johnson said truly[4] that 'courage is reckoned the greatest of all virtues because, unless a man has that virtue he has no security for preserving any other'; it is found at its best among men too humble-minded to know they possess it, too obscure for the world to discover it. It

[4] *Boswell's Life of Johnson*. Birkbeck Hill, vol. ii., p 339 (April 5, 1775) On another occasion he said: 'Courage is a quality so necessary for maintaining virtue that it is always respected even when it is associated with vice' (*Ibid*, vol iv, p 297)

is of virtues the most unequivocal, for it cannot be counterfeited with impunity: it is, in Sir Philip Sidney's words, the valiance of men despising death, but confident, as men unwonted to be overcome: it is the generosity of men who will freely offer what they hold dearest.

The human will, at supreme moments, transcends obedience, overleaps the bounds of prudence and disregards self-interest. No one who has faced death alone in voluntary pursuit of some warlike aim, or in the attempt to save life in peace would, for a moment, admit that the hope of honour or reward played any part in his mind, but few would deny that honourable recognition of great deeds, accorded to those who survive, and to their dependants if they should perish, helps to create an attitude of mind which is ultimately the deciding factor. That, indeed, is the very basis of every system of honours and rewards over the world. It is to this end that Orders of Knighthood exist, and that His Majesty from time to time, on the advice of his Ministers, bestows some mark of royal favour upon those of his servants and subjects who have served the State in their capacity. Those who, in the words of Ecclesiasticus, 'maintain the state of the world, for all their desire is in the work of their hands,' merit, when from the marriage of opportunity with nobility of soul there springs a gallant deed, no less recognition at the hands of the head of the State and of their fellows.

The Corporation of Glasgow has the unique distinction of conferring its own medal upon those of its citizens who have performed deeds of gallantry in civil life. Will no other local authorities better their example by doing what George Watts, sixty years ago, suggested to his fellow-countrymen, and commemorate in some public place the courage and heroism of their own people?

ARNOLD WILSON.

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